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ABSTRACT 
 
Islamic Modernism in China: 
Chinese Muslim Elites, Guomindang Nation-Building, and the Limits of the Global Umma, 
1900-1960 
 
John Tseh-han Chen 
 
 
Modern Chinese Muslims’ increasing connections with the Islamic world conditioned and were 
conditioned by their elites’ integrationist politics in China. Chinese Muslims (the “Hui”) faced a 
predicament during the Qing and Ottoman empire-to-nation transitions, seeking both increased 
contact with Muslims outside China and greater physical and sociopolitical security within the 
new Chinese nation-state. On the one hand, new communication and transport technologies 
allowed them unprecedented opportunities for transnational dialogue after centuries of real and 
perceived isolation. On the other, the Qing’s violent suppression of Muslim uprisings in the late 
nineteenth century loomed over them, as did the inescapable Han-centrism of Chinese 
nationalism, the ongoing intercommunal tensions between Muslims and Han, and the general 
territorial instability of China’s Republican era (1911-49). As a result, Islamic modernism—a set 
of positions emphasizing both reason and orthodoxy, and arguing that true or original Islam is 
compatible with science, education, democracy, women’s rights, and other “modern” norms—
took on new meanings in the context of Chinese nation-making. In an emerging dynamic, ethos, 
and discourse of “transnationalist integrationism,” leading Chinese Muslims transformed Islamic 
modernism, a supposedly foreign body of thought meant to promote unity and renewal, into a 
reservoir of concepts and arguments to explain and justify the place of Islam and Muslims in 
China, and in so doing made it an integral component of Chinese state- and nation-building. 
“Islamic Modernism in China” argues that Chinese Muslims’ transregional engagement 
with Islamic modernism did not subvert but enabled the Chinese government’s domestic and 
foreign policies toward Muslims, and ultimately facilitated the nationalization of Muslim identity 
in modern China. From Qing collapse through the Second World War, urban coastal Chinese 
Muslim religious and political elites imported, read, debated, disseminated, and translated classic 
Islamic texts and modern Muslim print media, while establishing their own modernist schools 
and publications. Yet those same figures, through those same practices and institutions, 
increasingly wielded an image of Islamic authority and authenticity in support of the nationalist 
Guomindang government’s efforts to develop, integrate, and Sinicize China’s frontiers, including 
the predominantly Sufi Muslim communities of the Northwest.  
In the 1930s and early 1940s, integrationist Chinese Muslim elites further mobilized 
modernist narratives of Islam’s rationality, peacefulness, and past and present “contributions” to 
China. For example, they responded to Islamophobic misperceptions about halal by arguing that 
Islamic medicine was an important part of Chinese medicine. They also dispatched nationalistic 
goodwill delegations to the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and China’s own frontiers 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), to pursue cultural cooperation and spread anti-
Japanese propaganda. At the same time, in contrast to this instrumentalized Islam, certain 
Chinese Muslim scholars studying in Cairo instead articulated an expansive, democratized 
version of the Islamic concept of independent human reason (ijtihad) as the basis for a more 
inclusive vision of both Chinese nationalism and the global Islamic community (umma). The 
opportunity to pursue this or any other alternative to mere integrationism soon evaporated, 
however, as the renewed Chinese Civil War (1945-49) split the Chinese Muslim elites across the 
Mainland, Taiwan, and a variety of Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Thereafter, the Chinese 
Muslim elites largely became marginalized from high politics in the era of Cold-War and 
decolonization. Many of their once-contingent narratives of history and identity, however, have 
nevertheless been normalized as the canonical truth of Chinese Islam to this day, quietly 
informing China’s minority policies, foreign relations, and rhetoric of the “New Silk Road.” 
“Islamic Modernism in China” is a history of the subsumption of modern forms of 
mobility by modern structures of power. It narrates an assertion of difference in the context of 
multiple, partially overlapping integrations: the integration of a Han-centric idea of the Chinese 
nation-state, of an Arabo-centric idea of the Islamic world, and of a Eurocentric system of global 
infrastructures, institutions, networks, and knowledge. It de-parochializes the modern history of 
Chinese Muslims, showing how they epitomized aspirations and challenges common to Muslim 
minorities across many large non-Muslim societies and, to an extent, to modern Muslims 
everywhere. Using a wide range of new or under-studied archival and published sources in 
Chinese and Arabic, it connects questions of the meaning and scope of Islam, Islamic 
community, and Islamic modernism (scholarship on which tends to prioritize the Arab Middle 
East and relations with the West) to questions of religion and state in modern China (scholarship 
on which tends to prioritize popular spirituality and the official Confucian system, as well as 
relations with the West). As such, it presents Sino-Islamic transregional interactions beyond the 
lens of Western influence, yet also uncovers new trajectories by which Western concepts 
(“religion,” the “nation-state,” the “Islamic world”) became universalized. Overall, it moves 
beyond a circulation-based understanding of global encounters, and instead maps the contingent 
ways in which forms of mobility became pressed into the service of hegemonic processes of 
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This study’s shortcomings are my responsibility alone, and its merits are the result of diverse 
contributions. As a multiregional and multilingual project taking shape for over a decade, it has 
involved many groups of people. I have therefore written these acknowledgements as inclusively 
as possible. I beg indulgence. Still, many deserve far more recognition than the space allows. 
 I have benefitted beyond words from the support of my supervisors at Columbia. Rashid 
Khalidi is a model of intellectual and moral clarity, humility, and concern for students. His 
feedback and mentorship have shaped both my teaching and my approach to this study. He has 
shown considerable openness in embracing a topic that largely takes place outside the Middle 
East, and I hope anyone who reads this will see my great debt to him and his work. Eugenia Lean 
similarly exemplifies great intellectual depth, conceptual and methodological rigor, and 
commitment to students. She has given especially generous, thorough, and insightful feedback at 
every stage, much of which I am still endeavoring to implement. I could not have developed any 
claim to be a historian of China without her support. Marwa Elshakry, likewise, is an extremely 
original, careful, and perceptive scholar and generous mentor. She was always willing, with 
patience and humanity, to read drafts and improve underdeveloped ideas. She pushes students in 
new directions while caring for them as people. Together, these individuals make this sort of 
project possible through their commitment to global history. To their credit, I never felt like I 
was working in my own separate field, but toward a shared goal of more connected scholarship.  
 My other committee members have also played formative roles. This project originated in 
a spring 2012 seminar at Columbia taught by Zvi Ben-Dor Benite. Since then, it has benefitted 
immensely from his feedback, his extensive scholarship on Islam and Muslims in China, and his 
careful and sophisticated approach to the sources. Similarly, Michael Laffan’s work on Islam and 
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nationhood in Indonesia has long been an inspiring example, and his feedback over the last two 
years has enriched this project with many new comparisons and connections.  
Additional Columbia faculty supported this project in numerous ways: Manan Ahmed, 
Elizabeth Blackmar, Richard Bulliet, Matt Connelly, Karl Jacoby, Anupama Rao, Gray Tuttle, 
Madeleine Zelin, and the late Adam McKeown. In addition, Sharee Nash, Patrick McMorrow, 
Lawino Lurum, and all the History Department staff were always extremely helpful. 
Roger Owen, my undergraduate advisor, deserves special recognition. My first college 
history seminar was his “The Middle East during the First Wave of Modern Globalization, 1870-
1930,” and the thesis I wrote under his supervision was in part an early attempt at understanding 
China-Middle East interactions. His capacious knowledge, investment in students, and sense of 
justice—not to mention wit, wisdom, and devastating one-liners—were responsible for my 
continuing to study history. Others then or still at Harvard taught similarly revelatory courses 
that helped set me on my current path: Susan Miller, Henrietta Harrison, Charles Maier, and Erez 
Manela. Several other scholars, graduate students at the time, offered feedback and guidance to a 
clueless twenty-year-old, and helped him avoid the unexamined life: Nathan Fonder, Hannah-
Louise Clarke, Eric Paras, Abby Krasner Balbale, Arbella Bet-Shlimon, and Raja Adal. 
More recently, this project has benefitted from the input and example of many others, 
especially through conferences, correspondence, and serendipitous encounters: Attiya Ahmad, 
Ismail Alatas, Syed Mohamed Khairudin Aljunied, Jackie Armijo, Cemil Aydin, Nicole Barnes, 
David Brophy, Leïla Chérif-Chebbi, Chang Chung-fu, Kenneth Dean, Mark Elliott, Hale Eroglu, 
Michael Gilsenan, Nile Green, Kyle Haddad-Fonda, Kelly Hammond, Shireen Hamza, Michael 
Gibbs Hill, Engseng Ho, Janice Jeong, Brooks Jessup, Mikiya Koyagi, Jonathan Lipman, Isa Ma, 
Rosey Ma, Mustafa Ma Qi, Masumi Matsumoto, Projit Mukharji, Erin O’Halloran, Hyunhee 
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Park, Christopher Reed, Aaron Rock-Singer, Umar Ryad, Tansen Sen, Angela Schottenhammer, 
Dan Stolz, Mohammed Al-Sudairi, Rian Thum, Meltem Toksöz, Dror Weil, and Shuang Wen.  
I owe special thanks to Anu Rao, John Calabrese, Michael Montesano, and Cemil Aydin 
for supporting early publications of my work. Relatedly, I am grateful to Anu Rao, Tim Mitchell, 
Liz Beasley, and Basma Radwan for their patience with my distractedness while working as an 
editorial assistant at CSSAAME and simultaneously finishing up and defending my dissertation. 
Primary research funding came from a Fulbright-Hays DDRA grant and a Columbia 
GSAS International Traveling Fellowship. Shorter-term grants were provided by FLAS; the 
Columbia Department of History; the Columbia Weatherhead East Asian Institute; and the 
Columbia Institute for Religion, Culture, and Public Life. Prior to grad school, my Arabic study 
in Cairo was supported by a Fulbright student grant and Critical Language Enhancement Award. 
In China, Zhang Zhongmin served as my academic advisor and generously provided both letters 
of introduction and substantive guidance, including the suggestion to look at Islamic medicine. I 
am also extremely grateful to the staffs of the libraries and archives named in the bibliography. 
I learned invaluable lessons from, and am ultimately responsible to, everyone I met in 
Beijing, Chengdu, Dali, Lanzhou, Linxia, Nanjing, Shanghai, Tongxin, Xi’an, Xining, Yinchuan, 
and elsewhere, particularly the scholars, imams, and other Muslim and non-Muslim citizens who 
were willing to speak with me. Unfortunately, I suspect it is safest not to name them. I also 
suspect that some may not agree with my arguments. To be clear: the figures I study were 
dedicated to asserting a complex identity that some, then and now, have considered contradictory 
or, worse, have actively sought to regulate or destroy. The difficult choices they faced in that 
process reflected above all the possibilities and challenges of the time and place in which they 
lived. In telling their stories, I seek above all to illuminate and analyze those conditions.  
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The initial inspiration for this project came from researching contemporary China-Middle 
East relations during a summer internship with Jon Alterman at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. Dr. Alterman provided a wealth of knowledge and practical advice, and 
supported my work and graduate school plans. Partly as a result, I also learned a tremendous 
amount about the Middle East and U.S. foreign policy from Isobel Coleman, Mohamad Bazzi, 
and Gayle Lemmon during my time as a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. 
None of these pursuits would have been possible without working for many years with 
talented, patient, and dedicated language instructors: at Harvard, Mostafa Atamnia, Carl Sharif 
El-Tobgui, Khaled Al-Masri, Qiuyu Wang, and Ye Tian; at the American University in Cairo’s 
Center for Arabic Study Abroad (CASA), Nevenka Korica, Nadia Harb, Abeer Heider, Heba 
Salem, Kamal El-Ekhnawy, Shereen El-Ezabi, Azza Hassanein, Ashraf El-Sherif, Ahmad 
Abdelmoneim, and Nady Abdal Ghaffar; and at Columbia and the Columbia in Beijing program, 
Lening Liu, Yang Binbin, Sang Dongxia, Meng Yuan-yuan, Zhirong Wang, and Yanhua Meng.  
Friends from Columbia read drafts, offered advice and encouragement, and ensured that 
life was filled with plenty of therapeutic rants; coffee, cake, beer, burgers, kebabs, xiaolongbao, 
and hot pot (not all at once); and events such as the “post-workshop workshop” accompanied by 
old fashioneds and mujaddara (somehow it worked). I am especially thankful to Roy Bar Sadeh, 
Tania Bhattacharyya, Kumhee Cho, Anatoly Detwyler, Clay Eaton, Hannah Elmer, Susanna 
Ferguson, Arunabh Ghosh, Angela Giordani, Aaron Glasserman, Shehab Ismail, Colin Jones, 
Chien Wen Kung, Ulug Kuzuoglu, Sayantani Mukherjee, Jack Neubauer, Sean O’Neil, Chris 
Peacock, Rahul Sarwate, Stephen Wertheim, Laura Yan, Adrien Zakar, and Dongxin Zou. 
Special thanks as well to my friends from Boston, DC, Cairo, New York, Beijing, and 
elsewhere. Those who have been there the longest: Sasha, Kayvon, Faon, Tegan, Katie Rose, 
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Ieva, Zoe, Thalia, Annalisa, Matt, Matt, Matt (yes, three), Nitesh, Avi, Josh, Aneesh, Rajiv, and 
Chethan. I can only hope Nitesh finds my footnotes to be sufficiently extensive. 
Doug Jankey first inspired me to study history. His class was where I learned that grand 
narratives are unjust and historical truth is often counterintuitive. I believe it will be clear how 
those lessons motivate this study. Ben Snyder, Michael Denning, Vicky Seelen, and Christine 
Pasterczyk provided enormous encouragement as well. I also wish to acknowledge several more 
wonderful people: Tom Duprey, the late Nancy Waterhouse, Auntie Slavenka, Auntie Cheri and 
her family, and Mary and her family, for everything they have done for me and my family. 
Liz and I met in Beijing in 2012, working on our Chinese. I especially admire her 
idealism, humor, and progressive politics (and enthusiasm for Game of Thrones, boxing, travel, 
koshary, and all the foods of greater Asia, meatless in her case). Her knowledge of Chinese and 
Tibetan history, as well as her gift for clarity, have led to many helpful conversations. I am 
grateful to her for making a two-year move to China work with her career, and for supporting me 
through the writing and job processes, dealing with my frequent distractedness and neglect of 
certain chores. It has also been a pleasure getting to know her dad Al and the rest of the family. 
This project has provided a wonderful opportunity to get to know my family members in 
Shanghai better. I am grateful for their welcoming me, my parents and sister, and Liz in their 
homes on several occasions; for everything they have taught me; for their extraordinary warmth, 
humor, and generosity (especially the excellent homemade jiaozi and hongshaorou); and for 
their diligent custodianship of our own family’s history. We are all grateful to my sister Gina for 
successfully getting the two sides of the family back in touch, and to our cousin Francis for 
everything he has done to keep us in contact since then. As our Gufu reminds us, 血濃於水, with 
“water” in this case meant literally. 
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Gina Chen has always been brilliant, unfailingly supportive, and hilarious. Like our 
parents, she has become a skillful and caring physician, liked and respected by patients and 
colleagues. She once asked for a list of relevant Arabic phrases, and learned them from scratch, 
to be able to provide better care for a patient. On top of professional achievement, she continues 
to maintain many diverse interests and talents. To name a few: mariachi, blues, baking, Spanish 
literature, art history, Star Wars, and all things having to do with Boston and Rhode Island.  
My grandmother, Gloria Aska (or “Mooma”), helped raise me and Gina and has 
supported me and our family in countless ways. At ninety-one, she is full of energy and 
curiosity, and is a loyal and caring friend to many, though perhaps above all to the Boston Red 
Sox. She has shown great open-mindedness in allowing me to live in New York all these years.  
 Most importantly, my parents, Alida Aska and David Chen, have put every ounce of 
thought and effort into my and Gina’s education and well-being for our entire lives. They worked 
selflessly and extraordinarily hard to make every opportunity available, hoping for our overall 
fulfilment rather than expecting specific outcomes. Their love and confidence means everything, 
and I am grateful for their encouraging me and Gina to determine our own paths. I am also glad 
that they have been able to return in recent years to long-held personal interests such as 
gardening, activism, and violin. This study is dedicated to them not as repayment (that would be 
impossible) but as a sign and product of their virtues, values, and accomplishments.  
 Finally, I have written this study in memory of my grandparents, Drs. Tse-ping Chen and 
Tseh-han Chen, who came of age in Shanghai in the 1930s. My family would not exist had they 
not made the difficult choice to leave. I have written it too in memory of my grandfather John 
Aska, who also survived the horrific Second World War, who also spent time in China and sailed 
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“Long live Muslims! And long live the Republic of China!” 
-‘Abdullah Ma Linyi, GMD Deputy Minister of Education, 19121 
 
Islam and Chinese Nation-Making 
The above valediction concluded an address to a gathering of prominent Chinese Muslim ulama 
(Islamic scholars), government officials, community leaders, and publishers held at Beijing’s 
millennium-old Niujie Mosque at 2:00p.m. on 22 July 1912. These leading Chinese Muslims had 
seen their world transformed overnight: the nationalist revolution of October 1911 and 
abdication of the last Qing emperor in February 1912 had just brought an end to twenty centuries 
of imperial dynasties—and with that, new possibilities for connecting with Muslims outside 
China, as well as new pressures to articulate their identity and safeguard their status within 
China. Decrying Qing oppressiveness yet looking to the future, this group of elite Chinese 
Muslims met at Niujie to establish China’s first ostensibly nationwide Islamic organization, 
known as the Chinese Islamic Progress Association (Zhongguo huijiao cujinhui).  
The Chinese Islamic Progress Association’s founders aimed first and foremost to 
improve Islamic education, a platform that struck a judicious balance between their aspirations to 
know their fellow Muslims abroad and their anxieties about asserting belonging in China. 
                                                 
1 This declaration (Ar. li-yahya al-muslimun wa-l-jumhuriyya; Ch. unknown, but perhaps zhu huimin wansui, 
minguo wan sui) was attributed to ‘Abdullah Ma Linyi in an Arabic article in al-Manar on the foundation of an 
“Islamic association in Peking,” which claimed to have obtained the information from a Russian newspaper 
identified only as “The Times” (Ar. jaridat al-waqt al-rusiyya). I have not yet determined which Russian periodical 
this may have been. ‘Inayatullah Ahmadi, “Ahwal Muslimi al-Sin: Jam‘iyya Islamiyya fi Bikin [Conditions of the 
Muslims of China: An Islamic Association in Beijing],” al-Manar (1 Dhu-l-qa‘da 1330 / 11 October 1912), p. 791.  
Extant Chinese sources on the founding of the Chinese Islamic Progress Association are relatively sparse. 
The event is mentioned in Yufeng Mao, “Muslim Educational Reform in 20th-Century China: The Case of the 
Chengda Teachers Academy,” Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident 33 (2011): pp. 149. Mao cites Ma Bozhong, “Tang 
Kesan yu chengda shifan [Tang Kesan and the Chengda Academy],” Zhongguo musilin 5 (2004): p. 26. 
  
 2 
Chinese Muslim education reform reflected the priorities of the association’s chairman, Imam 
‘Abd al-Rahman Wang Kuan (a.k.a. Wang Haoran, 1848-1919), who had traveled to Cairo and 
Istanbul from 1905-07, was impressed by Egyptian and Ottoman Muslims’ emphasis on 
education, and was and is remembered as one of the first major figures to promote both Islamic 
modernism and Chinese nationalism among Chinese Muslims.2 Wang instituted his vision of 
reformed Muslim education through a new-style school established at Niujie itself, also in 1912. 
This vision sought to attune Islam and Muslims in China to trends in the Islamic world outside 
China; to lift them out of an alleged state of “backwardness” and “ignorance,” and set them 
firmly on the path to progress and modernity; and encourage them to accept the new Chinese 
nation and participate in its society and politics. In the decades to come, Wang’s students and 
associates would work to implement this vision in dialogue with leading Islamic modernists 
across the Indian Ocean and Middle East, and with the highest levels of China’s government 
(primarily the Guomindang or Kuomintang; hereafter GMD). 
News of the Chinese Islamic Progress Association’s founding traveled both high and 
far—prefiguring Chinese Muslim religious and political elites’ increasingly close relations with 
both the Chinese government and with Muslims beyond China. Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), 
president of the new republic, sent ‘Abdullah Ma Linyi (1865-1938), a Chinese Muslim and the 
new Republican government’s deputy minister of education, to represent him at the meeting. 
Before long, meanwhile, an Arabic-language summary of the meeting, based on a Russian 
                                                 
2 Ding Yimin, ed., Zhongguo huizu mingren cidian [Dictionary of Chinese Muslim Personages] (Yinchuan: Ningxia 
renmin chubanshe, 1995), p. 269; Ma Shanting, “Wang Haoran ahong yishi (yi) [The Passing of Imam Wang 
Haoran (I)],” Yuehua 6/19-20-21 (1934), p. 25; Ma Shanting, “Wang Haoran ahong yishi (er) [The Passing of Imam 
Wang Haoran (II)],” Yuehua 6/31-32-33 (1934), pp. 29-30; “Beiping: Jinian Wang Haoran ahong [Remembering 
Imam Wang Haoran of Beijing],” Yuehua 7/9 (1935), p. 28; Ma Shanting, “Wang Haoran ahong yishi (san) [The 
Passing of Imam Wang Haoran (III)],” Yuehua 7/15 (1935), p. 12; Yin Boqing, “Wang Haoran ahong zhuanlue: 
sheng yu Daoguang nian [A Brief Biography of Imam Wang Haoran, Born in the Daoguang Era],” Zhongguo 
musilin 2 (1982): p. 8. 
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source, appeared thousands of miles away in the 11 October 1912 issue of al-Manar (1898-
1935), the world’s leading Islamic modernist periodical published in Cairo.3  
The question of Islam’s relationship to modern nationhood had come to preoccupy 
Muslim leaders in Egypt, India, Indonesia, and elsewhere, whose writings the Chinese Muslims 
read and many of whom they would eventually meet. Incidentally, the news of the Chinese 
Islamic Progress Association’s founding reached the Middle East just as the Balkan Wars 
(October 1912-July 1913) were breaking out and as a trend of Arabism was rising against the 
Committee of Union and Progress’s Turkification policies—a chain of events that finally ended 
the Ottomans’ long-standing status as a multi-ethnic empire. Just as late-Ottoman models were 
inspiring Wang Kuan’s Islamic educational reforms in China, the Ottoman system itself was 
giving way to essentially the same forces of nation-statism facing Chinese Muslims (and Chinese 
generally). Viewing one another across formidable linguistic barriers and geographical distances, 
like-minded Muslims at all ends of the Asian continent confronted this new but apparently 
inexorable political form, the nation-state.4 
This fraught yet unavoidable question of Islam’s role in modern nationhood was 
especially consequential for Muslim minorities in large non-Muslim countries such as China, 
who faced a question of difference and divided loyalty. This problem stood out clearly enough at 
the Chinese Islamic Progress Association’s founding. Ma Linyi offered a set of timely and 
carefully crafted reflections:  
The nation has now entered the most critical phase in its development, and the 
need for cohesion and unity is stronger than at any previous time. Muslims’ ardent 
                                                 
3 Ahmadi, “Ahwal Muslimi al-Sin.” As we will see, Chinese Muslims eventually became aware of al-Manar, and 
some may have read it, but it is unlikely that this was the case in 1912. Chapter One will provide evidence that al-
Manar remained novel or unknown to urban coastal Chinese Muslims even in the early 1930s. 
 
4 The literature on the empire-to-nation transition is rightly enormous. One representative work that places the 
Middle Eastern and East Asian cases in comparative context is Joseph W. Esherick and Hasan Kayali, eds., Empire 
to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 2006). 
 4 
capacity for friendship and bravery is well known, [as are] their efforts on behalf 
of the nation. The truth is that we are all the children of a single nation. Our 
urgent task is to save the nation from destruction and to exert ourselves on behalf 
of the Republic with the best of our moral and material resources… 
 
Such statements were natural enough amidst acute crises of territory and identity such as those 
China faced after the 1911 revolution. Perhaps more surprisingly, however, Ma continued:  
Muslims are heroes of the nation. Moreover, the loftiness and holiness of Islam is 
manifest to all the people of China, and the Republican government regards Islam 
in the same terms. Muslims are free to practice their religion. Muslims [in China] 
have preserved their religion up to this point by continuing to attain some 
knowledge of the Arabic language. Thus the first piece of advice I have for you is 




Ma Linyi’s words at the Chinese Islamic Progress Association’s founding point to the major 
questions of this study. How did Islamic transnationalism and Chinese nationalism influence one 
another, according to and through the intermediation of urban coastal Chinese Muslim elites? 
Why, from the perspective of these Chinese Muslim elites, should the study of Arabic and the 
reform and modernization of Islam make them better citizens of a Chinese nation-state, 
especially one so often concerned with the assimilation of China’s frontier peoples? From the 
perspective of that Chinese state, how much difference could its citizens, which it hoped would 
include all former subjects of the Qing, exhibit? What roles could or should Islam and Muslims, 
as such, play in the making of a new China? How could those roles be made to serve the larger 
aims of the Chinese state, such as promoting nationalism, conducting foreign policy, and 
retaining control of vast, contested, multi-ethnic and multi-religious frontier regions? 
                                                 
5 Ahmadi, “Ahwal Muslimi al-Sin,” p. 791. While the prioritization of Arabic education certainly would have 
appealed to Rashid Rida and many readers of al-Manar, the consistency between this account of Ma’s words and 
most other sources I have seen on modern urban coastal Chinese Muslims, in both Arabic and Chinese, leads me to 
believe that Ahmadi was not significantly tailoring his description of the Chinese Islamic Progress Association’s 
founding or Ma’s address for his Arabic-speaking audience.  
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Furthermore, from the perspective of Muslims outside China, what was the significance of 
learning about China and (re)forging contact with China’s Muslims? Did Southeast Asian, South 
Asian, and Middle Eastern Muslims understand that rediscovery in the same terms as Chinese 
Muslims? More broadly still, what definitions of Chinese, Muslim, and Chinese Muslim identity 
were possible in a world without emperors, sultans, or caliphs—and newly transformed through 
steamships, newspapers, and foreign knowledge—and why? To what extent was direct, 
autonomous translation or communication possible between Chinese and Arabic speakers, and to 
what extent did such “non-Western” relationships, and the conceptual commensurations they 
produced, instead reflect and internalize visions of self and other informed by Orientalist and 
missionary knowledge (even in the absence of direct involvement from such actors)?  
Chinese Muslim religious and political elites’ (re)discovery of the Islamic world outside 
China both conditioned and was conditioned by their integrationist politics in China, from Qing 
and Ottoman collapse through the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and into the early PRC 
(1949-60). Chinese Muslims—the group now known as the “Hui,” though the term itself was in 
flux in the early twentieth century—faced a predicament at the crucial moment of the Qing and 
Ottoman empire-to-nation transitions, seeking both increased contact with Muslims outside 
China and sociopolitical security within the new Chinese nation. Against a backdrop of violence 
and territorial crisis, leading Chinese Muslims saw little choice but to cast their lot in with the 
newest rulers of a land they had inhabited for over a millennium, with consequences for the 
entire definition of their community that have endured to this day. As a result, Islamic 
modernism—a set of positions emphasizing both reason and orthodoxy, and arguing that true or 
original Islam is compatible with science, education, democracy, women’s rights, and other 
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“modern” norms—took on new meaning in the context of Chinese nation-making.6 In an 
emerging dynamic, ethos, and discursive orientation I call “transnationalist integrationism,” elite 
                                                 
6 Scholarship offers a wide range of alternative terms capturing most or some of the aspects of “Islamic modernism.” 
See especially Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1962; 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983); Nikki R. Keddie, “Islamic Philosophy and Islamic Modernism: The Case of 
Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani,” Iran 6 (1968): pp. 53-56; David Dean Commins, Islamic Reform: Politics and 
Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria (New York: Oxford UP, 1990); Amal Ghazal, “Sufism, Ijtihad, and 
Modernity: Yusuf al-Nabhani nin the Age of ‘Abd al-Hamid II,” in Sonderdruck aus Archivum Ottomanicum, edited 
by György Hazai (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2001), pp. 239-72; Charles Kurzman, ed., Modernist Islam, 
1840-1940: A Sourcebook (New York: Oxford UP, 2002); Umar Ryad, Islamic Reformism and Christianity: A 
Critical Reading of the Works of Muhammad Rashid Rida and His Associates, 1898-1935 (Leiden: Brill, 2009); 
Indira Falk Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the Evolution of Modern Sunni Islam (New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2010); Mark Sedgwick, Muhammad Abduh (New York: OneWorld, 2010); Marwa Elshakry, 
Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).  
Scholars often treat “Islamic reformism” and “Islamic modernism” as synonyms. Despite her title, Gesink 
uses the terms “modernists” and “modernism” throughout her study, and considers the modernist aspects of al-
Azhar’s reforms in great depth. Sedgwick, meanwhile, also characterizes Muhammad ‘Abduh as a modernist, for 
example on pp. 127-28, though he ties this identity to a large extent to liberalism. Elshakry’s Reading Darwin in 
Arabic in particular supports an expansive definition of modern Islamic thought as intrinsically engaged with 
questions of science and political and social life, rather than merely the reform of doctrines and curriculua. 
One could argue that there is a stronger etymological basis for “Islamic reformism,” given the prominence 
of the Arabic term al-islah (“reform”) in the writings of relevant individuals. On the other hand, across modern 
Muslim societies, the so-called reformers were just as often referred to “renewers” (mujaddidun), which one could 
argue meant not only “revivers” of the essence of Islam in the narrow “religious” or doctrinal sense, but rather as 
“bringers of the new” or “enacters of the new.” As Gesink states on p. 6 of Islamic Reform and Conservatism, the 
term “modernizers” (muhaddithun) was also used. The term “reform” or “reformism” alone risks suggesting that 
Muslim thinkers were primarily concerned with amending Islam only as a “religion” and, concomitantly, that their 
attention to politics, society, the economy, culture, and history should not be regarded as integral to their thought as 
Muslims. I argue, however, that this latter set of concerns was integral to Chinese Muslims’ (and other Muslims’) 
status, thought, and self-identification as Muslims, and therefore generally opt for “Islamic modernism.”  
Among other things, this position would appear to be consistent with Shahab Ahmed’s critique of the 
tendency to “legal supremacism” in the study of Islam and to the privileging of “prescriptive” discourses and 
practices over “exploratory” ones. It is also consistent with Ahmed’s (and Talal Asad’s, and many others’) critique 
of “religion” as being a Eurocentric concept that should not be applied descriptively to other belief systems without 
qualification. Islam, Ahmed argues, is best not thought of as a “religion,” especially due to its lack of a hierarchical 
“church” institution equivalent to that of Christianity; rather, Islam is, as Muslims themselves say din wa dawla—
which in light of Ahmed’s arguments would probably best be translated as “a comprehensive system for both truth-
making and social life” (often misleadingly rendered as “both a religion and a state”). Shahab Ahmed, What is 
Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2015), pp. 176-97; Talal Asad, Genealogies of 
Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1993); Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith, “Islamic History as a Concept,” in William Cantwell Smith, One Understanding Islam: Selected 
Studies (The Hague: Mouton, 1981), pp. 3-25; Timothy Fitzgerald, “A Critique of ‘Religion’ as a Cross-Cultural 
Category,” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 9 (1997), pp. 91-110; Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of 
World Religions; Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005).  
In its (provincialized) European context, the term “religion” entered English as early as the twelfth century 
from Latin religio, related to Latin religare, “to bind.” The original meaning is thought to have related to “life under 
monastic vows,” or more generally to the reinforcement of bonds (hence the particle lig-, as in “ligament” or 
“obligation”). It is additionally believed that this particle li- may have some connection to “law” (Latin lex, legis) 
and/or to “to read” (lego, legere). Historically speaking, one could argue that the term “religion” was connected, 
from a very early point, to the notion of ontological separation of the realm of belief from the realm of politics, and 
even the subordination of the former to the latter, as in the famous principle established by the Peace of Augsburg 
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Chinese Muslims transformed Islamic modernism, a “foreign” body of thought meant to promote 
Islamic unity and renewal, into a reservoir of concepts and arguments that explained and justified 
Islam and Muslims’ place in a Chinese nation-state. In so doing, they made Islam and Muslims 
integral to modern Chinese state- and nation-building. 
Transnationalist integrationism held the key to resolving Chinese Muslims’ modern 
predicament as their elites understood it. Leading Chinese Muslims tacitly accepted that there 
was no alternative but to find a way to belong in China: to strive to configure the category of 
China as something that could accommodate the category of Islam, and vice versa. Regardless of 
what their hearts may or may not desire, Chinese Muslims ultimately could not “return” to the 
Islamic world outside China in a world of nation-states. Instead, they argued that coming to 
know Islam and Muslims outside China could enrich the process of integration while undoing the 
effects of centuries of isolation.  
In contrast to the assertions of their elites, Chinese Muslim communities in the early 
twentieth century were in fact highly fragmented. They lived everywhere among the Han, but 
they also came to live under Japanese rule in Manchukuo, as well as alongside the many other 
minorities in Yunnan, in Xinjiang, and on the Tibetan plateau. At the same time, many remained 
interconnected through trade and study, forming what Jonathan Lipman has evocatively termed a 
“patchwork-network society.”7 Following Lipman and others, I argue that the contrast between 
                                                 
(1555), cuius regio eius religio (“Whose realm, his religion”), and more broadly in the European “Wars of Religion” 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries generally considered to have ended with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). 
On the significance of Europe’s early modern period for the emergence of the concept of religion, see Asad, 
Genealogies of Religion, pp. 40-43. Asad’s overall argument is still true, however: that “religion” as it is currently 
understood—apolitical, private, non-repressive, distinct from other modes of knowing the world, and authorizing of 
certain modes of history-making—is a product of European modernity. Asad, Genealogies of Religion, Introduction 
and Ch. 1. 
 
7 Jonathan Lipman, “Patchwork Society, Network Society: A Study of Sino-Muslim Communities,” in Islam in Asia, 
vol. 2, edited by Raphael Israeli and Anthony Johns (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1984), pp. 246-74. 
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Northwest frontier Muslims versus urban coastal Muslims was an especially important one. 
Frontier Muslims belonged predominantly to Sufi orders dating to the eighteenth century or 
earlier, whereas urban eastern Muslims were mostly gedimu (from Arabic qadim, meaning the 
“ancient ones”) claiming descent from the first Arabs and Persians to arrive in China, or, 
increasingly, similarly descended Islamic modernists who did not identify with any traditional 
subgroup. As was the case with the Han Kitab authors described by Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, it was 
primarily the latter group—the much better educated urban coastal Muslims—who tended to be 
politically integrationist, and who claimed to speak for Chinese Muslims as a whole, despite 
lacking the consent of those spoken for.8 In other words, in the Republican era, the frontier-urban 
divide was becoming not only doctrinal, economic, or cultural, but political: by the 1930s, the 
frontier Muslims became the target of policies articulated by the urban eastern Muslims in 
conjunction with the central government.9  
 The twin afflictions of violence and real and perceived isolation from the Islamic world 
explain Chinese Muslim elites’ prevailing orientation of transnationalist integrationism. At the 
dawn of the twentieth century, as Muslims elsewhere looked hopefully to the model of Japan 
(then not yet a colonial power), called for the reform of the besieged Ottoman Empire, or 
supported the nationalist cause in Egypt and India, Chinese Muslims were undergoing one of the 
most precarious and isolated phases of their entire history. Only a handful per generation 
traveled to the Middle East. Eventually, Muslims across the frontier regions had risen against the 
Qing in the 1860s and 1870s, in some cases forming independent states—events the Republican-
                                                 
8 Similarly to Lipman, Zvi Ben-Dor Benite states that “in the early modern period there was no such thing as a 
Chinese Muslim identity, despite claims to the contrary by the state (pre- and post-imperial) or by early scholars and 
observers of Chinese Islam.” Benite, Dao of Muhammad, p. 6.  
 
9 The frontier-coastal divide was by no means absolute—Yunnan and Henan do not quite fit, and many Muslims 
went back and forth between regions—but notionally this divide was highly relevant to Islam’s role in state policy. 
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era Chinese Muslim elites attributed to their incorrect understanding of Islam and insufficient 
contact with Chinese culture. The Qing responded by dispatching Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885) 
and his predominantly Han Hunan army to the frontiers, where he ruthlessly crushed the Chinese 
Muslim and Uyghur rebellions, killing thousands and forcibly relocating thousands more.10 
While the 1911 revolution only lightly touched China’s frontiers, warlord rule and natural 
disasters meant perennially adverse conditions for ordinary Muslims across the Northwest. The 
result was local eruptions of violence between Muslim and Han Chinese. The Muslim press 
reported at least one claim of multiple arson attacks against mosques.11 At the same time, 
Islamophobic materials regularly made their way into the Han press, leading to protests and 
intercommunal discord.12 Such incidents often bore striking resemblance to conflicts and 
misunderstandings in earlier times, and more recent ones.  
The study of modern Chinese Muslim history requires attention not only to incidental or 
intercommunal violence, but also to the more systemic violence of state-building. In fact, 
Muslims in the Republican era committed far more violence on behalf of the state than against it. 
The powerful northwestern Muslim warlords—descended from those who broke ranks with the 
nineteenth-century rebels to favor the Qing—all killed fellow Muslims to maintain their own rule 
                                                 
10 Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1997), pp. 125-29. 
 
11 “Henan gushi bei feifen qingzhensi shisi chu [A Story of Fourteen Mosques in Henan Targeted by Arson],” 
Yuehua 2.18 (1931). 
 
12 Tian [pseudonym], “Wuru huijiao wenzi de laiyou [The Reasons for Publishing Characters Insulting to Islam],” 
Yuehua 2.2 (1930); “Beiping jiao’an shimo [The Case of the Beiping Xinbao Insulting Islam, from Start to Finish],” 
Yuehua 8.12 (1936), pp. 1-20; See also Gladney, Muslim Chinese, pp. 4-5; Rudolf Löwenthal, The Religious 
Periodical Press in China (Peking: The Synodal Commission in China, 1940), Ch. 7. Strikingly similar events 
occurred in India in the same period. See Julia Stephens, “The Politics of Muslim Rage: Secular Law and Religious 
Sentiments in Late-Colonial India,” History Workshop Journal (Spring 2014): pp. 45-64.  
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and, after 1927, that of the Guomindang (GMD).13 Muslim generals also played an important 
role in the GMD’s campaigns against the Communists, and helped set the basic geopolitical 
conditions making possible the GMD’s ambitious development plans in the Northwest. These 
Muslim military figures were the primary constituency supporting the urban eastern Chinese 
Muslim elites populating this study. Chinese Muslim initiatives of the 1920s and 1930s, which 
might otherwise appear purely intellectual, cultural, or “religious” in nature, always occurred 
against the backdrop of fraught relations with the Han, and tended to reflect the decisively pro-
state orientation of the Muslim militarists. These relatively unshakable political conditions 
provided a major impetus for leading Chinese Muslims to explain Islam in a friendly and 
apologetic manner: hence, for example, senior Chinese imams’ heavy emphasis, from around 
1930, on the Prophetic Hadith “Patriotism is an article of faith” (Ar. hubb al-watan min al-iman), 
which they notably came to render in translation as a total equivalence rather than a 
subordination: “Love of country is love of the religion” (Ch. aiguo aijiao).14  
 A perhaps natural question is whether Muslims in China wished to form their own 
country. After all, the nineteenth century uprisings had raised the possibility, and in some cases 
the short-lived reality, in dramatic fashion.15 Moreover, the first two decades of the twentieth 
century had seen the collapse of the Qing, Ottomans, and other multi-ethnic empires, and in their 
place, the increasingly globalized norm and expectation of national self-determination.16 The 
                                                 
13 Lipman, Familiar Strangers, Chs. 4-5; Andrew D.W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A 
Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986). 
 
14 Wang Jingzhai, “Jinshou huijiao yu aihu guojia [Preserving the Religion and Protecting the Nation],” Yuehua 2.3 
(1930); Ma Lishen, “Aiguo yu aijiao [Love of Country and Love of the Religion],” Yuehua 2.3 (1930).  
 
15 In contrast to Xinjiang and Yunnan, Lipman maintains that the nineteenth-century Gansu uprisings remained 
localized and did not seek political independence. Lipman, Familiar Strangers, Ch. 4. 
 
16 See for example Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determinatino and the International Origins of 
Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford UP, 2007).  
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notion that every group of people possessing certain common characteristics should occupy its 
own territorial state may explain, for example, why the assumption of Muslims’ inability to 
assimilate into China continued to suffuse missionary writings. The same assumption lay behind 
the Japanese Empire’s gamble in proposing a “Muslim Manchuria” in North China.17 Other 
foreign observers such as Edgar Snow made the same assumption of Chinese Muslims in the 
1930s.18 Nevertheless, as far as I have seen in the available sources, none of the warlords or 
urban Chinese Muslim elites ever talked openly about independence. A sole Chinese Muslim 
scholar wrote in Arabic of Uyghurs and Chinese Muslims forming a single state across Xinjiang 
and the Northwest, but this is not what he said when writing in Chinese. On the other hand, 
indirect clues to the political anxieties of Chinese Muslims are abundant enough: in the 1920s, 
Chinese Muslim periodicals paid close attention to the fate of Muslims in large Muslim-minority 
societies such as India and the Soviet Union, as well as in the newly formed secular Turkish 
Republic (a model of nationalism and modernization Chiang Kai-shek happened to admire).19 
After the formation of the unified GMD state in 1927-28 and the institution of censorship in the 
mid-1930s, however, integrationist and “patriotic” themes became more pronounced in the 
Chinese Muslim press. 
What follows is an attempt to understand, in the political context summarized above, the 
components and implications of Chinese Muslim elites’ transnationalist integrationism: how 
Chinese Muslims’ relationship with the Chinese (especially GMD) state, and their relationships 
                                                 
17 Selçuk Esenbel, “Japan’s Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World 
Power, 1900-1945,” American Historical Review 109/4 (October 2004): pp. 1140-70; Kelly Anne Hammond, “The 
Conundrum of Collaboration: Japanese Involvement with Muslims in North China, 1931-1945” (PhD dissertation, 
Georgetown University, 2015); Kelly A. Hammond, “Managing Muslims: Imperial Japan, Islamic Policy, and Axis 
Connections during the Second World War,” Journal of Global History 12/2 (July 2017): pp. 251-73. 
 
18 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Random House, 1938), Ch. 4. 
 
19 For example, Zhongguo huijiao xuehui yuekan [Chinese Islamic Study Society Monthly] (Shanghai: 1926-1929). 
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with Muslim networks outside China, shaped one another; how Chinese Muslims attempted to 
reassemble a profound sense of dislocation into a secure sense of belonging and authenticity; 
how Islamic modernism, decoupled from the project of Islamic political unity, nevertheless 
performed crucial political work in in a seemingly unlikely Chinese context; how nationalisms 
thus gained meaning primarily through transnational contacts, yet also how transnationalisms 
became increasingly seen as merely the sum of smaller national parts; how mobility came to 
serve immobilization. As already indicated, Chinese Muslims’ rediscovery of the Islamic world, 
and the impact of that process on their self-identification in China, was not simply an instance of 
benign “cosmopolitanism,” “translation,” or intellectual or cultural “exchange” facilitated by 
modern communication technologies. It was, primarily, part of an ongoing struggle for survival. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, and especially from the late 1920s to late 1940s, 
Chinese Muslim elites engaged extensively and intensively with transnational Islamic networks 
that tended to affirm Islam’s borderlessness, but consciously offered up the fruits of that 
encounter to the bordered hegemonic project of GMD state- and nation-building, which included 
the top-down Sinicization of Islam and Muslims. Ultimately, Chinese Muslims’ engagement 
with Islamic modernist thought and networks did not subvert but rather enabled the Guomindang 
government’s domestic and foreign policies toward Islam and Muslims, and facilitated the 
nationalization of Muslim identity in modern China. 
 
By Land and Sea: A Survey of Islam in China and Islam in Republican China 
 
Chinese Muslims, now known as the huizu, or “Hui minority nationality,” today number slightly 
over ten million and are distributed throughout every province and major city of the present-day 
territory of China, distinct from the Turkic Uyghurs as well as various smaller Muslim groups. 
They trace their descent to Arab and Persian merchants arriving in China primarily by sea 
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beginning in the eighth century, or to subsequent waves of Muslims arriving primarily overland 
from Central or West Asia in later centuries. The first six centuries of Islam’s history in China, 
coinciding with the late Tang (618-907), Song (960-1279), and Yuan (1271-1368), were 
dominated by the multidirectional movement of people, goods, and knowledge by land and sea.20 
The transition from the vast Mongol Yuan to the more compact, Han-centric Ming (1368-1644), 
brought several developments that, in Zvi Ben-Dor Benite’s words, made the “Muslims in 
China” into “Chinese Muslims.”21 This trend intensified with the introversion of Ming policy 
following the cancellation of the famous maritime voyages (1405-1430) of the Muslim admiral 
Zheng He.22 Generations of intermarriage and localization transformed Muslims’ physiognomy 
and ways of life; most forgot the languages of their ancestors outside contexts such as prayer or 
giving their children Arabic names in addition to Chinese ones. Muslims in the late Ming and 
Qing (1644-1912) responded creatively to prejudices and cultural pressures by crafting a canon 
of works eventually known as the Han Kitab (“Chinese Islamic canon”), which used Confucian 
                                                 
20 On this extremely rich period, see Ralph Kauz, Aspects of the Maritime Silk Road: From the Persian Gulf to the 
East China Sea (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010); Angela Schottenhammer, “Yang Liangyao’s Mission of 785 to 
the Caliph of Baghdād: Evidence of an Early Sino-Arabic Power Alliance?” Bulletin de l’École Française 
d’Extrême-Orient 101 (2015): p. 177-241; Hyunhee Park, Mapping the Chinese and Islamic Worlds: Cross-Cultural 
Exchange in Pre-Modern Asia (New York: Cambridge UP, 2012); John Chaffee, “Diasporic Identities in the 
Historical Development of the Maritime Muslim Communities of Song-Yuan China,” Journal of the Economic and 
Social History of the Orient 49/4 (2006): 395-420; Kuwabara Jitsuzo, “On P’u Shou-keng,” Memoirs of the 
Research Department of the Toyo Bunko 2 (1928): 1-79 and 7 (1935): 1-104; Thomas Allsen, Culture and Conquest 
in Mongol Eurasia (New York: Cambridge UP, 2001); Jackie Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall Shams al-Din: A 
Muslim from Central Asia, Serving the Mongols in China, and Bringing ‘Civilization’ to Yunnan” (PhD 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1997); Morris Rossabi, “The Muslims in the Early Yuan Dynasty,” in John 
Langlois, ed., China under Mongol Rule (Princeton UP, 1981), pp. 257-95. 
 
21 Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, “‘Follow the White Camel’: Islam in China to 1800,” New Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 
3 (New York: Cambridge UP, 2010), pp. 421; Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, “The Marrano Emperor: The Mysterious Bond 
between Zhu Yuanzhang and the Chinese Muslims,” in Sara Schneewind, ed. Long Live the Emperor!: Uses of the 
Ming Founder across Six Centuries of East Asian History. Ming studies research series 4 (2008): 275-308. 
 




vocabulary to explain Islamic beliefs and practices in Chinese.23 Matsumoto Masumi in 
particular has argued that this sophisticated literary tradition was not merely a philosophical 
exercise, but a deliberate attempt to present Islam to non-Muslim Chinese as innocuous, and 
“almost the same in ontology” as Confucianism, in order to mitigate misunderstandings and 
violence.24 In spite of such efforts, the influx of Naqshbandi revivalist influences into 
northwestern China beginning in the eighteenth century sparked intra-communal fractiousness 
and eventually violent uprisings against the Manchu Qing, in turn suppressed by Zuo Zongtang 
on behalf of Beijing.25 These developments heightened political and doctrinal differences 
between northwestern versus urban coastal Chinese Muslims, and cast a shadow over much of 
the twentieth century, when Chinese Muslims contended with Chinese nationalism, warlordism, 
a reinvigorated Han-centrism, war with Japan, civil war, and Chinese Communism.26 
                                                 
23 Benite, Dao of Muhammad; Lipman, Familiar Strangers, Ch. 2; James D. Frankel, Rectifying God’s Name: Liu 
Zhi’s Confucian Translation of Monotheism and Islamic Law (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011); 
Sachiko Murata, Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light: Wang Tai-Yu’s Great Learning of the Pure and Real and Liu Chih’s 
Displaying the Concealment of the Real Realm, with a New Translation of Jami’s Lawa’ih from the Persian by 
William C. Chittick (New York: SUNY, 2000); Sachiko Murata et al., The Sage Learning of Liu Zhi: Islamic 
Thought in Confucian Terms (Harvard, 2009). 
 
24 Masumi Matsumoto, “Secularisation and Modernisation of Islam in China: Educational Reform, Japanese 
Occupation, and the Disappearance of Persian Learning,” in Jonathan Lipman, ed., Islamic Thought in China: Sino-
Muslim Intellectual Evolution from the 17th to the 21st Century (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), pp. 
171-96. 
 
25 Lipman, Familiar Strangers, Chs. 3-4; Joseph Fletcher, “The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China, edited by 
Jonathan N. Lipman,” in Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia, edited by Beatrice Forbes Manz (Aldershot: 
Variorum, 1995), pp. 3-20. While uprisings in Gansu remained relatively localized, large portions of Turkistan and 
Yunnan actually broke away from the Qing to form independent Muslim states during this same period. See Atwill, 
David. The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873. 
Stanford, 2005; Hodong Kim, Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-
1877 (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004). 
 
26 On nationalism and the state, see John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the 
Nationalist Revolution (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996); on Han-centrism, see Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race 
in Modern China (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1992). Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese Muslims have 
regained some means to connect with Muslims outside China, but only under the watchful eyes of the state. See for 
example Mohammed Turki al-Sudairi, “Adhering to the Ways of Our Western Brothers: Tracing Saudi Influences 
on the Development of Hui Salafism in China,” Sociology of Islam 4 (2016): pp. 27-58. 
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China’s Republican era (1911-1949) was a key moment of transition when Chinese 
Muslims enjoyed unprecedented opportunities to (re)connect with the Islamic world after 
centuries of isolation, but simultaneously felt pressure to demonstrate loyalty to the new Chinese 
nation-state.27 On the one hand, they sought to improve their knowledge of Islam as a whole, and 
they increasingly associated this task with Arabic texts and mastery of the Arabic language. New 
transport and communication technologies allowed Chinese Muslims to undertake pilgrimage 
and study in the Middle East and elsewhere, beginning with the journey of Ma Dexin of Yunnan 
in the mid-nineteenth century, developing further with the journeys of several leading imams to 
the Islamic world from 1905 to the early 1930s, and culminating in the dispatching of six 
delegations of aspiring Chinese ulama to study at al-Azhar in Cairo from 1931 to 1947.28  
On the other hand, the GMD’s struggle to consolidate power throughout the former Qing 
dominions compelled Chinese Muslims to cooperate with the state in a manner that directly 
shaped their modern collective identity. During the Nanjing Decade (1927-37) and the Second 
Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), Chinese Muslims perceived that their community’s best chance to 
survive and thrive was to ally with the GMD (and, notably, with its conservative-nationalist wing 
rather than its liberal-internationalist one). China’s territorial crisis, perhaps even more than the 
war with Japan or the ongoing struggle between the GMD and the Communists, lay at the heart 
of this calculus. Chinese Muslims consistently sought to demonstrate that they were unlike the 
Manchus, Mongols, Uyghurs, or Tibetans, all of whose territories broke away from China, were 
                                                 
27 Masumi Matsumoto provides a helpful summary of this period in “The Completion of the Idea of Dual Loyalty 
towards China and Islam,” Études Orientales 21/22 (2004).  
 
28 Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, “Taking ‘Abduh to China: Chinese-Egyptian Intellectual Contact in the Early Twentieth 
Century,” in James L. Gelvin and Nile Green, eds., Global Muslims in the Age of Steam and Print (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2014), pp. 249-68; “‘Nine Years in Egypt’: The Chinese at al-Azhar University,” 
HAGAR Studies in Culture, Polity, and Identities 8/1 (2008): 105-28; Kristian Petersen, “The Multiple Meanings of 
Pilgrimage in Sino-Islamic Thought,” in Lipman, Islamic Thought in China, pp. 81-106.  
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conquered by outside powers, or maintained de facto independence during the first half of the 
twentieth century. Loyalty to and cooperation with the central Nanjing government served the 
interests of the Muslim warlords—virtually unconquerable in their own northwest frontier 
provinces of Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai, but not strong enough to form their own polity. As 
Lipman observes, “It is ironic…that the time of China’s most thorough disintegration in recent 
centuries, the warlord period, should have been the period of Gansu’s incorporation into the 
Han-dominated political system of China proper, but that is precisely what happened.”29  
As fluid as the situation was at this time for Chinese Muslims in China, so too was the 
situation they encountered across the Islamic world. The many disruptions wrought by 
colonialism produced responses in Islamic societies not unlike those in China: an emphasis on 
education reform, self-strengthening, and increasingly, national independence. China’s 
burgeoning print media industry had already given Chinese Muslims, and Chinese generally, an 
awareness of these simultaneities and sometimes even a sense of identification with the plight of 
other “non-Western” peoples.30 Of special relevance for Chinese Muslims, however, was the 
reform of Islam itself. From the 1880s to the 1930s, figures such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, 
Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida, and their disciples and counterparts across the Middle East, 
Asia, and Africa, espoused a complex set of positions in which they argued, against Orientalists 
and other detractors, that Islam was fully compatible with various aspects of “modernity.” 
Importantly, this set of positions often involved rejecting Sufism as a body of irrational, 
superstitious, or traditionalist accretions obscuring the true, rational essence of the original Islam. 
                                                 
29 Jonathan N. Lipman, “Ethnicity and Politics in Republican China: The Ma Family Warlords of Gansu,” Modern 
China 10/3 (July 1984): 288; see also Lipman, Familiar Strangers, Ch. 5. 
 
30 On the bases of this identification, see Rebecca E. Karl, Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of 
the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke UP, 2002); Xiaobing Tang, Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of 
Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996).  
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Chinese Muslims largely abstracted Islamic modernism, as a body of texts, questions, and 
priorities, from its Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Southeast Asian contexts, and translated 
and applied it selectively to their situation in China. At the same time, their travels in the Islamic 
world compelled them to confront life, politics, and linguistic and cultural difference in ways 
they may not have expected upon departing from China. 
 
Authority without Power: The “Eliteness” of Republican-Era Chinese Muslim Elites 
 
At the helm of both processes I am describing—transnationalism and integrationism—stood a 
network of elite Chinese Muslims hailing primarily from the eastern urban centers of Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, and Guangzhou. Backed by the Ma warlords, and descended 
intellectually (and in some cases biologically) from the Han Kitab generation of Islamo-
Confucian scholars, this group of ulama, government officials, diplomats, merchants, academics, 
and communal leaders were consummate middlemen. They traveled to Southeast Asia, South 
Asia, and the Middle East in search of texts and authoritative, authentic voices on Islam. At the 
same time, they were personal acquaintances of Chiang Kai-shek (i.e. Jiang Jieshi, 1887-1975), 
Chen Lifu (1900-2001), and other top officials, and actively supported the GMD’s frontier 
nation-building. The various constituents within the larger network of Chinese Muslim elites did 
not always agree with one another: important differences emerged at various points, in particular, 
between the political and military leaders versus the religious leaders. What they did almost 
always agree on, however, was the overriding ethos of transnationalist integrationism: 
connecting with Islam and Muslims outside China was to serve the improvement of Muslims’ 
conditions and status in China, and nothing else. The publications and institutions established by 
this group of urban coastal Chinese Muslims anchored their collaboration and reinforced this 
ideological orientation.  
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By extension, the other point the Chinese Muslim elites agreed on was their own 
relatively narrow group’s aspiration to speak on behalf of all the disparate communities of 
Muslims of China, including not only the “Hui” scattered through all China’s regions, but to an 
extent also the Uyghurs as well as the smaller Muslim groups (who would not be identified as 
separate ethnicities until the 1950s). One of the most important byproducts of transnationalist 
integrationism was a powerful and versatile narrative of Islam and Muslims’ (positive) historical 
role in China and many “contributions” to Chinese civilization, and now, to the Chinese nation-
state.31 The list of those contributions included a flourishing maritime trade, transmission of 
medical materials and knowledge, the conquest and incorporation of Yunnan, improvements in 
astronomy, the rectification of the calendar, and the maritime voyages of the Yunnanese Muslim 
admiral Zheng He. It is not a coincidence that these and other episodes have come to be seen as 
the most important moments in the history of Islam in China (I am not contesting whether they 
occurred, but arguing that their latter-day renarrations have been deeply political, and as such are 
crucial to understanding Islam in China in the twentieth century). In articulating such narratives, 
elite Chinese Muslims displayed a tremendous capacity to anticipate how the Chinese state and 
society would view their community, and act accordingly yet still “authentically.”32 Once again, 
                                                 
31 In this regard, the Republican-era Chinese Muslim elites resembled their counterparts in other generations, 
particularly the Han Kitab authors whose similarly subtle skills of self-narrative are detailed in Benite, Dao of 
Muhammad. The main difference is that, in the Republican era, opportunities to connect directly with the Islamic 
world outside China were much greater, but so too were pressures to state clearly one’s loyalty to “China.” 
Due to the influence Republican-era Chinese Muslim elites’ narrative continue to exert even over current 
scholarship on Chinese Islam, selectively taking the Chinese Muslim elites at their word cannot mean taking their 
word as the definitive “truth” for all Chinese Muslims. Rather, I view the narratives articulated by Chinese Muslim 
elites not as expressions of empirical “identity,” but as processes of discursive “self-identification.” Frederick 
Cooper and Rogers Brubaker, “Identity,” in Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, 
History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p. 71. 
 
32 In contrast to other non-Han groups who were defined as ethnicities by the PRC in the 1950s, Chinese Muslims 
developed an argument that their community represented an ethnicity in the 1940s, well before the PRC had even 
come into existence. On ethnicization generally, see Tom Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic 
Classification in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). On Chinese Muslim self-
ethnicization, see Wlodzimierz Cieciura, “Ethnicity or Religion? Republican-Era Chinese Debates on Islam and 
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I give considerable attention to these narratives not as an empirical description of who the 
Chinese Muslims were or are, but in order to illuminate the historical conditions that made them 
describe that community in that particular way.  
 The term “elites” requires qualification. Here, it does not primarily signify pure wealth or 
socioeconomic status, even though certain Chinese Muslim leaders did amass considerable 
wealth and used that wealth to further the agendas and initiatives described in this study.33 
Rather, the term refers primarily to the intangible factors behind those agendas and initiatives: 
shared backgrounds, values, assumptions, discourses, and vocabularies. This often unspoken 
political common ground meant that the Republican-era Chinese Muslim elites resembled both 
earlier generations of Chinese Muslim political, religious, and intellectual leaders (again, 
particularly the Han Kitab authors), as well as the Confucian ideal of the literati (a status to 
which the Han Kitab authors claimed to belong).34 Furthermore, in their relations with the GMD 
state, the Republican-era Chinese Muslim elites also bore resemblance to Buddhist elites of the 
                                                 
Muslims,” in Lipman, Islamic Thought in China, 107-46. See also Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic 
Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991). 
 
33 In other words, Eurocentric or U.S.-centric definitions do not fully apply. The classic study Charles W. Mill, The 
Power Elite (1956) certainly identifies many forms of eliteness, but the overall assumption is that these are rooted in 
wealth. Gramsci’s notion of a “historical bloc” exerting “cultural hegemony” comes closer, but it characterizes the 
elites as a fixed sociological group determined by material factors, even if history is one of those factors.  
 
34 Benite, Dao of Muhammad; Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, “From Literati to ‘Ulama’: The Origins of Chinese Muslim 
Nationalist Historiography,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 9/4 (2004): p. 88. On aspects of literati culture 
generally see also Benjamin Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in 
Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California, 1986); Benjamin Elman, A Cultural History of Civil 
Examinations in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Susan Mann, The Talented 
Women of the Zhang Family (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); William T. Rowe, Saving the World: 
Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001). On the culture 
of elite intellectuals in the Republican era, in some ways similar to the imperial literati despite their new-style 
educational institutions (and rejection of Confucianism, doubting of antiquity, and so on), see Wen-Hsin Yeh, The 
Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China, 1919-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1990). 
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same period, though I would argue that their real and perceived status was generally higher: in 
particular, there is no equivalent to the Ma warlords among China’s other minority groups.35 
 On the other hand, the Republican-era Chinese Muslim elites may not have differed all 
that greatly from Muslim elites of other places or periods. The ulama, of course, were ulama. 
Beyond them, the political, military, and communal leaders also paralleled certain social groups 
in both premodern and modern Muslim societies. They certainly live up to the classical notion of 
“those who loose and bind” (ahl al-hall wa-l-rabt). In the case of the military figures, there is 
also a strong echo of the notion of the Muslim “warrior-poet”: many of the Ma warlords were 
known to be well-versed in both the Islamic and Confucian classics, and to have cultivated skills 
in calligraphy.36 Perhaps the closest “Islamic” parallel to the Chinese Muslim political leaders, 
however, is Albert Hourani’s study of the Ottoman “politics of notables.” Hourani argued that 
Ottoman-era ulama, janissaries, and communal leaders were crucial intermediaries who helped 
stabilize the authority of the central government in the provinces, but who also remained partly 
to largely autonomous from that government, and could put selective pressure on it. Theirs was a 
politics of families and local institutions more than of bureaucrats. In the nineteenth century, this 
otherwise durable system was weakened by centralizing reforms of the Ottoman Tanzimat and 
Muhammad Ali in Egypt, as well as by European imperialism.37 Substituting the proper nouns, 
this would be an entirely apt characterization of the Chinese Muslim elites in the Republican era. 
                                                 
35 On Republican-era Buddhist leaders, their discourses, and their relations to the state, see Gray Tuttle, Tibetan 
Buddhists in the Making of Modern China (New York: Columbia UP, 2005) and Jan Kiely and J. Brooks Jessup, 
eds., Recovering Buddhism in Modern China (New York: Columbia UP, 2016). 
 
36 For an exploration of the “warrior-poet” ideal in classical Islam, see Paul Cobb, Usama bin Munqidh: Warrior-
Poet of the Age of Crusades (New York: OneWorld, 2005); see also Michael Gilsenan, Recognizing Islam: Religion 
and Society in the Modern Arab World (New York: Pantheon, 1982), Ch. 2: “The Men of Learning and Authority.” 
 
37 Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,” in Albert Hourani, Philip Khoury, and Mary C. 
Wilson, eds., The Modern Middle East: A Reader (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005).  
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 Chinese Muslim elite status also involved specific images of masculinity. After all, 
almost all the figures in this study are male. Much more than bravery, chivalry, or physical 
strength, their conception of male eliteness emphasized qualities of social and intellectual 
authority and articulateness that drew upon both “Islamic” and “Chinese” models. They strove to 
embody cultivation (Ch. xiu; Ar. taraqqi), literary gentility (Ch. wen; Ar. adab), culture (Ch. 
wenhua; Ar. thaqafa), and so on. They were well-educated, well-spoken, and well-connected. 
When abroad, they saw themselves as the social and intellectual peers of the Hadrami merchants 
of Singapore, the Arab intellectuals of Cairo, and the sheikhs of al-Azhar—even while being the 
first to admit that they were less knowledgeable in the Arabic language or Islamic doctrine.  
Above all, elite status for the Republican-era Chinese Muslims rested less upon material 
power for its own sake, or even upon mastery of Islam, and more upon learning to be reliable 
guardians—whether communicating in Chinese, Arabic, or another language—of a certain 
narrative of Islam’s place in China and the world, as dictated by the ethos of transnationalist 
integrationism.  
 
Islam in China as Chinese, Islamic, and Global History 
 
The earliest academic studies of the history of Islam in China were undertaken by Orientalists 
and Christian missionaries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While rich in 
detail, such works were of course inescapably problematic due to what Edward Said would call 
the authors’ “final disapproval” of their object of study, and often enough, their fear that Islam 
would spread further in China at the expense of Christianity and the European empires.38  
                                                 
38 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979), p. 224. See Marshall Broomhall, Islam in China: A 
Neglected Problem (London: Morgan and Scott, 1910); Rev. Claude L. Pickens, Jr. Collection on Muslims in China 
(Harvard-Yenching Library); Isaac Mason Collection (New York Public Library). See also the many relevant 
articles published in Moslem World, 1911-1950s, by Samuel Zwemer, Pickens, Broomhall, Mason, and others.  
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Not long thereafter, in conversation with such missionaries and Orientalists, Chinese 
Muslims began writing their own academic histories of Islam in China, often in a manner that—
as was the case elsewhere in the Islamic world—reproduced and internalized Orientalist 
assumptions even while resisting their arguments.39 One important assumption, filtered through 
Islamic modernist thinkers, was that Islam and China were distinct “civilizations” that had 
undergone periods of “golden age” and “decline” and had interacted in certain ways at certain 
points. Another was that Islamic civilization was centered on Arabia, while Chinese civilization 
revolved around an imperial Confucian cosmology. The Republican era thus intertwines the 
history of Chinese Islam with its historiography in a way that other periods do not. 
Some missionary and early academic studies of Islam in China expressed skepticism 
toward Islam’s basic capacity to exist, or to remain fully “Islamic,” in a Chinese environment, 
assuming that the supposed cosmic-civilizational monoliths of Islam and (Confucian) China 
were fundamentally contradictory.40 Since then, most scholars have highlighted the opposite: the 
remarkable ways in which Islamic identity has been reconciled, syncretized, or synthesized with 
Chineseness, particularly through translation projects such as the Han Kitab in pre-modern times, 
or through processes of ethnogenesis (partly elective, partly state-imposed) in modern times.41  
                                                 
39 Bai Shouyi’s numerous works, all in Chinese, are the most important. From the 1930s and 1940s, there is also: 
Muhammad Makin al-Sini [Ma Jian], Nazra jami‘a ila tarikh al-islam fi-l-sin wa ahwal al-muslimin fiha 
[Comprehensive Overview of the History of Islam in China and the Conditions of Muslims Therein] (Cairo: al-
Matba‘a al-Salafiyya, 1935); Fu Tongxian, Zhongguo huijiao shi [A History of Chinese Islam] (1940); Muhammad 
Tawadu‘, al-Sin wa-l-Islam; Badr al-Din al-Sini [Hai Weiliang], al-‘Alaqat bayn al-‘Arab wa-l-Sin [Relations 
between the Arabs and China] (Cairo: 1950).  
 
40 Marshall Broomhall’s Islam in China: A Neglected Problem could be said to fit this description. See also Raphael 
Israeli, “Muslims in China: The Incompatibility between Islam and the Chinese Order,” T’oung Pao, Second Series, 
63/4-5 (1977): pp. 296-323. Notably, Israeli quotes numerous missionary and Orientalist sources in this article, but 
no Chinese Muslim ones. 
 
41 Benite, Dao of Muhammad; Sachiko Murata, Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light: Wang Tai-Yu’s Great Learning of the 
Pure and Real and Liu Chih’s Displaying the Concealment of the Real Realm, with a New Translation of Jami’s 
Lawa’ih from the Persian by William C. Chittick (New York: SUNY Press, 2000); Sachiko Murata et al., The Sage 
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Scholarship on the Han Kitab has established that “reconciliation” is an effective 
framework for understanding Islam in late imperial (Ming-Qing) China. The unprecedented 
intensity of both Islamic transnationalism and Chinese nationalism as of the early twentieth 
century, however, requires a modified framework. The Republican era was one of the most 
dramatic transitional periods in Chinese Islamic history, but also one of the least thoroughly 
understood. Some scholars have characterized it as a period of “Arabization,” in which Chinese 
Muslims (re)forged contact with the Middle East and abandoned previously dominant Persian, 
Turkic, and to an extent even Chinese Han Kitab works in favor of Arabic ones in their madrasa 
curricula.42 At the same time, others have pointed to the undeniable trends of nationalization and 
the proto-ethnicization of Chinese Islamic identity in this same period.43 Meanwhile, few have 
systematically addressed how modern Chinese Islam was an example of Islamic modernist 
thought or modern thought in general.44 How could it be that Chinese Islam was taking on more 
“Arabic” features and more “Chinese” features at the same time, while also becoming “modern”?  
Arabization and nationalization were not unrelated, nor were they contradictory. They 
were two sides of the same coin of transnationalist integrationism. Moreover, the epistemological 
                                                 
Learning of Liu Zhi: Islamic Thought in Confucian Terms (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2009); Frankel, Rectifying 
God’s Name; Gladney, Muslim Chinese. 
 
42 Maris Boyd Gillette, Between Mecca and Beijing: Modernization and Consumption among Urban Chinese 
Muslims (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000); Ben-Dor Benite, “Nine Years in Egypt”; Masumi Matsumoto, 
“Secularisation and Modernisation of Islam in China: Educational Reform, Japanese Occupation, and the 
Disappearance of Persian Learning,” in Lipman, Islamic Thought, pp. 171-96. 
 
43 Lipman, Familiar Strangers, Ch. 6; Yufeng Mao, “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation: Chinese Pilgrimage 
Missions to Mecca during World War II,” Journal of Asian Studies 70/2 (May 2011): 373-95; Mao, “Muslim 
Educational Reform”; Cieciura, “Ethnicity or Religion?”  
 
44 The three primary exceptions are Benite, “Taking ‘Abduh to China,” and Zeyneb Hale Eroglu Sager, “Islam in 
Translation: Muslim Reform and Transnational Networks in Modern China, 1908-1957” (PhD dissertation, Harvard 
University, 2016); Yufeng Mao, “Sino-Muslims in Chinese Nation-Building, 1906-1956” (PhD dissertation, The 
George Washington University, 2007). 
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foundations on which they rested were common to the experience of “modernity” in China, in 
the Islamic world, and in general. As Talal Asad has argued for Islamic (and Christian) contexts, 
a defining feature of modernity is that human mobility is not the opposite of immobility, 
hierarchy, or power, but is constituted by them, and informs them in return. Consider Asad’s 
commentary on an aspect of Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism: 
[Arendt is] aware of a problem that has escaped the serious attention of those who 
would have us celebrate human agency and the decentered subject: the problem of 
understanding how dominant power realizes itself through the very discourse of 
mobility. For Arendt is very clear that mobility is not merely an event in itself, but 
a moment in the subsumption of one act by another. If people are physically and 
morally uprooted, they are more easily moved, and when they are easy to move, 
they are more easily rendered physically and morally superfluous. From the point 
of view of power, mobility is a convenient feature of the act subsumed, but a 
necessary one of the subsuming act. For it is by means of geographical and 
psychological movement that modern power inserts itself into preexisting 
structures.45 
 
In other words, modernity construes “religion” in such a way that physical or ideological 
movements associated with religion automatically carry with them the potential for complicity in 
various hegemonizing projects, even as religion itself continues to be deemed apolitical. Rebecca 
Nedostup, as well as Vincent Goossaert and David Palmer, have applied Asad’s arguments to 
modern Chinese history, particularly with respect to the conceptual distinction between rational 
“religion” (zongjiao) and irrational “superstition” (mixin)—whose emergence enabled the GMD 
government’s practice of destroying certain temples and marginalizing certain groups while 
                                                 
45 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, pp. 10-11; Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: 
Benediction Classics, 2009), p. 475. The original passage does not mention mobility explicitly, but implies the 
negative understanding of it discussed by Asad: “[U]prootedness and superfluousness…have been the curse of 
modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution and have become acute with the rise of imperialism 
at the end of the last century and the break-down of political institutions and social traditions in our own time. To be 
uprooted means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to 
belong to the world at all.” 
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folding approved religious organizations into the structures of the state.46 An equivalent 
distinction circulated at the same time among Islamic modernists, who cast Sufism, traditional 
education, and other discursive adversaries as clinging to “superstitions” (khurafat).47 As will 
become clear, modern Chinese Muslim transnationalist integrationism drew upon this discursive 
development in both its Chinese and its Islamic contexts. 
 Saba Mahmood adds to this equation by arguing that secular nation-states, by virtue of 
their intolerance of alternatives, and by way of their reconfigurations of historical and literary 
thought, tend to exacerbate rather than neutralize inter-religious conflict. This is especially the 
case when religion coincides with minority status. Focusing on modern Egypt, but with broadly 
applicable conclusions, she finds that “the regulation of religion under secularism has not simply 
tamed its power but also transformed it, making it more, rather than less, important to the 
identity of majority and minority populations. This process has resulted in the intensification of 
interreligious inequality and conflict, the valuation of certain aspects of religious life over others, 
and the increasingly precarious position of religious minorities in the polity.”48  
 The experience of modern Chinese Muslims highlights the ways in which physical 
mobility can be pressed into the service of state power, particularly for a “religious minority.” To 
borrow from Asad and Arendt, modern Chinese Muslims’ transnationalist integrationism 
involved a “subsumed act”—connecting textually and personally with Muslims outside China—
                                                 
46 Rebecca Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard 
East Asia Monographs, 2009). See also Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern 
China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
 
47 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003), pp. 35, 253-
54. Examples of this tendency among Muslim thinkers can be found in Rashid Rida’s al-Manar, among other 
places. 
 




and a “subsuming act”—the ways in which those new mobilities came to support the GMD’s 
assimilationist policies toward Muslims living in China’s Northwest, part of the larger project of 
GMD state- and nation-building. To borrow from Mahmood, this intertwining of mobility and 
hegemony contributed (decisively, I would argue) to the consolidation of Chinese Muslim 
identity as a “religious minority” within the secular modern Chinese nation-state, distinct from 
other minority groups and from the Han, but by no means enjoying political or cultural security.  
Understood in these terms, the only way to comprehend the features and consequences of 
transnationalist integrationism is to make the study of Islam and Muslims in modern China more 
fully “Chinese,” “Islamic,” and “global.” By contrast, if Chinese Muslims are treated as having 
been an isolated or unique group, or merely an “ethnic group” in waiting, the full picture will not 
materialize. What, then, are the implications of Chinese, Islamic, and global historiography, as 
they currently stand, for the study of modern Chinese Muslim transnationalist integrationism? 
And what adjustments might such a study require from those fields? 
First, with respect to China, the “New Qing History” has drawn much greater attention to 
China’s non-Han peoples, including Chinese Muslims.49 The frameworks that the New Qing 
applies to the Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Uyghurs also apply to an extent to the Chinese 
Muslims, who were largely (though not entirely) cut off from the Islamic world during the Qing 
(1644-1911), and therefore articulated their identities to a large extent in dialogue with the Qing 
state and its Beijing-centered imperial cosmology. At the same time, however, by inviting the 
assumption that the “Hui” as a group are more or less analogous to the Manchus, Mongols, 
                                                 
49 See especially: Pamela Kyle Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic 
Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001); Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing 
Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge: Belknap, 2005).  
 
 27 
Tibetans, and Uyghurs—potentially, in the Qing as well as in other periods—the New Qing 
paradigm obscures certain unique features of their history. Islam, after all, is vast, and in the long 
term has not been inherently co-articulated as a whole with the Chinese world to nearly the same 
extent as Manchuness, Mongolness, or Tibetanness (even though those identities also extend 
well beyond “China”). Therefore, to whatever extent the Chinese Muslims were or imagined 
themselves to be in dialogue with “Islam” as a whole, that would automatically make them 
different from those other groups (except the Uyghurs, in certain cases). The other issue that 
differentiates the Chinese Muslims from all other groups, including the Uyghurs, is their use of 
Arabic (and often Persian or Turkish as well, before the twentieth century). The New Qing’s 
fundamental insight has been that sources in non-Chinese languages (Manchu, Mongolian, 
Tibetan, etc.) can illuminate Chinese history in new ways. Yet in spite of this emphasis, the 
overall significance of the Arabic language to Chinese Muslims (be it in the twentieth century, 
the Qing, or earlier) is a question that has mostly not been asked—perhaps partly because, unlike 
with the Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Uyghurs, Arabic for the Chinese Muslims is not a 
“native” language, and does not coincide cleanly with “ethnicity” or territory. The utility of 
viewing Chinese Muslims as simply one of many “Chinese minority groups” erodes further 
when we reach the Republican era, at which point they began grappling with the question of their 
relationship to Islam (again, as a whole) in new ways—a dynamic with no direct equivalent 
among the Manchus or Mongols, or, I would argue, even among the Tibetans or the Uyghurs.50   
                                                 
50 Tibetan Buddhism was mostly contained to the Himalayan region, while Uyghurs’ interaction with the Islamic 
world generally ran overland to Anatolia or southward to India and from there to Mecca. By contrast, Chinese 
Muslims in the twentieth century were active on the entire maritime network that included Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Ceylon, Bombay, Mecca, Cairo, and Istanbul.  
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The history of Islam in modern China must confront a central tension of Chinese history 
and historiography (and politics) as a whole: that it is problematic to equate China only with the 
Han, but it is equally problematic to assert that all groups living in the present-day territory of the 
PRC belong exclusively to Chinese history.51 The old “Sinicization” paradigm addressed this 
tension by arguing that non-Han groups throughout Chinese history were gradually transformed 
by Chinese norms, whereas the New Qing History advocated moving beyond the Han to see 
China as a composite of multiple group histories. Chinese Islam does not quite fit either model: 
modern Chinese Muslim leaders tirelessly asserted their community’s distinctiveness, but in the 
same breath posited a special relationship between themselves and the Han. As was the case 
elsewhere in the world, articulations of minority identity tended to inform those of majority 
identity.52 Therefore, questions of Han identity and Sinicization cannot simply be discarded 
when considering modern Chinese Muslim history, but at the same time, they must be radically 
redefined (historicized). Notions of the Han as a dominant social group, as the embodiment of 
quintessentially “Chinese” traditions, and as the foremost bearers of Sun Yat-sen’s (1866-1925) 
revolution loomed large for Chinese Muslims in the twentieth century. Conceptions of modern 
Chinese Muslim identity were articulated in large part alongside and in contradistinction to these 
notions. For example, Chiang Kai-shek, and some Chinese Muslim leaders, went so far as to say 
                                                 
51 John King Fairbank spoke of this tension, awkwardly yet stubbornly affirming the frontiers’ status as part of the 
Chinese “world order,” and failed to account for the specificities of Chinese Muslim history: “The basic fault 
underlying this Sinocentric world order was the fact that it was not coterminous with the Chinese culture area. The 
non-Chinese states of that area, forming the Sinic Zone, were umbilically tied to China by cultural bonds such as the 
Chinese written language and Confucianism, but the Inner Asian Zone was composed of peoples of distinctly non-
Chinese culture. Manchus, Mongols, Uighur Turks, Tibetans, and others had to be included, even though their 
societies and cultures were basically very different from those of China.” John K. Fairbank, “A Preliminary 
Framework,” in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Harvard, 1968), p. 3. Emphasis added. 
 
52 This point has been made with respect to China/Islam in China (and several other examples) in Dru C. Gladney, 
Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998). 
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that Chinese Muslims were merely “Han who believed in Islam.” The Chinese Muslim elites also 
asserted that of all China’s peoples, their community was the most loyal to the Han and their 
revolution, and had the longest and most positive record of cooperation and cultural exchange 
with the majority. They also, again, acted as agents of the GMD government’s Sinicization 
policies toward frontier Muslims. At the other end of the spectrum, meanwhile, Islamophobia, 
misunderstandings, and violence frequently tainted Han-Muslim relations throughout the late 
Qing and Republican eras: but the hope of mitigating these problems was part of the reason why 
the Chinese Muslim elites said what they said and did what they did. 
In light of the special relationship (real and imagined) between the Chinese Muslim elites 
and the Han-dominated GMD government, this study also illuminates new aspects of republican 
governance and religion-state relations in modern China. The question of how to govern China’s 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious frontiers represented perhaps the most important continuity from 
older imperial visions of “China as the world” to newer national visions of “China in the 
world.”53 I argue that the GMD’s “revolutionary conservative” vision did not only consist of 
mass mobilization campaigns directed at the coastal cities, but also included a specific set of 
prescriptions for the Sinicization of China’s non-Han frontier peoples. By the mid- to late 1930s, 
and especially after the Chinese Muslim elites retreated with the GMD government to the 
wartime capital Chongqing, the GMD in fact developed an increasingly specific (if highly 
circumscribed and instrumentalized) understanding of Islam.54 I therefore build on recent 
                                                 
53 On this transition, see Crossley, Translucent Mirror, pp. 36-52; Rebecca E. Karl, Staging the World: Chinese 
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54 The term “revolutionary conservatism” appears in Brian Kai Hin Tsui, “China’s Forgotten Revolution: Radical 
Conservatism in Action, 1927-1949” (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2013), esp. Ch. 1. 
 A paradigmatic view of the Guomindang government as an incomplete or weak state can be found in Philip 
A. Kuhn, Origins of the Modern Chinese State (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002), pp. 109-10, 132. 
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scholarship showing that the GMD, in contrast to conventional characterizations, was neither an 
exclusively “secular” state nor a mere “weak state,” but rather is better thought of as both highly 
ideological and highly malleable—and indeed, in keeping with Saba Mahmood’s arguments, that 
its secular nationalism constructed and co-opted particular forms of “religion” and “minority” 
status.55 The GMD was not simply consumed with destroying the Communists or with scraping 
by on tight budgets. Rather, the matrix of Republican China’s secular nationalism, acute 
territorial crises, and minority histories, though conditioned by the struggle with the CCP, should 
to an extent be understood separately from that more familiar narrative. The GMD’s 
determination to retain control of the vast frontier territories it had inherited from the Qing 
required it to articulate a vision of Chinese nationalism that included non-Han peoples and lands, 
yet attempted to pave a way for their assimilation. The GMD’s answer to this problem contrasted 
with that of the CCP, but they would have had to come up with some answer even if the CCP had 
never existed, for the entire legitimacy of their leadership of China was at stake. Through organs 
such as the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, GMD officials from Chiang Kai-shek down 
relied on input from non-Han peoples’ elite representatives—especially Chinese Muslims—to 
make up the difference between the state’s limited capacity and initial ignorance of frontier 
conditions, on the one hand, and its ambitious goals on the other. Also at stake was the balance 
of power within the GMD itself: the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that it was the 
conservative nationalist wing of the GMD (Chiang Kai-shek, Chen Lifu, He Yingqin, etc.), and 
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not the more liberal-internationalist wing of Wang Jingwei, that saw the most to be gained from 
cultivating a partnership with the Chinese Muslim elites.  
Second, with respect to Islamic history, the story of Islam in modern China obviously 
helps challenge methodological Arabo-centrism.56 Beyond this, however, it seeks to historicize 
Arabo-centrism, asking how and why an emphasis on the Arabic language, Arab authenticity, 
and Muslim communities’ “Arab origins” emerged in particular (modern) contexts, enabling new 
connections with the Middle East and other regions, as well as new formulations of history and 
identity.57 Islam, however, is also much more than a set of spatial relations, or even a historically 
evolving manner of conceptualizing those spatial relations. In addition to Talal Asad, then, what 
conceptualizations of modern Islam generally can cast Islam in modern China in a new light?  
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The late Shahab Ahmed’s What Is Islam? provides a number of starting points for this 
question. As a whole, Ahmed reconceptualizes “human and historical Islam” as a “coherent 
contradiction” consisting of “Pre-Text, Text, and Con-Text,” and thoroughly deconstructs 
notions that it was or is a “law,” “civilization,” “cultural system,” “symbol system,” 
“orthodoxy,” or even “religion.” Arriving at modern Islam, however, Ahmed argues as follows: 
My fundamental point…is that Muslims have, in making their modernity, moved 
decisively away from conceiving of and living normative Islam as hermeneutical 
engagement with Pre-Text, Text, and Con-Text of Revelation, and have, instead, 
begun conceiving of and living normative Islam primarily as hermeneutical 
engagement [only] with Text of Revelation. In Islamic modernity, the cosmo-
Revelatory continuum of Pre-Text, Text, and Con-Text is effectively fractured, 
the role of Pre-Text as a direct source for meaning-making is considerably 
delegitimated and delimited, if not almost entirely eliminated, and the range and 
scope and variety of Con-Text that is available for mobilization in meaning-
making is considerably depleted.58 
 
Ahmed defines Pre-Text as the esoteric or the Unseen (corresponding to the Islamic concept of 
al-batin): the principles of truth and the nature of the universe that exist outside any human 
attempt at understanding them. The Con-Text, meanwhile, refers to the exoteric or the Seen (i.e. 
al-zahir), or all aspects of human experience and social life. One of the few topics that Ahmed 
does not address in detail, and one of the issues that matters most for Muslims in the modern 
world, is the question of minority status. Therefore, while the history of Islam and Muslims in 
modern China does conform to Ahmed’s characterization of an increasingly exclusive emphasis 
on Text, I would argue that context (or Con-Text) still matters tremendously to modern Muslims 
to the extent that that context will by definition be informed by either a Muslim-majority or a 
Muslim-minority environment, with potentially widely varying implications for what Islam can 
mean. In twentieth-century China, Islam and Muslims stood the best chance of surviving if 
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Chinese Muslims could articulate a vision of Islam asserting its benign and fruitful historical 
relationship with China, its peacefulness, its refraining from proselytizing, its lack of political 
aspirations, its patriotism and service to the nation, and above all its rationality (in other contexts, 
this assertion of political consonance coupled with the assertion of cultural distinctiveness has 
been aptly described as claiming a “right to difference”).59 Moreover, Chinese Muslims tended to 
assert that these qualities were synonymous with Islam or intrinsic to it, not merely contingent 
byproducts of it. By contrast, Muslims in Muslim-majority societies would certainly defend 
Islam against external Orientalists or Islamophobes, but would not be nearly so obliged to make 
such arguments to the government and society of the land in which they lived. For Muslims in 
Muslim-majority societies, Islam was simply Islam, whatever that might mean. Both Hodgson 
and Ahmed would of course remind us that this does not imply that Muslims in Muslim-majority 
countries are more Muslim. Yet their experiences can be starkly different. 
 An additional argument of Ahmed’s nevertheless applies to both Muslim-majority and 
Muslim-minority societies, including Chinese Muslims. This is the useful distinction between 
Islam’s “exploratory” versus “prescriptive” valences.60 Echoing Asad’s mobility-power 
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dichotomy (and syncing rather neatly with the notion of transnationalist integrationism), 
Ahmed’s distinction between Islam’s exploratory and prescriptive qualities aptly characterizes 
the predicament of the modern Chinese Muslim elites. They sought “exploratorily” to connect 
with and learn about the Islamic world outside China, but at the same time saw the fruits of their 
exploration, particularly their increasing “prescriptive” emphasis on “correct belief,” become 
tools of the GMD state’s efforts to integrate and Sinicize frontier Muslims, which for some 
Chinese Muslim elites became a kind of prescription in itself.  
 Both “exploration” and “prescription” point, each in its own way, to the third level on 
which this history is constituted, that of the fully or properly “global.” Ahmed’s definition of 
Muslims’ exploratory engagement with science, philosophy, music, poetry, and all knowledge of 
the human world as intrinsically part of their Islam is methodologically empowering. Chinese 
Muslims indeed saw quantum physics, John Dewey’s pedagogical and psychological theories, 
Henri Bergson’s quest to reconcile the “spiritual” and the “material,” and biomedical theories of 
infectious disease as being just as relevant to their conceptualizations of Islam as more obviously 
germane transnational developments such as the writings of missionaries and Orientalists about 
Islam, the partition of British India (1947), or Indonesia’s war of independence (1945-49). 
“Modernity,” it would seem, when seen through Ahmed’s own concept of exploration, does not 
only disrupt the Con-Text, but forms a new Con-Text for “meaning-making” in Islam.  
At the same time, the Chinese Muslim elites’ “prescriptive” practices were also global. 
Their search for the sources of “correct belief” increasingly came to form a component of the 
(also transnational and also prescriptive) project of GMD state- and nation-building. Chiang Kai-
shek was known to have admired Turkey’s modernizing reforms, which had marginalized Islam 
and rendered it innocuous to the status of the nation-state (a set of developments whose 
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significance the Chinese Muslims appear not to have fully appreciated at first). Meanwhile, 
GMD ideologues such as Chen Lifu saw U.S. practices of minority management, assimilation, 
and frontier development as directly relevant to China’s own frontier governance. 
 Part of the challenge in determining the extent of Chinese Muslim agency in the modern 
world lies in Sebastian Conrad’s distinction between global history as connections versus as 
integration.61 It is possible to argue that the infrastructural and territorial incorporation of most of 
the world into European empires and a European-dominated global economy—particularly upon 
the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the laying of telegraph cables, the proliferation of steam 
routes, the institutionalization of standard time, and above all the universalization of the form of 
the nation-state itself—dramatically reduced the scope of human difference, even as perceptions 
and assertions of difference increased.62 The overwhelming scale and disruptiveness of these 
developments, and the European power that they signify, has made it extremely difficult not to 
see non-European discourses of identity as anything other than “derivative,” especially if the 
subjects in question are a minority lacking their own polity.63 
Particularly for the period after the First World War, however, it is no longer entirely 
fitting to assume that large social or political processes, be they hegemonizing or emancipatory, 
simply emanated from “the West” and were subsequently imposed upon, appropriated by, or 
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applied derivatively in the “non-West.” It has finally become easy to argue that various Western 
claims to universalism must be re-particularized and re-historicized: “provincialized.”64 More 
difficult is to do away with “West” and “non-West” as descriptive categories altogether, and 
instead acknowledge the messiness of simultaneity: to appreciate how and why ostensibly 
Western universalisms were not simply applied but co-articulated or even primarily articulated 
by certain actors outside, in varying degrees of dialogue with, European and American 
counterparts. To do so is not to deny the violence of colonialism, capitalism, and European 
expansion, but to grasp more fully its consequences. The dynamic in which discourses of 
“modernity” were constructed simultaneously across varying geographies applies to disciplines 
of knowledge such as history, literature, the social sciences, and the natural sciences, as well as 
to practices of governance, state-building, development, and the management of populations and 
information. Even for discourses that did empirically originate in Europe, the fact of 
derivativeness was not the sole nor even the primary determinant of their subsequent trajectory. 
Context mattered decisively. The apple—even Newton’s apple—might not fall far from the tree, 
but which way it then rolls, and how it is reshaped, depends entirely on the ground on which it 
lands. Ultimately, these observations apply even to the idea of “West and non-West” itself.65 
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In the terms of the preceding discussion, the history of Islamic modernism in China, the 
most important expression of elite Chinese Muslims’ transnationalist integrationism, involved 
engaging exploratorily with discourses common to multiple Muslim societies in the early 
twentieth century, as well as those rooted in non-Muslim China and in the world at large, but that 
this mobility, partly by virtue of its prescriptive quest for “correct belief,” soon became co-opted 
within the (also highly prescriptive and transnational) discourse and practice of power that was 
GMD state- and nation-building—with the result being that new conceptualizations of “religion” 
ultimately exacerbated the tensions inherent in belonging to the “Hui minority,” despite also 
facilitating forms of collaboration between Chinese Muslim elites and the GMD government. In 
the process, Chinese Muslims participated—not derivatively but simultaneously, though still not 
as equals—in early twentieth-century constructions of “Islam,” “China,” and global “modernity.” 
 
Distinctions: Land versus Sea, Public versus Private Islam, Ethnos versus Ethos 
 
Briefly, this study rests on three sets of assumptions that are worth making explicit. One 
concerns the distinction between maritime versus land-based patterns of Sino-Islamic exchange, 
another that between public versus private Islam, and a third between a methodological emphasis 
on ethnogenesis versus on the emergence of the political and intellectual constellations that 
eventually and contingently led Chinese Muslims to be imagined as the “Hui ethnic minority.” 
First, elite Chinese Muslim transnationalist integrationism bore a clear relationship to the 
unevenness and politicization of geographical space. Urban coastal Chinese Muslim elites had 
privileged access to the maritime networks connecting Shanghai to Hong Kong, Singapore, 
India, Jidda, and Cairo. This was the foremost material fact behind their dramatically expanded 
importation of Islamic texts and print media and of Islamic modernist thought more broadly (see 
Chapters One, Three, and Five). Although Muslims from the Northwest frontiers would 
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sometimes make the Hajj in considerable numbers, overall they had less immediate access to the 
maritime system as a whole. The urban coastal elites, meanwhile, used the texts and ideas they 
were importing from that system to argue that they, and not the frontier Muslims, possessed the 
most authentic and authoritative understanding of Islam. When leading Chinese Muslims 
returned from studying in Cairo or from their work with the wartime diplomatic delegations, 
many often proceeded directly to the Northwest frontiers to use what they had learned to 
propagandize both “correct” Islam and Chinese nationalism to the frontier Muslims. The fact that 
the same people drove these “sea-based” and “land-based” initiatives is not at all a coincidence. 
The two sets of activities were linked by the ethos of transnationalist integrationism. 
Second is the refusal to conceptualize Islam as only a matter of “private faith.” Shahab 
Ahmed offers a conceptualization of public versus private Islam, defining private Islam as the 
interior truth of the self (which is often not accessible through historical sources), and public 
Islam as “meaning-making” that can be communicated to others (which is accessible far more 
often).66 I have repeatedly found, consistent with Ahmed’s definition, that when acting vis-à-vis 
a variety of publics, the Chinese Muslim elites more often than not did the things they did and 
said the things they said as Muslims. Most notably, this includes their participation in GMD 
frontier nation-building (see Chapter Two), their anti-Communism (see Chapters Two and Six), 
their wartime diplomatic delegations to the Middle East and Southeast Asia (see Chapter Four), 
and their attempts to reconcile Islam with Communism (see Chapter Six). In other words, 
collaborating with the Chinese state is not automatically a sign that the Chinese Muslim elites 
were somehow “less” Muslim or “bad” Muslims. Rather, it requires a broader definition of 
public Islam, and in particular challenges the assumption that Islam normally and normatively 
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means not supporting a non-Islamic government. Indeed, as with members of the Han Kitab 
generation, the Republican-era Chinese Muslim elites saw contributing to the preservation of 
Chinese sociopolitical order to be an integral feature of their identity as Chinese Muslims. Their 
public pursuits therefore cannot be seen as separate from their Islam (to assume otherwise would 
be to naturalize the modern Christian notion of a separation of “church and state”).  
Third is the problem of ethnos versus ethos: of seeing Chinese Muslim history in the 
early twentieth century more retrospectively as the prehistory of their ethnicization as on of the 
fifty-five “Ethnic Minority Nationalities” (shaoshu minzu) of the PRC, or more prospectively as 
a complex process of contingent but deliberate entanglement with both transnational Islam and 
the modern Chinese state that eventually resulted in the articulation of ethnic status, but not at all 
inevitably so.67 This, too, is very much a problem of sources. The ethos of transnationalist 
integrationism is always already baked into the enormous volume of writings the Chinese 
Muslim elites produced about themselves and their community’s history in both Chinese and (to 
a somewhat lesser extent) in Arabic—not to mention into much of the subsequent secondary 
scholarhip about them. Eventually, this meant arguing that the “Hui” were and are an ethnic 
group, and that their history could be traced in linear fashion from the earliest arrivals of 
Muslims during the Tang Dynasty up to the present. In the beginning, however, it was the ethos 
that posited the ethnos, and not vice versa. 
 
Structure of the Dissertation: Expanding Geographies, Converging Concepts 
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This study proceeds in a way that links chronology with varying arguments, themes, and 
analytical scales. It begins in Chinese Muslim mosques, madrasas, and printshops. It then 
follows Chinese Muslims inland to the frontiers; back east to the urban centers of Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Nanjing; overseas to Singapore, Lucknow, Mecca, Istanbul, Jerusalem, and Cairo; 
and finally to their various fates across the Mainland, Taiwan, and a variety of other countries. 
 The first two chapters outline the dynamic of transnationalist integrationism. Chapter One 
argues that Chinese Muslim practices of “textual transnationalism,” though multiregional and 
complex, resulted by the early 1930s in a normative preference for Arabic influences and Islamic 
modernist thought, as opposed to other languages or ideologies. As such, it arrowed the textual 
and ideological gap between urban coastal Chinese Muslims and Islamic modernists outside 
China, while widening the gap between those urban coastal Chinese Muslims and their own 
coreligionists on the Northwest frontiers. Chapter Two examines the consequences of this textual 
transnationalism for elite Chinese Muslims’ support for GMD state- and nation-building in the 
coastal cities and on the frontiers in the years immediately before and during the war with Japan 
(1937-45), including their efforts to establish Islamic modernist schools in the Northwest 
frontiers and to propagandize (including in Arabic) to frontier Muslims. 
 Chapters Three and Four detail some of the main consequences of transnationalist 
integrationism, characterized as “narratives in action.” Chapter Three illustrates how leading 
Chinese Muslims applied the pro-science polemics and historical logics of Islamic modernism in 
order to mount a response to Han Islamophobia and construct a way for Chinese Muslims to 
“contribute” to Chinese “civilization” generally, and later to the war with Japan. Chapter Four 
moves outside China, providing an account of the Chinese Muslim wartime diplomatic 
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delegations in the context of the longer-term co-optation of the Hajj and Muslim travel as an 
instrument of Chinese foreign policy. 
 Continuing to alternate between the intellectual and the political, Chapters Five and Six 
present the two turning points that closed this period of Chinese Muslim history. Chapter Five 
analyzes the careers and thought of the younger generation of Chinese Muslim leaders that 
studied in Cairo in the 1930s and 1940s, arguing that through their studies at al-Azhar and their 
dialogues with Arab thinkers and Arab Muslim activists in Cairo, they attempted to formulate 
new, sounder bases for safeguarding their community’s belonging in China, ones that would be 
less instrumentalized than mere political collaboration. Chapter Six narrates how the characters 
that appear throughout this study were divided from one another by the resumed Chinese Civil 
War (1945-49), with some relocating to Taiwan with the GMD leadership, others remaining on 
the Mainland, and yet others choosing “exile” in a variety of Muslim and non-Muslim countries. 
Though the Chinese Muslim elites themselves became marginalized from high politics in 
the era of Cold War and decolonization, their narratives of history and identity, while ultimately 
contingent, have nevertheless been normalized as the virtually uncontested canonical truth of 
Chinese Islam to this day. As such, their widespread contacts and numerous writings form a 
hidden background to contemporary Sino-Islamic relations. Perhaps most importantly, their 
concerns were in many cases shared with other interwar political and intellectual elites, other 
non-Han groups in China, and Muslims throughout the world. For these reasons and others, this 
study, rather than seeing Chinese Muslims as “peripheral” to both Islam and China, places 
modern Chinese Muslim thought and action within the broader reconfigurations of politics, 
knowledge, and identity brought about by Ottoman and Qing collapse and the emergence of 
territorial nationalisms across Asia. It also offers new understandings of the scope, content, and 
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consequences of Islamic modernism and of Muslim-state relations in modern China, rethinking 
the relationship between religion and reform in a decolonizing world. Overall, it moves beyond a 
circulation-based understanding of modern global encounters, and instead maps the contingent 
ways in which forms of mobility came to serve hegemonic processes of state- and nation-























CHAPTER ONE: ISLAMIC MODERNISM IN CHINA 
 
 
The ulama of China read old Arabic books and understand them well, but they 
fall short expressing themselves in writing in either Arabic or Chinese. With 
Chinese, this is because they detest using the language of the country to which 
they belong except by necessity, as it is the language of the kuffar [unbelievers] 
which is not spoken by those who are destined for Paradise. As for Arabic, they 
are familiar with its classical style but not with that of its newspapers and 
journals, nor do they know well how to speak it. They transmit learning only 
orally, so when one of them dies, his knowledge is buried with him. Such indeed 
is the state of the majority of our believers, and among our ulama, it is rare to find 
anyone much better.  
–Imam Muhammad Tawadu‘ Pang Shiqian (in Arabic)68 
 
 
Introduction: Chinese Muslims’ Changing Relationship with the Arabic Language 
 
Pang Shiqian is a narrator worth listening to. Pang (1902-58), known in Arabic as Muhammad 
Tawadu‘, was born in the old Muslim village of Sangpo, Henan, distinguished himself as an 
imam, scholar, and instructor, and in 1938 led the sixth and last delegation of Chinese Muslim 
students to al-Azhar, remaining in Egypt for nine years as the leader of these Chinese Azharites, 
and returning to China only in late 1946.69 More than his accomplishments, however, it is Pang’s 
perspective that merits special attention here. He was one of the foremost proponents of 
improving Arabic education as a means of modernizing Islam in China and improving the 
conditions of Muslims there, and also one of the foremost critics of Chinese Muslims’ earlier 
efforts toward those ends. Furthermore, living and studying in Cairo and writing in Arabic 
afforded Pang a type of distance not enjoyed by his coreligionists who remained their whole 
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al-islami li-jama‘at al-ikhwan al-muslimin [Islamic World Outreach Division of the Society of the Muslim 
Brothers], 1945), p. 83. 
 
69 Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, “‘Nine Years in Egypt’: The Chinese at al-Azhar University.” HAGAR Studies in Culture, 
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lives in China, or did not stay away quite so long as he did. The mere fact that he wrote the 
above words in Arabic, after years abroad, and far from the watchful eyes of the Guomindang 
(GMD) government and the Chinese press, makes them a valuable counterpoint to the dominant 
narratives of loyalty and belonging that emanated more easily, or at least more frequently, from 
the words and writings of Chinese Muslim elites at this time. At the same time, Pang’s statement 
illuminates that dominant discourse by virtue of its contrapuntal perspective. Even as he sat 
writing in Arabic, Pang was thinking about Chinese Muslims’ past and future relationship with 
the Arabic language. Even though he expressed rare overt disdain here for nonbelieving Chinese 
and for the Chinese language, his goal nevertheless remained to improve Chinese Muslims’ 
knowledge of Arabic in order to improve their lives and their Islam in China.  
From the first through the fourth decades of the twentieth century, leading Chinese 
Muslim ulama, publishers, and lay intellectuals in China’s urban coastal regions imported, 
collected, read, debated, disseminated, and occasionally translated both multiregional modern 
Muslim print media and classic Arabic Islamic texts. Simultaneously, they began to print their 
own periodicals and mass-producible books modeled on the print media, and new interpretive 
works to explain the classic texts. They wrote primarily in Chinese, but incorporated some 
English where necessary and an increasing amount of Arabic wherever possible (first 
handwritten and lithographed, later printed). In doing this, they solidified the perceived 
boundaries between genres (newspaper, journal, book); set those genres somewhat apart from 
older forms that were not mass produced, and whose primary place was not the street but the 
madrasa (grammatical primers, doctrinal primers, prayer books, Han Kitab works); and 
developed a new set of normative positions on what Islam was (a “religion” or “civilization” 
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existing in the world, rather than a comprehensive way of life existing merely in China or unto 
itself). I refer to these processes collectively as “textual transnationalism.”70 
Republican-era Chinese Muslims’ newfound ability to import, engage with, and imitate 
an unprecedentedly high volume and variety of texts from abroad brought a sudden and welcome 
end to the relative isolation they felt had afflicted their community during the Qing (1644-1912). 
It also fundamentally reconfigured their understanding of the Islamic world and of Islamic 
knowledge. Practices of textual transnationalism were certainly facilitated by new technologies 
of “steam and print,”71 but their contours and consequences cannot be reduced to a manifestation 
of European-led infrastructural transformation. Rather, the primarily significance of textual 
transnationalism for modern Chinese Muslims lies not in the fact of circulation, but rather in 
what substantive new prescriptions it enabled politically, socially, religiously, and culturally. 
In the case of both modern print media and classic texts, Chinese Muslim textual 
transnationalism meant that earlier patterns of linguistic, geographical, and doctrinal eclecticism 
eventually gave way to an increasingly exclusive emphasis on the Arabic language and on 
                                                 
70 Matsumoto, “Yuehua”; Matsumoto, “Perfection of Dual Loyalty”; Benite, “Bringing ‘Abduh to China”;  
Structurally speaking, urban coastal Chinese Muslims’ engagement with various literatures from outside 
China entirely resembled that same process as undertaken by China’s majority non-Muslim population, again 
especially in the coastal cities. The authoritative material history of this process, focusing in particular on 
Shanghai’s Commercial Press (Shangwu yinshuguan), is Christopher A. Reed, Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese 
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Nahda (“awakening”) in Middle Eastern contexts and the “May Fourth Movement” or “New Culture Movement” in 
China (though we should note that the latter came about more suddenly after the collapse of the Qing), both of 
which focus overwhelmingly on “secular” writings and on each region’s relationship with “the West.” The scholarly 
literature on these movements is far too vast to summarize here; several relevant works appear in the bibliography. 
 
71 Gelvin and Green, Global Muslims. 
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Islamic modernist texts from the Middle East (or texts seen as compatible with that orientation). 
To an extent, modernists predated modernism: Arabic Islamic modernist influences had to an 
extent been present among certain Chinese Muslim ulama since the first decade of the twentieth 
century, but these influences only became mainstream in the early 1930s. Only in 1930 did 
modernist, Arabic influences come at the expense of other influences—such as more familiar 
Persian texts or the more culturally proximate Islamic movements in South or Southeast Asia. 
This chapter addresses the tremendous scope of modern Chinese Muslim textual 
transnationalism, but also seeks to answer the question of what the Arabization of that textual 
transnationalism did and did not entail, why Arabization occurred, why it occurred at the 
particular moment it did, and what its limits were.  
It may seem strange to focus so much on Arabic. After all, the primary language of daily 
life for most Chinese Muslims was Chinese (or at least some spoken dialect of it). Chinese was 
also the language of most of their accumulated canonical works that explained and interpreted 
Islam. With few exceptions such as Pang Shiqian, Chinese Muslims in the twentieth century did 
not compose original works in Arabic, and the extent to which they used Arabic texts, even after 
they physically possessed them, is not always clear. At the same time, however, Arabic has 
undeniably flourished in ritual, scholarly, aesthetic, and other capacities among Muslims all over 
the world despite being, for the majority of them, a “non-native” language (one could go further 
and argue that the history of the Arabic language outside the Arab world challenges definitions 
of nativeness and non-nativeness). As we will see, Chinese Muslims did make use of Arabic in 
significant ways, even if this use was not as extensive as in other Muslim societies, and even if it 
did not exclude the use of other languages.72 Nor was the significance of Arabic limited to the 
                                                 
72 A brief comparison may be of use here. Tahera Qutbuddin has provided a helpful classification of the uses of 
Arabic in India from the eighth century through the twentieth: “liturgy, teaching and study, nomenclature, 
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number of believers who could read and speak it: even those who failed to learn Arabic in 
practice still insisted in theory that gaining better knowledge of Arabic would make China’s 
Muslims better and more modern Muslims, and thereby help to improve their lives and their 
status in China and their connectedness to Muslims outside China. In other words, quite apart 
from questions of linguistic proficiency, the promotion of Arabic education and the attempt to 
use Arabic texts was one of the most important metrics of Chinese Muslim leaders’ Islamic 
modernism, an ideological orientation that was both transnationalist vis-à-vis the world’s 
Muslims and integrationist vis-à-vis Chinese state and society. 
It is also true that Arabic had never really gone away, even in the Ming and Qing when 
Persian and Turkic works became dominant in Chinese madrasas, and when the Han Kitab 
                                                 
inscriptions, vocabulary assimilation, composition of religio-scholarly texts, composition of secular-scholarly texts, 
and marginal utilitarian uses.” Tahera Qutbuddin, “Arabic in India: A Survey and Classification of Its Uses, 
Compared with Persian,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 127/3 (July-September 2007): p. 315. See also 
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Arabic, the Arab Middle East, and the Definition of Muslim Identity in Twentieth-
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secular-scholarly texts (though, we should note, “secular” only in the sense of not being works of doctrine, ritual, 
etc., even while they could be partly about such topics). The three most significant of such works composed in 
Arabic by Chinese Muslims were all completed by Chinese Azharites: Muhammad Makin al-Sini (a.k.a. Ma Jian), 
Nazrah Jami‘a (Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-Salafiyya, 1935); Tawadu‘ (Pang), al-Sin wa-l-Islam; and Badr al-Din al-Sini 
(a.k.a. Hai Weiliang), al-‘Alaqat bayn al-‘arab wa-l-sin (Cairo: 1950). 
To appreciate the extent of vocabulary assimilation from Arabic to Chinese, which was primarily limited to 
Chinese Muslims, see Jianping Wang, Glossary of Chinese Islamic Terms (Curzon, 2001). 
On jingtang jiaoyu, see Lipman, Familiar Strangers, pp. 50-51; Feng Zenglie, “Ming Qing shiqi Shaanxi 
Yisilanjiao de jingtang jiaoyu [Islamic mosque education in Shannxi during the Ming and Qing],” Qingdai 
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University of Minnesota Press, 1974), and Gerard Albert Wiegers, Islamic Literature in Spanish and Aljamiado 
(Leiden: Brill, 1993). 
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authors undertook to translate Islamic thought into a Confucian idiom using the Chinese 
language. Han Kitab works often interspersed transliterations of Arabic words, or actual Arabic 
script, into the main Chinese text, and some Han Kitab authors (most notably Liu Zhi) also 
compiled bibliographies including Arabic works.73 In the twentieth century, it was not so much 
that Arabic suddenly returned from a state of total absence, but rather that its position rose while 
the status of Persian and Turkic works mostly diminished.74  
Meanwhile, textual transnationalism and Arabization also did not entail rejection of the 
Chinese Islamic canon. The Han Kitab texts were re-published in the Republican era by the same 
urban ulama who were exhibiting an increased thirst for Arabic.75 Republican-era Chinese 
Muslim leaders increasingly sought to incorporate Middle Eastern Arabic texts more 
systematically into their knowledge of Islam, and to use the texts as Arab Muslims did, yet 
simultaneously continued to identify the Han Kitab authors as their intellectual forebears, and in 
some cases even continued to render certain Islamic concepts in Confucian vocabulary.76 
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74 I say “mostly” even here because the use and translation of some Persian texts persisted even into the 1920s, even 
by some of the figures credited most directly with “Arabizing” Chinese Islam, such as the “Four Great Imams”: Da 
Pusheng, Wang Jingzhai, Ha Decheng, and Ma Songting.  
 
75 Muslim bookstore catalogs from Beijing and Shanghai, contained in Box 17 of the Harvard-Yenching Pickens 
Collection, indicate as much, as do occasional bibliographic advertisements published in Yuehua. 
 
76 The significance of Arabic to the modernization of Chinese Islam is not a new question. Others have characterized 
Chinese Muslims’ twentieth-century education reforms and collection of Arabic texts as a process of “Arabization.” 
On one level, this signified a linguistic departure from the Han Kitab tradition, even while echoing its politics. On 
another, it also came at the expense of Persian and Central Asian texts, which in earlier periods had stood alongside 
and even surpassed Arabic in importance. See Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, “From ‘Literati’ to ‘Ulama’: The Origins of 
Chinese Muslim Nationalist Historiography.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 9/4 (Winter 2003/4): 83-109 and 
“Nine Years in Egypt”; Gillette, Maris. Between Mecca and Beijing: Modernization and Consumption among Urban 
Chinese Muslims. Stanford, 2000, esp. 1-21, 221-236. 
The term “Arabization” can be misleading, however. One reason for this has to do with aesthetics: on a 
basic level, the term might call to mind reviving the practice of building mosques with minarets and colonnades 
rather than with painted wooden beams and slanted stone roofs. This is largely an issue of the present day, when 
Egypt and India’s status as cosmopolitan Islamic centers has declined, and when Chinese Hajjis travel by plane 
straight to Mecca and do not traverse the vast and diverse spaces in between. It is also an issue of much earlier 
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The Islamic modernism and Arabo-centrism born of Chinese Muslim textual 
transnationalism, however, did lead modernist Chinese Muslims to invent certain adversaries. 
Most modernist Chinese Muslims came from urban eastern China: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, 
Guangzhou, Nanjing, Shandong, and parts of Henan. This meant that they were descended 
intellectually and in some cases biologically from the Han Kitab authors of the Ming and early 
Qing.77 As such, they had come to rely heavily on Chinese sources such as the Han Kitab texts 
for understanding Islam, and even used Chinese characters as phonetic aids for learning and 
reading Arabic.78 As was the case with Muslim societies elsewhere (and, we might add, with 
many Christians and non-Muslim Chinese), modernists imagined their “internal” enemies to be 
heterodox, traditionalist, and superstitious Muslims (the external enemies included Orientalists, 
imperialists, and missionaries).79 Much like madrasa education across the Islamic world, the 
Ming-Qing system of Chinese Muslim “scripture hall education” (jingtang jiaoyu) was criticized 
for emphasizing rote memorization and for its unstandardized and vulnerable practices of oral 
knowledge transmission (noted by Pang above).80 By contrast, Chinese Muslims’ new-style 
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schools would balance “traditional” topics such as Arabic language and Islamic doctrine with 
“modern” ones such as mathematics, geography, biology, chemistry, physics, music, hygiene, 
and physical education, as well as an increased emphasis on Chinese language. Theoretically, 
modernist Chinese Muslims’ anti-tradtionalism could apply to any imam or local leader who 
resisted incorporating “modern” subjects into madrasa education. In practice, however, this 
stance set itself especially against the Sufi-dominated Muslim communities on China’s 
Northwest frontiers (Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang), and to an extent Muslims 
in more proximate but poorer regions (Henan, Chahar, Shanxi, and so on; Yunnan and Sichuan, 
or parts of them, tended to be more ideologically tied to the coast).  
An irony, however, is that those supposedly “backward” Muslims—at least the ones in 
the Northwest who possessed literacy—were if anything more skilled in the Arabic language 
than the ulama of urban eastern China.81 But by contrast, there is no evidence that they 
polemicized about the need for Arabization (or if they did, not in the same way as the urban 
coastal modernists). They simply continued to use the same Arabic, Persian, and Turkic texts 
they had been using since the seventeenth century or earlier, and even used Arabic letters to 
transliterate Chinese (the opposite of the urban coastal Chinese Muslims). As I will show, by the 
1920s and 1930s, Chinese Muslim institutions in urban eastern China had greatly expanded their 
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Arabic collections, to the point that those collections more closely resembled those of madrasas 
outside China than those of the Sufis in the Northwest. Although it is difficult to measure 
precisely, relative lack of access to print technology and maritime trade routes almost certainly 
meant that textual change could not have occurred on the same scale in the Northwest at this 
time. The Arabization of modern Chinese Islam primarily meant the Arabization of the certain 
practices and assumptions of the urban coastal ulama, not of China’s Muslims as a whole.  
For the urban coastal Chinese Muslims, textual transnationalism produced Arabo-
centrism, and not the other way around. Urban coastal Chinese Muslims’ increasing preference 
for the Arabic language and perception of the normativity of Arabness in Islam were not 
foregone conclusions owing to the empirical centrality of Arabic and Arabness. Rather, Arabo-
centrism was a contingent result of the very process of multiregional exchange. In fact, at first it 
was engagement with Japanese, Ottoman, South Asian, Southeast Asian, and Orientalist 
knowledge of Islam—more so than Arabic Middle Eastern knowledge—that gave Chinese 
Muslims an impression of the singular importance of the Arabs and their language, and relatedly, 
of the Arab-dominated Islamic modernist position on Islam. The assumption that Islam was 
fundamentally an expression of Arab culture had crystallized only relatively recently among both 
Orientalists and missionaries and certain Arab Islamic modernists, and was only gradually and 
circuitously absorbed by Chinese Muslims (and other “peripheral” Muslims). This racialized 
assumption had the feedback effect of intensifying Chinese Muslims’ sense of isolation from the 
Islamic world at the same moment when they felt they were overcoming that isolation. At the 
same time, it also appeared to provide a blueprint for reversing that isolation: restoring dialogue 
with Islam outside China now simply meant studying the Arabic language, recovering the lost 
connection with Islam’s Arabic essence, and establishing discursive links between that Arab 
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essence and Chinese Muslim history and identity. This project had precedents in the Han Kitab 
generation, but the much greater ease of physically traveling to the Arab Middle East as of the 
late nineteenth century fundamentally altered it, making reconnecting with Arabic and Arabness 
logistically easier, but conceptually harder.82 Thus, to the extent that an Arabization of modern 
Chinese Islam did occur, it represented not the metahistorical “return to the origin” that its 
proponents claimed, but rather signified an internalization of Orientalist definitions of Islam 
mediated through Islamic modernists and, ironically, through non-Arab Muslims from other 
regions who were experiencing similar issues at a similar time. 
This chapter explores the roles of Arabic and Arabness for modern Chinese Muslims by 
focusing on three interrelated processes. The first is their determination to make contact with and 
improve knowledge of Muslim communities outside China, collect their periodicals and other 
publications, and establish their own print media and educational institutions. At first, these basic 
building blocks of Chinese Muslim textual transnationalism involved accepted virtually any 
materials on Islam from outside China, in virtually any language. Only in time did they privilege 
Arabic, Arabness, and the Arab world over other Muslim languages, peoples, and regions. 
The second process, curricular reform in Chinese madrasas, was the object of the first. 
The discovery or “recovery” of previously unavailable classic Arabic works provided teaching 
and reference material for the Islamic component of new-style school curricula. This process 
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brought additional ironies, allowing the urban Chinese ulama to improve and refine their positive 
knowledge of Islam, but also drew them into a transnationally articulated set of normative 
positions on what the true Islam was. From a textual situation characterized by eclecticism, 
regional variation, and oral transmission, by the early 1930s Chinese ulama had begun to 
institute a more standardized curriculum built on distinct genres Quran, hadith, tafsir, and so on.  
Only the third process, however, fully answers the question of why Arabic and Arabness 
received increasing emphasis. The process was the sweeping transformation of the structures, 
institutions, and bases of knowledge themselves—a phenomenon common to China, the Islamic 
world, and to an extent the world as a whole in the early twentieth century, but that had specific 
consequences for Islam in China. Chinese Muslim textual transnationalism engaged with many 
topics extending beyond the strictly “religious,” such as history, science, medicine, philosophy, 
and international politics. In the end, this extra-doctrinal engagement had consequences for 
modern Chinese Islamic thought just as profound as the transformation of formal doctrinal 
knowledge. I will focus here on the one example of “Islamic civilization,” an idea increasingly 
assumed to be rooted in Arab culture and to have undergone periods of “florescence and 
decline.” As complex as the process of textual transnationalism was, it took place in the context 
of this even broader epistemological transformation or “conceptual convergence” in which 
Islamic modernist thinkers outside China and their (largely unknown) Chinese Muslim audiences 
alike found themselves in dialogue with a common set of Orientalists, from whom they derived 
this crucial new concept of an eternally Arab-centered “Islamic civilization.”  
In sum, Chinese Muslims were rediscovering the Islamic world outside China at the exact 
moment when actors on all sides were reaching a new consensus that the Arabs and Arabic 
represented the core of Islam. This chapter traces—in terms of regions, institutions, genres, and 
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ideological formations—the uneven but discernable emergence of a recognizably Islamic 
modernist orientation among coastal Chinese ulama by the early 1930s, one that privileged 
Arabic and Arabness, and as such resembled trends around the Indian Ocean and Arab world 
much more than it resembled the ideas and practices of Chinese Muslims’ own Chinese-speaking 
coreligionists on the northwestern frontiers.  
 
Textual Transnationalism I: Chinese Muslim Modernist Institutions and Print Media  
 
Textual transnationalism sought to (re)forge connections with Muslims outside China in order to 
improve Islamic knowledge and institutions in China. The stakes of this project were high. ‘Abd 
al-Rahman Wang Kuan, the first major Chinese imam to travel to the Middle East in the 
twentieth century (Cairo and Istanbul, 1905-07), and later chairman of the Chinese Islamic 
Progress Association, composed a letter in Arabic to the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II (likely 
with the assistance of Ottoman emissaries) assessing Chinese Muslims’ predicament: 
In the name of God, the Lord of Mercy, the Giver of Mercy!...O noble and 
forgiving Caliph, great one of the age, shadow of God, all Creation knows that the 
impoverished, far-flung Muslims of Beijing arrived there in the eighth century 
after the Hijra of the Prophet (God bless him and grant him salvation!) or 
earlier…at present, they are overcome by the subordination of the Sultan to the 
unbelievers [al-kafirin, i.e. al-kuffar], their Islam subject to the regulation of 
barbaric unbelief [al-jahiliyya]. Science and knowledge languish; their light 
grows dim in the schools and mosques of Beijing…If we had oriented ourselves 
more toward conditions [in your region], we would have been more attuned to the 
ways of the world both lowly and lofty [al-din wa-l-dunya], and the joys of faith 
and Islam. We thank and praise Almighty God and hope to return to stand by your 
side. But alas we cannot do so at this time, and so we ask God’s help to preserve 
your will and your state… 
As for the Muslims of China, a great many of them had once been 
Muslims of the Abode of Islam [ahl al-Islam, i.e. dar al-Islam], and all of them 
are of the People of the Prophetic Example [ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama‘a, i.e. 
Sunnis]. They reside in Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Guangdong, 
and other places…As for the unbelievers among us, the reason for their unbelief is 
a paucity of books and study. And as for the weak [sic] of our Islam, its cause is 
the lack of communication between us and Your Eminence, as well as the power 
of the Christians who have sent their emissaries to the Sultan of Beijing. Herein 
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we ask our great lord to send his own emissary to our ruler the Sultan of Beijing, 
so as to embolden our Sultan with the wisdom of your mighty countenance, to 
show us the light of faith, and to fortify the path of Islam by extending it to our 
Sultan. We ask you to send us bearers of the good news [du‘a], and in any case to 
keep us always in mind and never forget us.83 
 
This passage summarizes the sentiment that reviving Islam in China requires contact with Islam 
and Muslims outside China: “lack of communication” had made Chinese Muslims “weak,” led to 
a “paucity of books and study,” and corrupted belief. Wang hints, furthermore, that in a world 
where political unity is impossible (“[We] hope to return to stand by your side…But alas we 
cannot do so at this time”), the second-best outcome would be for Muslims in the Middle East to 
send texts and emissaries to help the Chinese Muslims be better Muslims, and that this in turn 
will improve their conditions in China. Wang attempted to implement his plan upon returning to 
China, applying what he had seen and learned in Cairo and Ottoman Istanbul by founding a new-
style madrasa at Beijing’s Niujie Mosque (the city’s oldest and largest). While continuing to 
teach Persian and Turkish, this school devoted more attention than others to both Arabic and 
Chinese instruction and even managed to recruit a certain number of foreign instructors to assist 
in the task; it also sought to integrate modern subjects with the Islamic sciences—one of the first 
madrasas in China to do so.84  
Though not mentioning Arabic explicitly, Pang Shiqian later implied that the revival of 
Arabic instruction, and the improved capacity to reform Islam in China that resulted, was the 
primary significance of Wang Kuan’s mission:  
God be praised, for the twentieth century arrived, and with it the modernist ulama 
[al-‘ulama al-mujaddidun]. Among them was the late Hajj ‘Abd al-Rahman 
Wang Haoran [i.e. Wang Kuan], who visited Egypt and Turkey in 1905. He 
requested the Ottoman Caliph Abdülhamid II’s assistance in spreading Islam in 
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China. Abdülhamid II therefore sent a religious and educational delegation to 
Beijing chaired by Sheikh Ali Rida, accompanied by Sheikh Hafiz.85 
 
In other words, the reform of Islam in China emphasized Arabic from an early point, but it did 
not begin as an Arabo-centric project in every sense of the word. In the first two to three decades 
of the twentieth century, the drive to improve Arabic instruction was not yet tied to a broader 
Islamic modernist program, to the compulsion for doctrinal “correctness,” or to an Arabo-centric 
understanding of Islam. That would all come later. 
 Wang Kuan’s mission to Cairo and Istanbul should not be taken as confirmation that 
Chinese Islamic modernism was from the beginning a Middle-East-centered or Arabizing force. 
Soon after Wang returned from the Middle East, a separate group of thirty-six Chinese Muslims 
set out to study abroad, of all places, in Tokyo—not unlike their Han Chinese intellectual 
counterparts such as Liang Qichao or Zhang Taiyan.86 These Chinese Muslims called themselves 
the “Tokyo Pure and True Study-Abroad Educational Society” (liu dong qingzhen jiaoyu hui). In 
Tokyo, they published one of the earliest Chinese Muslim periodicals of the twentieth century, 
named Xinghui pian (“Awakening Islam” or “Awakening Muslims”).87 This bulletin consisted of 
only a single issue, published in December 1908, and printed with lead-based letterpress 
(qianyin). Xinghui pian’s publication coincided with a unique juncture following Japan’s victory 
in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) but preceding the full onset of Japanese imperialism, at 
                                                 
85 Tawadu‘ (Pang), al-Sin wa-l-Islam, p. 69, originally translated in John T. Chen, “Re-Orientation: The Chinese 
Azharites between Umma and Third World, 1938-55,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle 
East (CSSAAME) 34/1 (May 2014): p. 37. 
 
86 Tang, Global Space; Murthy, Zhang Taiyan. 
 
87 A detailed discussion of the Tokyo encounter and Xinghui pian can be found in Shuang Wen, “Mediated 
Imaginations: Chinese-Arab Connections in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries” (PhD dissertation, 
Georgetown University, 2015), pp. 126-38. 
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which time Japan was perceived as a model of “Eastern” progress by both Chinese and Muslim 
reformers, and even as the potential “savior of Islam” against Western imperialism.88  
Xinghui pian may or may not have been the first Chinese Muslim periodical. Either way, 
it was probably the first to articulate an explicit relationship between the reform of Islamic 
education, the idea of a nation-state, and the status of Chinese Muslims, three years prior to the 
Revolution of 1911 that brought down the Qing and established the Republic. The inaugural 
preface stated in no uncertain terms: “[The reform of] religion and education is the starting point 
for propelling social progress, which in turn will enlighten the nation and restore power and 
prosperity to the Lands under Heaven. That being achieved, the eventual result, distant though it 
may be, can be nothing other than self-rule.”89 Other essays bound in the same bulletin, however, 
were not so unequivocal. As Matsumoto Masumi discusses, one author focused less on political 
autonomy and more on peaceful coexistence in a Chinese system: “Even though there are racial 
differences among the Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Hui and Tibetans, they should not fight each 
other. Since they are crews of the same state ship, those races should live in harmony…Religions 
always encourage people to do their best and are prime movers of the society. In accordance with 
the current of the times, we have to reform our religion.”90 Regardless of the end goal, the 
                                                 
 
88 Esenbel, “Japan’s Global Claim,” p. 1141; Tanaka, Japan’s Orient; Aydin, Politics of Anti-Westernism; 
Hammond, “Conundrum of Collaboration.” 
As Selçuk Esenbel has shown, an “Islam circle” consisting of Japanese military and civilian elites 
combined with their Muslim associates emerged in the first decade of the twentieth century, interested in the 
potential role Islam could play in the Japanese Empire’s pan-Asian policy. It is unclear whether the Chinese 
Muslims’ studies in Tokyo were directly related to Japan’s emerging Islam policy, or whether the simply went there 
for the same reasons as non-Muslim Chinese. Wen, “Mediated Imaginations,” p. 128, suggests that the Chinese 
ambassador to Japan, Yang Shu, who was also a Muslim, played an important role.  
 
89 “Xinghui pian fakan xu [Inaugural Preface to Xinghui pian],” Xinghui pian, p. 3. 
 
90 Matsumoto, “Completion of the Idea of Dual Loyalty,” n6. 
 
 59 
Xinghui pian authors tended to agree that reforming Islamic education was the key to everything 
they hoped to achieve.  
At the same time, Xinghui pian illustrates that its authors and publishers had absorbed 
from their mentors in Japan much of the vocabulary and thematic concerns common to Islamic 
modernists throughout the Islamic world. Significantly, whereas the Chinese title’s relatively 
ambiguous verb-object phrase xinghui could be rendered as “awakening Islam” or as “awakening 
the Muslims (of China),” its Arabic title, Istiqaz al-Islam, signified more clearly “the awakening 
of Islam” as a whole.91 Indeed, the topics discussed in Xinghui pian would have been familiar to 
Islamic modernists anywhere: education, “religious reform” or “religious progress” (zongjiao 
gailiang, zongjiao jinhua), and “Islamic civilization” (huijiao zhi wenming). The problems raised 
in Xinghui pian, especially education reform, would continue to dominate Chinese Muslim 
periodicals into the 1930s, 1940s, and beyond.92 
In addition to these broad themes, Xinghui pian also evinced a more specific ideological 
priority found among Islamic modernists elsewhere: an emphasis on the oneness of God, the 
correction of errors, and the negation of superstition. In an article titled “The Relationship 
between Religion and Education,” the Chinese Muslim Tokyo student Huang Zhenpan declared 
that “(The Prophet) Muhammad was the first religious reformer in the history of the 
world…Western histories recount how he spread his teaching with lightning speed, and 
established a true monotheistic religion (du yi wu er de zongjiao).” Huang went on to address 
certain errors concerning the founding of Islam, including the notion that early Muslims were 
                                                 
91 Ahmad Fadali, an Egyptian living in Japan, had suggested the Arabic title, according to Wen, “Mediated 
Imaginations,” pp. 131-36. 
 
92 Zhao Zhongqi, “Lun zhongguo huijiao zhi guomin jiaoyu [On Chinese Islamic Citizen Education], Xinghui pian; 
Zhao Zhongqi, “Zhongguo huijiao zhi laili [The Historical Origins of Chinese Islam],” Xinghui pian; Huang 
Zhenpan, “Huijiao zhi wenming [Islamic Civilization],” Xinghui pian.  
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excessively violent or opposed to reform, or that “superstitions” (mixin) from the Arabian 
Peninsula had played a role in Islam’s formation. Huang asserted that these were not his personal 
views, but the “common consensus of the world across all ages” (tianxia wanshi zhi suo gong).93 
Like education reform, nationalism, progress, and civilization, notions of doctrinal correctness 
and of Islam’s rationalism were shared by Islamic modernists everywhere, and would 





IMAGE 1. Cover of Xinghui pian. The Muslim testament of faith (shahada), “There is no god 
but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God,” appears under the Arabic title. The cover 
also notes that this publication is “not for sale.” Source: Huizu dianzang quanshu. 
 
Leading Chinese Muslims resumed their westward sojourns in the following decade. In 
the 1910s, Da Pusheng (1874-1965), a colleague of Wang Kuan at Niujie eventually known as 
one of modern Chinese Islam’s “Four Great Imams” (sida ahong), ventured to Southeast Asia, 
                                                 
93 Xinghui pian, p. 8. 
 61 
South Asia, and the Middle East, staying abroad for most of 1916-17.94 One of Da’s reflections 
on his travels combined issues that had originally appeared in Wang’s letter to Sultan 
Abdülhamid II and in Xinghui pian: 
My travels to Egypt, Arabia, and India left a deep impression of the spirit of Islam 
in those countries. With regard to the true meaning of our faith [wu jiao zhenti], 
every interpretation is supported by a considerable body of works that could be 
used to propagate Islam’s ways and teachings [xuan dao chuan jiao]. I felt 
ashamed for having only a superficial knowledge, and did not want to carry out 
my research carelessly.95 
 
Wang, the Tokyo group, and Da all expressed the sentiment that Chinese Muslims needed to 
grow in knowledge, with Wang and Da further suggesting that Chinese Muslims’ collections of 
Islamic texts were far inferior to those of Muslims outside China. The difference from Wang to 
the Tokyo group and especially to Da is that the latter two placed greater emphasis on the need 
for doctrinal correctness, as well as the need to actively propagate that correct Islam (remember 
this for Chapter Two). Da—speaking about the 1910s, but writing in the late 1930s—had come 
to feel that the purpose of connecting with Islam and Muslims outside China was not to obtain 
willy-nilly whatever works Middle Eastern authorities were willing to send, but rather to identify 
the subset that contained the “true meaning” of Islam. After returning to China, Da and his 
associate Ha Decheng (1885-1943), remembered as another of the “Four Great Imams,” 
established the Shanghai Islamic Teacher’s Training School in the mid-1920s.96 Similar 
institutions were established elsewhere in the same period, including the Chengda Academy 
                                                 
 
94 Da filled in as imam of Niujie while Wang Haoran was abroad. After Wang returned, he made Da headmaster of 
his new-style madrasa at Niujie. Da Jie, “Da Pusheng ahong zhuanlue [Brief Biography of Imam Da Pusheng],” 
Zhongguo musilin 1 (1984): pp. 19-20. 
 
95 Da, Yisilan liushu, pp. 8-9.  
 
96 Da, “Da Pusheng ahong zhuanlue,” p. 21. 
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(Chengda shifan xuexiao) in Jinan, Shandong, and later Beijing; Mingde Upper School (Mingde 
zhongxue) in Kunming, Yunnan; the Wanxian Islamic Normal (Wanxian yisilan shifan xuexiao) 
in Wanxian, Sichuan; the Jiejin Upper School (Jiejin zhongxue) in Changsha, Hunan; and the 
Chongshi Upper School (Chongshi zhongxue) in Shanxi. 
Modernist Chinese Muslim textual transnationalism expanded steadily from this point on, 
including the formation of new institutions, the establishment of new periodicals, and the 
importation of new texts (or newly accessible old ones). In the process, it came to embody the 
priorities articulated by figures such as Wang, the Tokyo group, and Da Pusheng, though in a 
gradual and circuitous manner. For example, Wang Jingzhai (1879-1949) of Tianjin, another of 
the “Four Great Imams,” studied at al-Azhar in Cairo in the 1920s, but this appears not to have 
imparted a rigid sense of Arabo-centrism: after returning to China, he continued translating 
Persian works into Chinese into the late 1920s.97 
Materially speaking, powerful Chinese Muslim patrons drove the expansion of Chinese 
Muslim modernist institutions and periodicals as well as the importation of texts. First and 
foremost, the Ma warlords of the Northwest lent decisive material and moral support to key 
Islamic modernist institutions in both the coastal regions and the Northwest frontiers. Descended 
from the Muslim militarists who had turned on the Muslim rebels and defected to the Qing 
during the late nineteenth-century uprisings, the Ma clan ruled Ningxia and Qinghai virtually 
autonomously and dominated much of Gansu, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang as well during the 
late Qing and Republican eras. These figures, particularly Ma Fuxiang (1876-1932), established 
their own privately funded Muslim schools across the Northwest, which, unlike the traditional 
system, taught both Chinese and Arabic.98 Ma Fuxiang’s family also supported the 
                                                 
97 Tawadu‘ (Pang), al-Sin wa-l-Islam, pp. 82-83. 
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abovementioned Chengda Academy, the Republican era’s leading Islamic modernist institution, 
founded in 1925 in Shandong but moved to Beijing after the Japanese invasion of Shandong in 
1928. Through Ma’s good offices, Chengda came to receive direct support from the GMD 
government as well, via the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission (Meng-Zang weiyuanhui), 
on which Ma served as deputy director from 1929-30 and director from 1930-31, as well as the 
Ministry of Education. Chengda trained young Chinese Muslims to be imams and instructors in 
new-style madrasas throughout China. It also published Yuehua, the preeminent Chinese Muslim 
modernist periodical, and counted among its faculty and affiliates many of the individuals 
responsible for importing both modern print media and classic Islamic texts.99 
In addition to the warlords, mosque-merchant networks also lent considerable support to 
Chinese Muslim institutional development and textual importation efforts. Among these, the 
Muslim merchants of Shanghai, involved in pharmacy, furs, and other industries, played an 
especially important role. These figures sponsored the Chinese Muslim Hajj through Shanghai’s 
Ximen Mosque. According to Yang Rongbin, when Da Pusheng and Ha Decheng set sail in 
1916–17 in search of Islamic texts to bring back to China, they did so under the largesse of Ma 
Jinqing, a Shanghai Muslim businessman with South Seas connections. When they returned, 
many of the texts were translated and sold with the support of Xu Xiaochu, the Chinese Muslim 
manager of Shanghai’s famous “Great Eastern Dispensary Ltd.” (Zhongfa yaodian).100 
                                                 
98 The history of these schools is summarized in several chapters in Li Jieshun et al., eds., Xibei huizu yu yisilan jiao 
[Islam and the Muslims of the Northwest] (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1993), Part V. 
 
99 Mao, “Muslim Educational Reform,” pp. 157-59; Chinese Islamic Association, Cheng de da cai: jinian chengda 
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100 Yang Rongbin, Minguo shiqi shanghai huizu shangren qunti yanjiu [Research on the Republican-Era Shanghai 
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The remainder of the period before the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) saw 
Chinese Muslim periodicals established in most major urban centers. Yuehua published a 
detailed survey of this expansion from 1908 to 1936,101 summarized in the following chart: 
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101 Zhao’s summary of periodicals: Zhao Zhenwu, “Sanshi nian lai zhi zhongguo huijiao wenhua gaikuang [Cultural 
Conditions of Chinese Islam over the Past Thirty Years],” Yuehua 8.23 (1936), pp. 3-7. See also Rudolf Löwenthal, 
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TABLE 2. Geographical distribution of Chinese Muslim periodicals, 1908-36. 
 







Beijing/Beiping 21 13  
Shanghai 8 2  
Nanjing (incl. 
Luhe) 
6 2 One of these, 回教青年月报, 
moved to Lanzhou 
Yunnan 5 2  
Tianjin 3 3  
Guangzhou 3 1  
Zhenjiang 2 ?  
Henan (incl. 
Kaifeng) 
2 ?  
Changde 2 ?  
Qinghai 2 ?  
Tokyo 1 0  
Xi’an 1 1  
Guilin 1 ?  
Liaoning 1 1 “Second volume published in 
Shaanxi” 
Shenyang 1 ?  
Tai’an 1 ?  
Nanning 1 0  
Hankou 1 0  
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Hong Kong 1 1  
TOTAL 63 26+  
 
 
Several observations immediately stand out. First, modern Muslim publishing in China got off to 
a somewhat gradual start, but accelerated in the late 1920s and 1930s, coinciding with the 
reunification of the country under the GMD. Second, although the earliest publication came from 
Tokyo, and others from important Muslim centers in Yunnan (see below), the general rule was 
that coastal cities dominated Muslim publishing, as they did in Chinese publishing generally, 
with Beijing and Shanghai leading the way (after excluding short-lived publications, Beijing’s 
dominance becomes even clearer).102 Most of these publications were linked to important 
mosques (for example, Niujie and Dongsi in Beijing, and Ximen and Xiaotaoyuan in Shanghai). 
Third, relatedly, traditional inland Muslim centers such as Xi’an and Kaifeng were not 
particularly productive, given the lower degree of technological penetration there. On the other 
hand, in addition to Yunnan, certain other Muslim frontier strongholds did become centers of 
reform-minded Muslim publications—most notably Xining, Qinghai, under the rule of Muslim 
warlord Ma Bufang. Fourth, the new capital Nanjing eventually became the third most 
productive locale for Muslim publishing. It emerged late as an additional center of explicitly pro-
state Muslim periodicals beginning in 1934, at a time when many leading Muslims had already 
long been serving in the government, and when their community stood to benefit considerably 
from showcasing such “contributions.”  
Crucially, the fact that most modernist Chinese Muslim publications were located in the 
coastal cities intensified Chinese Muslims’ dialogue both with “China” (the state and leading 
                                                 
102 See especially Christopher Reed, Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1937 (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2004). 
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Han intellectuals) and, through the maritime connections linking those cities to Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and beyond, with Islamic networks far beyond China. Indeed, along with the firmly pro-
state stance of the Ma warlords, this may be the basic material fact that most readily explains the 
dual “transnationalist” and “integrationist” character of Chinese Islamic modernism. The 
concentration of publishing activity in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou ensured that 
the Republican-era Chinese Muslim press would reflect the trends and habits of the Han press 
and engage with the Han in a more direct manner than the Han Kitab generation. At the same 
time, however, Chinese Muslim publications also took cues from Muslim publications imported 
at those same locales, in terms of format and topics regularly covered.103 
The immediate result of Chinese Muslim publishing’s consolidation in the urban coastal 
regions was, again, not a unidirectional path toward Arabization, but fluid simultaneous 
engagement with multiple actors, regions, languages, events, and modes of thought.104 Amidst 
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104 One of the earliest Chinese Muslim periodicals after Xinghui pian was an apparent exception to the concentration 
of print media in the coastal cities. This was Yunnan’s Qingzhen yuebao, founded in 1915 and reestablished in 1929 
as Qingzhen duobao after a decade-long hiatus. By this time, Yunnan had emerged as a center of Islamic knowledge 
production, including in Arabic. The publishers and authors of Qingzhen yuebao/duobao were the intellectual 
descendants of Ma Dexin, a Muslim tea merchant from Dali who made the Hajj in the mid-nineteenth century, set 
down in his Chaojin tuji (A Record of the Hajj; see Chapters Four and Five). Qingzhen duobao published Ma’s 
Quranic exegesis, Kelanjing zhijie, in a serial beginning in its first issue in 1929.  
 Despite lying quite far inland, however, Yunnan’s unique position on the southbound trade routes, 
extending through the jungle to Burma, Thailand, India, Malaysia, and so on, meant that it in fact was tied into the 
same maritime system of exchange as Hong Kong or Shanghai—and at a point more proximate to Muslim-majority 
regions. Accordingly, Qingzhen duobao was one of the earliest Chinese Muslim periodicals to publish news on 
current conditions in multiple Muslim countries and regions including Afghanistan, the Dutch East Indies, India, 
Syria, and Turkey. In April 1929, it also published an article on “the Arabs of the South Seas.” In 1929, Qingzhen 
duobao published a series of articles on “education reform and Islam.” Around the same time, the future Chinese 
Azharites Ma Jian and Na Zhong began writing for it, as did Zhao Zhenwu, the editor of Yuehua (see below). 
Benite, “Taking ‘Abduh to China,” pp. 249-67; Ma Dexin s, Chaojin tuji (n.p. 1864); Ma Fuchu yigao, 
“Kelanjing zhijie [Clear Explanation of the Holy Quran],” Qingzhen duobao 2.1- (1929-30); Qingzhen duobao 2.4, 
2.6; Zhao Bin, “Zhu ci san [Congratulatory Poem No. 3],” Qingzhen yuebao 1/4 (May 1915), p. 5; Zhao Bin, 
“Baihua xiangjie yimani fuzhu xuyan [Prefatory Statement Regarding the Use of Ordinary Chinese to Explicate 
Issues of Belief],” Qingzhen yuebao 1/4 (May 1915). The last article by Zhao was a discussion of the use of ordinary 
Chinese (baihua), rather than classical Chinese (guwen), to address issues of Muslim belief (Ar. al-iman; Ch. 
yimani). 
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the bustling print capitalist culture of Beijing, Shanghai, and elsewhere, Chinese Muslim textual 
transnationalism became more transnational, and Chinese Islamic modernism became more 
modernist. We could even say that Chinese Muslim periodicals both became more Chinese, if 
that is taken to mean sharing certain social spaces, a certain common knowledge of “current 
events,” a certain sense of participating in and witnessing national and interational politics, and 
certain vocabularies and aesthetics tied to the print media form. Chinese Muslim publications in 
the 1920s and early 1930s entered into a more intense and plural dialogue with Han intellectual 
trends, Orientalist and missionary knowledge, and Islamic thought from outside China. With this, 
Chinese Muslims’ calls for reforming Islam, concerned primarily with questions of doctrine and 
curriculum, expanded into a more fully modernist Islamic modernism interested also in broader 
questions such as Islam and science, Islam and women’s rights, Islam and representative political 
systems, Islam’s role in human history, and so on.  
Several Chinese Muslim publications arose in Shanghai, China’s main center of print 
media, commerce, and intellectual exchange. One of the earliest was Zhongguo huijiao xuehui 
yuekan (“Chinese Islamic Study Society Monthly,” though calling itself The China Muslim in 
English).105 Its Arabic title was al-I‘lam, perhaps best understood in this context to mean 
“spreading knowledge”; the Arabic subtitle further described it as an “intellectual, literary, and 
religious publication of the Chinese Islamic Study Society.” Imam Da Pusheng was a frequent 
contributor, as were others who would later write for Yuehua.  
On one level, Zhongguo huijiao xuehui yuekan exemplified the multiregionalism of urban 
Chinese Muslim print media, publishing multiple articles about Egypt, Java, Johor, Turkey, and 
                                                 
 
105 Zhongguo huijiao xuehui yuekan (1926-29). This was funded partly by Chinese Muslim medical institution: the 
Tianfang zhongyi yuan. 
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Delhi.106 At the same time, however, it edged Chinese Muslim print media further toward 
political integrationism and Arabo-centrism. Like many Chinese Muslim publications both 
before and after it, Zhongguo huijiao xuehui yuekan maintained a particular interest in the 
question of the translation of the Quran (see below), serving as both a publisher of translated 
Quran excerpts and as a forum where the debate over Quran translation played out.107 In the 
foreword to the first issue, the editors stated that the translation of the Quran into Chinese was 
one of the two most important tasks facing Chinese Muslims, and conceded that the task 
remained as yet incomplete due to linguistic challenges and to the fact that the original was the 
“language revealed by God” (zhenzhu qishi zhi wen).108 The drive to translate the Quran in its 
entirety should not necessarily be seen as contradicting the gradually increasing Arabo-centrism 
of publications such as Zhongguo huijiao xuehui yuekan, for both Arabo-centrism and emphasis 
on comprehending the Quran were symptoms of the larger quest for “correct” belief. Quran 
translation also carried integrationist implications, for it made the core text of Islam legible to 
anyone who could read Chinese, Muslim or non-Muslim. 
In addition, Zhongguo huijiao xuehui yuekan’s version of multiregionalism still reflected 
a quest for “correct” belief. Unlike certain other Chinese Muslim publications at the time, it did 
not exhibit influence from the Ahmadiyya or other allegedly heterodox movements; rather, it 
privileged voices claiming to represent Islamic modernism. Significantly, it also contained the 
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107 Jin Chuqing, “Gulanjing hanyi zhi shangque [The Debate over the Chinese Translation of the Quran],” Zhongguo 
huijiao xuehui yuekan 1/6 (June 1926), pp. 13-14; Jin Ji, “Ba Zhao jun Zhenwu lun yi gulanjing shang Wang 
Jingzhai ahong shu [Addendum to Mr. Zhao Zhenwu’s Discussion of Imam Wang Jingzhai’s Translation of the 
Quran],” Zhongguo huijiao xuehui yuekan 1.6 (June 1926), pp. 14-17; Tian Zhen, “Gulanjing hanyi zhi xuanyan [A 
Declaration Regarding Chinese Translation of the Quran],” Zhongguo huijiao xuehui yuekan 1.6 (June 1926), pp. 
17-18. 
 
108 “Fa kan ci [Foreword],” Zhongguo huijiao xuehui yuekan 1.1 (January 1926), p. 5. 
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kernel of greater Arabo-centrism, devoting more attention than earlier Chinese Muslim 
publications to the unique role of the Arabs in Islamic history, as well as the role of Arabic in the 
institution of orthodoxy. In fact, according to the foreword to the first issue, the other most 
important issue confronting Chinese Islam besides translation of the Quran was the “deficiency 
of propagation” (xuanchuan quefa) of correct beliefs in China, as opposed to heterodox or 
superstitious ones. The publication bore the stamp fo Da Pusheng. In the beginning, it explained, 
Islam had been brought to China by the Prophet’s maternal uncle, Sa‘d bin Abi Waqqas, who 
traveled to Guangzhou by sea. In subsequent generations, however, the great distance between 
China and Arabia, and the relatively proximity of Persia, meant that Persians “altered the nature 
of Islam in China,” and that “China’s Muslims began studying in the Persian language…and use 
of Arabic books became more specialized and infrequent.” The fact that Muslims needed to 
study Chinese in order to go about their daily life, it said, further contributed to the relative 
marginalization of Arabic.109 Although the publishers did not quite say it outright, the 
implication was clear enough that revivifying Chinese Islam required reversing the dominance of 
Persian over Arabic. 
The establishment of Yuehua in 1929 by Chengda Academy represented the culmination 
and elaboration of many of the trends contained in Xinghui pian, Zhongguo huijiao xuehui 
yuekan, and other similar publications.110 Chengda’s headmaster was Ma Songting (1895-1992), 
the youngest of the “Four Great Imams,” and its dean was Tang Kesan (1882-1950). Ma and 
Tang coordinated with the warlord Ma Fuxiang and later with his son Ma Hongkui, each of 
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110 Matsumoto, “Rationalizing Patriotism”; Matsumoto, “Completion of the Idea of Dual Loyalty.” 
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whom served as chair of Chengda’s board, to keep financial support flowing. This relationship 
was eased by the fact that Tang Kesan also worked as a deputy of Ma Fuxiang in the Mongolian-
Tibetan Affairs Commission (see Chapter Two).111 
Yuehua was Chengda’s most important cultural product. It aspired to be the leading voice 
representing all the Muslims of China. In Arabic, Yuehua called itself Nadarat al-hilal (“Youth 
of the Crescent”), and described itself as “a journal of religion, science, society, and morals.” 
Established two years after the consolidation of the GMD government at Nanjing, Yuehua 
represented a new phase in Chinese Muslim publishing in which efforts to connect with the 
outside Islamic world and Muslims’ support for the government both intensified. The 
publication’s state objectives suggest how this duality was not viewed as a contradiction: 
1.  To implement Islamic doctrines consistent with modern [xiandai] trends;  
2.  To introduce news about Muslims [huimin] in other parts of the world;  
3.  To improve awareness of Muslims in China [zhongguo huimin] and 
improve their status;  
4.  To clear up misunderstandings between the New and Old Teachings;  
5.  To strengthen a conception of the nation-state (guojia guannian) among 
Muslims in China;  
6.  To promote education and a better livelihood for Muslims in China.112 
 
The first two goals clearly require contact with the Islamic world outside China. The first states 
in so many words that the ulama, authors, instructors, and students associated with Yuehua and 
Chengda sought to import Islamic modernist thought—without explicitly acknowledging that it 
was imported, or from where. The second, introducing news about Muslims elsewhere, served 
multiple purposes: overcoming Chinese Muslims’ isolation, identifying authoritative sources of 
“correct” belief, and (perhaps more debatably) studying the conditions of Muslim communities 
                                                 
 
111 Mao, “Muslim Educational Reform.” 
 
112 Yuehua 1.1; originally translated in Mao, “Muslim Educational Reform,” p. 157 (I have made only minor 
adjustments). 
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across multiple new Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority nation-states in order to anticipate 
by analogy what their own fate in China would be. The third goal operated on both Islamo-
centric and Sino-centric levels: Chinese Muslims wanted Muslims elsewhere to be aware of their 
situation because improved connections would in turn support the first goal of improving Islamic 
knowledge and practice in China, and they also wanted non-Muslim Chinese to be aware of their 
history so as to mitigate intercommunal conflict. The fourth goal (reconciling the New and Old 
Teachings) is the most encoded: it refers to the modernists’ argument that doctrinal differences 
between the Jahriyya and Khufiyya Sufi brotherhoods were to blame for outbreaks of violence 
across the northwestern frontiers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.113 According to the 
thinking of the Yuehua group (and coastal Muslim elites and their supporters generally), if such 
differences could be explained away or shown to rest on unacceptable foundations, such violence 
would not return and Chinese Muslims would be able to live in peace with their non-Muslim 
neighbors. The fifth goal (“strengthening Muslims’ conception of the nation-state”) speaks 
clearly to Yuehua’s pro-state stance, whereas the sixth (education reform), while superficially 
positive, would also serve to incentivize Muslims’ integration into Chinese society.  
In the 1930s, several new Muslim periodicals were established in the capital Nanjing, and 
several more were established whose titles contained the term Xibei (“the Northwest”). Among 
these, Chenxi and Tujue were dedicated to showcasing Muslim accomplishments such as the 
expansion of education or their participation in the GMD government. Xibei was published by 
the Beiping-based Xibei gongxue, whose headmaster was the prominent Muslim official Sun 
Shengwu. Tianshan, meanwhile, concerned itself especially with issues related to Xinjiang. 
                                                 
 
113 Lipman, Familiar Strangers, Chs. 4-5. 
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Huijiao qingnian is a particularly interesting case: founded by the Chinese Muslim government 
official Wang Zengshan (see Chapters Four and Six) in Nanjing in 1936, its inaugural issue listed 
Chiang Kai-shek, Lin Sen (honorary president of the Republic), Sun Fo (son of Sun Yat-sen), 
Wang Shijie (minister of education), Ma Liang (a Muslim general from Liaoning), Masud Sabri 
(a Uyghur MP in the GMD government), and Wang Zengshan himself as members of its board. 
Huijiao qingnian advocated that “Muslim youths,” after being trained in new-style schools, 
move to the frontiers to spread both modernist Islam and Chinese patriotism. Not only this: by 
1940, when it could have retreated to Chongqing with the government, the periodical had instead 
relocated to Lanzhou, the capital of Gansu Province, to make good on its support for GMD goals 
on the northwestern frontiers. The first article in its first issue post-relocation was an 
inspirational wartime message from Chiang Kai-shek to China’s Muslims that cited Quran and 
Hadith in the context of fighting the enemy, Japan. After its move, Huijiao qingnian published 
multiple pro-government articles in Arabic and Uyghur, hoping to reach its target audiences on 
the frontiers more effectively. Chapter Two will return to these issues. 
 
Textual Transnationalism II: Multiregionalism and Arabization by Accident 
 
A central but under-studied figure in the development of Muslim institutions and modern print 
media was ‘Abdullah Siddiq Zhao Zhenwu (a.k.a. Zhao Bin, 1895-1938) of Zhuoxian, Hebei 
Province. In China and Islam, Pang Shiqian praised Zhao as a “lifelong servant of Islamic 
learning.”114 More than any other individual, Zhao connected the figures, institutions, and trends 
of textual transnationalism, and embodied the circuitous path by which China’s urban coastal 
                                                 
114 Tawadu‘ (Pang), al-Sin wa-l-Islam. 
 
 75 
ulama and their lay associates came to emphasize the Arabic language and Islamic modernist 
thought over other languages and ideological orientations.  
Zhao was educated at Beijing’s Niujie Mosque under Wang Kuan and Da Pusheng. There 
he studied Arabic as well as Turkish with unknown instructors.115 As a young student in the early 
1910s, Zhao worked with Sun Shengwu (1894-1975; see Chapters Two, Four, Six) to support 
educational reforms at Niujie, bringing poor children into the madrasa to learn Chinese and 
Arabic. After his Niujie years, Zhao became increasingly involved in the educational and 
political structures of the Beiyang and GMD governments. At some point in the early years of 
the Republic, Zhao enrolled in the “Frontier Governance Department” at the Beijing Law 
College (Fazheng zhuanmen xuexiao bianzheng xi). After graduating, he went to the Altai region 
of Xinjiang, where his activities included conducting ethno-linguistic studies of the local 
Muslims.116 He returned to Beijing in 1923. Growing in status, he was appointed as a lecturer in 
history at Yanjing University and as a civil servant in the Beijing Municipal Government. By 
1926, he became a regular contributor to the abovementioned Zhongguo huijiao xuehui yuekan 
of Shanghai as well as to the similar Yunnanese publication Qingzhen duobao. In 1928 he was 
appointed instructor in Chinese and Islamic history at Chengda Academy.117  
Zhao’s career reached its pinnacle in October 1929 when he was appointed managing 
editor of Yuehua. Because editor-in-chief Sun Youming was rarely in Beijing, Zhao Zhenwu 
took charge of most of the paper’s daily affairs and earned himself the nickname “housekeeper.” 
                                                 
115 The Turkish instructor may have been Sa‘id al-‘Asali, according to research in progress by David Brophy. 
 
116 Zhao Bin [Zhenwu], “A’ertai zhi huijiao [Islam in the Altai Region],” Yuehua 2.3-2.10 (1930). Published also in 
Qingzhen duobao (1929.7). 
 
117 Most biographical details are from Wei Sheng, “Yi Zhenwu xiansheng [Remembering Mr. Zhao Zhenwu],” 
Yuehua 11/28-29-30 (1939), pp. 8-9. 
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Zhao wrote several series of articles for Yuehua. In 1932, he accompanied Ma Songting to Egypt 
to deliver the second study abroad delegation to al-Azhar (see Chapter Four). During that 
journey, in the early morning of 22 February, Zhao went with the Azharite Na Zhong to the 
Matba‘at Sharikat al-Tamaddun al-Sina‘iyya (the “Civilization Manufacturing Co. Press”) to 
purchase a set of Arabic moveable type. Zhao specially marked the occasion in his travelogue, 
exclaiming “We succeeded in purchasing the Arabic type set, Praise be to God!118 After 
returning to China in 1933, he painstakingly inverted the type and carved new castings by hand 
in order to make more sets, making possible the spread of Arabic printing in China.119 Thanks to 
Zhao, Chinese Muslims could now print in Arabic for the first time. With this, the potential to 
pursue Yuehua’s abovementioned objectives—implementing modernist doctrines, providing 
news about Muslims elsewhere, improving awareness of Muslims in China, disseminating 
“correct” beliefs, encouraging patriotism, and promoting education reform—increased 
dramatically, for it offered the opportunity to present those agendas to China’s various Muslim 
communities in an aesthetically and substantively “authentic” manner. 
Zhao’s purchase of the Arabic type coincided with and facilitated a transformation in the 
format and aesthetic of Yuehua. In its first year, 1929-30, Yuehua looked like any Chinese 
newspaper, with multiple blocks of text spread across large pages. As it imported Muslim 
periodicals from outside China, however, it adopted the format of a journal or magazine, with a 
single field of text, or perhaps two or three columns, per page, beginning in its second year 
(1930-31). As time went on, its Arabic title and subtitle also became more prominent and 
                                                 
118 Zhao, Xixing riji, p. 130. 
 
119 After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, Zhao Zhenwu was ill and did not move south with Chengda. He 
stayed in Beijing. He died in 1938 at age 43. 
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stylized. Moreover, the contents of any given issue would include the latest installment in a 
senior imam’s serial on doctrine (usually a translated or original exegesis of an important excerpt 
from Quran or Hadith), discussions of Islamic cultural or historical issues (also by prominent 
ulama), translations of and commentaries on major Islamic writings from outside China, 
translations of and commentaries on Orientalist writings (with particular attention to correcting 
their errors), editorials on important current events, answers to important questions of doctrine 
and practice (for example, prayer, diet, fasting, marriage, funerals, and so on), and news and 
correspondences from both the “Islamic world” and from Muslim communities around China. In 
other words, as it interacted with Muslim periodicals from outside China, Yuehua became more a 
publication of Islam, and less simply a publication about Islam.  
In accordance with Yuehua’s stated priorities, one of Zhao’s accomplishments as 
managing editor was to improve contact with Muslims abroad. Before setting off on his own 
travels of 1932-33, Zhao undertook this task by publishing notices in English in Yuehua and 
initiating correspondences with the editors of similar publications across the Islamic world. For 
the time being, eagerness to make contact with Muslims outside China outweighed insisting on 
Arabic as the language of outreach. Under Zhao, Yuehua used English to great effect in forging 
contacts with Muslims in British India, British Malaya and even the Netherlands East Indies. 
Their first English-language notice (April 1931) explained that Yuehua was  
an organ of Muslim[s]...which we beg to send...to all the brethren of the world. 
Regarding the social and religious condition of your area...we are very earnestly 
[sic] to have some information from your point, frequently, [e]specially any of 
your valuable periodical[s] and pamphlet[s].120 
 
“All the brethren of the world,” while hyperbolic in the literal sense, nevertheless signals that 
Yuehua saw value in contacting multiple Muslim regions, not just the Arab Middle East. A 
                                                 
120 “Notice: Yueh Hwa Magazine,” Yuehua, 5 April 1931. 
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subsequent issue announced, again exclusively in English, the receipt of letters “from every 
quarter of the world asking for...news of Chinese Muslim conditions [and the] addition of some 
sheets written in Arabian [sic] or English in Yueh Hwa.”121 The strategy was working: contact 
with Muslims outside China was on the rise. While use of Arabic in Yuehua increased in the 
mid-1930s, the editors apparently saw use of English as pragmatic, not unduly compromising to 
Islamic authenticity.  
While Zhao’s correspondences with foreign Muslims themselves are not extant (other 
than what was published in Yuehua), we do know which foreign publications Yuehua received as 
a result, because they were listed with volume information toward the back of each issue of 
Yuehua from 1931 to 1933 (Volume 3, Number 10 through Volume 5, Number 24). These 
periodicals, numbering thirty-six titles and over three hundred issues in total, vividly illustrate 
the contingency, eclecticism, and multiregionalism of Chinese Muslim textual transnationalism, 
but also the emerging overall trend in favor of Arabic and Islamic modernism. 
 
TABLE 3. Foreign Periodicals Received by Yuehua, 1931-33, by Region of Origin122 
 



































Bandung; Malay; Persatuan Islam 
Singapore; English; Hadramis 
Batavia; Dutch; Jong Islamieten Bond 
Makassar; Malay 
Singapore; Arabic; Arab community 
Java; Dutch 
Singapore; Arabic; Arab community 
?; Malay? 
? 
Singapore; Malay; Hadramis and Malays 
BRITAIN, EUROPE, & RUSSIA 
3 
6 
Review of Religion 
“Why I Accepted Islam” 
? 
1 
London; English; Ahmadiyya 
?; English; Ahmadiyya? 
                                                 
121 “Notice,” Yuehua, 25 May 1931.  
 
122 An earlier version of this table appears in John Chen, “‘Just Like Old Friends’: The Significance of Southeast 
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TOTALS 35 >335  
  
 
Again, measured through exchange of print media, the Arab Middle East was neither the 
first nor the decisively dominant region shaping Chinese Muslim thought about the Islamic 
world, even as late as the early 1930s. Instead, Zhao’s overtures at first proved especially 
effective in making contact with Southeast Asian periodicals, which Zhao requested in exchange 
for copies of Yuehua. Ten of the thirty-five foreign publications received by Yuehua, and no 
fewer than five of the first eight, came from Southeast Asia. Significantly, both the number of 
titles and number of issues received from Southeast Asia exceeded that from the Arab world. 
Among them were Pembela Islam, of the Bandung Muslim modernist movement Persatuan 
Islam; Het Licht, of Batavia’s Jong Islamieten Bond; and The Real Islam, of Singapore’s 
Hadrami community.123 
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In addition to being received earliest and longest, Southeast Asian publications collected 
by Yuehua were especially consequential insofar as they laid the groundwork for Chinese 
Muslims to engage the Hadrami diaspora. Venerated figures of southern Yemeni origin who 
trace their ancestry to the Prophet, as indicated by their use of the title “Syed” (Arabic: sayyid), 
Hadramis began settling in Singapore in the early nineteenth century, not long after Sir Stamford 
Raffles’ colonization of the island. Their patriarchs in this era were Syed Abdul Rahman 
Alsagoff (i.e. al-Saqqaf), Syed Sharif Omar bin Ali Aljunied (i.e. al-Junayd), and others.124 They 
made fortunes in spices and real estate, intermarried with local royalty, maintained strong ties to 
Arabia and the Indian Ocean rim, and acted as trustees of the city’s Muslim community through 
the institution of pious endowments (Arabic: awqaf). Their philanthropy focused on schools, 
mosques, hospitals, cemeteries and the Hajj.125 Overall, the Southeast Asian Hadramis provide 
one example of how Arabic language and culture resonated far outside the Middle East. They are 
significant here, however, because they became political and cultural (and perhaps commercial) 
allies of the Chinese Muslim elites in multiple contexts, including but not limited to the GMD-
sponsored Chinese Muslim wartime diplomatic delegations (see Chapter Four). 
Even the first Arabic-language publication Yuehua received did not come from the 
Middle East, but from Southeast Asia. This was al-Huda126 edited by A.W. Aljelany (i.e. ‘Abd 
                                                 
123 The image and theme of “light” cuts across several boundaries between Islamic movements and languages. Het 
Licht, Nur al-Islam i.e. Majallat al-Azhar, The Light, Yiguang (Wang Jingzhai), Huiguang (a Shanghai-based 
Japanese multilingual publication on Islam, with significant attention to India). 
 
124 Ma Dexin’s Chaojin tuji states that he in fact met Syed Sharif Omar bin Ali Aljunied in Singapore in the 1840s 
(see Chapter Five). 
 
125 Ho, Graves of Tarim, 2006, p. 70. In 1939–40, the Hadramis were among the most powerful and welcoming 
constituencies to meet the Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation. See Chapter Four. 
 
126 Al-Huda is a Quranic term meaning “sound guidance” or “the well-guided path,” and can serve as a modifier of 
the Quran itself, as in Quran 2:2: Dhalika al-kitabu la rayba fihi hudan li-l-muttaqin (“This is a book about which 
there is no doubt, a guide for the pious”). 
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al-Wahid al-Jilani) of Haji Lane, a well-known street in Singapore’s Arab quarter packed densely 
with local Muslim organizations of transnational reach. Al-Huda became the foreign publication 
received in greatest quantity by Yuehua. Yuehua’s receipt of al-Huda resulted from a personal 
connection: Aljelany had met Zhao Zhenwu and Ma Songting in Singapore on 15 December 
1932, while the two were en route to Cairo, Jerusalem, and the Hijaz. Aljelany received Zhao 
and Ma warmly and even referred them to his father, who was working in Egypt and would meet 
them upon their arrival there (thanks to Aljelany’s advanced notice to his father, the plan did 
indeed come to fruition).127  
For those Chinese Muslims who could read it, al-Huda offered news from the Islamic 
world; the who’s who of Singapore’s Arab community; coverage of the controversy between 
Ahmad Surkitti’s “reformist” Irsyad movement and the “traditionalist” Ba ʿAlawi sayyids; and 
reviews of other Southeast Asian periodicals, some of which the Yuehua editors could not 
themselves read.128 Al-Huda gave particularly extensive attention to Southeast Asia’s Hadramis. 
During Zhao and Ma’s visit to Singapore in 1932-33, they were not granted a meeting when they 
attempted to visit Syed Ibrahim bin Omar Alsagoff (grandson of the patriarch). By the time the 
                                                 
 
127 Roff, Bibliography of Malay Periodicals, p. 39. 
 
128 “Pambala Islam,” al-Huda, 22 February 1932, p. 5; “Al-Ustadh al-Surkitti,” al-Huda, 4 April 1932; “Tarikh al-
Irshad [History of the Irsyad Movement],” al-Huda, 25 April 1932, p. 13; “Radd al-Ustadh al-Surkitti ‘ala al-Sayyid 
Ibrahim al-Saqqaf [Al-Surkitt’s Response to Syed Ibrahim Alsagoff],” al-Huda, 9 May 1932, p. 3; “Editorial 
Notice,” al-Huda, 24 October 1932, p. 6. 
Another potential effect of al-Huda was to provide a glimpse of how Arabic-speaking Singaporeans viewed 
China and Islam in China. In its brief existence (1931–33), al-Huda also published a three-part feature entitled 
“Islam in China,” which speculated on the origins of Chinese Islam while giving scant treatment to the thirteen 
hundred years that followed its arrival there, instead arguing that other than the few Muslims, “the Chinese do not 
have ‘religion’ as conventionally understood, but a mixture of philosophies into which enters a good deal of 
superstition.” Clearly, Chinese Islam, more than China generally, held some novelty for Arab Singaporeans, and one 
could say that the determination subsequently shown by the Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation to educate its 
hosts was not altogether unjustified. “Al-Islam fi-l-Sin,” 2 January 1933, p. 1; “Al-Islam fi-l-Sin (II),” 16 January 
1933, p. 11; “Al- Islam fi-l-Sin (III),” 20 February 1933, p. 11. Al-Huda had also published a more obscure earlier 
article having to do with a Chinese Muslim: “Sini Muslim yubashshir bi-l-Islam [A Muslim Chinese Preaching 
Islam],” al-Huda, 20 June 1932, p. 10. 
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Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation met Syed Ibrahim in 1939-40, however, each side had 
learned considerably more about the other. 
Chinese Muslims’ turn toward Arabo-centrism and Islamic modernism in the early 1930s 
appears to have resulted from a controversy over the Ahmadiyya. Through Zhao Zhenwu’s 
outreach efforts, Yuehua also came into possession of a number of Ahmadiyya publications from 
India, Europe, and Britain. The Ahmadiyya were a controversial Islamic movement founded by 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian in the late nineteenth century; later, a second branch developed 
in Lahore. While the Ahmadiyya became highly influential for its widespread work in South 
Asia and Europe and its apologetic explanations of Islam, it was reviled by figures such as 
Rashid Rida due to its loose approach to matters of doctrine, its embrace of English and other 
non-Islamic languages, and above all, its founder’s claim to be a new savior figure in Islam. 
Most of the Ahmadiyya publications Yuehua received were indeed written in English.129 By this 
point, Yuehua had received relatively few publications in Arabic or from the Arab Middle East.  
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a group of Beijing-based Chinese Muslims calling 
themselves the “Searching Academy” (Zhuiqiu xuehui, literally “Seeking Knowledge Study 
Society”) published a set of translations of Ahmadiyya works into Chinese, including M. Manzur 
Ilahi’s The Muslim Catechism and Maulana Muhammad Ali’s Islam: The Religion of Peace.130 
                                                 
129 Yuehua also received copies of the Berlin-based German Ahmadiyya publication Moslemische Revue. Based on 
translated articles and citations appearing in Yuehua, it appears that the English-language publications, such as the 
London-based Islamic Review and Review of Religion, were the easiest for Yuehua authors to read. By contrast, 
there is little evidence that they were able to read the Malay- or Dutch-language materials they received from 
Southeast Asia, though they collected them all the same. The Yuehua editors and authors would theoretically have 
been able to get at least a sense for the contents of the Malay- and Dutch-language publications once they began 
receiving the Arabic-language al-Huda, published in Singapore, as this publication carried advertisements and 
summaries of Pembela Islam and Het Licht. 
 
130 Musilin de qidao [Muslim Prayers], translated by Zhuiqiu xuehui (Beiping: Qingzhen shubao she, n.d.); M. 
Manzur Ilahi, Wen da [Questions and Answers; originally The Muslim Catechism], translated by Zhuiqiu xuehui 
(Beiping: Qingzhen shubao she, 1930); Maulana Muhammad Ali, Heping de zongjiao [Islam: The Religion of 
Humanity], translated by Zhuiqiu xuehui (Beiping: Qingzhen shubao she, 1930). 
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The same group also published a monthly periodical that frequently quoted Ahmadiyya 
sources.131 Far more remarkable than the mere existence of these translations is the fact that they 
were published by the Chinese Islamic Book Company (Qingzhen shubao she, literally “Pure and 
True Publishers”) at Niujie Mosque, the birthplace of the Arabic revival under Wang Kuan and 
Da Pusheng.  
As a whole, the list of foreign periodicals received by Yuehua from 1931 to 1933 forces 
us to reconsider the weight of the Arab world as against that of other Muslim regions in Chinese 
Muslim practices of textual transnationalism. A particularly conspicuous absence from that list is 
Rashid Rida’s al-Manar (Cairo, 1898–1935), one of the most sustained, widespread and 
influential voices in the history of Islamic modernism (it is also an ironic absence given Rida’s 
fierce polemics against the Ahmadiyya).132 Al-Manar lacked an official circulation in China, and 
as Masumi Matsumoto notes, “there is no evidence that the contributors of the [sic] Yuehua 
subscribed to this journal.”133 Al-Manar does not appear among the periodicals that Yuehua 
received, despite its intimate involvement with the Muslim reformists across Malaya whose 
publications the Chinese Muslims possessed. In fact, al-Manar contains but one instance of 
direct contact with Chinese Muslims, in May 1930, when it published a fatwa request (istifta’) 
from Ma Ruitu, editor of Tianfang xueli yuekan (see above chart), with Riḍā’s response.134  
                                                 
131 Zhuiqiu xuehui, Zheng dao a.k.a. The Justice (Beiping: Qingzhen shubao she, 1931-34). Zheng dao was directly 
connected to Zhao Zhenwu, though it is not entirely clear how, given that the “Searching Academy” members 
remained mostly anonymous. At least one advertisement for a book edited by Zhao Zhenwu and also published by 
the Qingzhen shubao she appeared in Zheng dao in October 1931. 
 
132 Interestingly, a Southeast Asian derivative of al-Manar, the Islamic modernist Kaum Muda’s publication al-
Munir, also does not appear on Yuehua’s list, even despite Yuehua’s relatively robust engagement with Southeast 
Asian periodicals. On al-Munir and the Kaum Muda, see Roff, Origins of Malay Nationalism. 
 
133 Matsumoto, “Rationalizing Patriotism,” pp. 147-48. 
 
134 Muhammad Rashid Rida, “Risala muhimma min al-Sin fi hal man fiha min al-muslimin [An Important Letter 
from China on the Muslims Living There],” al-Manar (Muharram 1349 i.e. May-June 1930), p. 75. I am grateful to 
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In other words, just as Zhao Zhenwu’s efforts to make contact with Muslim publications 
outside China did not focus exclusively on Arabic publications, they also did not single-
mindedly seek out publications identifiable as Islamic modernist—this in spite of Zhao’s studies 
with Wang Haoran and Da Pusheng. On the contrary: the presence of so many Ahmadiyya 
publications, and the glaring absence of al-Manar, vividly illustrate that Zhao’s outreach project 
was highly uneven and eclectic, and—as he admitted in Yuehua’s English-language notice—
aimed at connecting with any and all Muslim groups outside China. It was not inevitable that 
Yuehua would come to espouse Islamic modernism at the expense of movements such as the 
Ahmadiyya, or that it would come to place such a high value on the Arabic language.  
Nevertheless, not long thereafter, a greater emphasis on Arabic language and Islamic 
modernism is precisely what came about, due largely to the Ahmadiyya controversy itself. In 
1932, Yuehua published an article on this controversy by the Chinese Muslim scholar Hai 
Weiliang, then only twenty years old and studying at the Nadwat al-‘Ulama in Lucknow. Hai 
wished to convey a “word of caution” to Chinese Muslims in China. The purpose of this 
admonition was to dissuade Chinese Muslims from relying on Ahmadiyya writings, and instead 
advocate greater attention to Islamic modernist thought produced in Arabic.135 Hai sympathized 
with Chinese Muslims’ impulse to reach “all the brethren of the world,” but criticized the 
Ahmadiyya’s heterodoxy nonetheless: 
Muslims in our country have long maintained a closed-door policy, having little 
contact with Muslims outside China, and understanding little of the situation in 
other countries…Upon seeing that a given book has something to do with Islam, 
they will regard it as a priceless treasure! While I respect their hard work and 
                                                 
Aaron Glasserman for pointing out that the author of the istifta’ was Ma Ruitu. Al-Manar also published occasional 
coverage of China and Islam in China, often translated from European sources (see Introduction and Chapter Five). 
 
135 Hai Weiliang, “Jinggao guonei rexin jiaowu zhi tongbao [A Word of Caution to my Coreligionists at Home Who 
Eagerly Seek News of Islam Outside China].” Yuehua 4.6 (1932), 11-14. 
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enthusiasm, I must alert them to a certain unnatural strain that is harming and 
polluting Islamic belief.136  
 
Hai accused the Ahmadiyya of promoting “sectarianism” (zhipai zhuyi) and compared its 
founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, to Martin Luther, citing his abandonment of the 
“original innate unity of Islam” (huijiao xingben datong). This failure to emphasize unity, Hai 
continued, had made the Ahmadiyya complicit in British imperialism.137 Hai noted that in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, a Beijing-based group of Chinese Muslims (i.e. the Searching 
Academy) had translated several Amhadiyya publications into Chinese. Hai appreciated their 
eagerness for contact with Muslims outside China, but could not accept their failure to prioritize 
unity and correct belief. In place of Ahmadiyya teachings, Hai urged his readers to study the 
“pan-Islamism” of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, which “fifty years ago empowered Muslims and 
struck fear into the British.” He also referred them to “anti-Ahmadiyya” publications including 
al-Manar, al-Rabitah al-Sharqiyyah, and Umm al-Qura.138  
There was a backstory to this. The evolution of Zheng dao’s contents and format 
demonstrate that Hai elected not to marginalize the publication, but to commandeer it in the 
service of an Arabo-centric Islamic modernist orientation. Hai had in fact managed to publish an 
                                                 
 
136 Hai, “Jinggao,” p. 11. 
 
137 This line of reasoning echoed that of certain Islamic modernists, who remained skeptical of any identity that 
risked sowing divisions between Muslims, and who repeatedly assailed the Ahmadiyya in al-Manar and al-Fath, 
labelling it “Islamic messianism” (al-masihiyya al-islamiyya). 
 
138 Hai, “Jinggao,” p. 13. Hai’s article was one of the first in Yuehua to mention al-Manar. Scholarship on the 
Nadwat al-‘Ulama makes clear that Hai would have been exposed to al-Manar and other similar Arabic periodicals 
during his time in Lucknow, where Nadwa scholars imported many such publications—just one component of their 
tremendous emphasis on the Arabic language as the sole legitimate vehicle for accessing Islamic knowledge. As 
Muhammad Qasim Zaman states, these included Mecca’s Umm al-Qura, Damascus’s Fata al-‘Arab, Hajj Amin al-
Husayni’s al-Jami‘a al-Islamiyya, and Rashid Rida’s al-Manar, as well as al-Hilal, al-Muqtataf, Majallat al-Zahra, 
al-Majma‘ al-‘Ilmi, al-‘Irfan, and al-Fath. The purpose of these periodicals was not only to hone Nadwa students’ 
linguistic skills, but also to provide a window onto “issues of Arab and Islamic identity, and…nationalism, 
secularism, and Islam.” Zaman, p. 66. 
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anti-Ahmadiyya warning in Zheng dao itself, similar to the Yuehua one and a few months earlier 
than it.139 Shortly thereafter—and shortly before Hai’s warning essay appeared in Yuehua—the 
editors of Zheng dao published a notice in Chinese and English in which they cited evidence that 
the Ahmadiyya in India had claimed them as a branch organization, using this as a pretext to 
renounce the Ahmadiyya in the same breath:  
We are exceedingly surprised to note from an open letter signed by a certain Mr. 
Wu of Peiping in “The Light”, vol. X, No. 41, November 1, 1931, a journal 
published in India in English, that our “Searching Academy” is stated as being 
one of their branches of the Young Moslem Society in Peiping and the four 
pamphlets of Chinese literature on religion published by us, as well as the piodical 
[sic], Cheng Tao “The Justice” which he wrongly quotes as “The right path” 
belong to their Society. You have probably noted that in the first issue of our “The 
Justice” an announcement was made that our “Searching Academy” is entirely an 
independent organization. We neither receive any allowance nor do we solicit for 
any contribution from anywhere for any purpose. It is surprising that such an is-
statement [sic] has been made by Mr. Wu in “The Light”, which is not only 
insulting but fraudulent. In order to call the attention of the public to this matter, 
this formal announcement is hereby made by the “Searching Academy” in 
addition to the warning which we made to Mr. Wu, that such an assertion is 
entirely baseless.140 
 
The following month (January 1932), at the same time that Hai was preparing his Yuehua 
warning, he published an entirely normal article in Zheng dao 2/1—that is, one that was 
expository rather than critical or prescriptive.141 He then published additional installments of this 
essay in 2/2 and 2/3, and new material in 2/4. Significantly, in 2/5, he published the first 
installment of a translation of Shakib Arslan’s Limadha ta’akhkhara al-muslimun wa limadha 
taqaddama ghayruhum (The Causes of Muslims’ Decline, and of Others’ Progress, 1930), an 
                                                 
139 Hai Weiliang, “Zhongguo huijiao jianglai yingyou de dongxiang [The Trend Chinese Islam Must Follow from 
Now On],” Zheng dao 1/7 (15 November 1931), pp. 221-28.   
 
140 I have not yet found extant copies of the relevant issues of The Light. 
 
141 Hai Weiliang, “Yindu hui yin jiaotu zai zhengzhi shang zhi jiufen [The Political Conflict between Muslims and 
Hindus in India],” Zheng dao 2/1 (15 January 1932), pp. 24-29.  
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Arabic pan-Islamic tract consistent with modernist values.142 Finally, beginning with issue 2/7 
(15 July 1932), Zheng dao, perhaps at Hai’s suggestion, added an equivalent Arabic title, al-Sirat 
al-mustaqim—“the straight path,” a modifier for Islam drawn from the Fatiha (Quran 1:1). 
In short, the Arabo-centric and modernist turn in Chinese Muslim textual 
transnationalism came about almost entirely by accident, thanks to the brief but colorful 
Ahmadiyya controversy. Zhao Zhenwu, with the best of intentions, had been taking things in a 
completely different direction and teetering (allegedly) on the edge of “heterodoxy,” until Hai 
Weiliang intervened from Lucknow (where he appears to have been the only Chinese Muslim at 
the time). From that point on, Zhao learned his lesson. From 1932 until his premature death in 
1938, he became an instrument of modern Chinese Islam’s Arabization and adoption of Islamic 
modernism. In December 1932, he and Ma Songting set out on a journey to the Middle East. On 
the way, they held meetings in Singapore, Cairo, Jerusalem, and the Hijaz—but, notably, not in 
India. In the process, they delivered the first group of Chengda Academy students to al-Azhar; 
made arrangements with al-Azhar and King Fu’ad I of Egypt to have two Azhar instructors sent 
to China, to teach Arabic and Islamic doctrine at Chengda; accepted a gift of Arabic Islamic texts 
from the king; collected instructional materials from al-Azhar to be used at Chengda; and made 
the abovementioned purchase of a set of Arabic moveable type.143 The full consequences of 
these actions will become clear over the rest of this study.  
The immediate result, however, was to consolidate the turn toward Arabo-centrism and 
Islamic modernism. From that point on, prioritization of the Arabic language and Islamic 
                                                 
 
142 Shakib Arslan, “Shijie huijiao minzu luohou zhi yuanyin [Reasons for the Backwardness of the World’s Muslim 
Peoples, i.e. Limadha ta’akhkhara al-muslimun wa limadha taqaddama ghayruhum],” translated by Hai Weiliang, 
Zheng dao 2/5 (15 May 1932), pp. 130-36. 
 
143 Zhao, Xixing riji. 
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modernist thought increased dramatically at Chengda and on the pages of Yuehua. This shift was 
visible in several ways: the ongoing calls for stricter implementation of correct belief from senior 
imams such as Da Pusheng, the “doctrinal research” (jiaoyi yanjiu) efforts of Chengda Academy 
scholars and Yuehua authors, the abovementioned Arabization of Yuehua’s appearance, and 
Yuehua’s growing number of translations of Arabic-language Islamic modernist writings.  
 
Curricular Reform: Continuity and Change in Chinese Madrasas 
 
Again, education reform was a major concern for modernist Chinese Muslims. How did urban 
coastal Chinese Muslims’ increasingly Arabo-centric and Islamic modernist priorities influence 
curricula in Chinese madrasas? How much did textual changes mirror the ideological shift? 
By the 1930s, the madrasa curriculum—classic Islamic texts, and the manner of 
transmitting and engaging with them—increasingly differed between the Northwest frontiers and 
the urban coastal regions. Northwest frontier Sufis and urban coastal Muslims used some of the 
same texts, but these texts operated in completely different “Con-Texts” and involved differing 
practices of transmission and authority.144 Moreover, even when texts used in the Northwest 
happened to coincide with those in the coastal regions, they would have largely arrived through 
contrasting routes. To be reductionist for the sake of clarity, one circulation was pre-modern and 
land-based, relying on caravan towns connecting to Central Asia, and the other was modern and 
sea-based, relying on port cities connecting the South China Sea and Indian Ocean rim.  
Beginning in the late seventeenth century, Sufis sheikhs in the Northwest would transmit 
texts orally through memorization to a group of students, supplemented by a variety of ritual 
practices body movements.145 Chanting was also common among some groups: the Jahriyya, for 
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example, chanted sacred verses called Mukhammas based on the Qasidat al-Burda of the 
Egyptian poet Sharaf al-Din al-Busiri (d. 694AH/1296AD), as well as encomia of the Prophet 
called Mada’ih.”146 These verses are used by certain Chinese Muslims to this day, with large 
groups of men and/or women chanting in unison, following a lead vocalist.147  
In terms of doctrinal and instructional materials, each Sufi brotherhood (Ar. tariqa; Ch. 
menhuan) in the Northwest accumulated its own set of texts over the four centuries since 
Sufism’s arrival, depending on the experience of the imam.148 The Huasi Gongbei of Hezhou 
(Linxia), for example, still possesses the texts Ma Laichi (1680s-1760s) and his eight generations 
of descendants collected beginning with Ma’s journey to Mecca in the 1730s.149 Among these 
are the tafsir (Quranic exegesis) Ruh al-bayan, by the Ottoman Naqshbandi Ismail Haqqi al-
Bursawi (1063-1137AH/1652-1725AD); the Sufi masterwork al-Futuhat al-makkiyya (“Meccan 
Revelations”), by Ibn al-‘Arabi (560-638AH/1165-1240AD); and the Prophetic genealogy 
Mawlud al-nabi. Huasi also possesses a number of significant objects such as Ma Laichi’s ijaza 
granted in Mecca in the 1730s, a miniature black velvet “ka‘ba cover” also brought back by Ma, 
and, even more remarkably, a scroll containing an complete miniature Quran claimed to have 
                                                 
145 This image of “rote memorization” at the feet of a sheikh was itself to an extent an essentialization of Sufis and 
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been produced by Abu al-Qasim bin Muhammad al-Junayd al-Baghdadi (220-298AH/835-
910AD), a central figure in the chain of early Sufi masters.150  
As the presence of the Ruh al-bayan suggests, the formation of the northwestern 
menhuan was shaped by the reformist currents of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Sufi 
(especially Naqshbandi) revival in the Ottoman lands, India, Yemen, and elsewhere. These Sufi 
influences from points south and west led to the emergence of a “New Teaching” (xinjiao) in 
Northwest China, which used new texts such as the Ruh al-bayan in conjunction with some 
much older Sufi classics such as Ibn al-‘Arabi’s al-Futuhat. Disagreements over ritual resulting 
from these developments brought schisms and violence among the Muslims of the Northwest, 
and also set them as a whole apart from the “Old Teaching” (laojiao) of the gedimu (from Arabic 
qadimun, the “ancient ones”), who claimed descent from the first Muslims to arrive in China.151 
Meanwhile, in eastern China (and parts of Yunnan and Sichuan), the establishment of 
teacher-training schools such as Chengda Academy produced a drive toward standardization not 
witnessed in the Northwest. Centralized training of ulama eventually meant that students in a 
given town or village would no longer necessarily be taught only by the imam from that place, or 
use only the texts he had used.152  
                                                 
150 Information about Huasi is based on author’s visit there in September 2015. Lipman, Familiar Strangers, also 
mentions some of these objects and texts as being held there. Ruh al-Bayan is known as a popular Sufi tafsir among 
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Encyclopaedia of Islam 2; A.J. Arberry, “al-Djunayd,” Brill Encyclopaedia of Islam 2.  
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 Before that standardizing turn toward Arabic language and Islamic modernism, however, 
the training of ulama in eastern China during the Qing and early Republic shared broad features 
in common with madrasas throughout Asia and Africa, and remained closer in style to the 
Northwest as well. Pang provides the following description in China and Islam:  
Some madrasas in China are very old, others new. Both types have elementary 
and advanced levels. Elementary schools are widespread; there is generally one 
attached to each mosque. These are attended by the Muslim children of a given 
area once they reach the age of four years, four months, and four days. First they 
learn to spell, then they study the meaning of the shahada: that there is no god but 
God, and that Muhammad is His prophet. Then they memorize the Khatm al-
Quran prayer, the Surat al-kahf, and the Kitab al-da‘awat…then they read some 
portions of the Noble Quran, and study the three Persian books, al-Fasl, al-
Mahammat, and ‘Umdat al-Islam. The first of these is a treatise on iman and 
‘aqida, and the second and third deal with the rules of worship. This course of 
study prepares students wishing to continue to the advanced stage…   
Advanced schools are to be found in some mosques. The costs are born by 
the community as a whole [al-qawm ajma‘in]…Here students study etymology 
and morphology, derivation, and case inflection… 
These madrasas have no formal exams. The judgment of the ahong 
determines when a student has completed his studies and deserves his degree 
[shahada]. At this point the student will be given a special green robe and white 
head covering, and a two-meter by one-meter cut of red silk, on which is written 
the sciences in which he successfully completed his studies, as well as the areas 
where he distinguished himself in understanding and ijtihad. He is recognized by 
the entire Muslim community during Eid. After this, he will be known as ahong, 
or ‘alim. Imams do not receive a fixed salary, but receive donations from the 
community, especially on occasions such as weddings and holidays.153 
 
Chinese Muslims divided Qing-era madrasa curricula loosely between the basic prayers and 
Arabic language at the primary level versus advanced Arabic grammar and substantive topics at 
the advanced levels. Students would often learn some Persian or Turkish as well before moving 
on to scripture, doctrine, law, and other genres. Importantly, Sufi influences and Turkic and 
Persian sources played a large role. Chinese Muslims’ access to texts was constrained, however, 
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by their physical distance from other Muslim societies, resulting in relatively fragmented textual 
collections, and by uneven Arabic abilities, resulting in a few key texts enjoying elevated status.  
According to Pang, the following five works form the elementary course of study in the 
Arabic linguistic sciences of etymological discrimination (al-ishtiqaq), morphology (al-sarf or 
al-tasrif), derived word structures (al-bina’), case inflection (al-i‘rab), and grammar (al-nahw): 
(1) Al-Ishtiqaq wa-l-sarf, by Baha al-Din al-Kashgari 
(2) Al-Zinjani, by Ibrahim bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Zinjani 
(3) Al-‘Aza, by Hussein Faydullah al-Kashgari 
(4) Al-‘Awamil, by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jami, a work on nahw  
(5) Al-Misbah, by Sheikh Hussein, a preacher in Kashgar, on nahw, and also including 
his sharh titled Dau’ al-misbah.154 
 
Pang then lists the following substantive works as constituting the advanced level of study:   
(1) Mullah Jami, by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jami, on nahw 
(2) Talkhis al-bayan, by al-‘Allama Sa‘d al-Taftazani155 
 (3) Sharh al-wiqaya, by ‘Abdullah bin Mas‘ud, on fiqh 
 (4) Tafsir al-Baydawi, by Nasir al-Din al-Baidawi 
 (5) ‘Aqa’id al-Nasafi, by Najm al-Din ‘Umar al-Nasafi156 
 (6) Usul al-Shashi, on usul al-fiqh 
 (7) al-Khutab, by al-Farisi, on hadith 
 (8) Lam‘at, by al-Farisi, on tasawwuf [i.e. Sufism]157 
 
Pang notes that the above books are collectively known as the “Thirteen Texts,” and are studied 
in all advanced madrassas in China. He adds that the following may be studied as well:  
(1) Tafsir al-Jalalayn, by al-Mahalli and al-Suyuti 
(2) Tafsir al-Nasafi, i.e. the ‘Aqai’d of al-Nasafi and the accompanying Sharh al-‘aqa’id 
al-nasafiyya by al-Taftazani 
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(3) Tafsir Hussein al-Farisi, i.e. the Tafsir-i Mawahib by Husayn bin Ali al-Wa’iz-i 
Kashifi (d.910/1505) 
(4) Arba‘un, on hadith 
(5) Sharh Durr al-Mukhtar, on fiqh, by Ibn ‘Abidin (a.k.a. al-Shami)  
(6) Maqamat al-Hariri, on Arabic literature (adab) 
(7) al-Mathnawi al-Farisi, the famous magnum opus of Rumi.158  
 
 
This curriculum was relatively narrow and eclectic compared to what one might find in the 
Middle East (though perhaps less so compared to madrasas in more remote regions). It also 
displayed abundant Turkic and Persian influences as well as an emphasis on Sufism. As was the 
case elsewhere in the Islamic world, many of these texts would lose ground in the twentieth 
century’s new-style Chinese Islamic schools in favor of more standardized, and Arabo-centric set 
of texts approved by Islamic modernists. This process, however, unfolded unevenly: a number of 
texts, even some of Persian provenance, remained in the curriculum into the twentieth century. 
The overall changes (or attempted changes) in Chinese madrasa curricula in the early 
twentieth century, however, are undeniable. Not only were Persian and Turkic texts increasingly 
marginalized, but the approach to learning Arabic was also modified through external influences. 
Modernist Chinese Muslims imported a new set of texts to teach the basics of proper recitation 
(tajwid), morphology (sarf), grammar (nahw), and reading (qira’a). Though in practice few 
students could achieve it, greater emphasis was placed on accurate pronunciation and trying to 
learn the Arabic language as native speakers learned it. For example, in the 1930s, Chengda 
Academy printed its own edition of al-Qira’a al-rashida, a multi-volume Arabic textbook 
published in 1931 by the Egyptians ‘Abd al-Fattah Sabri Bey (a ministry of education official) 
and ‘Ali ‘Umru Bey (secretary-general of the Egyptian University, later Cairo University). Zhao 
Zhenwu received this and other textbooks on 17 January 1933 from a man identified only as 
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“‘Ali,” who may have been the second of the two authors himself.159 In eastern China, this would 
have been used as an advanced text given that its contents were entirely in Arabic. Crucially, this 
same textbook was increasingly used at this time to teach Arabic in India and Indonesia.160 
Chengda’s emphasis on Arabic thus increasingly resembled that of madrasas around the 
Indian Ocean, all of them under the pedagogical influence of Cairo. Chengda imported and 
translated dictionaries as well as textbooks. Imam Wang Jingzhai produced a Chinese translation 
of the Ilyas Arabic-English dictionary, and the standard encyclopedic dictionary al-Qamus al-
muhit began to appear in Chinese Muslim book catalogs around the same time. Da Pusheng also 


















FIGURE 4. Cover and title page of the Chengda Academy edition of al-Qira’a al-rashida 
(1930s). From the author’s collection. 
  
 Beyond textbooks, textual differences in the formal genres of Islamic knowledge between 
the coastal versus frontier regions also became more pronounced in the early twentieth century. 
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The infrastructures of textual exchange were simply transforming much more rapidly in eastern 
China.161 As with textbooks, the most important consequence of this process was that textual 
collections in Shanghai and Beijing came to resemble those of madrasas elsewhere in the greater 
Indian Ocean world (Java, Delhi, Cairo) more closely than they resembled those of the menhuan 
in the Northwest. The problem was that ulama in eastern China were not familiar with all the 
material they had brought in, and were overwhelmed by its volume—hence the need to learn 
more about these texts from Muslims abroad, especially from al-Azhar. The potential inherent in 
this project was clear, however: accumulating and mastering a more complete set of classic 
Islamic works than that held by frontier Muslims was crucial to the eastern ulama’s drive to 
claim claiming a more authentic knowledge of Islam than their northwestern counterparts.  
Increasing access to a wider range of primarily Arabic texts prompted Chinese ‘ulama to 
undertake a new phase of translation and pedagogical reform that differed from earlier ones. In 
contrast to the more fragmented, Turkic- and Persian-influenced madrasa curricula of the Qing 
era, by the late 1920s and 1930s institutions such as Chengda and Shanghai Islamic Normal 
School enjoyed access to a greatly expanded collection of Arabic works in most of the major 
genres of Islamic knowledge, as evidenced in lists such as the Shanghai Chinese Islamic 
Bookstore’s (Zhongguo huijiao shuju) “Ramadan sale” catalog (see FIGURE 5). This Shanghai 
catalog reflected a more complete subdivision of the revealed and transmitted Islamic sciences 
(al-‘ulum al-naqliyya)—as opposed to the rational sciences (al-‘ulum al-‘aqliyya)—conforming 
to the system set forth in the tenth century by al-Khwarizmi (780-850) and revised thereafter by 
Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) in his Muqaddima: that is, (1) scripture (mashaf, i.e. the Quran) (2) 
Prophetic traditions (hadith) (3) exegesis (tafsir) (4) jurisprudence (fiqh), and (5) Sufism 
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(tasawwuf); the Shanghai list also added a separate section for the doctrine of God’s unicity 
(tawhid).162 In addition, the Shanghai list included the major categories of the Arabic linguistic 
sciences: tajwid, sarf, and nahw, plus rhetoric (balagha), and language (lugha, here meaning 
especially dictionaries). Several works of “history” (tarikh) were also included, though some 
were apparently miscategorized (such as al-Futuhat al-Makiyya, a work of philosophy). The 
occasional flaw aside, this increasing systematization of Islamic knowledge, and its increasing 
conformity to madrasa curricula elsewhere in the Indian Ocean rim, reflected the cumulative 
collection efforts of Wang Kuan, Ha Decheng, Da Pusheng, Wang Jingzhai, Ma Songting, and 
Zhao Zhenwu from the 1900s to the early 1930s (the Shanghai catalog in particular is likely to 











FIGURE 5. “Ramadan sale” catalog of Islamic sciences holdings of Shanghai Chinese Islamic 
Bookstore, 1930s. Source: Rev. Claude L. Pickens, Jr., Collection on Muslims in China, 
Harvard-Yenching Library, Box 17. 
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The linked preferences for correct belief and Arabic language embodied in the Shanghai 
catalog did not materialize immediately upon the reception of new texts. With certain texts, even 
basic comprehension of the contents took time. Simply put, Chinese ulama knew that they did 
not know everything they were looking at or how it all fit together. At this juncture, Chinese 
Muslim scholars writing in Yuehua and elsewhere therefore called repeatedly for the need to 
undertake “research on doctrine” (jiaoyi yanjiu).164 This new doctrinal research movement 
further widened the textual differences between coastal versus northwestern Chinese Muslims, 
and narrowed differences between the coastal Chinese ulama and their counterparts around the 
Indian Ocean. These shifts manifested themselves unevenly but discernably across the various 
genres of Islamic knowledge.  
First and foremost in the hierarchy of the ‘ulum naqliyya comes the Quran itself. The 
Quran was familiar to Muslims across China before the twentieth century, but this familiarity 
had limits. At the beginning of the century, most Muslims in China had a sense for its 
significance and knowledge of some of its verses, but did not necessarily possess a full copy of 
the Arabic original, and if they did, could not necessarily understand its meanings. Differences in 
Muslims’ relationship to the text had emerged over the generations, furthermore, in the 
Northwest versus the eastern cities. Northwestern Muslims may have preserved the Quran 
physically to a greater extent than Muslims in eastern China, and appear to have known it more 
thoroughly, relied on it more consistently, and reproduced it in greater quantity even before the 
age of print.165 Meanwhile, it is not clear exactly how widespread or how emphasized the Quran 
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was in eastern China before the twentieth century.166 The Muslims of the Northwest, more 
densely populated and farther from the capital, also appear to have preserved their ability to 
comprehend the Arabic original better than Muslims in eastern China. After all, Arabic was 
traditionally the main written language of literate northwestern Muslims. Again, though they 
spoke a dialect of Chinese, even the literate did not always know Chinese characters, and instead 
developed a method known as xiao’erjing to transliterate Chinese using Arabic. Accordingly, 
northwestern Muslims may have adhered to the belief that the Quran can only be properly 
understood in its original Arabic, for Arabic was not merely a record of God’s creation and will, 
but God’s word itself, and was therefore not translatable into other languages.167 By contrast, 
Muslims in eastern China had translated aspects of the Quran’s meaning into Chinese since the 
late Ming. Moreover, their relationship to Arabic script in the Qing and early Republican eras 
was the inverse of the Northwest: fully literate in Chinese for generations, their scholars did not 
use xiao’erjing, but rather used Chinese characters to create phonetic approximations of Arabic.  
That being said, Muslims in eastern China did not translate the Quran in its entirety 
before the twentieth century. Only in the 1920s and 1930s did urban coastal ulama begin to 
argue that it should be translated. Pang Shiqian tells us that the full translation of the Quran was 
one issue “on which the ʿulama of China disagree, because it has been so belated.”168 Yuehua in 
particular became an organ for advocates of translation, for several reasons. One was pressure 
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from China’s burgeoning translation and publishing industry, which led to the first two Chinese 
Quran translations being produced by non-Muslims Tie Zheng and Ji Juemi in 1927 and 1931, 
respectively.169 The appearance of non-Muslim translations not only put the Chinese ulama in an 
awkward position by making them seem unwilling or unable to produce their own translation, 
but also contained, in the words of Pang, a “number of errors” they felt compelled to correct.170 
These errors resulted partly from the fact that the two non-Muslim translations had relied in only 
small part on the Arabic original. Additional factors prompting the first Muslim Chinese Quran 
translation are catalogued in Yuehua. For example, missionaries had used Arabic to disguise 
Christian propaganda as Islamic tracts, which they managed to disseminate among Chinese 
Muslims.171 Incidents such as these prompted Chinese ulama to realize that mere reverence for 
Arabic as a holy language was not sufficient when their faith was under attack. Chinese 
Muslims, the argument went, needed to understand the meaning of the Quran in order to relate 
their faith to “modern trends” and to defend it against the missionary onslaught.172 On an even 
more basic level, furthermore, Chinese ulama worried about the ability of their students and 
community at large to grasp the basic content of that faith if it were not taught in Chinese, the 
only vernacular they could comprehend. Thus, a reliable Quran translation, Muslim-led and 
based solely on the Arabic original, came to be seen not as blasphemy but as an absolute 
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necessity by the Yuehua-affiliated ulama and other Muslim leaders in eastern China. Writing on 
this point in Yuehua, the future Chinese Azharite and wartime diplomat Wang Shiming spoke of 
“our weakness in the Arabic language” and the need to “propagate correct and reliable doctrines 
among our coreligionists” (xuanchuan zishi jiaoyi de zhengque).173 The Chinese ulama soon 
asked Sheikh Ilyas Wang Jingzhai of Tianjin, who had studied for several years in Egypt, to 
undertake the translation.”174 Wang’s finished product, published in 1932 as Gulanjing yijie, 
finally provided Chinese Muslims with a reliable approximation of the Quran’s meanings. 
Quran translation is one instance where the “Arabization” of Chinese Islam clearly 
emerges not as the antithesis of “Sinicization,” but as a crucial facilitator of it. As the Shanghai 
catalog shows, Arabic Qurans were being imported from abroad during the Republican era and 
sold in China. Even though most Chinese Muslims could not read the Arabic, Chinese ulama 
insisted that an authentic Quran translation must be based on an Arabic original. At the same 
time, as Henning and Matsumoto have also argued, translation would not only make Islam more 
accessible to Chinese Muslims, but also render it more legible and less threatening to non-
Muslim audiences in China, both official and popular, in order to serve the ends of integrationist 
Chinese Muslim leaders. The normative preference for preserving the original Arabic text lost to 
the normative preference for accommodating a nationalistic and homogenizing Chinese state and 
society, while still remaining as “authentically” Islamic as possible. 
On the other hand, Chinese Quran translation resulted from a “push” and not only a 
“pull.” Several Azhar sheikhs, including Yusuf al-Dijwi, Mustafa al-Maraghi, and Muhammad 
al-Khidr Hussein—all of whom knew and taught Chinese Muslims—wrote on the topic of 
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translation of the Quran, with the balance being (qualifiedly) in favor. In addition, the Egyptian 
‘alim Muhammad ‘Abd al-Latif bin al-Khatib (“Ibn al-Khatib,” 1900-81), in his work al-Furqan, 
also advocated translation of the Quran (Ibn Khatib was also known to the Chinese Muslims: his 
other work, Awdah al-tafasir, appeared in the Shanghai catalog).175 While most of these figures 
agreed that the Arabic, as the language of God, was ultimately untranslatable, they nevertheless 
believed that the Quran’s meanings could and should be rendered in other languages, and that 
such a task was worthwhile in pragmatic terms given the need to promote Islam in a world where 
a majority of Muslims were not native Arabic speakers. The Azhar sheikhs were articulating 
these positions precisely at the moment when the Chinese Muslim students were arriving there 
(early 1930s), coinciding with the greater turn toward Arabo-centrism (if not Arabic itself).176  
 The Chinese Muslim translation movement did not stop at the Quran. As is the case 
elsewhere in the Islamic world, Muslims in twentieth-century China came to rely on hadith, the 
recorded sayings and deeds of the Prophet, as the second most authoritative textual tradition after 
the Quran. That said, despite its weight in Islam generally, Hadith in China, even more so than 
the Quran, has a relatively uncertain history. The two Hadith collections now considered most 
authoritative, Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, are not attested in the Qianlong list.177 The 
main text (matn, i.e. excluding footnotes, commentaries, etc.) of both, however, are listed in the 
Shanghai Chinese Islamic Bookstore’s catalog from the Republican era, along with an 
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explanatory commentary (sharh) on Sahih Muslim. In addition to these, the Shanghai catalog 
lists only one other hadith work, Imam Malik’s al-Muwatta’.178 
 Chinese ulama did study some hadith before the 1930s. Da Pusheng, Wang Jingzhai, and 
Ma Songting studied hadith at Wang Kuan’s Niujie school. The text they used was probably the 
Arba‘un, work of Persian origin that was long present in China (and that appears on Pang 
Shiqian’s list of the thirteen texts traditionally studied in Chinese madrasas).179 A related or 
possibly identical work to the Arba‘un was the Khutab (Ch. Hu-te-bu), a Persian collection of 
sermons and commentaries on hadith, probably translated from the Arabic original al-Khutab al-
arba‘in al-wad‘aniyya many centuries earlier by the Mosulite Muhammad bin ‘Ali bin ‘Abdullah 
al-Mausili bin Wad‘an bin Nasr (d.489/1096).180 Neither the Arba‘un nor the Khutab, however, 
appear in the Shanghai bookstore catalog, which lends support to the generalization that Persian 
works were losing favor to Arabic ones by the 1930s. 
As in other genres, the Chinese ulama’s shift to a more comprehensive and Arabo-centric 
engagement with hadith began only at the end of the 1920s. At this time, Ma Ruitu, editor of the 
Hong Kong-based periodical Tianfang xueli yuekan, began publishing discussions of hadith, or 
shengxun.181 Yuehua picked up on the trend in 1930, with Wang Jingzhai publishing an article on 
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the problem of false hadith. Citing an Arabic essay from an unknown source, he gave fifteen 
examples of hadith that were found to be “baseless” (wu gen de, equivalent to Arabic saqim or 
“infirm,” the lowest of the four hadith classifications). Wang warned that these fifteen, and many 
more, were “not the actual words of the Prophet.”182 
Nevertheless, reform of hadith knowledge progressed slowly. In 1936, the young ‘alim 
Ma Hongyi of Jincheng, Shanxi, who would later join Pang Shiqian in the sixth delegation of 
Chinese Azharites, took up Wang Jingzhai’s challenge of translating hadith and separating the 
solid from the unreliable. For most of that year, Ma published a series of articles in Yuehua titled 
“Selected Hadith Translations.”183 Finally, in the late 1940s, after returning from Egypt, Ma 
published another series of articles in Yuehua translating the “essence” of the Sahih al-Bukhari 
collection. As already mentioned, Chinese Muslims had possessed this work for several years by 
this point, for it appears on the Shanghai bookstore list. Ma’s translations of 1947, however, 
appear to be the first time this most authoritative hadith collection was discussed in depth in a 
Chinese Muslim periodical. Ma evidently had maintained his focus on hadith while in Cairo, and 
he notes in Yuehua that the Azhar ulama had selected some of its most important passages for 
Ma and the other Chinese Azharites to translate. Ma’s rather rudimentary explanation of hadith 
in the introduction to the Yuehua series on al-Bukhari hints at Chinese Muslims’ general lack of 
exposure to the genre, as well as the limitations of the Chinese Azharites’ capabilities:  
Among the Islamic classic texts, in addition to the Quran, is the Sahih al-Bukhari 
collection. It is something all Muslims scholars across the Islamic world must 
read. Because they are so numerous, however, and not all relevant to Chinese 
scholars, the Grand Council of ‘Ulama at al-Azhar decided on a set of seven 
hundred essential passages for our use. Following this decision, Professor ‘Abd 
al-Jalil helped us by adding commentary on these seven hundred passages.184 
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In other words, Ma Hongyi’s research on hadith, greatly facilitated by the opportunity to study at 
al-Azhar, began to fil an important gap in the Chinese ulama’s quest to comprehend and institute 
“correct belief” in the first half of the twentieth century.  
 Despite the shift toward hadith, the genres of Quranic exegesis (tafsir, pl. tafasir), 
foundational catechisms (‘aqida, pl. ‘aqa’id), and explanatory commentaries (sharh, pl. shuruh), 
were much more well-established in China. With regard to tafsir literature, its richness in China 
confirms the recent scholarly assertion that it has been too long seen as “merely an auxiliary 
science” and “just an extension of the foundational text of Islam.”185 On a basic level, the need 
for authoritative explanation of the Quran stems from the fact that many of its passages cannot be 
taken fully literally; therefore, ulama over the centuries interpreted scripture according to their 
understanding of one or more schools of Islam (madhhab, pl. madhahib) and, in some cases, to 
their own informed views.186 
The prominence of tafsir, ‘aqida, and sharh makes particular sense in China: the isolation 
of China’s Muslims from Muslims elsewhere, as well as the need to defend Islam before a non-
Muslim majority, made clear and reliable explications of Muslims’ beliefs particularly valuable 
genres. Perhaps this explains why a number of tafasir and shuruh appear in both the Qing-era 
and Republican-era lists. In the Shanghai catalog, such works are listed after the Quran (and 
before hadith), presumably meaning they were considered quite fundamental. They were also 
more numerous than the Shanghai list’s hadith works, particularly when we include the works on 
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tawhid, totaling eleven as opposed to the four works of hadith. More significantly, tafsir and 
other doctrinal works embody a more revealing combination of long-held and newly-acquired 
texts. As a whole, these works reinforce our impression of eastern Chinese ulama’s gradual 
movement from a relatively eclectic and fragmentary engagement with classic texts to a more 
orthodox and comprehensive one in the early twentieth century—and as such, their divergence 
from textual trends on the frontiers and greater conformity with those found outside China. 
 The tafsir works in the Shanghai catalog do not represent a total rupture from the Qing-
era curricula. The oldest exegetical text that appears on both Pang Shiqian’s list of works used in 
Qing times and in the Shanghai catalog is the Tafsir al-Jalalayn (“Tafsir of the Two Jalals”), 
initiated by the Mamluk-era Egyptian scholar Jalal al-Din al-Mahalli (790-864AH/1389-
1459AD) and completed by his pupil Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (859-911AH/1445-1505AD). The 
work employs a word-by-word approach, with marginal commentary (hashiya) arranged on 
facing pages surrounding the core text (matn) of the Quran, as was the common practice. 
Importantly, the Tafsir al-Jalalayn became popular for being one of the most accessible Quranic 
exegeses, due to its plain style and relatively short length (only a single volume).187 Brevity and 
accessibility no doubt explain the text’s popularity among Chinese Muslims who, as Pang noted, 
often struggled with the grammatical intricacies and unfamiliar sounds of the Arabic language. 
The Tafsir al-Jalalayn was reproduced multiple times before the nineteenth century, and 
reprinted at least fourteen times in the nineteenth century and again in 1934, so it is entirely 
possible that it arrived in China on multiple occasions and by multiple routes.188 In sum, the 
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presence of the Tafsir al-Jalalayn on the Shanghai list—and by extension, in the growing 
collections of the Chinese ulama of the eastern cities—demonstrates some continuity in the 
genre of exegesis in China from the Qing to Republican eras.  
 Provocatively, the Shanghai catalog’s tafsirs sometimes overlapped with texts held by the 
Northwest Sufi brotherhoods. Another major tafsir on the Shanghai list is the abovementioned 
Ruh al-bayan (“Essence of Elucidation,” or the “Soul of the Quran”). The provenance of this 
work differs completely from the Tafsir al-Jalalayn: as indicated above, it was produced by 
Ismail Haqqi al-Bursawi (1063-1137AH/1652-1725AD), a Mujaddidi (“reformer” or 
“revivalist”) of the Khalidi branch of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. While Ismail Haqqi was an 
Ottoman from Bursa, the Ruh al-bayan became popular particularly in South Asia, and was 
eventually translated into Urdu. The presence of this Sufi revivalist tafsir in the otherwise 
modernist Shanghai catalog is surprising due to the overlap with the holdings of the Naqshbandi 
Huasi (see above). It is also surprising for its sheer length—ten volumes of five to six hundred 
pages each—which might have felt prohibitive for Chinese Muslims who, as Pang tells us, 
struggled with the Arabic language. The easy conclusion is that the coastal Muslims did not use 
it extensively.189  
                                                 
in circulation throughout the Middle East, India, and East Africa, “where he, from Cairo, played the role of 
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 We should not assume, of course, that the presence or absence of a particular text suffices to prove a 
particular ideological orientation. After all, madrasas around the Indian Ocean more often than not held texts from 
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 The Shanghai catalog’s tafsirs exhibit considerable temporal and geographical diversity. 
A newer tafsir on the Shanghai list, and one whose presence is more readily understandable, is 
the Awdah al-tafasir (“Clearest of Tafsirs”). Produced by the abovementioned Egyptian scholar 
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Latif bin al-Khatib when he was only in his thirties, this one-volume tafsir 
was well-received in Egypt and received the endorsement of several Azhar sheikhs including 
Yusuf al-Dijwi.190 Meanwhile, the Fath al-qadir, authored by the Yemeni scholar Muhammad 
al-Shawkani (1173-1255AH/1759-1839AD) and considered a foundational tafsir, also appeared 
in the Shanghai catalog. While miscategorized the work as fiqh, the significance is that Chinese 
Muslims were importing a wide array of texts from multiple Indian Ocean locales. 
Perhaps the most interesting work in the Shanghai catalog was the ‘aqa’id (creed) of Abu 
Hafs ‘Umar Najm al-Din al-Maturidi al-Nasafi (d. 537AH/1142AD), and the accompanying 
commentary (sharh) by Sa‘d al-Din Mas‘ud bin ‘Umar bin ‘Abdullah al-Taftazani (722-
93AH/1322-90AD). Both al-Nasafi and al-Taftazani lived and worked in the environs of 
Samarqand. Al-Nasafi’s work was the “first abridged form of the creed according to the 
scholastic method of the new orthodoxy.”191 We do not know when their texts first became 
available in China, but it is reasonable to expect that it could have done so quite early given the 
huge influx of Muslim officials, scholars, soldiers, scientists, and texts into China from Central 
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Asia and the former ‘Abbasid lands during the Mongol Yuan (1272-1368). Pang Shiqian 
includes Taftazani’s sharh on his list of works commonly used in old-style Chinese madrasas. 
Furthermore, Pang states in China and Islam that the Yang Zhongming, a prominent member of 
the Chinese ulama, had translated the Nasafiyya into Chinese.192 In other words, despite the fact 
that the Nasafiyya and Taftazani’s sharh had long been present in China, Chinese ulama in the 
Republican era did not cast it aside (in contrast to other classic texts of Persian or Central Asian 
provenance), but rather further disseminated it as a valuable guide to correct belief.193  
Why were al-Nasafi and al-Taftazani so highly regarded among modernist Chinese 
Muslims? Simply pointing to a blanket preference for Arabic and Arab authorities does not 
suffice here: although al-Nasafi and al-Taftazani wrote in Arabic, they were not themselves Arab 
and did not live in the Arab lands. Adherence to the Hanafi madhhab, which became important 
to Chinese Muslims in certain other contexts, is also probably not the primary reason here either, 
for although al-Taftazani is usually categorized as Hanafi, he was also versed in the Shafii 
tradition and is sometimes identified as Shafii.194 It appears the answer had more to do, rather, 
with the more subjective perception of al-Nasafi and al-Taftazani’s works as “reliable and 
correct.” Despite their medieval and Central Asian provenance, al-Nasafi’s ‘aqa’id and al-
Taftazani’s sharh are listed in the Shanghai catalog in the section on tawhid, alongside 
Muhammad ‘Abduh’s Risalat al-tawhid, one of the most important works of Islamic modernism.  
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A colorful episode from the early years of the Chinese Azharites sheds light on why this 
may have been the case. In the abovementioned July 1934 lecture on Islam in China organized in 
Cairo by Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib and attended by ‘Abduh’s primary disciple, Rashid Rida, Ma 
Jian noted that the “Muslims of China hold the Sharh al-‘aqa’id al-nasafiyya in high esteem, 
though there are some who reject it or at least view it with skepticism.”195 Ma’s otherwise brief 
comment came in the context of a discussion of doctrinal differences between the Chinese 
qudama’ (i.e. gedimu or laojiao) and the Sufi orders of the Northwest: the former, Ma implied, 
had retained their sense of correct belief, whereas he derided the latter for their “ignorance” 
(jahl) and “superstition” (khurafat)—in the presence of Rida, whose al-Manar was one of the 
main Islamic modernist organs expressing the very same polemics in Arabic. Ma may or may not 
have known that al-Taftazani did indeed have anti-Sufi credentials, being generally regarded as 
anti-Mu’tazilite and having authored a polemic tract against the Sufi master Ibn al-‘Arabi and his 
doctrine of wahdat al-wujud (“the unity of being”).196 What Ma unquestionably did know was 
that his audience included some of the foremost proponents of Islamic modernism, including of 
its anti-Sufi positions. When Ma’s lecture was finished, Rashid Rida praised it as “one of the 
most useful he had heard in years.” Nasafi’s ‘aqa’id was of the oldest classic Islamic works 
known to Chinese Muslims, but the Shanghai catalog now categorized it as a work of “tawhid” 
(the doctrine of the oneness of God, though in this context also meaning “doctrine” more 
generally), placing it alongside Islamic modernist works such as ‘Abduh’s Risalat al-tawhid. To 
be able to claim that one of the oldest Arabic Islamic works used by Chinese Muslims was also 
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the most in keeping with modernist priorities lent tremendous legitimacy to modernist Chinese 
Muslims in their search for an authentic, authoritative Islam that could push back against Sufi 
influence in the Northwest. 
 
Conceptual Convergences: “Islamic Civilization” and its “Arab Essence” 
 
The processes of textual transnationalism detailed above did not occur in a hermetically sealed 
space linking modernist Chinese Muslims only to Islamic modernists elsewhere. Both groups, 
rather, were conditioned by their (often fraught) dialogue with missionaries and Orientalists in 
Europe and North America. The academic and popular histories of such figures—Lothrop 
Stoddard, H.G. Wells, Samuel Zwemer, and others—were disseminated across the Middle East 
and Asia and translated into Arabic and Chinese. Generally speaking, as this process unfolded, 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike often corrected the details and challenged the conclusions of 
missionary and Orientalist studies, but less frequently contested their underlying assumptions. As 
is well known, one of the most important of these assumptions was that human societies are 
divided into discrete and hierarchized units based largely on factors such as religion and race. 
Very broadly speaking, with the First World War, a norm of “Civilization” held to be universal 
and rooted in the European Enlightenment gave way, especially in the eyes of “non-Western” 
political and intellectual leaders, to a more plural notion of “civilizations” rooted in the authority 
of older cultural and religious “traditions.” This transition was reflected linguistically in the 
Arabic distinction between the earlier term tamaddun (a general quality of urbanity) versus the 
later term hadara (a more particular sedentary developedness), and in Chinese between the term 
wenming (more general literary achievement) versus wenhua (more particular literary or cultural 
change). Muslims and Chinese had naturalized such categories, ever since moments such as the 
famous Renan-Afghani debate of the 1880s (in which the French Orientalist and the pan-Islamic 
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activist debated whether or when Islam had lost the “scientific spirit”). The specific result of 
civilizational discourse for Chinese Muslims was that Arabic and Arabness were increasingly 
defined, yet accepted a priori, as the essence of “Islamic civilization.” In other words, just as 
Chinese Muslims were starting to rediscover the Islamic world outside China, the center of that 
world was growing more distant. In earlier centuries, contact with Samarqand or Singapore more 
than sufficed as contact with Islam; now, even many Muslims in those places had come to agree 
that accessing the true Islam meant traveling all the way to Mecca or Cairo. 
 Orientalist and missionary ideas often lived colorful careers within the dynamic of Sino-
Middle Eastern textual transnationalism—and often with surprisingly little resistance. While we 
have noted above Chinese Muslims’ opposition non-Muslims’ translating the Quran, they and 
Muslims elsewhere often saw foreign-produced histories of Islam, curiously, as relatively 
unproblematic. Take for example Lothrop Stoddard (1883-1950), the Harvard historian and open 
white supremacist whose best-known work was The Rising Tide of Color against White World-
Supremacy (1920). Another of Stoddard’s works from the time was titled The New World of 
Islam (1921), which began with an introduction on the “decline and fall of the old Islamic world” 
followed by a discussion of the new “Mohammedan revival.” Such works clearly introduced a 
temporality of “florescence and decline” applicable to all civilizations. They also placed greatest 
emphasis on the role of the Arabs in Islamic history: Stoddard attributed Islam’s decline to the 
transition from the rule of “pure-blooded Arabs” to “mixed-bloods” and corrupting “Turks.” The 
twentieth century revival of Islam, by a similar logic, was being propelled by a “Neo-Arab” 
revival. Stoddard’s implication that Islam was currently undergoing a revival appealed to many 
Muslim readers, despite the author’s broad racism and assertions that this renaissance was 
following a particularly long decline. Stoddard’s New World of Islam was translated between 
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1924 and 1933 by the pan-Islamic activist Shakib Arslan, the same period in which he produced 
his better-known Why Did the Muslims Fall Behind? (Limadha ta’akhkhara al-muslimun?).197 
Even though Arslan tended to emphasize Islamic unity across racial differences, the notion of a 
second rise after the decline resonated nevertheless. 
 In July 1933, Hai Weiliang—then at the Nadwat al-Ulama in Lucknow—referenced 
Stoddard in a Chinese article in Yuehua on British policies toward Arabia and India, in an 
attempt to understand Europeans’ views (he knew that Stoddard was American) toward the 
“Islamic world” and the institution of the “Caliphate.” Hai, while absorbing Stoddard’s 
arguments about the Arabs and approving of his notion of Islmamic “revival,” nevertheless 
extracted several quotations from Arslan’s translation that emphasized the Hajj and the 
institution of the Caliphate, rather than Arabness, as the unifying core of Islam.198 In other 
words, some Chinese Muslims pushed back in certain ways against a growing consensus that the 
Arabs were the best Muslims. At the same time, however, Hai was writing this article while 
studying at the Nadwa, an institution known for its heavy emphasis on the Arabic language as 
the most authentic means of accessing Islamic knowledge. He was also reading Arslan’s writings 
in Arabic, and within two years, he would move to Cairo to continue his studies at al-Azhar, the 
epicenter of the supposedly Arab Islamic revival. There, Hai would compose his Arabic-
language magnum opus al-‘Alaqat bayn al-‘Arab wa-l-Sin [Relations between the Arabs and 
China], a history modeled on the work Relations between the Arabs and India of the Nadwa 
scholar Sulayman al-Nadwi. This history indeed privileged the place of the Arabs in the history 
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of Sino-Islamic relations, and would in turn be cited in his fellow Chinese Azharite Pang 
Shiqian’s work China and Islam—also composed in Arabic. 
 Stoddard and Arslan were not the first time Chinese Muslims encountered the question of 
Arabs, Arabic, and Arabness through a foreign interlocutor. In the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese 
Muslims also payed close attention to the writings of Christian missionaries on Islam generally 
and Islam in China specifically.199 For example, in 1937 the Chinese Muslim Wang Weiling 
published in Yuehua a list of essays on Chinese Islam that had appeared in the Orientalist journal 
Moslem World. Most of these essays had been authored by members of the China Inland 
Mission, known for its extensive studies of and concern with Islam in China. One missionary 
work cited on the list was Marshall Broomhall’s Islam in China: A Neglected Problem (1910).200 
Although Broomhall had spent considerable time in China and with Chinese Muslims and knew 
of the many Persian and Central Asian influences in Chinese Islam, his book began with a 
discussion of “China and the Arabs” during the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates. Moreover, its 
ethnographic sections also focused on features such as Arabic mosque inscriptions. In the case of 
the missionaries, perhaps this tendency to focus on Arabic and Arabness can be explained by 
their education: most members of the China Inland Mission had been sent to Cairo for Arabic 
training (but not Persian training) before proceeding to their assignments in China. In other 
words, they arrived in China already seeing Islam, on a fundamental level, as primarily 
associated with and expressing Arabness. Indeed, they tended to assume that Chinese Muslims 
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“cannot be effectively reached…without an Arabic-speaking missionary.”201 Like Stoddard after 
him, Broomhall spoke of Chinese and Arabs in civilizational terms (though in this case, he rarely 
used the term “civilization” itself). He also, like Stoddard, spoke of the “present Mohammedan 
revival” and its possible implications for China. 
 In short, urban coastal Chinese Muslims were beginning to absorb many of these 
assumptions and vocabularies by the early 1930s. One early example is Li Tingbi’s two 1930 
essay series in Yuehua on the history of Islam (presented, indeed, as the history of Islam). Titled 
“Islamic Civilization” (Yisilan zhi wenhua) and “The Arabs’ Contributions to Civilization” 
(Alaboren duiyu wenhua shang zhi gongxian), these essays focused entirely on the early history 
of Islam and therefore on Arab achievements.202 The increase in terminological commonalities is 
obvious. Li’s essays were based largely on the works of Toynbee, and mentioned features of 
Islamic history such as Galen, Ibn Sina, algorithms, Harun al-Rashid, Cordoba, the Seville 
Alcazar, and the Alhambra (all provided in Roman letters in the midst of the Chinese text). 
Notably, they also mentioned the “Semitic, Hamitic, and Aryan races.” Of course, the routes by 
which such content entered Chinese Muslim circles were often extremely circuitous: another 
Yuehua article from 1929, this time by Zhao Zhenwu, translated an article by Abdürrešid 
Ibrahim, the ex-Ottoman intermediary and founder of the Tokyo Mosque, who instead cited John 
William Draper as his source for an Arabo-centric history of Islam.203 In short, the overall effect 
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was that Chinese Muslims were receiving an Arabized and essentialized image of the Islamic 
world and Islamic history from multiple directions. 
 This trend of Arabizing Islamic history reached its apogee in the work of the brilliant 
Chinese Muslim scholar Bai Shouyi—who later became a leading “Marxist” historian during the 
PRC. As we will see in detail in Chapter Three, Bai’s scholarship on Islamic history, despite 
recovering rich evidence of Islam’s complexity and multiregionalism, nevertheless insisted on 
arguing for a smooth trajectory from “Arab origins” to subsequent “Sinicization.” Without 
giving too much away, the reason for adopting this temporal logic had very much to do with the 
integrationist politics of Chinese Muslim elites in the 1930s. 
In sum, leading Chinese Muslims’ ways of speaking about the “Islamic world,” the 
“Arabs,” and “civilization” were increasingly coming to resemble those of Orientalists and 
missionaries by the early 1930s. In addition to the course of textual transnationalism and 
curricular reform itself, this conceptual convergence must be seen as an additional, crucial factor 
in the coalescence of Chinese Muslims’ normative preference, emerging precisely at this time, 
for the Arabic language and for the authority of Arab voices on Islamic modernism. 
 
Conclusion: The Contingency of “Arabization” 
 
Texts, by their nature, simultaneously embody both imagination and authority. In the first four 
decades of the twentieth century, urban coastal Chinese Muslims’ contact with the Islamic world 
outside China began as an exploratory and extremely heterogeneous process of “textual 
transnationalism” that accompanied the expansion of modernist institutions and publications in 
China itself. To an extent, developments in both print media and the madrasa curriculum 
remained exploratory and heterogeneous. Nevertheless, the process of exploration led, 
circuitously and contingently, to a more prescriptive and aspiringly authoritative consensus that 
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Islam in China should be reformed along Arabo-centric and Islamic modernist lines. The 
following chapter will explore with greater specificity how urban coastal Chinese Muslims’ 
Arabo-centrism and Islamic modernism shaped new assertions and exertions of authority—both 
doctrinal and political—as the GMD state and its Muslim allies sought to consolidate the 
governance of China’s Northwest frontiers and their predominantly Sufi populations. 
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CHAPTER TWO: MAKING ISLAM CHINESE 
 
 
The large number of Muslims scattered across the Northwest are simple-minded 
and honest in character. In light of the need to consolidate the development and 
defense of the Northwest frontier, there is no way forward but for the central 
government to smelt and cast the Muslims of the Northwest in the image of the 
Three Principles of the People.  
–Chinese Muslim Youth Society petition to central government, 1932204 
 
Among the essential points of Islamic education, first and foremost is the study 
and affirmation of God’s unicity (‘ilm al-tawhid)…If people do not know that 
there is one true God…chaos and confusion (daluan) will return ceaselessly to the 
lands under heaven (tianxia)!  
–Da Pusheng, circa 1939205  
 
 
Introduction: Chinese Muslim Support for Guomindang Nation-Building 
 
As occupied as Chinese Muslims were with refining their understandings of Islamic modernism 
and building connections to the Islamic world outside China, that history cannot be fully 
understood without reference to the also highly fluid mainstream of Chinese state and society. 
Throughout the Republican era, the fate of China’s Muslims was never far removed from the 
overall course of the country’s politics and the policies of the Guomindang (GMD). As at certain 
earlier points in Islam’s history in China, elite Chinese Muslims—in many cases the same 
figures, or associates of the figures, introduced in Chapter One—attempted to protect their 
community as well as their own status by positioning themselves favorably toward the dominant 
groups politically (the GMD) and socio-culturally (the Han).  
One need not look far for evidence of Muslim elites’ contingent yet deliberate 
entanglement with the GMD. The GMD owed its very consolidation of power in no small part to 
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the actions of a Chinese Muslim. Chiang Kai-shek’s purge of the Communists in the Shanghai 
massacre of 12 April 1927, a foundational event of the Nanjing Decade (1927-37) and the 
Chinese Civil War (1927-49), was carried out by Bai Chongxi, the highest-ranking Muslim in the 
GMD.206 This controversial action, in which several thousand CCP members and pro-
Communist laborers were tortured or killed, held great strategic significance in Chiang Kai-
shek’s struggle against the CCP, as well as in his positioning vis-à-vis Wang Jingwei’s rival left-
leaning GMD faction. It also, however, held symbolic significance in the evolution of Muslim-
GMD relations. This was a dramatic and violent, but by no means unique, instance in which a 
leading Muslim was left with little choice but to perform loyalty to the nationalist cause, and 
made the most of it. Of course, Bai was first and foremost a Chinese general following orders, 
and the extent to which Islam played an active role in his life and career is an open question, and 
not the most fruitful one (at the very least, a calligraphic bismillah and the name of the Prophet 
adorn his grave in Taipei’s Chongde Muslim cemetery, alongside Chinese inscriptions and the 
coat of arms of the Republic). On the other hand, Bai’s status as both a staunch anti-communist 
and a figurehead of China’s Muslims, regardless of personal piety, is beyond doubt. After the 
Shanghai massacre, Bai cemented his position close to Chiang Kai-shek. While differences 
emerged between the two in the early 1930s, Bai again rose in favor and prominence during the 
war with Japan in his capacity as one of China’s most effective military leaders, and as the titular 
head of China’s Muslims overseeing several joint Muslim-GMD wartime initiatives. By the early 
1940s, Bai stood atop a pyramid of “patriotic and progressive” Muslims formally incorporated 
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into the structure of government. His role in the Shanghai massacre was but one of these 
Muslims’ many gestures of support for the political victory and ideological vision of the GMD. 
Chinese Muslims’ proactively compliant approach to the GMD had its roots in China’s 
fraught empire-to-nation transition, particularly in questions regarding frontier territory. During 
the Nanjing Decade (1927-37) and Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), Chinese Muslim 
(“Hui”) elites participated actively in Guomindang (GMD, i.e. “Nationalist Party”) government 
efforts to control China’s vast, largely Muslim northwestern frontiers (today’s Ningxia, Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, and Xinjiang). At a time of acute political and territorial crisis, Chinese frontier 
nation-building involved multiple forms of infrastructural expansion. This chapter introduces 
these projects and details several interrelated ways in which Chinese Muslim elites participated 
in GMD state- and nation-building across the northwestern frontiers. 
In a sense, the status of China’s frontiers was a very old question. The varied relations 
between China’s low-lying agricultural regions and urban centers (roughly the eastern third of 
the country today, where 80 percent of the population lives; often called “China proper”) and the 
steppes, deserts, mountains, and plateaux that make up its frontiers challenge the definition of 
Chinese history itself. On the one hand, Chinese history cannot be understood by examining the 
politics, society, and culture of “China proper” alone. On the other, the notion that “China” was 
always coterminous with the present-day borders of the Chinese nation-state is even more 
problematic. Xinjiang and Tibet were not incorporated into a “Chinese” system until the Qing 
conquests of the mid-eighteenth century, and the status of these regions remained largely 
ambiguous until they were re-conquered in the early PRC era. The frontiers were always relevant 
to Chinese history, but their destiny was never inevitable. 
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 The frontier question took on new political, geopolitical, and ethnic dimensions in the 
context of the twentieth-century empire-to-nation transition. The predominantly Han 
revolutionaries who had overthrown the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) to form China’s first 
Republic (1911-49) blamed the Qing’s failures on the decadence of its Manchu rulers, who were 
increasingly imagined as “foreigners” (an argument Chinese Muslims would occasionally 
reproduce).207 China’s new Han leaders not only viewed themselves as the foremost constituency 
in Chinese society and the most deserving candidates to steer the new nation, but also were 
determined to retain control of the vast, largely non-Han frontier regions the Qing had ruled 
before them. It is an irony of history that as China emerged from years of weakening and 
warlordism, its new unified nationalist government came to define success in no small part in 
terms of inheriting the territorial mantle of its otherwise despised and derided Qing predecessors. 
Effective frontier governance became a major question for any new Chinese government’s 
viability and legitimacy. 
After Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition (1926-28) reunified China’s north(east) 
and south(east), the Nanjing government, though still beset by difficulties, could for the first time 
devote serious attention to the frontiers. As if confirming the government’s worst fears, however, 
several frontier regions gained independence (Outer Mongolia and part of Xinjiang), maintained 
de facto independence (Tibet), or remained under warlord rule (Inner Mongolia, Yunnan, and 
much of Xinjiang) during the Republican era. On top of this, Japan’s conquest of Manchuria in 
the Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931 was an especially harsh blow that prompted the 
GMD to look for new opportunities in the regions remaining more or less under its control. By 
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this point, of all the frontier territories, only the Muslim-dominated Northwest remained reliably, 
if still loosely, tied to the center.208 The GMD feared that this region too would break away from 
China or be carved up by imperialist powers such as Britain, Russia, or Japan, unless something 
was done to tie the territory and its peoples more firmly to Nanjing. 
Beginning in the early 1930s, the GMD government built or tried to build railroads, 
highways, dams, farms, factories, and trading centers across the northwestern frontiers as a 
means of binding those territories and their populations to the center. Muslims were involved in 
these processes on multiple levels. The powerful Chinese Muslim militarists de facto military 
and political control of the Northwest, and their increasing participation in frontier governance 
institutions, helped set the conditions under which the GMD could even contemplate developing 
the region. Virtually unconquerable in their own territories, yet incapable or undesiring of full 
independence, these Chinese Muslim “warlords” now took it upon themselves to help Nanjing 
integrate Muslims into the new nation-state. In addition, Northwest development by definition 
targeted the ordinary Muslims living there, though rarely identified them as such or sought their 
input; Chinese-speaking Muslims of the Northwest in fact tended to belong to a number of Sufi 
groups centered in or near major towns or around mosque-tomb complexes (gongbei). Finally, 
while most of the GMD’s Northwest development projects did not reach fruition, they 
nevertheless helped set the parameters and the tone of relations between elite coastal Chinese 
Muslims (ulama, officials, intellectuals, and communal leaders) and the GMD government.  
In keeping with the pro-state stance of the Ma warlords, who were their main financial 
and sociopolitical supporters, the tight-knit network of Chinese Muslim ‘ulama and intellectual 
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and communal elites in Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing strove to show that their community, 
unlike the Mongols, Manchus, Uyghurs, or Tibetans, was unwavering in its loyalty to the Han 
revolution and the Chinese nation. In particular, Chinese Muslims of the eastern urban centers 
wanted to set themselves apart from the separatist and culturally dissimilar Uyghurs, and correct 
the lack of distinction in the state’s categorization of all China’s Muslims (“Turkic” Uyghurs, 
“Chinese” Sino-Muslims, and others) as “Hui.”209 They also wanted to show that they were 
unlike the Chinese Muslims in Manchuria, some of whom either willingly or for lack of 
alternative did not oppose the Japanese occupation—which even included plans for the formation 
of a separate Muslim puppet state—lending credence to the Japanese Empire’s argument that 
“China” was not a nation but merely an accidental and artificial amalgamation of distinct 
communities.210 Finally, with the nineteenth-century Muslim uprisings still in living memory, 
they wanted to show that they would reject the path of those Muslims who had rebelled across 
the Northwest and even established independent Muslim states in Yunnan and East Turkistan.211 
To the contrary, they presented themselves as the intermediaries through whom the state could 
integrate the poorer, less literate, and allegedly more superstitious and less patriotic northwestern 
Muslims into the nation-state via development, education, and cultural Sinicization.  
 In other words, infrastructural expansion in China’s Northwest was not only physical, but 
also organizational, discursive, and pedagogical. Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, Chinese 
Muslim elites formed associations that supported the GMD’s frontier policies—and that re-
articulated Chinese Muslim identity in terms consistent with those policies. These same Chinese 
                                                 
209 This formulation had appeared, most prominently, in Sun Yat-sen’s characterizations of China’s “five races” (wu 
zu), the Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Muslims, and Tibetans (Han Man Meng Hui Zang). 
 
210 Again, on the Japanese empire and Chinese Muslims, see Esenbel, “Japan’s Global Claim,” and Hammond, 
“Conundrum of Collaboration.” 
 
211 Atwill, Chinese Sultanate; Kim, Holy War in China; Lipman, Familiar Strangers, Ch. 5. 
 123 
Muslim leaders worked to train a new generation of young Chinese Muslim schoolteachers who 
could institute pedagogical reforms in schools across the northwestern frontiers, teaching local 
Muslims to be both good modern Muslims and patriotic citizens of the new China.  
Frontier educational reform represented one of the most important ways in which Chinese 
Muslims’ fluid and borderless engagement with Islamic modernist thought from outside China 
came to support the bordered hegemonic project of making Islam Chinese. According to the 
Chinese Muslim elites, Islamic modernism’s emphasis on reason and orthodoxy was entirely 
consonant with the ideological imperatives of Chinese nationalism under the GMD. In particular, 
the two worldviews drew an effectively identical distinction between “rational religion” and 
“irrational superstition,” a distinction that informed Chinese Muslim elites’ attempts to remake 
frontier Sufi Muslims in a new image, simultaneously Islamic modernist and Chinese nationalist. 
Simply put, Chinese Muslim elites lent an indispensable type of cultural legitimacy and 
specificity to Chinese nation-building that the GMD state could not generate on its own. 
 From the late 1920s to the mid-1940s, Islamic modernism and its proponents became an 
infrastructure of Chinese nation-building. As Susan Leigh Star states, infrastructures are “both 
transparent and opaque”: they are easy to take for granted, but they also create and conceal new 
relations and discrepancies of power.212 They facilitate both circulation and control. Furthermore, 
as AbdouMaliq Simone has argued, people themselves can become a form of infrastructure, 
especially in instances where the power of the central state is limited: this was absolutely the 
case with Chinese Muslim elites’ support for GMD frontier nation-building.213 In sum, Chinese 
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Muslim elites facilitated, legitimized, and implemented GMD state- and nation-building across 
the Northwest frontiers in a period of territorial crisis and war, often to greater effect than the 
state could achieve on its own. Islam and Muslims became integral to Chinese nation-making 
and GMD policy, and in the process, the integrationist Chinese Muslim elites’ version of Chinese 
Muslim history and identity attained hegemony both descriptively and prescriptively. 
 
Northwest Frontier Development and China’s Manifest Destiny Crisis 
 
In mid-1932, He Yingqin (1890-1987), a top general and friend of Chiang Kai-shek from their 
military academy days in Japan, addressed the GMD’s Central Party Bureau enthusiastically 
supporting the new “Northwest Development Plan” (Kaifa Xibei jihua). Perhaps this was an 
attempt to salvage his own career. While He had secured multiple southeastern provinces during 
the Northern Expedition, and backed the Shanghai massacre, his record had been tarnished more 
recently when his forces failed in the Second Encirclement Campaign against the CCP’s Jiangxi 
Soviet (April-May 1931), suffering major losses.214 He may have hoped that joining the 
bandwagon of frontier development would offer an opportunity to distinguish himself and to 
return to Chiang’s good graces. Whatever the reason, He’s speech articulated an emerging 
confluence of interests in the early 1930s that was much larger than himself, involving officials, 
domestic and foreign financiers, warlords, foreign-educated Chinese engineers and geologists, 
Han migrants, and Chinese Muslims.  
He’s speech opened with a politically loaded description of a journey to the Huashan, 
located east of Xi’an in Shaanxi Province. He invited his listeners to imagine this peak as the 
spiritual center of the country, situated on an imaginary line separating the flat fertile east from 
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the rugged wild west. For support, he quoted the Western Han aphorism saying, “Lands east of 
the Mountain produce officials, whereas lands west produce generals,” claiming that the 
Huashan’s epicentric status dated back to the “ancient civilization of the Yellow River.”215 In 
this era of important and easily politicized archaeological discoveries,216 the presence of 
historical artifacts in the Northwest was a point of real political significance. The Northwest had 
many invaluable ancient stone tablets, he said, some going all the way back to the Qin and Han 
(221BC-220AD). In He’s opinion, the presence of such artifacts was “but one reason why 
developing the Northwest is a matter of utmost importance to our country’s [policies].”217 At the 
end of this sentence, a classical Chinese term for “statecraft” (jingshi) was crossed out by hand in 
He’s script; we do not know what term He spoke instead, but the conspicuous edit leads us to 
wonder whether he opted for something along the lines of “domestic policy,” so as to avoid any 
suggestion that the Northwest was not fully part of China. 
From there, He laid out the case—geopolitical, economic, demographic, mineral, 
infrastructural, civilizational—for a dramatically increased state presence in the Northwest, or 
Xibei. Rather than dwelling solely on the material benefits, He painted frontier development 
Romantically as the fulfillment of China’s historical destiny: 
“Xibei,” as it is known, is adjacent to the high steppe and the former lands of the 
States of Qin and Jin, and includes Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, 
Suiyuan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and other areas. Scholars of geography tell us: the 
physical formation of our country’s territory can be divided into five periods; the 
arc that is now Mongolia and Xinjiang once lay under an ocean, but in more 
recent times has dried up to become the deserts of today. Historians tell us: all 
nomadic peoples eventually became agriculturalists on the model of the Han, the 
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foundation of the Chinese nation [zhonghua minzu]. Originating east of the 
Pamirs, they followed the Yellow River Valley toward the Pearl and Heilong, 
became imperial subjects, and multiplied. They survived the periods of the 
Yongjia Strife and Jingkang Strife, and gradually, Manchus, Mongols, Hui, and 
Tanguts [Tibetans] became homogenized into the great Chinese nation of today.  
In light of this, we should understand the development of the Northwest in 
terms of three concepts. First, due to the many transformations its land has 
undergone, “Xibei” is of course a geological treasure chest. Second, the rivers of 
“Xibei” are few and its climate continental, so the economic activity of the 
Republic has only sluggishly begun to enter into the lives of the nomads there. 
Third, while “Xibei” is like a basket the Chinese nation must drag along by hand, 
it is also a vast territorial buffer protecting that Chinese nation.218 
  
With regard to defense, He reminded the audience that Mongolia and Xinjiang bordered on 
Soviet Russia, whereas the southwest bordered on British India. The recent breakaway of Outer 
Mongolia, he said, should alert the Chinese to the issue of border defense. With regard to 
minerals, he remarked that the Altai Mountains “might as well be called the ‘Golden 
Mountains,’” that the Gurbantunggut Desert of northern Xinjiang contained alluvial gold 
deposits, that Shanxi had rich stores of coal, and that Shaanxi and Gansu had a lot of oil. With 
regard to Chinese “civilization,” He remarked that Chang’an’s long status as the capital again 
showed the centrality of the Yellow River valley to Chinese civilization. He specified that a great 
change had occurred in the Sui and Tang: before that point, the “culture was purely that of the 
Han” (chun hanzu de wenhua). During the Tang, however, “Hui, Tibetan, and other cultures 
fused together in the same furnace, melding influences from Buddhism, Confucianism, and other 
religions.”219 In short, ruling and developing the frontiers required that the GMD and its 
supporters articulate such a narrative of frontier peoples and their beliefs becoming Chinese. 
                                                 






 He ended with two prescriptive points. First, developing the Northwest would provide a 
useful conduit and incentive for “migration and frontier colonization” (yimin zhibian). Xinjiang, 
he noted, had only 0.5 percent the population density of Jiangsu, while Gansu, Qinghai, and 
Inner Mongolia were virtually “lands without people” (kongdi). Detailed employment records of 
the main frontier development organization confirm that this initiative brought large numbers of 
Han male laborers, to the supposed terra nullius of the Northwest during the early 1930s.220 
Second, He continued, the most pressing issue was to identify human and material resources with 
which to implement the Northwest development plan. “At present,” he said, “too many of our 
journalists and scholars are living in the populous and affluent southeastern regions, or in the 
comfort and protection of the foreign settlements. They ought instead to go to Xibei and use their 
knowledge to make a real contribution.”221 At a time when the state lacked the ability to train 
large numbers of its own officials and dispatch them to the faraway frontiers, it was crucial to 
solicit the collaboration of intellectuals and others to support the project of frontier governance. 
If such individuals possessed some knowledge of frontier peoples and their culture—as was the 
case with urban Chinese Muslims—all the better. 
The “Northwest Problem” (Xibei wenti), as it was known at the time, became a 
permanent concern of state policy upon the GMD’s consolidation of the national government at 
Nanjing in the late 1920s.222 Much of the discussion of this problem was driven by the Chinese 
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press. The weekly Xibei wenti (“The Northwest Problem,” 1932-35) introduced the “politics, 
economics, culture, and history of Xibei…in order to provide a theoretical basis for developing 
the region,” while the more specialized Xibei wenti jikan (“Northwest Problem Quarterly,” 1934-
36) published employment rosters and survey findings, and discussed in greater depth issues of 
national defense, foreign policy, education, and religion. Meanwhile, among China’s elites at this 
time, a dissenting position maintained that “China” really meant the Han and that the 
government should not waste resources on the far-flung frontiers.223 In the Nanjing Decade, 
therefore, proponents of frontier development had to make their case on multiple levels to 
China’s dramatically expanded post-imperial reading public. 
By the early 1930s, a concerted group of frontier developmentalists began to articulate 
the “Northwest Development Plan” (Kaifa Xibei jihua) discussed by He.224 The state’s embrace 
of development as the solution to the Northwest Problem was institutionalized in June 1932 with 
the establishment of the Northwest Development Association (Kaifa Xibei xiehui). According to 
the Association’s constitution, its purpose was “to assist the central government in bringing the 
Northwest to the same level of development and prosperity as the national community as a 
whole.”225 The Association’s ambitious 1932 inaugural plan listed seven main components:  
1. Mineral Extraction (to include surveying, exploratory stratigraphic 
drilling, and extraction) 
2. Infrastructure Development (to include railroads, highways, telegraph and 
telephone, radio, and airlines) 
3. Hydraulics (to include irrigation and dam systems) 
                                                 
223 Such disagreements had occurred at earlier points, as when Zuo Zongtang made his case to skeptics at the Qing 
court regarding the necessity of reconquering Xinjiang. See Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, p. 126. 
 
224 The number of mentions of the Northwest Problem and related terms in the period 1930-39 was highest of any 
time before the twenty-first century, increasing nearly eightfold compared to the period 1920-29. By comparison, 
the reliable control-variable term “China” (zhongguo) increased by less than a factor of two in the same timespan. 
 
225 Kaifa Xibei Xiehui, Kaifa Xibei xiehui di yi jie nianhui baogao shu [Report of the First Annual Meeting of the 
Northwest Development Association] (Nanjing: Kaifa Xibei xiehui, 1933), p. 23. 
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4. Agriculture and Forestry Improvements (to include labs, nurseries, and 
“livestock bases” for horses, cows, sheep, and camels) 
5. Factory Construction (products to include electricity, machinery, spinning 
and weaving goods, canned food and milk, noodles, and soda) 
6. Internal Immigration and Opening Land for Cultivation (to include 
“wasteland reclamation,” “surplus population resettlement,” disaster 
victim relief, organization of “land reclamation garrisons” [tunken jun]) 
7. Educational Facilities (to include primary, teacher training, specialized, 
vocational, and agricultural and industrial schools) 
 
It is important to pause here and note the ways in which the ostensibly scientific and value-
neutral language of development concealed direct impact on the Muslims of the Northwest. As 
with modern infrastructural development anywhere in the world, activities such as mining, 
highway construction, commercial agriculture, and relocation of settlers (in this case the 
abovementioned Han laborers, who were often from Hunan or refugees fleeing the Japanese 
occupation of the Northeast, referred to in Point 6 above) would necessarily displace Muslim, 
Mongol, Tibetan, and other local populations. As with more familiar examples of settler 
societies, the designation of pre-settlement areas as uninhabited “wasteland” enabled ignorance 
of local peoples and conditions. 
 The Chinese frontier developmentalists resembled, and in many cases were directly 
connected to, their counterparts in other countries. They were engineers, geologists, agriculture 
and forestry experts, businessmen, and government officials. The plurality had studied in Japan, 
primarily at the Tokyo Imperial University. Others studied in the United States or Europe, or at 
one of the several new Western-style universities in China.226 Upon graduating or returning 
                                                 
 
226 Those who studied in the United States attended Cornell, MIT, Columbia (including the Columbia School of 
Mines), the University of Iowa, the University of Illinois, the University of Southern California, the Yale Forestry 
School, the Colorado School of Mines, and the University of Pittsburgh Swanson School of Engineering’s petroleum 
program (the world’s first, established in 1910). Those who stayed in China studied at Peking University, Qinghua 
University, Jinling University, Beijing Jiaotong University, Yanjing University, Beijing University of Agriculture, 
and the National Sun Yat-sen University School of Agriculture. Data drawn from Kaifa xibei xiehui huiyuanlu 
[Membership Roster of the Northwest Development Association]. 
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home, they based themselves in urban power centers such as Nanjing, Beijing, and Shanghai. 
This well-connected group were not simply technocrats spreading an increasingly globalized 
gospel of efficiency and technological progress, but also self-consciously sought to apply new 
ideas and techniques to the old problem of how much and what kinds of control a Chinese state 
could exert over its frontiers. Tellingly, Chinese frontier developmentalists made considerable 
effort to synthesize Qing-era knowledge of the frontiers, especially that of the Lifan yuan, or 
“Barbarian Affairs Bureau” (institutional predecessor to the Republican Mongolian-Tibetan 
Affairs Commission, discussed below)—even as they imported works by Western scientists, 
explorers, Orientalists, Turkologists, Tibetologists, and so on. 
The Northwest Development Association’s titular director was Chen Lifu (1900-2001), a 
top GMD official and conservative ideologue close to Chiang Kai-shek. Chen had received a 
master’s degree in mining engineering from the University of Pittsburgh in 1924, where he 
focused on coal and wrote a thesis titled “The Mechanization and Electrification of the Chinese 
Mining Industry.” After that, he briefly worked as a coal miner in Scranton, Pennsylvania.227 A 
consummate modernist and staunch nationalist, Chen formed a lasting impression in western 
Pennsylvania of the significance of mineral and industrial development for a country’s material 
strength. In China, he served in the Northwest Development Association’s mining division, in 
addition to his work as director. 
Several additional GMD officials and other top figures supported Northwest frontier 
development. While Chiang Kai-shek appears not to have been personally involved, his assistant 
Mao Qingxiang was an active member from the beginning. Prominent agriculturalists such as 
                                                 
227 Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, Vol. 3, p. 207; Ch’en Li-fu, The Storm Clouds over China, pp. 35-
36, 38-41 (digital edition). Several additional GMD officials and other top figures supported Northwest frontier 
development, including the abovementioned general He Yingqin (1890-1987) and the banker Kong Xiangxi (“H.H. 
Kung,” 1881-1967), both of whom were also close to Chiang Kai-shek. 
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Liu Yunchou, Xiao Zheng, Dai Hong, Zhang Jingyu, and others supported the Association’s 
founding and management. Engineers and geologists also played a large role. One such 
individual was Zhang Renjian (1897-1976), who earned an M.S. from the Colorado School of 
Mines in 1921, followed by further study at Columbia University (probably the School of 
Mines), and by the early 1930s was serving as director of the Natural Resources Survey Office in 
his native Henan Province. Zhang was the principal author of the Northwest Development 
Association’s inaugural plan.228 In addition, the banker Kong Xiangxi (“H.H. Kung,” 1881-1967) 
supported developing Northwest commerce and infrastructure, and lobbied the Executive Yuan 
during the war on behalf of the region’s salt and wool industries—the latter being a traditionally 
Muslim sector in which Muslim warlord Ma Fuxiang had also invested.229  
The Northwest Development Association’s concrete accomplishments remained limited. 
On the other hand, the involvement of so many top officials and other high-level personnel 
makes the Association significant as an expression of the priorities of the state in the early to 
mid-1930s. Resembling today’s “public-private partnerships,” the Association mobilized 
numerous private human resources, but answered directly to the central government in Nanjing 
via the Northwest Development Commission. The Central Party Bureau, Ministry of Interior, 
and Ministry of Education provided funding and helped connect the Association with appropriate 
sources of expertise.230 In its first year, the Association received a modest 2,957 yuan from the 
                                                 
 
228 Zhang Zhaozi (a.k.a. Zhang Renjian), Kaifa xibei shiye jihua [The Northwest Development Plan] (Nanjing: Kaifa 
Xibei xiehui, 1934), p. 1. 
 
229 Kangzhan shiqi xibei kaifa dang’anguan shiliao xuanji [Selected Historical Documents on the Development of 
the Northwest during the War of Resistance Period], pp. 31-34; Millward, “The Chinese Border Wool Trade, 1880-
1937.” 
 
230 Kaifa Xibei xiehui, Kaifa Xibei xiehui di yi jie nianhui baogao shu, p. 15. The Central Party Bureau connected 
the Association with participants in the Northwest exploration missions, the Ministry of Interior connected it with 
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Military Affairs Commission, Central Party Bureau, and member dues and donations; it spent 
half that sum on preparations and fact-finding, and saved the other half.231 At first, the 
Association would recruit personnel and conduct preliminary surveys of minerals and other 
natural resources—not unlike the missions Sven Hedin and other European scientists and 
adventurers had undertaken in the preceding decades. Future revenues would be supplied by the 
state-run “Colonization Bank” (Tuozhi yinhang), private banks, and a system of rural land credits 
to be established.232 While neither the 1932 inaugural plan nor the first annual report mentioned 
foreign funding, a 1931 article in the Development Committee Bulletin (Jianshe weiyuanhui 
gongbao) discreetly admitted, without further specification, that foreign loans would play some 
role, as they had in earlier stages of frontier development in the last two decades of the Qing.233 
 In one of its more robust initiatives, the Northwest Development Association resumed 
work on the Longhai Railroad (Long-Hai tielu), one of the clearest expressions of the durability 
of multiple Chinese states’ interest in developing the frontiers. China’s equivalent of the 
Transcontinental or the Trans-Siberian, the Longhai line was far shorter than its American and 
Russian siblings, but arguably much more challenging to construct. As its name suggests, the 
Longhai line connects Lanzhou in Gansu Province (traditionally called Long) and the port city of 
Lianyungang (traditionally called Haizhou), north of Shanghai. Construction began in the last 
decade of the Qing and was briefly continued under the Beiyang government. The Nanjing 
                                                 
participants in land reclamation surveys being carried out in Ningxia, and the Ministry of Education connected it 
with leading Chinese chemists.  
 
231 Kaifa Xibei xiehui, Kaifa Xibei xiehui di yi jie nianhui baogao shu, pp. 19-20. 
 
232 Zhang, Kaifa xibei shiye jihua, pp. 12-13.  
 
233 “Kaifa xibei jihua (san): Xibei tuozhi yinhang ji qi huodong [The Northwest Development Plan: III: The 
Northwest Colonization Bank and its Activities],” Jianshe weiyuanhui gongbao [Development Committee Bulletin], 
1931, no. 16, pp. 324-25. This should not come as a surprise, for officials involved in frontier development were 
known to advocate using foreign loans to support China’s development. See for example Chen, Storm Clouds, p. 30. 
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government extended the line from Lingbao, Henan, to Baoji, Shaanxi, between 1931 and 1936, 
and then to Tianshui, Gansu, by 1945. The final 348 kilometers to Lanzhou was only completed 
in the early years of the People’s Republic, by 1953. While this project brought numerous Han 
laborers westward in the early twentieth century, it also saw some early examples of Muslim 
participation in frontier development. From 1923 to 1931, under the Beiyang and GMD 
governments, the young Chinese Muslim Ma Tianying, future GMD diplomat to the Middle East 
and Southeast Asia (see Chapters Four, Six), worked as head storekeeper of Longhai’s Xuzhou 
and Haizhou supply houses.234 
On the whole, discrepancies between the Association’s mid-1932 inaugural plan and first 
annual report of mid-1933 reveal that it was not in a position to act on many of its proposals. 
After the first year, it was already becoming more of a lobbying organization promoting the idea 
of frontier development than an apparatus for actually implementing specific plans.  
 As already indicated, controlling territory and extracting resources—to say nothing of 
meeting deadlines—were not the only motives for developing the Northwest. Rather, ideological 
considerations of the “nation’s history and civilization” also played a role.235 Statements by 
Chiang Kai-shek, He Yingqin, Chen Lifu, and other GMD leaders clarify that frontier 
development was seen not only as a question of geopolitical necessity, but as a matter of national 
destiny. Despite its limited capacity, the GMD state asserted the political and racial unity of all 
the peoples living within the former Qing boundaries, and on the basis of that notion sought to 
remake frontier peoples in a Sinicized, nationalistic image. This assimilationist policy required a 
                                                 
234 “Biographie: Ibrahim Tien Ying Ma,” Ma Tianying Papers (Kuala Lumpur) MTY.C12 C500002; “Ma Tianying,” 
Ma Tianying Papers (Kuala Lumpur) MTY.C12 C500005.1; “Longhai tielu guanli ju zhiyuan zili zhengmingshu 
[Longhai Railway Management Bureau Certificate of Employment],” Ma Tianying Papers (Kuala Lumpur) 
MTY.C12 C500005.7. 
 
235 Zhang, Kaifa Xibei shiye jihua, Ch. 1 passim.  
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revised narrative of the historical relationship between those frontier peoples and the sedentary 
society of eastern China. For example, in August 1943, as he was preparing for the Cairo 
Conference, Chiang Kai-shek took a moment to telegram his ministers reiterating several points 
about territory, minorities, and the nation that had been circulating for some time, but only 
published in his book, Zhongguo zhi mingyun (China’s Destiny), in March of that year:  
The Chinese people are distinct from one another in terms of ancestry, but are not 
different from one another in terms of race. The Wuhu were outsiders. The Yuan 
and Qing were also barbarians from the north. The southern Man tribes of the 
Zhou were also barbarians. But the people of the so-called Huiyi borderlands 
were all descendants of the Fiery and Yellow Emperors. The same is true of those 
now known as Manchus, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans. Now they are all members 
of the Chinese nation. “Mongolia” and “Tibet” are merely names of places. “Hui” 
is the name of a religion. “Manchu” was originally the title of Nurhaci. His son 
Hongtaiji changed the name to ‘Qing,’ but this was not even officially the name 
of any place. When our founding father [Sun Yat-sen] spoke of nationalism, he 
meant the nationalism of the whole country [guozu zhuyi], not just that of a single 
group [minzu zhuyi]. This is made very clear in my book. Again, we are speaking 
of different groups [zongzu], not different nationalities [minzu]. When our 
founding father spoke of nationalism, he really meant nation-statism.236 
 
The assertion that China consisted not simply of the Han race, but of multiple races “fused” over 
time with the Han, became less sustainable the more GMD control of the largely non-Han 
frontiers eroded. Broadly speaking, this is what was at stake for the GMD in the Northwest. 
 
From Warlords to Muslim National Institutions 
 
Chinese Muslim elites acutely perceived these stakes and responded in a manner that served their 
interests. Northwest development provided them a structure and a vocabulary for giving 
something to the state and receiving something in return. It also offered a framework through 
which they could claim to speak for all the communities of Muslims in China, without 
necessarily seeking those communities’ approval or consent. By the early 1930s, frontier issues 
                                                 
236 Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 (2) – 13. 
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were becoming a regular topic of discussion in Chinese Muslim periodicals, in parallel to GMD 
official statements and the national press, with Chinese Muslim authors adopting the state’s 
terminology and its concerns. In an article titled “Northwest Development and Chinese Islam,” a 
Muslim author asserted that “China is the only country where Islam remains dispirited and 
listless,” and that “the state-led development of the Northwest could be a vehicle for revitalizing 
Chinese Islam.”237 Whereas the frontiers represented a test of the GMD government’s 
sovereignty and legitimacy, for Muslim elites they represented an opportunity for words and 
deeds whereby to perform loyalty to the nation and bind themselves to the highest levels of the 
government.  
Muslim leaders moved early to seize the opportunity of Northwest frontier development, 
for its potential to strengthen their material position and political clout. For example, not long 
after the establishment of the Northwest Development Association, the Qinghai-based Muslim 
strongman Ma Bufang cabled the central authorities recommending that the Association’s work 
in Qinghai be made to include: (1) the founding and subsidizing of “Mongolian-Tibetan frontier 
schools,” which despite the terminology would also focus on local Muslim populations (see 
below) (2) government support for local wool- and hide-making factories, a Muslim-dominated 
industry (3) similar support for the local horse-breeding industry, interestingly “to be reformed in 
keeping with American techniques” (4) the founding of a veterinary hospital, given that the 
previous year had seen a devastating outbreak of cattle plague that had killed 200,000 head and, 
at 10 yuan each, had cost Qinghai 2 million yuan.238 Even when significant central government 
                                                 
237 Liu Chunrong, “Kaifa xibei yu zhongguo huijiao [Northwest Development and Chinese Islam],” Yisilan qingnian 
[Muslim Youth], 1934 no. 4, p. 21. I am grateful to Aaron Glasserman for directing me to this article. 
 
238 “Ma Bufang guanyu kaifa xibei ying zai Qinghai biandi sheli gongchang, xuexiao deng wenti de ti’an [Ma 
Bufang’s suggestions that Northwest development in the Qinghai frontier should establish factories, schools, etc.],” 
November 1933, in Ma Zhendu, ed., Kangzhan shiqi xibei kaifa dang’an shiliao xuanbian [Selected Archival 
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support did not materialize, Ma Bufang took advantage of Qinghai’s relatively unscathed 
wartime status to import industrial and agricultural management practices from the United States 
and elsewhere throughout the 1930s and 1940s. At the same time, Ma also encouraged the influx 
of both modernist and conservative orthodoxizing Islamic thought via local Yihewani (i.e. 
Ikhwani) ulama who had visited the Hijaz, as well as at least one Arab sheikh who journeyed to 
Qinghai in 1934 to “teach the Wahhabi doctrine” under Ma’s aegis.239  
Muslim warlords such as Ma Bufang not only benefitted from Northwest frontier 
development, but helped guarantee the territorial security that allowed the GMD state to pursue 
that development in the first place. This relationship between the Ma warlords and the central 
government in fact predated the Republic by four decades. In 1872, Ma Zhan’ao helped bring an 
end to a tumultuous period of Muslim uprisings against the Qing by switching sides to support 
the government. Ma Fuxiang (1876-1932), grandson of Ma Zhan’ao and the most important 
Northwest Muslim figure of the early Republican era, transformed his forebears’ pro-Qing stance 
into a pro-Republican one. Moreover, Ma Fuxiang’s career and relationship with Chiang Kai-
shek transformed an earlier imperial style of governance in which the center relied on local 
strongman-clients into a post-imperial style in which those strongmen were formally 
incorporated into the institutional structure of the nation-state.240  
                                                 
Documents on Northwest Development during the War of Resistance] (Nanjing: Second Historical Archives of 
China, 2015), pp. 17-18. 
 
239 Merrill Ruth Hunsberger, “Ma Pu-fang in Chinghai Province, 1931-1949” (PhD dissertation, Temple University, 
1978); “City in West China to Get Piped Water: American ‘Sells’ Warlord at Sining on System to Aid Health—
People Suspect Clear Fluid,” The New York Times, 3 February 1947; Mohammed Turki al-Sudairi, “Adhering to the 
Ways of Our Western Brothers: Tracing Saudi Influences on the Development of Hui Salafism in China,” Sociology 
of Islam 4 (2016): pp. 35-36. Al-Sudairi identifies the former Gansu Naqshbandi (Sufi) imam Li Wenqing and the 
Yihewani imam Ma Debao as leading proponents of al-da‘wa al-salafiyya in Ma Bufang’s Qinghai.  
 
240 Lipman makes this argument in Familiar Strangers, Ch. 5, in the section “Becoming a National Figure.” 
 
 137 
Ma Fuxiang’s biography is worth reiterating to the extent that it epitomizes that process 
of institutionalization. Educated in both the Islamic and Confucian classics, Ma began his long 
military career serving under Dong Fuxiang, a Han commander of Muslim loyalist troops, during 
the Muslim revolt of 1895-96; in the conflict, Ma’s forces reportedly killed thousands of Muslim 
rebels and sent their heads to Dong. Soon thereafter, Dong’s army was transferred to Beijing, 
where it fought successfully against the Eight Nation Alliance during the Boxer Rebellion (1899-
1901) and came to be known as the “Gansu Braves” or Ganjun. Ma gained command of the 
Ganjun cavalry following the death of his elder brother Ma Fulu. This force not only participated 
in the Battle of Peking (1900) and the siege of the foreign legations, but also escorted the 
imperial family when it fled to Xi’an. For the next two decades, Ma held various semi-
autonomous posts throughout the Northwest under the Qing and Beiyang governments, first as 
de facto governor of Kokonor (Qinghai) and then in Altai (both 1912), and later as military 
governor of Ningxia (1913-20) and Suiyuan (1921-24). He spent much of the 1910s in a power 
struggle with the Jahriyya Sufi order, though after Jahriyya leader Ma Yuanzhang’s death in 
1920, he had more leeway to focus on expanding education and infrastructure in Suiyuan. 
Edward Slack has confirmed suspicion that Ma profited in the 1920s from Suiyuan’s rampant 
opium trade.241 Meanwhile, Ma had also established Sino-Arabic schools across Ningxia as a 
counter to the Jahriyya; these would become a model for later Muslim education reform efforts 
(see below).242  
                                                 
241 Slack, Opium, State, and Society, p. 31. Slack states that according to U.S. Department of State records 
concerning China (1930-39), Ma had made approximately US$2 million from taxing opium trade, which he used to 
offset military expenditures.  
 
242 Ning Wen, “Ma Fuxiang yu huimin jiaoyu [Ma Fuxiang and Muslim Education],” Xibei huizu yu yisilanjiao 
(Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1993), pp. 263-69. One of the first of these was the Ningxia Mongolian-
Muslim Teacher Training Academy (Ningxia Meng-Hui shifa xuexiao), founded in 1918 by Ma Fuxiang. 
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Ma’s connection to the GMD originated during the Northern Expedition, when he and his 
son Ma Hongkui fought under Feng Yuxiang’s Guominjun. In 1929, Ma broke with Feng and 
joined instead with Chiang Kai-shek. At this time, Ma was appointed to the Mongolian-Tibetan 
Affairs Commission (Meng-Zang weiyuanhui, hereafter MTAC), serving as deputy director 
under Zhao Daiwen from September 1929 to August 1930, and as director from then until 
December 1931.243 In 1930, he was also appointed governor of Anhui and a member of the 
Central Executive Committee of the GMD. News coverage celebrating Ma Fuxiang’s exploits in 
the Northwest appeared throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, especially in Xinwen bao, 
part of a process Lipman characterizes as “becoming a national figure.” Ma frequently put forth 
his own views in the periodicals of the MTAC, as well as in his work Conditions in Mongolia 
and Tibet (Meng-Zang zhuangkuang, 1931), which he opened by stating in no uncertain terms 
that “China absolutely cannot cause Mongolia and Tibet [shorthand for the frontiers as a whole] 
to break away from China’s territory, and Mongolia and Tibet cannot reject China to become 
independent.”244 After Ma’s death in August 1932, Ma Hongkui received command of his 
father’s army, the governorship of Ningxia, and a post in the MTAC. 
When Ma Fuxiang died, Chiang Kai-shek composed an obituary poem, “In Honor of Ma 
Fuxiang,” published in the Military Affairs Commission’s magazine: 
The lion of the Northwest,  
A tower of tremendous energy,  
Departs this world as destiny demands, 
Yet lived a hero’s life. 
An old friend 
Who treated all with utmost sincerity, 
                                                 
243 “Meng-Zang weiyuanhui zuzhi youguan ziliao [Materials Pertaining to the Formation of the Mongolian-Tibetan 
Affairs Commission],” KMT Archives (Taipei) 一般 561/8.  
 
244 Ma Fuxiang, Meng zang Zhuang kuang [Conditions in Mongolia and Tibet] (1931), available in Pickens 
Collections, Box 33, Pamphlet Case 5; translation in Lipman, Familiar Strangers, p. 167. 
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A just and loyal servant of the nation 
Who moved others with honesty,  
He leaves his mark on history, Chinese and beyond… 
His will above all was for peace.245 
 
While this poem fails to mention that Ma was a Muslim, that fact nevertheless silently heightens 
the impact of Chiang’s praise. Given popular stereotypes of Muslims as a disloyal and restive 
Other, each line of this poem becomes more remarkable when the implicit is made explicit: Ma 
was a hero who helped the government stabilize the Northwest despite his being a Muslim; he 
served the nation with loyalty and honesty despite his being a Muslim; he wished for peace 
despite his being a Muslim.246 From Chiang’s perspective, this was not only a descriptive eulogy 
for an important national figure, but a prescriptive statement that a “good” frontier person was 
one who displayed loyalty toward and welcomed assimilation into the nation-state. Chiang 
composed this obituary in late summer 1932, just as the Northwest Development Association 
was beginning its work.  
Ma Fuxiang’s career exerted a centripetal force that pulled other important Muslims into 
the orbit of the state. Under Ma, the MTAC became an instrument for deputizing prominent 
Muslims in service of the state. The most important example of this was the government’s 
reliance on Muslim warlords and officials throughout the 1930s in its mostly unsuccessful 
attempts to control the affairs of Tibet. In June 1930, a conflict known in English as the “Sino-
Tibetan War” broke out when the Dalai Lama’s forces attempted to gain more exclusive control 
over monasteries in the contested territories of Kham (now western Sichuan) and Amdo (now 
                                                 
245 Jiang Zhongzheng [i.e. Chiang Kai-shek], “Ji Ma Fuxiang wen [A Commemoration of Ma Fuxiang],” Junshi 
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246 In particular, “peace” was significantly both a recurring theme of Muslim self-descriptions (in fact, Chinese 
Muslims often translated al-Islam simply as “peace,” or heping), and at the same time, code for accepting the rule of 
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 140 
southern Qinghai).247 Ma Bufang and Liu Wenhui (the non-Muslim military governor of 
Sichuan) eventually defeated the Tibetans in battle in July-August 1932, pushing them back to 
the Jinsha River, after which pressure from the British in India led to ceasefire and a 
settlement.248 Before embracing Ma and Liu’s military option, however, the GMD attempted its 
own negotiated solution through the good offices of the MTAC, with equally heavy reliance on 
Muslim cooperation. In January 1931, Ma Fuxiang sent his Muslim deputy Sun Shengwu (1894-
1975) on a fact-finding mission to the region. The details of this earlier mission are unknown.249 
Shortly thereafter, Ma made plans to send Tang Kesan, another Muslim MTAC member, to 
resolve the conflict in Kham.  
Tang Kesan (1882-1950) epitomized the Republican era’s older generation of urban 
eastern Muslims who made a career out of the frontiers. Born in Zoucheng, Shandong, Tang was 
educated in the final years of the traditional exam system and belonged to a lineage of scholar-
officials characterized as “Confucian in form, Muslim in content” (nei hui wai ru).250 Moreover, 
his great-grandson and biographer states that Tang “frequently quoted portions of the Quran and 
                                                 
247 The event was and is known in Chinese as the “Kham-Tibet Conflict” (Kang-Zang jiufen or Kang-Zang 
chongtu). 
 
248 Tuttle, Tibetan Buddhists, p. 172. This was an important precursor to the GMD’s attempt to consolidate power in 
the region by forming the separate province of “Xikang” (1939-50, comprising the traditional Tibetan territory of 
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249 “Meng-Zang weiyuanyui pai Sun Shengwu deng diaocha Kang-Zang chongtu an [The Mongolian-Tibetan 
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250 Tang Shuxun, “Tang Kesan de jiafeng, yexu yu yihan [Tang Kesan’s Family Background, Achievements, and 
Regrets], in Cheng de da cai, pp. 176-78. His paternal grandfather Tang Chuanyou (d. 1900) rose from humble 
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eras, advocated the expansion of Islamic writings in the Chinese language. His father Tang Chenglie (d. 1905) 
served for thirty years as a Qing official in Sichuan and Shaanxi.  
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Hadith regarding the importance of patriotism.”251 Like his father, Tang served first as an official 
in the southwest, working for the salt ministry in Sichuan and Yunnan in the early 1910s; in 
1916, he briefly headed provincial tax collection in Gansu.252 Soon thereafter he was selected as 
a member of parliament. From then through the mid-1920s, he worked primarily in Shandong 
politics. In 1925, he established the Chengda Academy with Ma Songting, operating at first near 
his home in Jinan, and later in Beijing. In 1930, during Ma Fuxiang’s directorship, he was 
appointed a section chief in the MTAC; he remained a member of the organization well after 
Ma’s death.253 During the war, Tang founded the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Association 
along with Bai Chongxi, Ma Songting, and others. As the Association’s deputy director, he was 
instrumental in organizing the Chinese Muslim wartime diplomatic missions as well as 
coordinating anti-Japanese propaganda among Muslims in Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai. 
Tang Kesan’s mission to Kham, which lasted from March to September 1931, indicates 
both the GMD’s reliance on Muslims and the stakes of that relationship for the Muslim 
community. Tang left a record of his Tibetan assignment in his Diary of a Journey to Kham (Fu 
Kang riji), published in Nanjing in 1934. In it, he provides the following summary: 
In the third year of my service to the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, 
when the Mongolia Conference had ended and the Tibetan Conference was about 
to begin, and the [Thirteenth] Dalai Lama’s representative had arrived in Nanjing 
for the meeting, all those who care about the affairs of the Tibetans hoped that the 
problem of Tibet could soon be resolved. Who could have expected that at that 
moment, the Dajinsi and Bailisi Incidents would erupt and expand into the Kham-
Tibet Conflict, a violent episode detrimental to the Tibetan Conference? For this 
reason, the central government gave me special orders to travel to Kham to 
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investigate and resolve the situation. At this point, the Dalai Lama had already 
cabled the central government requesting them to send an impartial high-level 
official well-versed in the conditions of frontier peoples to call upon the Tibetan 
forces to withdraw and restore the status quo ante bellum. I accepted the 
assignment, attending to it secretly and urgently. I immediately packed up and set 
off. Before I reached Sichuan, towns across Garze and Zhanhua had already fallen 
in succession to hostile forces. When I reached Kangding, I conducted 
multilateral negotiations with the Tibetans. When a translation was provided to 
the Dalai Lama, he stubbornly refused to withdraw his troops, for the reason that 
Garze and Zhanhua were already under his control, and cited also the importance 
of the Dajinsi and Bailisi. I argued back forcefully on just grounds, going back 
and forth several times, but with no resolution after six months. At that point, the 
18 September Incident in Shenyang created a difficult situation for the central 
government…they said to settle the issue of the Dajinsi and Bailisi, and postpone 
all other discussion. I was forced to cease work short of my goal, and agreed only 
a temporary ceasefire with the Tibetans.254 
 
How significant was it that that government relied on a Muslim official to address the situation in 
Tibet? At the very least, it seems significant that Tang was chosen over Buddhists such as Dai 
Jitao or Taixu, both of whom were busy lobbying the Tibetan and Chinese sides for a peaceful 
resolution.255 Scholars have briefly noted Ma Fuxiang and Tang Kesan’s involvement in the 
conflict, but have not addressed the question of their Muslimness (indeed, that this question 
would be regarded as negligible speaks to the synonymy Chinese Muslims achieved between 
their interests and those of the state). The stakes of this question rise, however, when we consider 
the long-standing policy during imperial times of playing minority peoples against each other in 
the task of frontier governance.256 Without the government documents regarding Tang’s mission, 
we can only hypothesize that the relevance of his Muslimness for the state lay in a similar logic 
of “divide and rule.” Meanwhile, the relevance for Muslims lay in showing their interests to be 
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identical to those of the state, and in asserting that their loyalty set them apart from the Manchus, 
Tibetans, and Uyghurs, at the exact moment in the early 1930s when all three of those groups 
appeared to be breaking away.257 In other words, as with Chiang Kai-shek’s obituary poem for 
Ma Fuxiang, the fact that Tang’s Muslimness was formally a non-issue was part of the point. 
Tang clearly reinforces this privileged position when he affects indignation at the Tibetans’ ill-
timed attack, when he proclaims his own “impartiality,” when he portrays the Dalai Lama’s 
demands as unreasonable (in contrast to the “justice” of the government’s position), and when he 
complains that the Mukden Incident unfortunately cut short his otherwise sound mission.258 
Tang’s failed diplomacy of 1931 and Ma Bufang’s military intervention of 1932 would 
not be the last time the GMD enlisted Muslims to address Tibetan issues. The GMD supported 
Ma Bufang’s invasions of Tibet on multiple occasions into the 1940s.259 Even more significantly, 
in 1939, the central government and the MTAC (then under Wu Zhongxin) coordinated with Ma 
Bufang to arrange protection for the four-year-old Lhamo Thondup, by then identified as likely 
to be the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, on his journey from Xining to Lhasa. Essentially holding the 
family hostage and receiving considerable compensation from both the Chinese and Tibetan 
sides, Ma Bufang put his relative Ma Yuanhai in charge of the convoy, which consisted of Ma 
Bufang’s troops as well as, interestingly, a Tibetan Muslim Hajj delegation. Once the convoy 
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arrived in Lhasa in October 1939, the boy was confirmed as the reincarnated Dalai Lama.260 
Understandably, the entire episode involved a tremendous amount of coordination between the 
GMD, its agents in the MTAC, Ma Bufang, Tibet, and the British. 
Elite Muslims’ intimacy with the GMD went hand in hand with efforts to leverage 
influence in the interest of their community. Muslims knew how to speak to the state in its own 
language, and how to write themselves into official ideology in subtle and palatable ways. By the 
early 1930s, a narrative of Muslims’ peacefulness, of their “contributions” to China, and of the 
desirability of their (further) Sinicization was becoming increasingly ubiquitous, and 
increasingly merged with GMD terminology and political priorities. For example, on 17 
December 1932, the Chinese Muslim Youth Society petitioned the third plenary session of the 
GMD Fourth Central Party Congress (and copied the MTAC), asking that the Central Committee 
for Organizations establish a “division for Hui organizations” (Huimin zuzhi ke). In support of 
this request, which essentially sought institutional recognition for the Chinese Muslim people 
(“Huimin”) on equal footing with the Mongolians and Tibetans, the Chinese Muslim Youth 
Society submitted a list of rather direct points ingratiating Muslims to the government:  
1. That Sun Yat-sen had established the Republic on the principle of equality 
between the “Five Races”  
2. That it was “not religious differences, but rather linguistic and customary 
differences, each of which must be melted away in its own way, that made 
it difficult for the GMD to spread Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the 
People among the Manchus, Mongolians, and Tibetans”  
3. That it was necessary for the nation to “get revenge against the enemy” 
after the loss of Manchuria  
4. That in light of Outer Mongolia’s independence, the Sino-Tibetan 
Conflict, and the “Manchus’ betrayal of the nation in the Northeast,” the 
“British tigers and Russian eagles were now covetously eyeing the 
Southwest and Northwest,” but that the Huimin were the “only ones who 
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continue to support the Han and their revolution,” in keeping with the 
“age-old cooperation of the Han and Hui peoples”  
5.  That China’s Muslims numbered “forty or fifty million” and that “because 
their educational situation remains backward, they are often unreceptive to 
our Party ideology, but the central government could instead make 
effective use of religious psychology in order to guide them and bind them 
to the center”  
6. That if the government adopted this approach, “it would not be terribly 
difficult to transform the cherishing of religious morals into the cherishing 
of party-state psychology”  
7. That “the large number of Muslims scattered across the Northwest are 
simple-minded and honest in character, and in light of the need to 
consolidate the development and defense of the Northwest frontier, there 
is no way forward but for the central government to smelt and cast the 
Huimin of the Northwest via the Three Principles of the People” 
8. That the “nation’s separatism crisis” had made the question of setting up 
Huimin organizations all the more urgent.261 
 
This petition shrewdly wove appeals to principle and emotion together with hard-nosed advice 
and assessments of Muslim-GMD shared interests—not to mention a strong dose of 
condescension toward the Muslims’ own Northwest coreligionists. Above all, the purpose of 
such statements was to indicate to the government that Chinese Muslims were its most natural 
allies among China’s non-Han groups, and to present themselves as the intermediaries best 
positioned to help the government achieve its strategic objectives in the Northwest frontiers. 
 Muslim warlords’ and officials’ reputations with the GMD also carried weight in a wider 
variety of contexts. For example, in June 1937, Ma Ruye, the headmistress of Beiping’s New 
Moon Private Muslim Girls’ School and widow of Ma Fuxiang, submitted a petition to the 
Ministry of Education that cited prominent Muslims’ work as part of a funding request.262 Like 
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other leading Muslims, Ma Ruye explained that China’s Muslims numbered as many as fifty 
million, but that the educational level of this huge portion of the population was relatively low. 
With adequate educational opportunities, however, 
we will see the fruition of the positive cultural movement undertaken by the 
awakened Huimin of eastern China in the last decade, [which began] with former 
Ministry of Education official Ma Linyi, when he founded the Collective Progress 
Middle School (Xiejin zhongxue) in Hunan; with current MTAC member Tang 
Kesan, when he founded Beiping’s Chengda Academy, in order to train qualified 
instructors; and with MTAC member Sun Shengwu, when he founded Beiping’s 
Northwest School, in order to produce expert personnel to support the 
development of the Northwest…The seeds of Muslim girls’ education, however, 
have not yet sprouted. I, Ruye, as an awakened woman of the Huimin, have 
therefore humbly followed my late husband Ma Fuxiang in dedicating myself to 
the cause of Huimin education.263 
 
After referencing these important names and causes, Ma closed by requesting a subsidy of 500 
yuan per month—a considerable sum at the time, though still far less than what the government 
supplied to Chengda (10,383 yuan in 1938 from the MTAC alone) and certain other Muslim 
schools—“to support the development of the other half of our population of fifty million, the Hui 
women, in pursuing their studies.”264 In this case and that of the Chinese Muslim Youth Society 
above, the narrative of Muslims’ importance to China is mobilized in the context of making an 
administrative or financial request. On the other hand, Ma, much more so than the Youth 
Society, speaks to the state from a position of some authority: her letter implies that the 
government owes her a debt in light of her and her husband’s service, and in light of the 
insufficient attention paid to female education among China’s Muslims, which all sides could 
benefit from increasing.  
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 The examples of Ma Ruye and of the Chinese Muslim Youth Society point to a broader 
pattern. By the mid-1930s, Muslims in the eastern urban centers increasingly had to navigate 
their affairs through and with respect to the party-state. In particular, the New Life Movement, 
combined nationalism and cultural conservatism with new forms of social, organizational, and 
bodily modernity—in short, fascism—and mobilized society against domestic rivals, especially 
the Communists. This new ideological and organizational amalgam had specific consequences 
for Muslims.265 As was the case in Chinese society generally, the more open intellectual and 
cultural inquiry that emerged in the May Fourth era and persisted into the 1920s and early 1930s 
was now cut short.  
Leading Muslims in the urban centers responded to these new circumstances in the way 
they knew best: by anticipating the state’s priorities, by affirming the consonance of Muslim and 
government interests, and by reflecting the state’s own rhetoric back at it. New Muslim 
periodicals such as Chenxi (“Dawn’s Light,” 1935-38) and Tujue (“Surge Forward,” 1935-48?), 
led this response. These and other periodicals were based in the capital Nanjing (as opposed to 
earlier centers of publishing in Beijing or Shanghai), which grew as a locus of Muslim activity in 
the 1930s. While these publications still contained some articles dealing with Islamic doctrine, 
the point was not exegesis for its own sake, but politicized apologetics: making Islam appear 
innocuous to a non-Muslim audience. These publications differed from Yuehua in that their main 
purpose was not to drive Muslim cultural renewal, but to present the Muslims of eastern China as 
the government’s ideal partners in managing the frontiers and conducting diplomacy with the 
Islamic world beyond China: the twin sources of Muslim communal legitimacy. While Chenxi 
and Tujue made these points bluntly, Yuehua at this time also experienced a shift. It abandoned 
                                                 
265 Tsui, “China’s Forgotten Revolution.” 
 
 148 
the exuberant tone with which it reported successful efforts to connect with Muslims outside 
China in the early 1930s, and it also drastically scaled down its use of Arabic even before the 
war. The second purpose of these journals was to attempt, no doubt with little success, to make 
GMD ideologies and slogans relevant to a Muslim context. In fact, Chen Lifu wrote the first 
article of Chenxi’s inaugural issue, in which he explained the importance of the newly launched 
New Life Movement—but failed to mention Islam or Muslims by name a single time. It was not 
a coincidence that this inaugural issue also contained an article on “debating about the religion, 
but not about the country” (zheng jiao bu zheng guo), a new Muslim slogan that clearly 
prioritized national over transnational loyalties. The second issue of Chenxi followed up with an 
article by Lin Sen, chairman of the national government, on the concept of “governing the 
country through the party,” or “building the party-state” (yi dang zhi guo). While Muslims had to 
adopt a defensive posture at various points in the early to mid-1930s, the fact that figures such as 
Chen Lifu and Lin Sen would publicly throw their weight behind them demonstrates how elite 
Muslims’ loyalties were not under suspicion from the state’s perspective (the next chapter will 
show that Muslims did not necessarily enjoy the same goodwill from Chinese society). Indeed, 
despite the more rigid intellectual and cultural atmosphere, Muslim-GMD relations continued 
unscathed throughout the mid-1930s. 
These multiple processes of organizational and discursive institutionalization culminated 
in the early war years with the establishment of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation 
Association (Zhongguo huijiao jiuguo xiehui), an official organ intimately tied to the GMD 
leadership. This association mobilized Muslims and encouraged them to support the war, 
highlighted Muslim contributions to the national cause for non-Muslim audiences, and 
coordinated specific Muslim wartime efforts such as the Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation 
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(Zhongguo huijiao jindong fangwentuan, 1937-39) and Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation 
(Zhongguo huijiao nanyang fangwentuan, 1939-41).  
The Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation’s leadership consisted of three dozen 
military figures, officials, diplomats, imams, scholars, and community leaders.266 The common 
elements linking all these figures were their integrationist politics and their commitment to 
supporting GMD Northwest frontier development. Its director was Bai Chongxi, who was one of 
the war’s most successful generals and who by the late 1930s had eclipsed Ma Hongkui as the 
primary patron of Chinese Muslims. The Association’s senior supervisors included all of the so-
called “Four Great Imams”: Da Pusheng (1874-1965) of Shanghai, Wang Jingzhai (1879-1949) 
of Tianjin, Ha Decheng (1888-1943) of Shanghai, and Ma Songting (1895-1992) of Beijing. Its 
four deputy directors were no less significant. Besides Tang Kesan and Sun Shengwu of the 
MTAC, these included Ma Liang of Liaoning, a leading member of the Northwest Development 
Association, and Shi Zizhou (1879-1969) of Tianjin, an educator, GMD operative, and major 
advocate of translating the Quran into Chinese.267 The Association’s managers included several 
important names as well: Wang Zengshan (1903-61) of Shandong, head of the Chinese Islamic 
Near East Delegation, and at various points a GMD official in Gansu and Xinjiang; Ma Tianying 
(1900-82) of Beijing, head of the Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation; Zhang Zhaoli another 
participant in the Near East Delegation; Ai Yizai, a patron of the Muslim community of Beijing; 
Bai Shouyi (1909-2000), one of the most important Chinese historians of the twentieth century, 
Muslim or non-Muslim; authors and editors, such as Yuehua’s Wang Mengyang and Li Tingbi, 
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as well as Shi Juemin, editor-in-chief of the Nanjing-then-Lanzhou-based paper Muslim Youth 
(Huijiao qingnian); and several Chinese Azharites including Sha Guozhen (head of the Chinese 
Azhar missions), Na Zhong (a prolific translator), and Ding Zhongming (future Taiwanese 
ambassador to Libya). Interestingly, while Chinese Muslims dominated the organization, at least 
one or two little-known Uyghurs also participated. This extraordinary collection of individuals 
represented the bulk of Muslim political, intellectual, and communal clout in Republican China. 
The careers of the abovementioned individuals aptly illustrate the confluence of interests 
between elite Muslims and the GMD, especially as forged in the crucible of frontier governance.  
 
Intellectual Legitimation: The Fu’ad Library Project and Frontier Cultural Progress 
Association 
 
In the more constrained political and intellectual atmosphere of the mid-1930s, Chinese Muslim 
elites sought to make their cultural activities, and the whole history and identity of Islam and 
Muslims in China, more legible to the GMD government. New forms of intellectual 
collaboration between Muslim and Han Chinese intellectuals emerged as a result. While 
numerous shared values and instances of genuine curiosity existed between the two groups, it 
would be a mistake to view intellectual collaboration independently from the all-encompassing 
questions of politics and territory. Unfolding before and during the war with Japan, these 
collaborations required, implied, produced, and institutionalized certain arguments about what 
Islam in China was—and even what Islam and China generally were—and precluded others. 
One representative collaboration was the Fu’ad Library Preparatory Committee (Fude 
tushuguan choubei weiyuanhui) of the mid-1930s, in which Chinese Muslim leaders worked 
with well-known Han intellectuals and officials to house and expand a collection of classic 
Islamic texts bestowed by King Fu’ad I (r. 1922-36) and King Farouq I (r. 1936-52) of Egypt to 
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the Chengda Academy of Beijing, China’s leading institution of Islamic education providing 
teacher training along combined Islamic modernist and Chinese nationalist lines. 
The fifteen Han committee members were a superlatively credentialed group. The 
common themes between their careers were study abroad in Japan, Europe, or the United States; 
affiliation with one or more of China’s new Western-style universities, particularly Peking 
University; and high-level direct or indirect service to the GMD government. Of these fifteen, 
the best-known were Cai Yuanpei, the educator and revolutionary who had studied extensively in 
Germany and France, served as minister of education in the early years of the Republic, and 
founded Academia Sinica, and Feng Youlan, the neo-Confucian philosopher who earned his PhD 
from Columbia University in 1924. The rest, though not quite as famous, were equally 
prominent. Some were officials, such as Weng Wenhao (the first Chinese to earn a doctorate in 
geology, “father of the Chinese oil industry,” and later head of the Executive Yuan), Tao 
Xisheng (GMD minister of propaganda and secretary to Chiang Kai-shek), and Zhu Jiahua 
(GMD minister of transport, now remembered as a “pioneer of China’s modernization”). Beyond 
this, most were professional scholars of various sorts. These included the accomplished 
historians Yao Congwu, who focused on Song and Yuan times and had produced the first 
complete translation of the Secret History of the Mongols; Zhang Xinglang, who translated 
Benedetto’s Travels of Marco Polo and authored The Geographical Basis of History (which 
ought to remind us of He Yingqin’s speech about Xibei); Gu Jiegang, the Peking University 
historian who traveled through the Northwest describing its geography and its non-Han peoples; 
and Chen Yuan, who wrote on the “three great religions” of Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam, 
and authored several works about Islam.268 Another important subgroup were scientists and 
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engineers: not only Zhu Jiahua, but also the physicist Li Shuhua and the chemist Li Linyu, both 
of whom studied in Paris and were instrumental in instituting science education in Republican 
China. The remaining Han members were Bai Pengfei, one of China’s earliest legal scholars; Li 
Jinxi, an accomplished linguist, script reformer, and dictionary editor (and classmate and friend 
of Mao Zedong); Mei Yibao, an educator who had obtained his PhD in the United States, taught 
at Peking University, and briefly served as its president; and Xu Bingchang, who had studied 
philosophy at the University of Paris and taught at Peking University, but also served as the lead 
Chinese member of Sven Hedin’s Sino-Swedish Expedition, known in Chinese as the 
“Northwest Study Expedition” (Xibei kaochatuan).269 This worldly group of Han celebrities 
linked, and blurred the lines between, the more open, bottom-up intellectual exploration of the 
May Fourth era and the more constrained, top-down power aspirations of the Nanjing Decade. 
The Muslim members of the committee were also highly accomplished. Among them 
were Ma Songting and Tang Kesan, leaders of the Chengda Academy, which trained ulama to 
teach in frontier schools and/or to pursue further study in Egypt; Zhao Zhenwu, editor-in-chief of 
Yuehua; Ma Linyi, an elder Muslim who had served as the GMD-appointed minister of 
education for Gansu Province in the 1910s; and Bai Shouyi, a scholar who was interested in the 
frontiers and who would later become one of China’s most prominent historians in the PRC era. 
These Muslim leaders identified with their Han counterparts on both levels characterized above: 
that of developing positive knowledge, and that of expanding state power. The scholarly ethos 
did not counterbalance the statist one, however, but rather intertwined with it: Muslim leaders 
shared the GMD government’s politicized espousal of neo-Confucianism; its emphasis on 
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modernization, rationality, and science; and its developmentalist, pedagogical, and Sinicizing 
prescriptions for the frontiers. 
These Muslim leaders identified with their Han counterparts on both levels characterized 
above: that of developing positive knowledge, and that of expanding state power. The scholarly 
ethos did not counterbalance the statist one, however, but rather intertwined with it: Muslim 
leaders shared the GMD government’s politicized espousal of neo-Confucianism; its emphasis 
on modernization, rationality, and science; and its developmentalist, pedagogical, and Sinicizing 
prescriptions for the frontiers. In all these regards, the imperatives of the pen and the sword, so to 
speak, reinforced one another. This relationship between the Han and Muslim members of the 
Fu’ad committee developed thanks to the Muslims’ increasing contributions in the mid-1930s to 
non-Muslim journals such as Yugong and Xin Yaxiya—both of which happened to serve as major 
conduits for importing Orientalist knowledge about Islam, Asia, and China’s frontiers.270 
Muslims also established their own scholarly journals on those models, for example Bai Shouyi’s 
short-lived Yisilan (“Islam,” 1935), which presented ethnographic research Bai had conducted in 
Yunnan. To borrow Tuttle’s description of similar processes between Tibetan and Chinese 
Buddhists, Bai and the other Muslim members of the Fu’ad committee were fostering Sino-
Islamic dialogue, and producing new knowledge of Islam, on “Chinese terms.”271 
In a basic sense, the Fu’ad Library’s establishment was a matter of considerable pride for 
these Muslim leaders. The library building itself was located within the campus of Chengda 
Academy, adjacent to the Dongsi Mosque in Beijing (where Chengda had moved following the 
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Japanese invasion of Shandong in May 1928). The structure was large for its purpose, and 
similar to other Qing- and Republican-era buildings in Beijing: an imposing two-story stone 
facade with slanted ceramic-tile roof, carved lintels, and wooden columns preceding the main 
entrance, above which hung a Chinese calligraphic inscription (unfortunately illegible in the only 
available photograph of the facade). On 30 September 1936, Yuehua published a front-page 
announcement that physical construction of the library, “longed for by those who care about 
Islamic culture,” was finally complete. At this time, they also announced the participation of the 
abovementioned non-Muslim “cultural dignitaries” (wenhua mingliu) in the preparatory 
committee, whom Tang Kesan and Ma Songting had worked to recruit.272 The reason for their 
involvement, the announcement stated, was to help pursue the “critical task of connecting 
Chinese and Arab cultures—that is, promoting mutual support between Muslim and 
Han…[which] naturally must be developed from both sides.” The article added that these Han 
celebrities, particularly Li Shuhua, had a “clear understanding of Islamic culture and a sincere 
desire to support it,” and that their participation was a “truly joyous occasion for our brethren, 
Muslim and non-Muslim alike.” The article hoped that the Han celebrities, in these “days of 
serious national crisis,” would be able to “convey their understanding of Islamic culture to court 
and commoner and to cultural leaders nation-wide” and would continue to support the “progress 
and development of Islamic culture…which had already made great contributions to China.”273 
The first of these two aspirations was an oblique reference to recent instances of 
misunderstanding between Muslims and Han in China’s major cities, some of which had turned 
violent (these will be discussed further in Chapter Three). The second aspiration laid the 
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groundwork for further collaboration between Muslims and Han, singling out education as one of 
the most important areas where this further collaboration could take place.  
The committee appears to have met in full on a single occasion, 22 September 1936, from 
7 to 8p.m. Xu Bingchang and Ma Songting gave reports. The men sat at a single round table in 
one of the Fu’ad Library’s modest rooms, adorned with Arabic and Chinese calligraphic scrolls. 
Despite the deference accorded to the Han members in the Yuehua announcement, they 
addressed one another as “brothers” (xiongdi). The Muslim leaders appear to have had the 
strongest prior relations with Xu Bingchang, who invited Chen Shuren and Weng Wenhao; Gu 
Jiegang, who invited Cai Yuanpei and Zhu Jiahua; and Tao Xisheng, who invited Bai Pengfei 
and Li Jinxi. The atmosphere was warm and the format collaborative: tasks were not segregated 
between Muslims and Han. That said, the relationship between Gu Jiegang and Bai Shouyi—that 
of a Han mentor and a Muslim apprentice—dominated the committee’s work. In the course of 
the meeting, Gu, Bai, and Tang Kesan were elected as the group’s standing committee. 
Meanwhile, Ai Yizai and Zhao Zhenwu would prepare the group’s charter, but Gu Jiegang 
would edit it. Finally, the task of drafting a letter requesting additional books for the library also 
fell to Bai Shouyi (with Wang Mengyang’s assistance), though Gu Jiegang reserved the right to 
edit this document as well. In addition to the Muslims’ publishing the book request letter in 
Yuehua, certain Han members would see to its publication in several major nationwide 
periodicals.274 News of the library’s completion and the work of the preparatory committee also 
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appeared in Yugong (edited by Gu Jiegang) and Tujue (the Nanjing-based publication of by and 
for Chinese Muslims connected to the GMD government). 
The letter crafted by Gu Jiegang and Bai Shouyi, ostensibly to request further book 
donations for the library, clarifies the multiple levels of consensus between the committee’s Han 
and Muslim members regarding the outlines of Chinese Islamic history, Chinese Muslim 
identity, the role of religion in a modern nation-state, and the relationship of all this to the 
frontiers, education reform, and the integration and Sinicization of Islam and Muslims. The letter 
opened as follows:  
Islam in China is widespread. Its history already dates back over a thousand years. 
Today, the number of believers in all of China has reached fifty million. This 
long-standing history is the product of mutual influence, of constant give and 
take, between Arab civilization and Chinese civilization, which led to the creation 
of a type of inseparable civilizational collective [bu neng fenge de wenming jiti]. 
This huge Muslim population is a great pillar of the Chinese nation. It plays an 
indispensable role in the Northwest’s frontier defense, safeguarding the country’s 
lands. Thus, as pure, dispassionate research will show, from the perspective of the 
destiny of the nation-state, Islam in China is not simply a religion, but also brings 
even vaster territories into the equation. Clearly it is unlike other religions.  
 Most non-Muslims do not pay close attention to these matters. What’s 
worse, two to three centuries of deceptive policies by the [Manchu] ruling class 
erected curtains of obstruction between Muslims and non-Muslims, which 
exacerbated misunderstandings.275 
 
Chinese Muslims’ alleged “inseparability” from China and “indispensability” to controlling and 
developing the frontiers are the foremost operative ideas in this passage. As the thinking went, 
these two factors accounted for Chinese Muslims’ unique status in the new nation-state. In light 
of this understanding of Islam’s role in China, the next section of the letter explained the 
importance of Muslim educational reform: 
The Chengda Teachers’ Training Academy’s crucial mission consists of 
cultivating exceptional personnel to guide the religion…[It] was founded in the 
                                                 
275 Cai Yuanpei et al., “Beiping Chengda shifan xuexiao fude tushuguan zhengshu qi [Book Request Letter on behalf 
of the Fu’ad Library of Chengda Academy]” (Beiping: 1936). This letter was printed in Yuehua and as a stand-alone 
document. Chen Yuan’s copy is held in Beijing at the National Library of China’s Old Books Section.  
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fourteenth year of the Republic [and] struggled to develop in the face of difficult 
odds. After eleven years, its original ten students have grown to two hundred, its 
staff from six to twenty. Some of its graduates have been sent to Egypt to deepen 
their studies, while others have been sent to the provinces of the Northwest to 
work in Muslim frontier education. One must say that the special goal and special 
environment of Chengda is like the first ray of light in the dawn of Chinese Islam, 
and that it has an undeniable significance in the expansion of positive knowledge 
in China and the destiny of the nation-state.  
 
In other words, the main purpose of Chengda was to use new knowledge imported from the Arab 
Middle East in order to train qualified individuals to work in the Northwest frontiers, 
transforming that region’s predominantly Sufi Muslim populations, historically difficult to rule 
from the center, into loyal, quiescent, and conforming citizens of the new China.  
The book request letter reiterated that training competent teachers and collecting library 
books remained Chengda’s two most pressing tasks, and implied that the latter supported the 
former. In addition, it specified that the Fu’ad Library’s materials “must be able to satisfy the 
interests not only of its students, but also of Muslim and non-Muslim scholars from outside its 
walls.” Chengda’s goal, in the words of the letter, was to make the Fu’ad Library the “foremost 
library of Eastern Islam.” To accomplish that goal, however, they would need more books and a 
greater variety of books. Interestingly, the letter notes that the books received from King Fu’ad 
were “all in Arabic, and the quantity was not that great.” For this reason, Chengda also sought 
new and old Chinese books as well as foreign books on Islam. The letter closed by expressing 
Chengda’s “hope that the development of this large Islamic library will strengthen Chinese 
Muslim education and frontier education, that it will provide a new path forward for China’s 
scholars, and that it will prove enlivening for the entire Chinese nation.”  
 The letter contains certain elisions worth noting. The first is the absence of any attempt to 
convey the spiritual dimensions of Islam, and Islam’s construal instead as a “civilization” 
(wenhua or wenming). The conception of Islam as a civilization rendered Islam conveniently 
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commensurable with Chinese civilization, facilitating the argument that Muslims had over the 
centuries become Chinese. A second, related omission lies in the privileging of the Arab origins 
of Islam. By leaving out Islam’s circuitous path through Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast 
Asia, and beyond, Gu Jiegang, Bai Shouyi, and their counterparts could more easily convey a 
linear progression in which the history of Chinese Muslims began in Arabia but ended in China. 
Both of these creative misconceptions parallel Middle Eastern Muslim thinkers’ dialogue with 
Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the power of Europe and of its 
concept of civilization led to historically based counterarguments that Islamic civilization had 
“contributed” to the rise of Europe and that recovering a lost “Arab essence” was the key to 
Islamic renewal in modern times. In the Republican Chinese context, conceptualizing Islam as a 
civilization rooted in Arabness affirmed for a non-Muslim Chinese audience Islam’s 
innocuousness, as well as its compatibility with and subordination to “China.” The letter’s 
statement that Chinese- and foreign-language books would be a useful addition to Fu’ad and 
Farouq’s exclusively Arabic texts betrays that a main purpose of the Fu’ad Library project was to 
render Islam legible, in the most literal sense, to the Han and the GMD. 
In sum, the Fu’ad Library project in general rendered the Muslim processes of text 
collection described in Chapter One innocuous and useful to the state, and the book request letter 
in particular encapsulated the birth of a politically expedient narrative of Chinese Muslim 
identity. As the letter stated, the core of this narrative was the notion that Muslims were 
“inseparable” from and “indispensable” to China: that is, not foreign and not a threat, which 
popular Han stereotypes often held them to be. Their history, so the thinking went, consisted of a 
teleological path toward Sinicization, during which they had contributed meaningfully to 
Chinese civilization in multiple ways—strategically, culturally, intellectually. The work of 
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Chengda itself continued this all-important Muslim “contribution” (an idea explored further in 
Chapter Three). 
War with Japan accelerated the activation of these imperatives. For example, in the 
“Frontier Cultural Progress Association” (Bianjiang wenhua cujinhui, 1939-44) directed by Chen 
Lifu, a separate but related group of Muslim and Han thinkers and officials worked to gather 
strategically significant cultural knowledge of the frontiers and produce effective propaganda 
toward them.276 In contrast to the Fu’ad committee, the Frontier Cultural Progress Association 
was concerned less with abstract ideas, and more with formulating actionable plans for research 
and propaganda. The GMD formed such organs due to fears that the CCP or Japanese would 
outdo them in their outreach to frontier populations. The Frontier Cultural Progress Association 
sought to deepen the GMD state’s knowledge of and collaboration with Muslims in order to 
conduct more effective propaganda on the frontiers. To this end, it meticulously collected books 
and periodicals, conducted research and surveys, organized lectures and discussion groups, 
undertook outreach to local organizations, published multilingual propaganda, and supported 
frontier publications, bookstores, hospitals, movie theatres, and radio stations: strategies that 
resembled the GMD’s processes of party-building throughout China, but with emphasis on 
ethno-religious elements that were not as relevant elsewhere.  
The concrete accomplishments of the Frontier Cultural Progress Association, however, 
were probably less important than its symbolism: as the saying goes, personnel is policy. This 
Association connected the leadership of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Association, 
including Shi Zizhou, Ma Liang, Wang Zengshan, Li Tingbi, and Zhang Zhaoli, with top 
                                                 
 
276 Wang Zengshan appears to be the only figure who was involved in both the Fu’ad Library project and the 
Frontier Cultural Progress Association.  
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Chinese figures including Sun Fo (son of Sun Yat-sen and head of the Judicial Yuan), Kong 
Xiangxi, Dai Jitao (also active in the government’s collaborations with Tibetan Buddhists), Wu 
Zhongxin (head of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission from 1936 to 1944), Ju Zheng (a 
former 1911 Tongmenghui revolutionary and head of the Judicial Yuan), Kong Geng (another 
Tongmenghui member and publisher of the wartime journal Minzu zhanxian, “The Nation’s 
Battle Lines), Zhang Ji (another early revolutionary and leading conservative GMD politician), 
Li Yizhong (secretary of the Ministry of Social Organizations), and Rong Xiang (a Mongolian 
member of parliament), in addition to Chen Lifu.277  
 The Fu’ad Library project and the Frontier Cultural Progress Association are two of the 
clearest expressions of shared interests between Muslim elites and the GMD, and the 
implications of those shared interests for the definition of Chinese Muslim identity. The narrative 
of Chinese Muslims’ Chineseness, as well as the Muslim-GMD relationship behind it, were 
firmly in place by the mid-1930s. Soon thereafter, the demands placed on Muslims by the war 
with Japan created the conditions whereby that narrative and that relationship were fully 
instrumentalized in service of the nation-state, and whereby any alternative understanding of 
Chinese Islam and its role became unsustainable. 
 
Frontier Education Reform: State- and Muslim-Led Efforts amidst War and Communist 
Competition 
 
                                                 
277 Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 (2) – 1002. Other lesser-known but significant members of the 
Frontier Cultural Progress Association included Chen Wenjian from Jiangsu, a periodical editor for the Mongolian-
Tibetan Affairs Commission; Zhu Yonghua from Hunan, an Arabic- and Uyghur-language editor for the Mongolian-
Tibetan Affairs Commission; Chen Shi from Hunan, an assistant Arabic instructor for frontier schools; Jiang 
Guoguang, an assistant Arabic instructor from Xikang, also affiliated with the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs 
Commission; Pan Jingchang from Nanjing, an assistant Arabic instructor at the Frontier Affairs Research Institute 
(Bianwu yanjiu suo); Sha Lei of Jiangsu, editor-in-chief of the Muslim journal Muslim Masses Fortnightly (Huijiao 
dazhong banyuekan); and Liu Chuan of Jiangsu, an editor for the journal Northwest Muslims (Xibei Huimin). It is 
impossible to confirm from surnames alone how many of these individuals were Muslim, but it is at least highly 
unlikely that the Arabic instructors could be non-Muslim. 
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War with Japan and the GMD’s ongoing rivalry with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
greatly intensified collaboration between Muslim elites and the GMD government. State-led and 
Muslim-led educational reforms focused on the strategically crucial triangle between Ningxia to 
the north, Xining to the west, and Xi’an to the southeast. To the northeast of this triangle lay the 
Communists, encamped at Yan’an, Shaanxi, from 1936; beyond them lay the Japanese forces in 
Manchuria, whose agents regularly penetrated into China’s northwestern frontier regions. 
Lanzhou, in the south-center of the triangle, was the origin of the Gansu corridor, the most 
passable route connecting eastern China to the more distant frontiers. If hostile forces—Japanese, 
Communist, or otherwise—were to attempt to cut the eastern regions (that is, those still under 
GMD rule) off from the frontiers, controlling this swath of land would be a top priority. The 
GMD hoped to harness both the “hard” power of the Muslim warlords and the “soft” power of 
the modernist ulama to keep this unforgiving territory under GMD control. The GMD and 
Chinese Muslim elites agreed: if the inhabitants of this region could be made to see themselves 
as Chinese through language instruction and patriotic indoctrination, they would be less 
susceptible to enemy schemes—or to rising up against the state as their forebears had done in the 
nineteenth century.  
Concerns about the Communists were not unfounded. The CCP had come a long way in 
its relations with northwestern Muslims. In late 1936, nearing the end of the Long March, the 
Red Army had relied on local Muslims’ assistance in their struggle against GMD forces. On 20 
October, the CCP held a meeting with these Muslims at the Tongxin Great Mosque, an imposing 
Ming-era structure overlooking the Qingshui River.278 Here, the two sides formed the Yuhai 
County Hui Autonomous Government of Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia—the CCP’s first minority 
                                                 
 
278 On the Tongxin Great Mosque, see Xibei huizu yu yisilan jiao, pp. 433-36. 
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autonomous government, which provided the model that would be applied throughout the 
country after 1949.279 A placard commemorating the meeting hangs to this day over the entrance 
to the prayer hall. It is said that Tongxin’s special connection to the CCP is why, of the one 
thousand or more Ming- and Qing-era mosques that once dotted Ningxia’s landscape, this was 
the only one spared from destruction during the Cultural Revolution. (On the other hand, inside 
the prayer hall, on the back wall directly over the qibla, lies a calligraphic inscription of Quran 
3:103, “Cling fast, ye one and all, and do not let go the great cord of God”—a verse often 
invoked to express the borderless unity of the Islamic umma, and one that might have been 
anathema to the CCP at the time, if only they could have read it.)280  
About a year after the Tongxin meeting, GMD forces struck at the Yuhai Autonomous 
Government and succeeded in dismantling it. Needless to say, however, fear of CCP influence 
persisted. Although war with Japan brought renewed GMD-Communist cooperation, and 
although Stalin’s support for Chiang Kai-shek required the latter to walk a fine line, GMD-CCP 
rivalry in the frontiers largely continued apace. As the American journalist Edgar Snow’s rare 
account of life at Yan’an details, the CCP was actively training corps of Muslim soldiers—who 
appear to have shared a special dread and resentment for Ma Hongkui, with some citing Ma’s 
harsh policies as their reason for joining the CCP ranks.281 While this training was formally for 
                                                 
 
279 Erie, Prophet and Party, 290-91; also check Qiu 2009, quoted in Erie 291 
 
280 This Quranic verse, however, is used today in Chinese translation as the motto of the Chinese Islamic 
Association, founded by Chinese Azharites returned from Egypt. Today it is not understood as threatening, but in 
fact as being conceptually consonant with the PRC’s notion of “national unity” (minzu tuanjie). 
 
281 Snow, Red Star over China, pp. 312-16. Snow writes: “I asked one commander why he had joined. ‘To fight Ma 
Hung-kuei,’ he said. ‘Life is too bitter for us Hui-min under Ma Hung-kuei. No family is secure. If a family has two 
sons, one of them must join his army. If it has three sons, two must join. There is no escape—unless you are rich and 
can pay the tax for a substitute. What poor man can afford it? Not only that, but every man must bring his own 
clothes, and his family must pay for his food, fires, and lighting. This costs several tens of dollars a year.’ Although 
these Red Moslem regiments had been organized less than half a year, they had already achieved considerable ‘class 
consciousness,’ it seemed.”  
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the purpose of resisting Japan, it also allowed the CCP to establish its alternative ideology and 
approach to social organization among ordinary Muslims. Snow describes a conversation where 
he asked Muslim Communist soldiers how they would deal with wealthy landowning ahongs 
who sided with the GMD and could not be convinced to join the Communists. The soldiers 
replied, if such ahongs could not be persuaded, “‘We would punish them. They would be bad 
ahuns [sic], and the people would demand their punishment.’”282 
GMD-CCP competition also extended to frontier education. In 1938, the GMD Ministry 
of Education discussed “ways to guard against the expansion of CCP ‘progressive activities’ in 
Shaanxi and elsewhere.”283 The problem escalated over the following two years. In late 1939, the 
Executive Yuan alerted the Ministry of Education that they had intercepted CCP 
communications from Yan’an regarding an initiative by Mao Dun (1896-1981), the novelist and 
future PRC minister of culture, to establish a “Xinjiang Cultural Association” (Xinjiang wenhua 
xiehui), saying the Ministry of Education “must pay attention” to this issue.284  
Mao Dun did indeed work in Xinjiang from March 1938 to April 1940, and then lectured 
at the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Cultural Association until October 1940. He 
established the Xinjiang Cultural Association at Dihua (now Urumqi) shortly after his arrival in 
the region, in April 1938, serving as its director and section chief for fine arts. The Association’s 
purpose was to “guide and harmonize the cultural progress of [Xinjiang’s] ethnic groups, and 
support the development of culture across the province.” Similar to GMD frontier initiatives, this 
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283 Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 (2) – 15; Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 (2) 
– 16. The GMD government conducted similar discussions at this time regarding CCP activities abroad. These 
documents were not available to view during the author’s time in Nanjing in spring 2016. 
 
284 Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 (2) – 21. These were also not viewable in spring 2016. 
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Association researched local culture and antiquities, attempted to expand local education, and 
published materials translated into Uyghur, Kazakh, and Mongolian. It also conducted 
indoctrination alongside anti-Japanese activities.285  
Rather audaciously, Mao Dun even took advantage of nominal GMD-CCP cooperation to 
publish an article about his Xinjiang experience in the inaugural issue of Huijiao wenhua, the 
Chongqing-based magazine of the GMD-affiliated Chinese Islamic National Salvation 
Association. In it, Mao explains that each of Xinjiang’s fourteen minority nationalities (minzu) 
established its own “Cultural Progress Society” under the umbrella of the Xinjiang Cultural 
Association. The guiding principle of this “cultural work” in Xinjiang was to realize the goal of 
“ethnicity in form, socialism in content.”286 Each ethnic group would not only develop its own 
culture, but also develop a “new culture” fused with socialist principles. Significantly, Mao says 
that the constitution of each minzu’s Cultural Progress Society asserted the need to “do away 
with Han-centrism, narrow ethnic psychology, regionalism, and other incorrect tendencies”—a 
relatively direct critique of the GMD’s entire approach to frontier governance.287 
Mao closes his article by singling out one minzu whose cultural work was “already 
glorious and storied”: the Chinese Muslims. Mao says that when Beiping’s Chengda Academy 
and Shanghai’s Islamic Normal School sent their students to study in Egypt, and more recently 
                                                 
285 Liang Keming, “Xinjiang wenhua xiehui [The Xinjiang Cultural Association],” in Ji Dachun, ed., Xinjiang lishi 
cidian (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1994), p. 679.  
 
286 The exact original phrase was “Ethnicity in form, Six Great Policies in content”: 以民族为形式，以六大政策为
内容 yi minzu wei xingshi, yi liuda zhengce wei neirong. The Six Great Policies represented the core of Chinese 
Communist ideology during the Yan’an period. They included anti-imperialism (fan di), affinity for the Soviet 
Union (qin Su), equality of peoples (min(zu) ping(deng)), peace (heping), development (jianshe), and anti-corruption 
(qinglian). 
 
287 Mao Dun, “Tan Xinjiang ge huijiao minzu de wenhua gongzuo [On the Cultural Work of Xinjiang’s Muslim 
Peoples],” Huijiao wenhua 1/1 (1941), pp. 4-6.  
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when our “Muslim compatriots” organized the Near East, Hajj, and South Seas Delegations, 
these efforts were of “great benefit to strengthening relations between our country and Muslim 
countries.”288 In other words, disregarding their strong ties to the GMD, Mao was implying that 
the recent work of the Chinese Muslims could be seen as consistent with the CCP’s vision for an 
ideal minority nationality. This statement, combined with Mao’s choice to publish his article in a 
Chinese Muslim periodical, could be seen as a provisional overture to the leaders of a powerful 
“minority” group, and an attempt to draw them out of the orbit of the GMD.  
In short, the Communists, camped on Ma Hongkui’s doorstep and spread throughout the 
Northwest frontiers, jeopardized not only the GMD government’s basic control of territory, but 
also the legitimacy of its Sinicizing approach to frontier populations. Whereas the GMD 
envisioned the full-fledged transformation of frontier populations into loyal citizens fluent in 
written and spoken Chinese, the CCP’s also flawed yet subtler model of minority “autonomy” 
attempted no such feat, instead allowing populations to retain the outward appearance of cultural 
and linguistic distinctiveness as long as those features contributed to the creation of a “new 
culture” and conformed to ideological and organizational strictures derived from Stalinist 
nationalities policy.  
Ma Hongkui, Chiang Kai-shek, Chen Lifu, and other top officials discussed the GMD 
government’s Northwest strategy at length in mid-1937, just before the outbreak of full-scale war 
with Japan, and at about the time of the GMD counteroffensive against the Yuhai Autonomous 
Government. On 29 May 1937, Ma Hongkui, son of Ma Fuxiang, sent a secret telegram to the 
Executive Yuan Secretariat warning that  
Japan (1) is planning to set up an independent Muslim state similar to Manchukuo 
in northern Chahar (2) is moving westward organizing the false Manchus and 
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Mongol brigands and setting up Japanese instructors in their territories (3) is 
conducting broad propaganda among the Mongols of western Gansu and Ningxia, 
and giving material assistance to Mongol leaders there for the purpose of 
establishing self-rule, all of which is being carried out by Japanese spies (4) is 
conducting, at the same time, broad propaganda among the Huimin in western 
Gansu and all over Ningxia, encouraging them to band together in seceding from 
the central government and setting up a Huimin autonomous region. Kindly bring 
to the attention of the Military Affairs Commission [i.e. Chiang Kai-shek].289 
 
After detailing conditions in Inner Mongolia, Ma turned to the situation of frontier Muslims:  
 
As for the Huimin, apart from the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, all Muslims are Han who 
believe in Islam. There is no difference between them and Buddhists, Christians, 
and other religious Han Chinese people. Their ancestors were merchants and 
scholars; there is no difference between them and the Han except in terms of what 
they eat and drink…I, Ma Hongkui, take it upon myself to ask the central 
authorities to pay special attention to the education of Muslims, as well as to 
improve education in every frontier province, city, and county, and at every level. 
Currently, among the younger generation of Muslims receiving instruction, a 
great many cannot tell right from wrong. Their belief in religion is strong, so 
many send their children to the prayer hall to study Arabic, [but] I would invite 
you to consider sending one or two Chinese language instructors to each of these 
schools. Add some basic citizenship education as well. This will strengthen their 
sense of patriotism.290 
 
In the government’s responding cables, one phrase in particular stands out again and again: “Ma 
asks the central authorities to pay special attention to the education of Muslims.” On 5 July, two 
days before the outbreak of full-scale war with Japan, Chiang Kai-shek personally telegrammed 
his cabinet ordering them to “Act in accordance with Ma’s suggestions.”291  
 During Chen Lifu’s tenure as minister of education (1938-44), the Ministry of Education 
attempted to act on Ma’s advice. The ministry implemented numerous plans under the heading of 
providing “scholarships and preferential treatment” (buzhu yu youdai) for frontier populations. It 
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subsidized Mongol, Tibetan, and Muslim students to study at institutions in eastern China, even 
in the face of resistance from prominent Han Chinese educators who advocated reserving the 
state’s resources for Han students. The ministry also conducted extensive surveys of educational 
conditions throughout the frontiers, which incidentally illustrated that the Ma warlords were far 
more successful than the GMD state at providing basic education.292 As the war in Asia became 
internationalized in 1941-42, the GMD government’s commitment to frontier education reform 
persisted and continued to evolve, displaying greater attention to “linguistic and cultural 
specificities.” In particular, the category of “religion” was now more explicitly entering the 
picture. On 21 September 1942, Chiang Kai-shek sent a handwritten note to Chen Lifu: 
“Regarding the organization and guidance of cultural associations in the Northwest, we must in 
particular add more Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan associations, as well as Muslim and Lamaist 
religious ones.”293 
Perhaps even more than Chiang Kai-shek, Chen Lifu viewed frontier education through 
an ideological and unabashedly paternalistic lens. In his memoirs, Chen devoted only the 
following short section of the chapter on the wartime Ministry of Education to the topic of 
“educating the minorities”: 
China’s border regions in 1939 were inhabited by culturally deprived minority 
nationalities. A national conference on education adopted a plan to promote 
education in border areas and a program to implement frontier youth education. 
Education was to be limited to ‘the inhabitants of Mongolia, Tibet, and other 
places whose languages and cultures are of a special nature.’ Education was to 
foster national consciousness in accordance with the educational aim of the 
Republic of China, which was to unify our nation’s culture. The border education 
program also tried to increase ordinary knowledge; improve work skills; upgrade 
life, physical culture, and health; and rigorously train people to defend against any 
invaders. 
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 In 1943 we started seventeen national elementary schools for school-age 
children in the border regions. Taking into account the special circumstances of 
wartime, we built national secondary schools, border middle schools, and border 
vocational schools to reach some 5,858 students, excluding students in laboratory 
schools. In 1939 and 1940 we sent individual groups to Chahar, Kansu, and 
Sinkiang and obtained recommendations for the Miao and Yi minorities in the 
Southwest. We also formed a Summer Border Service Corps, similar to today’s 
Peace Corps, for university students by selecting teachers and students from 
universities to supply educational and medical services. On a higher learning 
level, we promoted specialized courses, studies, programs, and departments in 
border regional universities and colleges. In 1945 a national institute of border 
culture and education was instituted. Shortages of teaching materials, textbooks, 
and dictionaries were severe. There was a lack of teachers who possessed special 
knowledge of Mongolian, Tibetan, and Islamic languages, and there were few 
schoolhouses, recreational, athletic, or sanitary facilities. Yet I believe that one of 
the great influences of World War II on China was the new focus on the border 
regions, the minorities, and their welfare.294 
 
Chen states plainly that cultural and ideological uniformity was the goal of the GMD’s frontier 
educational reforms. This uniformity was to spring from education in Chinese language and 
script and indoctrination in patriotism and Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People. At the 
same time, Chen notes that unfavorable conditions plus the exigencies of war meant that frontier 
schools, where they existed, had to start with basic knowledge, practical skills, and physical 
education. Additionally, he acknowledges that even by the 1940s, the state had established only a 
limited number of schools. Most notably, he blames the less-than-ideal outcomes on a lack of 
teaching materials and instructors familiar with Mongolian, Tibetan, and “Islamic” languages. 
Chen’s vague wording speaks to the state’s lack of knowledge of frontier peoples. Furthermore, 
his imprecise reference to “Islamic languages” reveals his assumption that the languages of the 
frontier, from the perspective of the state, would only ever be conduits for inculcating the habits 
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of body and mind the GMD believed should constitute a modern Chinese citizen. That is, they 
should be loyal, patriotic, Chinese-speaking, clean, healthy, fit, vigilant, and (to a point) literate. 
For Chen, Muslimness, Mongolianness, and Tibetanness were at best a means to an end whose 
utility would evaporate in time. 
Predictably, challenges to the successful implementation of the Ministry of Education’s 
policies went beyond mere administrative difficulties. In March 1937, MTAC director Wu 
Zhongxin wrote an advisory note to the Ministry of Education relaying a report by Ao Jingwen, 
dean of the Beiping Mongolian-Tibetan Academy (Meng-Zang xuexiao), stating that a group of 
twenty-one students had submitted a petition to drop out and discontinue their studies effective 
that June. Wu’s note continued: “Bearing in mind the difficulties already faced by Mongolian-
Tibetan Academy students, the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission advises the Ministry of 
Education to implement in earnest the stipulations regarding preferential treatment of Mongolian 
and Tibetan students, and to encourage all universities to recruit such students. Convene these 
students three weeks after the semester has begun, and if they are not up to standard, move 
immediately to recruit new ones who will be capable of graduating.” Wu condescended that 
“those who fail will inevitably feel disappointed at the missed opportunity,” but that this was all 
the more reason for the Ministry of Education to encourage universities to expand their frontier 
student quotas, noting that the level currently stood at only “one or two per institution.” He 
concluded by reminding the Ministry that these measures were meant “to accord with the overall 
aim of helping the government improve frontier culture.”295 
                                                 




Others raised similar concerns, but with the opposite recommendations. On 31 October 
1938, Luo Jialun, dean of the National Central University, wrote to Chen Lifu noting that the 
number of frontier students graduating from eastern Chinese institutions was not meeting the 
level hoped for according to the Ministry of Education’s “scholarship and preferential treatment” 
policy. Luo was confident that he understood the reasons behind the discrepancy: “For these 
frontier students, to whom we are required to give special treatment, the education they have 
received at home in the frontier provinces is backward and underdeveloped (luohou). How can 
we possibly deal with them in the same way as graduates of secondary education from eastern 
China? Their opportunities for higher educational attainment are few indeed.” Unlike Wu 
Zhongxin, Luo concluded that frontier students were being set up to fail, and that the 
“scholarship and preferential treatment” programs were not only not worth the effort, but unfair 
to students from eastern China: “If frontier students are to attend eastern Chinese institutions and 
receive the same education as students from eastern China, then they must also receive the same 
treatment. In my humble opinion, in the interest of fairness, this temporary measure—which our 
institution has taken pains to enact—in fact still requires further thought.”296 Luo’s opposition to 
affirmative-action policies for frontier students only thinly veiled a Han-centric position that 
asked why investment in the frontiers was necessary. The existence of such prominent detractors 
as Luo further indicates the weight the GMD government attached to frontier education. In the 
end, the sustained involvement in the frontiers advocated by Ma Hongkui and Wu Zhongxin won 
out over the objections raised by Luo.  
 Ultimately, top-down Sinicization remained the GMD’s overall policy. Mirroring Chen’s 
priorities, the government pushed for frontier Muslims (as well as Tibetans, Mongols, and 
                                                 
296 Luo Jialun to Chen Lifu, Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 (2) – 936. 
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others) to write and speak decent Chinese, to subscribe to Chinese nationalism and Sun Yat-sen’s 
Three Principles of the People, to accept the notion that all China’s inhabitants constituted a 
single race, and to support China’s cause against Japan as well as the GMD’s struggle against the 
CCP. As Chen’s memoirs indicate, however, the GMD’s limited knowledge of frontier 
conditions—exacerbated by the earlier failure to complete the physical development of the 
Northwest and other regions—meant that many of their wartime frontier policies faltered in the 
early stages or did not even make it off the drawing board.  
Muslim elites were institutionally, materially, and culturally better prepared than the 
central government to carry out educational reforms for frontier Muslims. The most prominent 
Muslim-led wartime education initiative came when imam Da Pusheng relocated his Islamic 
Teacher’s Training Academy from Shanghai to Pingliang, Gansu, from 1938 to 1942. The 
Shanghai academy had been founded in August 1928 by Da Pusheng and his associates to 
provide instruction for Chinese Muslim schoolteachers along Islamic modernist lines, using texts 
that Da and others had collected abroad in Singapore, India, the Hijaz, and Cairo. The Shanghai 
school temporarily closed after the city fell to the Japanese in summer 1937, at which point Da 
undertook the Hajj.297 When he returned in early 1938, he met with Chiang Kai-shek in Wuhan 
and “reported to him on the conditions he observed abroad during his pilgrimage, and expressed 
his hope that the GMD government could help him continue the work of the Shanghai Islamic 
Teachers’ Training Academy in the interior of the country.”298 Chiang approved. An office was 
set up for the school in Xi’an in spring 1938 and classes began in fall of that year.  
                                                 
297 Ma Rulin, “Pingliang guoli shifan xuexiao [The Pingliang Islamic School],” Xibei huizu yu yisilanjiao [Islam and 
the Muslims of the Northwest], p. 242. 
 
298 Ma, “Pingliang guoli,” p. 242-43. 
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The significance of Da’s work was abundantly clear. On 19 August 1938, the Military 
Affairs Commission (temporarily in Hankou) telegrammed Chen Lifu to say that Da Pusheng 
and Sun Shengwu were developing a system to train one ahong per mosque in order  
to guide the believers in learning classics and to conduct political training 
[xunlian]… because the enemy as well as forces in northern Shaanxi are trying to 
draw in the Muslim youth. Therefore, we must pay particular attention to Da’s 
efforts to develop capable ahongs’ and to move the Islamic Academy from 
Shanghai to Pingliang, Gansu…After graduation, they can be sent to all regions to 
take charge of religious affairs [zhuchi jiaowu], and even be dispatched to North 
China to work making contacts behind enemy lines. One hundred fifty individuals 
will receive training to start, and a sum of 2,300 yuan per month will be granted to 
Da Pusheng’s school. This has been specially commanded by Zhongzheng [i.e. 
Chiang Kai-shek].”299 
 
By April 1939, the government had completed its retreat inland to Chongqing. At this time, 
Chiang Kai-shek personally ordered the Ministry of Education to send Da Pusheng an additional 
8,000 yuan for setting up his school in Pingliang.300 Chiang quoted Da’s telegram from February 
requesting only 5,000 yuan for food, clothing, books, and other necessities, but provided an extra 
3,000 anyway, in addition to guaranteeing the monthly 2,300 yuan promised in August 1938. 
Perhaps this was a premium offered preemptively for Da’s loyalty. However we interpret it, 
Chiang’s generosity points to the emphasis the government placed on protecting the Northwest 
and to the trust placed (even at a price) in figures such as Da. Incredibly, Chiang—the leader of a 
large country fighting for survival in a world war—went so far as to inspect the itemized budget 
himself, approving the breakdown of Pingliang’s 2,300 yuan per month for moving and travel 
fees, school and office supplies, school fees, books and periodicals, printing equipment, tea, 
medical supplies, exercise equipment, and uniforms.301 The only reasonable explanation is that 
                                                 
299 Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 – 13055.  
 




Muslim frontier education reform was not at all seen as a distraction from larger concerns, but 
rather was seen as performing a vital role supporting the war effort. As the war dragged on and 
resources dwindled, government commitment to Da’s school did not flag, but only increased.302 
 After the move to Pingliang, despite the high level of government support, Da struggled 
to recruit competent teachers and students and to implement his ideal curriculum, one that would 
include Chinese language education but also rigorous training in Islamic doctrine taught in 
Arabic. Ma Rulin, a Chinese Muslim instructor from Sichuan who moved to Pingliang in 1938 
with his wife and two daughters to work at Da Pusheng’s relocated academy, left a first-hand 
account of some of the day-to-day proceedings there. Ma reflected on his reasons for moving to 
Pingliang as follows: “I thought to myself: for one thing, working in national education [minzu 
jiaoyu] would be very meaningful for me, and for another, Pingliang is close to the frontier 
regions [ju bianqu jiaojin], so it would be easy for me to develop my credentials there.” Ma and 
his family arrived in Pingliang by the end of November. 
Not much more is known about Pingliang’s personnel. Ma tells us that Pingliang 
recruited students primarily among the Muslims of Henan Province.303 Unfortunately, we do not 
know if the school reached its goal of 150 students, and there is no additional information 
available on who the individuals they successfully recruited were. At the very least, however, the 
choice of Henan as the main region for student recruitment should confirm our impression that 
                                                 
301 Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 – 13055. 
 
302 Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 – 13055; 五 – 13056. Minister of finance Kong Xiangxi wrote 
to the Ministry of Education in February 1940 to re-approve the 2,300 yuan per month. On 23 May of that year, Da 
wrote to Chen Lifu requesting 27,600 yuan, and on 20 October he requested an additional 3,200 yuan. On 11 March 
1941, he requested an additional 42,060 yuan, and on 5 September another 30,000 yuan. In this final 
communication, however, he assented to a change in the academy’s status from private to state-run. 
 
303 Ma, “Pingliang guoli,” p. 243. 
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the government and the Muslim leaders viewed Muslims from China proper as being generally 
more in-line with the state than those living in the frontiers, who were the target population.304 
The process of designing the curriculum sparked some disagreement and necessitated 
compromise. At first, the school offered only two classes, one accelerated and one basic. In the 
beginning, the school had “no more than six” instructors and three to four administrative staff. 
When Ma first met with Da, he suggested dividing the curriculum in two: one module would 
train the teacher-students to teach in primary schools, able to provide basic standard instruction 
including one to two hours a week of Islamic doctrine taught in Arabic (Awen jiaoyi), and the 
other would train them as ahongs. Ma says that Da agreed with his suggestion “somewhat 
begrudgingly” (it seems that Da had hoped for a more thorough focus on doctrinal training). 
According to Ma’s suggestions, apart from the accelerated group, all classes would be primarily 
oriented toward the basic teacher training curriculum. The academy’s instructors, however, were 
still not numerous enough, leading Ma to assume responsibility for all the courses where no other 
instructors had been appointed, including pedagogy, physics, chemistry, and biology and 
hygiene.305 In short, the program Da and Ma hoped for remained out of reach. Ma does note, 
however, that each class sat for Arabic-language instruction in religious doctrine every day, and 
that the teacher-students were required to pray five times daily.306  
Regardless of these curricular challenges, fact that Pingliang was more than an 
educational institution explains the government’s high-level attention and support. The 
government plans for the academy stated that “After graduation, Pingliang instructors can be sent 
                                                 
304 While of course a Han-dominated region, Henan had several old and well-established Muslim communities, such 
as Sangpo, home of the Chinese Azharite leader, imam Pang Shiqian. See especially Elisabeth Allés, Musulmans de 
Chine: Une anthropologie des Hui du Henan (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2000).  
 




to all regions to take charge of religious affairs, and even be dispatched to North China to work 
making contacts behind enemy lines.”307 The Pingliang academy thus served a crucial 
extracurricular function, representing GMD interests in a fluid and even volatile wartime frontier 
environment where government presence was otherwise light. Formally speaking, this was the 
second period of GMD-CCP cooperation (August 1937 to June 1946), but in reality, competition 
between the Nationalists and Communists continued apace. Pingliang coordinated with agents 
working on the frontiers, including those from CCP-controlled territory in northern Shaanxi.  
Some of these CCP agents were Muslim. One such agent was Yang Jingren (1918-2001), 
who was born to a Muslim family from Lanzhou, joined the CCP in 1937, moved to Yan’an in 
1941, studied at the Nationalities Section of the CCP-operated Northern Shaanxi School 
(Shanbei gongxue minzu bu), and performed several wartime roles coordinating between the 
Yan’an-based CCP and frontier Muslims. Yang later played a role in the PRC’s pacification of 
Tibet in the 1950s. He eventually became one of the highest-ranking “Huizu” in the party, 
serving as vice-chair of the fifth through eighth sessions of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (1978-1998).308 Ma Rulin recalls Yang’s visit to Pingliang as follows:   
The Pingliang academy was relatively free to administer its own affairs, and 
interference by regional party members and government administrators played 
only a minimal role… the atmosphere was relatively free and open. For example, 
some intellectuals who came to us from regions affected by the war displayed 
particularly dynamic thought. A party official from CCP-controlled territory, 
Yang Jingren, came to Pingliang on behalf of the Gansu Hui Educational Progress 
Association [Gansu huimin jiaoyu cujinhui] to solicit funds for the Lanzhou 
Zhixing Middle School. During his visit to our campus, he gave a lecture about 
resisting Japan and saving the nation [kangri jiuguo], about democracy and unity 
                                                 
 
307 Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 – 13055.  
 
308 “Yang Jingren tongzhi shishi [The Death of Comrade Yang Jingren],” Zhongguo minzu bao [China Ethnic 
News], 81/23 (October 2001), p. 1. Founded by the CCP in July 1937 to train cadres in Yan’an, the Shanbei gongxue 
is considered a forerunner to two prominent present-day universities, Renmin Daxue (“People’s University,” now in 
Beijing) and Xibei Zhengfa Daxue (“Northwest University of Politics and Law,” now in Xi’an). 
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[minzhu tuanjie], and about reforming and improving the lives of the masses 
[gaishan qunzhong shenghuo].309  
 
We must regard Ma’s positive tone toward the CCP agents with skepticism, given that his 
recollection was produced in the 1990s. Unsurprisingly, moreover, GMD documents from the 
time indicate that the government was not actually interested in robust cooperation with the CCP, 
but in blocking their efforts at every turn.310  
In addition to navigating relations with the CCP in Yan’an and its Muslim 
representatives, the Pingliang academy also faced crucial tests in dealing with local Muslims. 
The most significant test came with the “Second Hai-Gu Muslim Uprising” of 1939, in which 
Muslims from the towns of Haiyuan and Guyuan rose up against GMD rule. The GMD had 
aggressively recruited soldiers and requisitioned supplies from the perennially hard-pressed local 
Muslim population and even coerced some into forced labor, upon which as many as twenty 
thousand local Muslims took up arms against the GMD. The GMD crushed the rebellion 
especially swiftly and ruthlessly because they believed it had been incited by CCP forces in 
                                                 
309 Ma, “Pingliang guoli,” pp. 243-44. Other prominent Communists of Muslim background also visited Pingliang. 
Ma recalls a similar visit by Liu Yifu (刘屹夫), a Beijinger of Muslim origin who enrolled in the Shanbei gongxue 
in 1937 and joined the CCP in 1943. Starting in 1939, Liu was appointed deputy director of the Fifth Grain 
Provision Bureau for Shanxi, Chahar, and Hebei, and secretary of the “Combat Zone Anti-Japanese Resistance 
Compatriot Assistance Society.” Liu held several positions managing electrical plants and electrification efforts 
throughout the north-northwest and northeast frontiers into the PRC period, and in 1979 was appointed secretary and 
director of the North China Electrical Research Institute (Huabei dianli xueyuan). Although little evidence exists 
regarding the role of Islam in Liu’s life, we know that his will left a portion of his savings to the Xuanwuqu Hui 
Kindergarten (Xuanwuqu Huimin you’eryuan) in the Xuanwu District of southwestern Beijing. As for his wartime 
visit to the Pingliang academy, Ma Rulin recalls that, similar to Yang Jingren, “When Liu Yifu of the Beiping Hui 
Middle School, who relatively early on had joined the party and enlisted in the military, stopped by Pingliang, he 
also came to campus and spoke of the achievements of the Eighth Route Army. 
 
310 A search of the Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) Ministry of Education Collection conducted in 
spring 2016 yielded two pertinent files, both of which were not viewable by researchers. The files were五 (2) – 15: 
“Jiaoyubu deng guanyu fangzhi Zhonggong zai Shaanxi deng sheng jiaoyu jie kaizhan jinbu huodong de wenshu 
[Ministry of Education documents re: guarding against Chinese Communist promotion of progressive educational 
activities in Shaanxi and other provinces]” (111 pages), and五 (2) – 16: “Jiaoyubu guanyu pozhi Zhongguo 
Gongchandang zai haiwai xuesheng zhong kaizhang jinbu huodong de wenshu [Ministry of Education documents 
re: suppressing the Chinese Communist Party’s promotion of progressive activities among [Chinese] students 
abroad]” (page count unknown). 
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Yan’an.311 We do not know how many people were killed, injured, or otherwise affected by this 
conflict. What we do know is that the Muslim students and instructors at the Pingliang academy 
were forced to side with the GMD’s pacification campaign against their local coreligionists. On 
one occasion they were ordered to go to the nearby hospital “to show appreciation to officials 
and soldiers of the GMD 97th Division who had been injured while suppressing the rebellious 
masses,” even though some of their families had been “directly affected by the disastrous 
‘cleaning up’ process.”312 The mood was grim: 
We often saw captive “bandits” [feitu] being escorted down the streets of 
Pingliang, among them everyone from an old ahong, white-whiskered and bent-
backed, to a youth of only nineteen. At the school, every day we heard stories of 
the devastation as the towns of Haiyuan, Guyuan, Longde, and Huaping [today 
Jingyuan] were ‘cleaned up’… Needless to say, [our students] were unable to 
focus on their studies. Some had to sell their possessions before returning to 
Pingliang to seek further help paying ransom for their detained relatives and 
ensuring their security.313 
 
Ma suggests that the GMD was forcing Pingliang to side with the government against local 
Muslims, and that the school complied despite private disapproval. The school’s hands were tied, 
regardless of how they might feel about the situation. They were obliged to cooperate with their 
GMD supporters against local Muslims, at least some of whom they knew personally. 
The GMD and the military demanded active assistance as well as passive compliance, 
enlisting the Pingliang school in several initiatives in response to the uprisings. For example, Ma 
remembers that a “very tense” meeting was convened with the ahongs of nineteen local 
                                                 
311 Xie Shengzhong, “Hai-Gu huimin 1938-1941 nian sanci qiyi shimo (2) [A History of the Three Haiyuan-Guyuan 
Muslim Uprisings of 1938-1941],” Ningxia daxue xuebao 2 (1981), p. 94. The Hai-Gu uprisings have been cast in a 
positive light in PRC scholarship because they were presented as evidence of the “revolutionary spirit” of 
northwestern Muslims against an oppressive GMD. 
 
312 Ma, “Pingliang guoli,” p. 244. 
 
313 Ibid. Recall that Haiyuan, Guyuan, Longde, and Huaping were four of the six Gansu counties identified as 
majority-Muslim by the abovementioned government surveys. 
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neighborhoods and a number of other local Huimin representatives, “in order to intimidate the 
Huimin of Pingliang not to be affected by the rebellious masses nor profess their support for their 
cause—almost as if the assembled Huimin were being regarded as the enemy.” In the aftermath 
of the uprising, the Pingliang academy also complied with government instructions to send new 
(Islamic modernist, pro-GMD) Muslim instructors to Haiyuan and Guyuan, as part of the 
government’s “reconstruction” policies in those areas.314   
Ma does not say whether Da Pusheng ever shared any private objections to GMD 
policies, but he does note that he himself left Pingliang for a time after the Hai-Gu uprising, 
“because the school’s expenditures were not public, because my relations with the headmaster 
[Da Pusheng] were worsening, and because I felt increasingly isolated and imperiled.”315 Ma 
apparently only returned to Pingliang in September 1942, to become headmaster after Da 
Pusheng had been elected as a GMD member of parliament. In the meantime, the Islamic school 
had changed to state-run status, becoming the “Eastern Gansu Teacher Training College.” 
Muslims from Da and Ma’s circles remained involved, however, including Yuehua author Wang 
Mengyang, who moved to Pingliang from Chongqing to take up Ma’s former position. More 
Arabic courses were added in 1944 despite the school’s new public status, but were abruptly 
removed in 1947. In 1949, the school was incorporated into the new Pingliang Teacher Training 
College, and thus formally ceased to exist.316 
 
Tawhid with Chinese Characteristics: Arabic Propaganda and Islamic Pedagogy under the 
Guomindang’s “Religion” Policies 
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One question remains: what specific ideological content were the GMD and its Muslim allies 
attempting to impart to frontier Muslims? 
The GMD government, for its part, cannot be seen as simply “secular.” Before the war 
with Japan, the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission (MTAC) for several years sought to 
portray the GMD government to frontier Muslims as an Islamically authentic and therefore 
politically legitimate regime, even as it pursued an overall policy of Sinicizing frontier 
populations. Facilitating these efforts, in the mid-1930s the MTAC gained the ability to print 
pro-state propaganda materials in Arabic. This new capability was most likely thanks to Zhao 
Zhenwu, managing editor of Yuehua, who purchased a set of moveable Arabic type from a 
Cairo-based publisher in late 1932 (see Chapters One and Four).317 After all, the Chengda 
Academy, which published Yuehua, was funded largely by the MTAC. A 1939 MTAC work 
report states that it provided a total of 10,383 yuan to Chengda in 1938 (a huge sum at the time, 
though not nearly as much as Chiang Kai-shek would supply to Pingliang). As we know, the 
MTAC and Chengda were also linked through personnel: Tang Kesan, the dean of Chengda, had 
been an active member of the MTAC since Ma Fuxiang’s tenure as director in 1929-32. In any 
case, in addition to its more frequent use of the Mongolian and Tibetan languages, the MTAC’s 
journal Meng-Zang yuebao (“Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Monthly”) began paying greater 
attention to Muslim-related issues, and publishing sections of its periodical in Arabic, in 1935.318 
                                                 
317 Before Zhao’s return from Egypt, even Muslim periodicals in China printed Arabic only by lithograph, and 
sparingly at that. After his return, Yuehua printed full passages or even pages of Arabic relatively regularly. Zhao, 
Xixing riji; “Buzhu bianqu xuesheng ji wenhua shiye [Subsidies to Frontier Students and Cultural Activities],” 
Meng-Zang weiyuanhui gongzuo baogao (1939), p. 7, available in microfilm at National Library in Beijing. This 
same report mentions the need for publishing in multiple languages as well as for anti-Japanese wartime propaganda 
on the frontiers. It states that the MTAC provided funding in the same year to Ma Bufang’s Qinghai Islamic 
Progress Association (Qinghai huijiao cujinhui) and twelve similar institutions, as well as 2,940 yuan to one or more 
“frontier society and education survey missions” (diaocha bianjiang shehui jiaoyu).  
 
318 Shi Juemin’s Huijiao qingnian (Muslim Youth), which moved from Nanjing to Lanzhou in 1938, also published 
pro-state propaganda in Arabic. 
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The most common materials to be translated into Arabic were Chiang Kai-shek’s speeches, news 
about the central government, and discussions of Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People. 
They also published photos of important governmental meetings captioned in all four languages, 




Figure 1. Meng-Zang yuebao’s use of Arabic. A photo of a governmental meeting 
commemorating the founding of the Republic, captioned in four languages. Source: National 
Library of China (Beijing). 
 
 
Much more creatively, in 1935 the Meng-Zang yuebao also published a copy of an 
excerpt from the Ikhwan al-Safa (see Figure 3).320 The Ikhwan al-Safa, or “Brotherhood of 
Purity,” were a secret society of scholars and mystics active in early Abbasid Basra (circa 8th-10th 
                                                 
 
319 A number of such translations are held in microfilm at the National Library in Beijing. For example, Jiang 
weiyuanzhang wei tejiu kangzhan gao quanguo guomin shu: Han, Meng, Zang, Hui wen ben [Director Jiang’s 
[Chiang]’s remarks to the nation’s citizens on protracted war: with text in Chinese, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Muslim 
languages] (Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission Publication and Translation Bureau, 1938); Jiang zhuxi wei 
xianfa shishi xiejin hui chengli dahui zhici [Chairman Jiang’s [Chiang’s] remarks at the founding conference of the 
Constitutional Implementation Cooperation Association: with text in Chinese, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Muslim 
languages] (Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission Publication and Translation Bureau, 1943). For the 1943 
publication, the copy I found at the National Library of China in Beijing did not actually contain a “Muslim” (i.e. 
Arabic or Uyghur) section. 
 
320 Meng-Zang yuebao 3.5-6 (1935). 
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centuries AD) who recorded their thought for posterity in the monumental Rasa’il ikhwan al-safa 
(“Epistles of the Brotherhood of Purity”). As if speaking directly to its imagined Arabic-speaking 
Muslim reader, the Meng-Zang yuebao titled the section “This is an excerpt from the Epistles of 
the Brotherhood of Purity.”321 The Meng-Zang yuebao’s use of this excerpt raises numerous 
questions. First and foremost, we do not know how the MTAC came to be aware of the Ikhwan 
al-Safa, their history, and their texts. Yuehua had published one article in 1929 mentioning the 
history of the Ikhwan al-Safa, but this article was based on English sources rather than the 
Rasa’il themselves.322 As a major work of Sufism, presumably the Rasa’il would have appealed 
to the predominantly Sufi Muslims of the northwest frontiers, but perhaps less so to the newly 
orthodox-minded eastern urban ‘ulama. Were the eastern ‘ulama and their allies in the 
government trying to demonstrate that they had a more thorough, more literate understanding of 
the history of Sufism than the northwestern Muslims? Or was this excerpt selected more 
randomly than that? 
The content of the excerpt suggests that it was anything but random. It comes from the 
Fasl fi bayan bad’ al-khalq (“Chapter on the Origins of Creation”), which is located relatively 
deep into the corpus of the Ikhwan al-Safa’s Rasa’il. Crucially, the excerpt in Meng-Zang 
yuebao cuts out the first paragraph and a half of the chapter, including the title clarifying that the 
topic is the creation of humankind and their transition from prehistory to settled civilization. We 
are left with the following as the opening paragraph: 
                                                 
 
321 Meng-Zang yuebao, vol. 3, no. 5, p. 14.  
 
322 Zhiwu, “Huijiao duiyu shehui jinhua shang de gongxian [Islam’s Contributions to Society],” Yuehua 1/6 (1929). 
This article did not make direct use of the Rasa’il, but rather was based on two English-language sources, H.G. 
Wells’ Outline of History and Philip Van Ness Myers’ Mediaeval and Modern History. Furthermore, the Rasa’il 
were not among the Arabic works listed in the Shanghai catalog, nor are they known to be among the texts used by 
northwestern Sufi brotherhoods (both discussed at length in Chapter One).  
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There [i.e. on that peninsula], there was a nation of merchants, craftsmen, 
scholars, and all other manner of people, who migrated to that peninsula and 
wandered about. With time they found many trees and fruits, sweet waters, 
pleasant air, good soil, herbs and aromatics, grains and crops, all nourished by the 
rains of the sky. They also saw all types of animals, including those that migrate 
and graze, those that fly, those that prey upon and devour the others, and those 
that slither, creep, and crawl. They all lived harmoniously together, coming to 
know one another as friends and not quarreling with one another.323  
 
The antecedent-less pronoun “there,” corresponding to fiha in the Arabic original, betrays that 
we are starting in medias res. With the topic of this chapter of the Rasa’il unknown to the 
theoretical frontier-based Muslim reader, the de-contextualization of the passage invites that 
reader to substitute his or her own context. Could the passage not serve as a subtle metaphor for 
Muslims’ original settlement and acculturation in China? According to Chinese Muslim origin 
myths since the Ming, the first Muslims to come to China—like the earliest settled humans, who 
are the real topic of the original passage—were merchants, craftsmen, and scholars. Even Ma 
Hongkui referenced Chinese Muslims’ ancestors being “merchants and scholars” in his 
abovementioned May 1937 telegram to the government. Furthermore, like the earliest humans 
who traveled in search of good fertile land, many of the first Muslims in China became sedentary 
agriculturalists (a particularly important theme in conventional dogma on Sinicization). And so 
on. Some of this was indeed historically true, but that is not the point. Compare the Ikhwan al-
Safa excerpt to following poem from the end of the Ming-era work Huihui yuanlai (On the 
Origins of the (Chinese) Muslims): 
 Formerly Islam was found only beyond the western border[s]. 
 Who would know that Muslims were to dwell in China forever? 
 It only came about through the Tang emperor’s dream in the night 
 That three thousand men were brought to establish it. 
 By imperial order the seal of the Board of Astronomy was given 
  to one of them. 
                                                 
323 Fasl fi bayan bad’ al-khalq [“On the Origins of Creation”], Rasa’il ikhwan al-safa [Epistles of the Brotherhood 
of Purity].  
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 They dwelt peacefully in China, pacifying the state. 
 All thanks to the grace of the emperor of the Tang for his fine  
  ritual treatment; 
 Even today we protect the state, not moving again.324 
 
The real point, in other words, was to interweave a set of moral and historical themes whereby 
Muslims’ integration in China could be rendered more palatable and meaningful, and whereby 
resistance to integration could be discouraged. Given Chinese Muslims’ rich, centuries-long 
history of constructing politically expedient origin myths, it is entirely plausible that the Chinese 
Muslims employed by the MTAC were advising the Meng-Zang yuebao to adopt a similar 
strategy in reproducing the Ikhwan al-Safa excerpt. The only thing that seems to have changed 





Figure 2. Meng-Zang yuebao’s use of Arabic and Islam. Reproduction of an excerpt from the 
Epistles of the Brotherhood of Purity. Source: National Library of China (Beijing). 
  
                                                 
324 Benite, Dao of Muhammad, p. 206. As Benite notes, a version of the poem is also translated in Broomhall, Islam 














Figure 3. Meng-Zang yuebao’s use of Arabic and Islam. Front cover of Volume 3, Number 4 




As concerned as the GMD (and their deputies in the MTAC) were with the goal of 
Sinicization, they nevertheless continued seeing the Northwest as somehow a “foreign” region, 
as the journal cover in Figure 3 suggests. Such inconsistencies, revealing the extent of GMD 
misconceptions of the frontiers, persisted through the 1940s. Such misconceptions operated on 
the most practical levels. Naturally, the GMD was concerned with being able to communicate 
with frontier Muslims. Adopting Arabic, as far as they knew, would be an effective means to this 
end. There were some major ironies, however, in the MTAC’s use of Arabic propaganda. The 
first was that the MTAC Arabic translators, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, did not possess full 
mastery of the language.325 This shortcoming is evidenced by their grammatically unsound 
translation of the journal title “Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Monthly,” Majallat al-shahr min 
                                                 
325 Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五（2）－1002. The MTAC had one “huiwen editor,” Zhu 
Yonghua of Hunan, aged twenty-seven, and three other huiwen specialists. 
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al-munquliyya wa-l-tibatiyya, literally “Journal of the month from the Mongolian and Tibetan.” 
Their translated Arabic propaganda materials contained systematic errors such as this one. 
Moreover, the MTAC referred to Arabic as huiwen, or “the Muslim language”—the same term 
they used to refer to Uyghur, in which they also published (ultimately slightly more than Arabic).  
Second, even more fundamentally, Arabic was in fact not the primary language of 
frontier Muslims. Arabic was used for ritual purposes, but ordinary frontier Muslims tended not 
to be fully literate in any language, and in daily interactions they spoke a dialect of Chinese. The 
GMD finally realized this in the early 1940s, after the government’s retreat to Chongqing had 
sharpened its attention to frontier peoples. In January 1941, the MTAC’s publishing arm stated 
tellingly in a report and funding-renewal request to Chen Lifu’s Ministry of Education: “As for 
our Arabic sections, because the believers in Islam are relatively more familiar with Chinese 
characters than the Mongols and Tibetans, we have temporarily discontinued [our use of Arabic], 
though we hope to resume it in the future.”326 In practical terms, the Arabic section had turned 
out to be superfluous and ineffective, and temporarily suspending it would spare the MTAC 
some costly printing expenses in a time of tight wartime budgets. Put differently, the Orientalism 
of the GMD and MTAC, combined with their ignorance of actual conditions on the frontiers (and 
the assumption that they should approach frontier Muslims more or less as they approached 
                                                 
 
326 Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 – 13195. In November of that same year, the head of MTAC 
publishing Huang Fensheng wrote to Chen Lifu asking for only 1,000 yuan to cover printing costs for the coming 
year (1942), noting that current funds were insufficient. The MTAC pointed out the high price of paper and the extra 
cost of printing in three languages, and asked Chen to note the publication’s “special importance,” reminding him of 
the Ministry’s emphasis on “frontier cultural propaganda” and hope that such propaganda would “contribute to unity 
and the public good.” 
 Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 – 12434 contains a Ministry of Education budget 
showing amounts the MTAC spent for printing Mongolian, Tibetan, “Huiwen,” and Chinese, a project in which they 
consulted with the Zhengzhong Bookstore (Zhengzhong shuju). In total, they spent 76,500 yuan on their printing 
equipment, and “600 yuan plus 240 yuan” for their “Huiwen” typeset (which perhaps meant a main Arabic set plus 
extra for the Uyghur letters that do not appear in Arabic). 
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Mongols and Tibetans), hindered the achievement of their objectives. Nevertheless, the results 
tell us a lot about how they viewed those objectives. 
In the context of this failure, the Pingliang academy represented an alternative approach 
in which, amidst even higher stakes than before, a more reliably “authentic” conception of Islam 
was pressed into the service of GMD frontier policy. Da Pusheng’s own writings from the time 
lend insight into this. His Six Treatises on Islam (Yisilan liushu), the first four of which were 
composed during his time at Pingliang, contain some of his views regarding Islamic education in 
China. Da’s goal in this book was to improve knowledge of Islam among both non-Muslim and 
Muslim Chinese, which, he laments, remained lacking despite Islam’s presence in China for over 
a thousand years. Da’s preface, completed at Xi’an in 1945, summarizes his reasons for writing: 
My travels to Egypt, Arabia, and India left a deep impression of the spirit of Islam 
in those countries. With regard to the true meaning of our faith [wu jiao zhenti], 
every interpretation is supported by a considerable body of works that could be 
used to propagate Islam’s ways and teachings [xuan dao chuan jiao]. I felt 
ashamed for having only a superficial knowledge, and did not want to carry out 
my research carelessly… First and foremost, [my essays] affirm the existence of 
the one true God, and that Muhammad is His Prophet, to clarify the basic tenets of 
the religion [jiaoben]. Second, they describe belief in the unknown [al-ghayb], or 
Islamic metaphysics, to clarify the fundamental principles of the religion. Third, 
they discuss knowledge, action, honesty, and faith, to clarify its substantive core. 
Fourth, they explain the five major rites [yishi, i.e. the five pillars], to clarify 
God’s will [tianming]. Fifth, they speak of the truth of the religion, to repudiate 
dissenting views. Finally, they explore the complementary nature of religion and 
science, to clarify how the teachings of the classics and the sayings of the Prophet 
are wholly compatible with the modern era. The former three topics comprise a 
basic understanding of Islam, whereas the latter three constitute a refined 
understanding of its message. The six treatises as a whole consist of 100,000 
statements, each of which has its own unique reasoning, and for which the Quran 
and Hadith form the sole basis. They entertain not the slightest fabrication, and 
form a solid basis for personal belief.327 
 
                                                 
327 Da, Yisilan liushu, pp. 8-9. Emphasis added. 
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The format of the Six Treatises is unusual: they are partly a work of Islam, partly a work on 
Islam. Above all, their purpose was not to introduce Islam in a standard way, but rather to 
present aspects of Islamic modernist and orthodoxizing arguments as the “true meaning of our 
faith,” and to present that set of ideas as compatible with the dominant value-systems of 
Confucianism and Chinese nationalism. 
These priorities are encoded in certain key word choices and turns of phrase. The Islamic 
content was directed at China’s Muslims, and sought to elevate modernist and orthodoxizing 
arguments above Sufi or “traditionalist” ones. The Islamic modernist impulse appears most 
clearly in Da’s choice to devote an entire section to the “complimentary nature of religion and 
science” and his assertion that the “classics and the sayings of the Prophet are wholly compatible 
with the modern era.” The orthodoxizing impulse, meanwhile, comes through most clearly in his 
statement that his book is based on a series of statements “for which Quran and Hadith form the 
sole basis,” which Lauzière argues reflected a dogmatic priority shared by certain “purist 
Salafis.”328 Significantly, this priority marginalized other traditional genres of Islamic knowledge 
such as tafsir and Sufism, which were now cast as insufficiently reliable. 
The Confucian content, meanwhile, was directed at non-Muslim audiences, and was 
intended to highlight Islam’s compatibility with China’s dominant moral system. Near and dear 
to figures such as Chiang Kai-shek, Confucianism was not merely a rhetorical touchstone, but 
had figured explicitly in national policies such as the New Life Movement. In Da’s treatises, the 
nod to Confucianism appears in such choices as describing Islam as a “Way” (dao) or a 
                                                 
328 Lauzière argues that reliance solely on Quran, Hadith, and the consensus of the Salaf tended to characterize the 
“purist” Salafi orientation. He states that Taqi al-Din al-Hilali was partial to Hadith as the “exoteric science par 
excellence”) and believed that “all the particulars (furu‘) of Islam should derive from hadiths [sic] rather than from 
traditional jurisprudence.” Lauzière, Making of Salafism, pp. 67, 170. 
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“Teaching” (jiao); its basic tenets not as usul but as the “essence of the teaching” (jiaoben); the 
Five Pillars not as arkan but as the “five rites” (yishi); and God’s will not through explicit 
reference to divinity, but as the “Mandate of Heaven” (tianming). Da’s conceptual 
commensuration of Islamic and Confucian concepts shows that the discursive thrust of the Han 
Kitab generation still had considerable use in the Republican era.  
Da Pusheng’s Pingliang school was designed to integrate the textualist-orthodoxizing and 
modernist-rationalist strains of Islamic modernism into state policy toward Muslims. Da’s Six 
Treatises also introduced readers to certain Islamic modernist concepts, interspersing Arabic text 
transliterated and translated into Chinese. The modernist-rationalist strain expressed itself in 
discussions of Arabic concepts of ‘aql and ‘ilm, as well as in injunctions to bring Chinese Islam 
in line with the “spirit of modern times” (xiandai jingshen, and similar phrases). These priorities 
were borne out in Da’s instructional materials, some of which survive. In contrast to the texts of 
Chinese Muslim scripture-hall education (jingtang jiaoyu), which utilized Chinese to explain and 
transliterate Arabic but did not assert epistemic equivalence between the two, Da’s Islamic 
modernist curriculum did precisely the opposite (see Figures 4 and 5). In sum, with instructional 
materials such as Da’s, Chinese and Arabic became equivalent media, where the only message to 
be expressed was the ostensibly universal content of modern life: political, social, economic, 
scientific, cultural, literary, religious, and so on. Ostensibly universal, that is, but also clearly 
relevant to a certain prescriptive vision of Chinese Muslims’ life in China. For many Islamic 
modernists such as Da, exercising one’s rational faculties primarily meant devoting greater 
attention to “modern” subjects derived ultimately from European curricula, in order to be 






Figure 4. Yi-ma-ni (al-Iman), 1928. Pages from a late jingtang jiaoyu text clearly 
showing how the Chinese is used to transliterate and explain the Arabic, but not to translate it. 
These particular pages are explaining the shahada, the basic creedal statement that “There is no 
god but God, and Muhammad is God’s Prophet.” The Arabic script is in khatt sini, or the 
Chinese Muslim calligraphic style, considered a form of muhaqqaq. Source: Rev. Claude L. 




Figure 5. Da Pusheng, Zhong-A huihua, pp. 24-25, from an early lesson titled “The Nation-State” 
(guojia / al-dawla). The vocabulary list—now side-by-side rather than top-to-bottom—includes 
terms such as “borders,” “nation,” “republic,” “capitalism,” “socialism,” “communism,” 
“imperialism,” “anarchy,” and “central government.” The Arabic handwriting is clean but not 
expert. From the author’s collection. 
 
 
Meanwhile, the most important concept for the orthodoxizing strain was tawhid, or 
“God’s unicity.” As demonstrated in Chapter One, tawhid and other concepts were imported 
from newly accessible Arabic texts beginning in earnest in the early 1930s. Chinese Muslims 
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translated tawhid as renzhu(xue).329 Literally, renzhu means “the affirmation of [the one true] 
Lord,” and renzhuxue means the study of that set of ideas. Out of context, however, renzhu could 
just as plausibly be translated as “acknowledging the master”; in other words, even tawhid had 
been rendered into Chinese so as to connote acceptance of authority, an idea not present in or 
relevant to the original Arabic term, which belongs to the same etymological-semantic field as 
“one,” “oneness,” “unique,” “alone,” “unity,” and so on (from the root w-h-d).  
Da explained that his understanding of tawhid was informed by the Quran. At the source 
of Creation, Da said, there is but one true essence, and this essence is God. God’s essence, he 
continued, has “neither face nor features, neither sensory perception nor light; it is simply total 
undifferentiated oneness.”330 Da corroborated this description by referencing Quran 2:163 
(“Your god is one God; there is none worthy of worship save Him”), 18:110 (“Say, ‘I am only a 
man like you, to whom has been revealed that your god is one God’”), and 112:1-4 (“Say, ‘He is 
God, the One, the Everlasting, neither born nor begotten; and to Him there is no equal’”).331 
What, in Da’s view, was the specific significance of tawhid to frontier Muslim education 
reform? To this he provides an explicit answer: tawhid was not simply another subject to be 
taught, but the very basis of all proper thought and action: 
Among the essential points of Islamic education, first and foremost is the study 
and affirmation of God’s unicity (‘ilm al-tawhid). Quran 35:28 states: “Among 
God’s people and creatures…the only servants who truly fear him are those who 
possess knowledge,” because knowing God is the essential purpose of Islam, and 
the study and affirmation of God’s unicity is the source of all other forms of 
learning, the path to all forms of morality. If people do not know that there is one 
true God, their hearts will not fear, their bodies will become corrupt, they will 
wantonly succumb to carnal desires, and all that will remain will be the desire for 
instant gratification. They will neither respect nor remember God’s mercy. Even 
                                                 
329 See Frankel, Rectifying God’s Name, on the Han Kitab’s equation of Allah with zhu (“lord, master”). 
 
330 Da Pusheng, Yisilan liushu, p. 49. 
 
331 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
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if their knowledge is broad and deep, ultimately it will be of no use. The impact 
on their heart will be negligible, their manners will deteriorate and become 
downcast, they will quarrel and cheat each other pointlessly, and chaos and 
confusion (daluan) will return ceaselessly to the lands under heaven (tianxia)!332 
 
This remarkable passage establishes tawhid/renzhuxue as the answer to what was understood to 
be a classically and quintessentially Chinese problem, the maintenance of political and moral-
cosmographical order, which Da articulated in the Confucian terms of fearing “chaos under 
heaven” (tianxia daluan).333 For Da, the most recent and relevant instance of such chaos was the 
northwestern Muslims’ uprisings against the Qing in the late nineteenth century. As the thinking 
went, if the children of those frontier Muslims, who had quarreled over differing interpretations 
of Sufi ritual, could instead be made to accept the fundamental truth of tawhid, their peaceful 
acceptance of a Sino-centric order would naturally follow. 
 
Conclusion: Islamic Modernism as an Infrastructure of Chinese Nation-Building 
 
During the Nanjing Decade and the war with Japan, urban coastal Chinese Muslims’ importation 
of Islamic modernist thought from outside China was co-opted in service of GMD state- and 
nation-building efforts, efforts that sought to integrate and Sinicize predominantly Sufi frontier 
Muslim populations. Chinese Muslim elites played a crucial role in providing the territorial 
preconditions, ideological justification, and on-the-ground implementation of the state’s frontier 
development initiatives. In the case of frontier Muslim education reform, Chinese Muslim elites 
far surpassed the state’s own capacity to make inroads among local Muslim populations. In the 
process, key Islamic modernist concepts, particularly that of God’s unicity (tawhid), were 
                                                 
 
332 Da Pusheng, Yisilan liushu, p. 14. 
 
333 There is a clear echo hear of Ibn Khaldun’s cycle of civilization and barbarism, but if Da was aware of this, he 
made no mention of it. 
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asserted to be compatible with (and even a necessary basis for) Confucianism and Chinese 
nationalism. While scholarship on Islam in China often understands such conceptual 
reconciliations as inexorable processes of “translation,” “syncretism,” or “cultural synthesis,” I 
show by contrast how the contingent political and territorial circumstances of the Republican era 
shaped many of the Chinese Muslim elites’ arguments—arguments that have, in the decades 
since, been naturalized as the canonical truth of Islam’s history and identity in China. Overall, 
this paper shows how Islamic modernist thought and Chinese Muslims themselves—both of 
which exhibited tremendous border-crossing tendencies—nevertheless became an infrastructure 
of modern Chinese nation-making. 
A final provocation: when the Northwest Development Association published its 
inaugural plan in mid-1932, the GMD diplomat Wang Zhengting submitted a four-character 
calligraphic endorsement to be published in the front matter of the plan (several other high-level 
officials did the same; Wang’s appeared first). Wang’s endorsement proclaimed the Northwest 
Development Plan to be a “Great Plan for Governing the Country” (jing guo da ji).334 The 
character jing經, however, has three meanings. Classically, it does indeed carry the meaning of 
“ruling,” especially a kingdom or country. It also can mean “channels” or “sinews,” as in a body, 
through which vital energies (qi) flow: in other words, and infrastructure. In addition, however, it 
also can mean a “classic text.” Chinese Muslim support for GMD frontier nation-building was a 
jing guo da ji in every sense of the word: Chinese Muslim elites made Islamic classic texts and 
Islamic modernist textualism an infrastructure of Chinese frontier governance. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE DISCURSIVE SINICIZATION OF ISLAMIC MEDICINE 
 
 
Chinese Muslim medicine and pharmacology (Ch. huizu yiyao; Ar. ‘ilm al-tibb 
wa-l-saydala li-qawmiyyat hui) is a treasure for humanity. It resulted from the 
Chinese people’s inheritance of ancient Arabian medicine, which has fused 
harmoniously and to a high degree with the traditional medical culture of our 
ancestral land. In the long-term development of medical practice, it has undergone 
continuous synthesis and generated excellent results…throughout history, it has 
made an important contribution to the perpetuation of our country’s various 
peoples and to the prevention and cure of disease. At present, it continues to play 
an important role in providing medical care and maintaining health in the Muslim 
regions of the country and in serving the health of the nation’s people as a whole.  
–Ningxia Hui Medical Research Institute Homepage (original in Chinese and 
Arabic)335 
 
Medicine may be taken up as a science in itself for the sake of science—namely, 
that science [dealing with] the prevention or cure of disease…Love of knowledge 
may be the chief motive: that is, it is an intellectual pursuit; though other motives 
may be associated.  
–Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Canon of Medicine336 
 
 
Introduction: The Politics and History of Islamic Medicine in China 
 
Today, Chinese Muslim pharmacies—with their unmistakable green signs and Arabic label 
saydaliyya appearing alongside the Chinese yaofang or yaodian—ubiquitously line the streets of 
Linxia, a city in Gansu Province known to Western media as “China’s Little Mecca.” Similar 
establishments dot towns across the Northwest. Why are they so numerous? In practical terms, 
they support and supplement local hospitals, as the above quotation suggests. On another level, 
as the quotation also suggests, they reflect a consciousness of Islamic medicine’s long history. 
On yet another level, however, these pharmacies exist only with approval from and in dialogue 
                                                 
335 “Zhongguo ningxia huizu yiyao yanjiusuo gaikuang [About the Ningxia Hui Medical Research Institute],” 
Ningxia huizu yiyao yanjiusuo [Ningxia Hui Medical Research Institute], 4 January 2013, web, accessed 26 
September 2016. Available at: http://www.huimri.com/about.html?c=13.  
 
336 O. Cameron Gruner, A Treatise on the Canon of Medicine of Avicenna (London: Luzac & Co., 1930). 
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with official ideology. Under China’s “New Silk Road” policies, such pharmacies (and Linxia as 
a whole) are meant to convey an authentic Islamic feel, invoking and evoking China’s age-old 
friendship with Muslim countries for high-level visitors. While they have long-standing 
precursors in the real past, these pharmacies represent a sanctioned form of cultural expression 
through which Chinese Muslims’ identity as the “Hui minority” (huizu), one of China’s fifty-five 
minority ethnic nationalities (shaoshu minzu), is produced with respect to a national grand 
narrative. Analogously to Tibetans and other non-Han groups, they show how official ideology 
considers the Hui to possess a distinctive “Chinese Islamic medicine” (huiyi) connected to the 
Islamic world outside China, yet contained under the umbrella of Chinese medicine (zhongyi). 
Debates about Chinese Muslim identity intersected in numerous and complex ways with 
the geopolitical aspirations of the Chinese state. For the past century, Chinese Muslims leaders 
have stood out for their active participation in the state’s discourse of ethnicized tradition, 
asserting that their medical knowledge and practice originated in Arabia, but subsequently 
became Chinese.337 This discursive Sinicization of Islamic medicine constituted an especially 
creative example of how elite Chinese Muslims contingently yet deliberately pressed their 
engagement with Islamic modernist thought from abroad into the service of Chinese state- and 
nation-building: first of the nationalist Guomindang (GMD, or KMT), and later of the CCP. 
Amid China’s fraught empire-to-nation transition, which pressured non-Han groups to 
demonstrate loyalty to the new nation-state, medicine became a stage on which the polemics of 
                                                 
337 In contrast to other non-Han groups who were defined as ethnicities by the PRC in the 1950s, Chinese Muslims 
developed an argument that their community represented an ethnicity in the 1940s, well before the PRC had even 
come into existence. On ethnicization generally, see Tom Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic 
Classification in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). On Chinese Muslim self-
ethnicization, see Wlodzimierz Cieciura, “Ethnicity or Religion? Republican-Era Chinese Debates on Islam and 
Muslims,” in Lipman, Islamic Thought in China, 107-46. See also Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic 
Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991). 
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nationalism and the narration of a modern Chinese Muslim identity played out.338 During 
China’s Republican era (1911-49), urban coastal Chinese Muslim ulama (Islamic scholars), 
intellectuals, and government officials played the pivotal role in initiating the ethno-nationalist 
appropriation of the Sino-Islamic past described above, pinpointing medicine as an important 
feature of Islamic history and culture, yet tying it to a specifically Chinese Muslim identity. 
From the rich history of Sino-Islamic medical exchange, these elite Republican-era Chinese 
Muslims forged a useful tool in processes of self-identification.339 Claiming to speak for all 
China’s fragmented Muslim groups, they displayed a tremendous capacity to anticipate how the 
Chinese state and Chinese society would view them, and productively reflect those discourses 
back outward, yet still in an “authentic” manner. As a result, they transformed the history of an 
intrinsically borderless premodern exchange of medical knowledge and materials, one that long 
predated concepts of nation and ethnicity, into a token of bordered modern identity tied precisely 
to those concepts.  
It was no accident that Chinese Muslim elites singled out medicine to highlight both 
Islamic authenticity and processes of becoming Chinese. Muslims in China had been active in 
pharmacy and the materia medica trade for centuries, linking Chinese medicine to the world 
beyond. For example, Li Xun (855-930), a scholar, merchant, and pharmacist whose ancestors 
                                                 
338 Frank Dikötter argues that the first two decades of the twentieth century—the years immediately before and after 
the fall of the Qing—witnessed a new equation of “race” and “nation” in which the Han were seen as the natural 
leaders of China and the primary engine and object of its historical progress. Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race 
in Modern China (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1992), pp. 116-25. On Han-centric politics see also Edward J.M. 
Rhoads, Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000). On the racialization of Chinese nationalism generally, see John 
Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1996), pp. 103-16. 
 
339 The usefulness of the terms “identification” and “self-identification” is discussed in Frederick Cooper and Rogers 
Brubaker, “Identity,” in Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), p. 71. 
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had migrated from Persia to Sichuan during the Tang (618-907), produced a catalogue known as 
the Haiyao bencao (Miscellany of Maritime Materia Medica). This work went on to influence 
canonical Chinese pharmacological studies such as the Zhenglei bencao (Materia Medica 
Compiled and Classed, 1082) and Bencao gangmu (Compendium of Materia Medica, 1598).340 
The Mongol Yuan (1272-1368) witnessed a particularly intense exchange of medical knowledge 
and materials between the Islamic world and China, as evidenced by the compilation of the 
Huihui yaofang (Muslim Pharmacopoeia).341 Muslim pharmacies remained active in China into 
the twentieth century, with some family-run enterprises stretching back to the Yuan.342  
As discussed in Chapter One, Republican-era Muslim pharmacies in Beijing and 
Shanghai played an important role in financing the elite urban ulama’s practices of textual 
transnationalism, including their travels to Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East; their 
collection of classic Arabic texts and modern Muslim print media; and their prolific translation 
                                                 
340 Li Xun, Haiyao bencao jiben [Compiled Excerpts from the Miscellany of Maritime Materia Medica], in Huizu 
dianzang quanshu [Unabridged Classic Texts of the Chinese Muslim Minority Nationality], volume 212, edited by 
Wu Haiying, Wu Jianwei, Lei Xingkui, and Lei Xiaojing (Lanzhou: Gansu wenhua chubanshe, 2008), pp. 1-66; Wu 
Jianwei and Zhang Jinhai, “Haiyao bencao jiben [Abstract: Compiled Excerpts from the Miscellany of Maritime 
Materia Medica],” in Huizu dianzang quanshu zongmu tiyao [Unabridged Classic Texts of the Chinese Muslim 
Minority Nationality: Annotated Contents], edited by Wu Jianwei and Zhang Jinhai (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin 
chubanshe, 2010), p. 206.  
 On these early exchanges, see Angela Schottenhammer, “Yang Liangyao’s Mission of 785 to the Caliph of 
Baghdad: Evidence of an Early Sino-Arabic Power Alliance?” Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient 101 
(2015): p. 177-241; Angela Schottenhammer, “Transfer of Xiangyao from Iran and Arabia to China—A 
Reinvestigation of Entries in the Youyang Zazu (863),” in Aspects of the Maritime Silk Road: From the Persian Gulf 
to the East China Sea, edited by Ralph Kauz (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010), pp. 117-49; Anna Akasoy, 
Charles Burnett, and Ronit Yoeli-Tlalim, Islam and Tibet: Interactions along the Musk Routes (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2010), especially Chs. 5 and 6. 
 
341 Paul D. Buell and Eugene N. Anderson, A Soup for the Qan: Chinese Dietary Medicine of the Mongol Era as 
Seen in Hu Sihui’s Yinshan Zhengyao (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 105-25; Thomas T. Allsen, Culture and Conquest in 
Mongol Eurasia (New York: Cambridge UP, 2001), Ch. 16. 
 
342 Shan Yude, Huizu yiyao xue jianshi [A Brief History of Chinese Muslim Medicine and Pharmacy] (Yinchuan: 
Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 2005), pp. 116-20. According to Shan, these pharmacies included the multi-city Bai 
family medical practice dating to the Yuan; the Wansong Pharmacy of Kunming, also dating to the Yuan; the Ding 
family medical practice of Xi’an, dating to the Qing; the Baosheng Pharmacy of Shaanxi, also dating to the Qing; 
the Deshen Clinic of Beijing, from the late Qing; the Jiqing Pharmacy of Shenyang, also from the late Qing; and the 
Bai Huairen Pharmacy of the late Qing and early Republic.  
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projects, including the first full Chinese translations of the Quran.343 These pharmacies 
represented a powerful yet almost entirely overlooked constituency (versus the more familiar 
northwestern Muslim warlords) supporting elite Chinese Muslims’ integrationist politics during 
the Republican era. Chinese Muslim pharmacists, ulama, scholars, and officials had a common 
interest in politicizing the history of Islamic medicine in China at this time. Homogenizing and 
Sinicizing pressures from the state, combined with perennial tensions between Muslims and Han, 
certainly motivated them. But so, more specifically, did the risk that elite Muslims’ unique role 
in Chinese history would be overlooked by a new, state-sanctioned, Han-centric nationalism; by 
a burgeoning mass media; and by the vast processes of knowledge transformation sweeping 
across urban China at this time. From the 1910s to the 1950s, new editions of Li Xun’s work 
were being published, as were the first comprehensive Chinese reference works on materia 
medica such as the 1930 Zhonghua yaodian (Chinese Pharmacopoeia).344 Such volumes, 
however, often did not give due acknowledgment to the Muslim origins of certain materia 
medica, further incentivizing Chinese Muslim elites to point out those origins—a powerful 
metaphor for Muslims’ belonging in and contributions to China. Not coincidentally, this logic of 
Muslim “contributions” closely paralleled arguments Islamic modernists elsewhere made 
regarding the Islamic roots of the European Renaissance and Scientific Revolution: as we will 
see, the two discourses were interconnected.345 
                                                 
343 Yang Rongbin, Minguo shiqi shanghai huizu shangren qunti yanjiu [Research on the Republican-Era Shanghai 
Muslim Merchant Community] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2015), pp. 55-75; Stefan Henning, 
“God’s Translator: Qur’an Translation and the Struggle over a Written National Language in 1930s China,” Modern 
China 41/6 (2015): pp. 631-55. 
 
344 Paul U. Unschuld, Medicine in China: A History of Pharmaceutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1986), p. 262. 
 
345 See for example Peter E. Pormann and Emilie Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown UP, 2007), Ch. 6. 
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This chapter’s first section traces the politicization of Islamic medicine in China in the 
early 1930s. This era saw rising Islamophobia in the Chinese press, including frequent false 
claims regarding Muslims’ reasons for pork abstention. In response, leading Shanghai imams 
launched a public relations campaign juxtaposing Western biomedical knowledge with Quranic 
and Hadith injunctions, both of which argued the unhealthfulness of pork. For a time, the 
Republican era’s fluid epistemic environment permitted such pluralistic invocations of authority. 
The second section shows that this defense of medical practices was part of Chinese 
Muslims’ larger engagement with Islamic modernism: a transnational process through which 
they absorbed and developed a set of politically useful arguments about the long history and 
scientific merits of Islamic medicine, thanks in part to their reading of Arabic-language writings 
from the Islamic modernist sheikhs of al-Azhar in Cairo. In particular, a new school of thought 
known as “scientific exegesis” (al-tafsir al-‘ilmi), articulated especially forcefully by the Azhar 
sheikh Muhammad Farid Wajdi, provided a basis for Chinese Muslims to generate a broader 
narrative of the relationship between medicine and Islam.  
The third section presents the more politically constrained, and by necessity more 
sophisticated, politicization of Islamic medicine that occurred immediately before and during the 
Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45). It first explores the elaboration of Islamic medicine’s 
relevance to China and Chinese Muslim identity as articulated by the prominent Chinese Muslim 
scholar Bai Shouyi. Bai’s essay on the Song-era (960-1279) Muslim maritime trade in materia 
medica, published in spring 1937, folded the history of Islamic medicine into a narrative of the 
Sinicization of China’s Muslims and of Islam’s contributions to Chinese civilization—crafting a 
metaphor for Chinese Muslims’ belonging in Chinese society in the present. This section ends by 
considering one way that such narratives of civilizational exchange became actualized: that of 
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the Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation, dispatched by GMD-affiliated Chinese Muslims 
during the war to conduct diplomatic outreach to the Muslims of Southeast Asia and, 
significantly, to solicit medical donations for the Chinese war effort. 
The full institutionalization and ethnicization of Chinese Islamic medicine in China did 
not take place until the PRC. On the other hand, Projit Mukharji warns with regard to Islamic 
medicine in modern Bengal that “Institutionalization is too often confused with the act of setting 
up colleges, journals, and professional organizations,” and that it may be better defined as “any 
process or set of processes which abstracts knowledges and practices from their lived social 
contexts, thereby organizing and framing them in such a way as to make them capable of being 
reproduced without significant displacements.”346 In the case of Islamic medicine in China, the 
distinctiveness of the Republican era lies in the deliberate fusing of Islamic medical practice, 
knowledge, and history to a unique Chinese Muslim identity for the first time. It also lies in the 
fact that the principal agents in this fusion were Chinese Muslim elites themselves, who chose to 
“make Islam Chinese” for contingent reasons: the turbulent politics of the Nanjing decade and 
war years. In the long term, Chinese Muslims’ discursive Sinicization of Islamic medicine can be 
considered a form of conceptual proto-institutionalization, a crucial step in transforming the 
localized globalism of pre-twentieth-century Islamic medicine in China into the ethnicized huiyi 
of the PRC. In the context of the Republican era, this process was another powerful means by 
which Chinese Muslims selectively imported, translated, and disseminated the texts, ideas, and 
temporal logics of Islamic modernism, and channeled them into their integrationist politics. 
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Chinese Muslim Responses to “Insulting the Religion”: Halal as Biomedicine 
 
Throughout the Republican era, Han-run Chinese newspapers in Beijing, Shanghai, and other 
cities printed stories offensive to Muslims. These episodes were part of a pattern of Islamophobia 
and Han-Muslim intercommunal violence, and occurred in the shadow of massive Muslim 
uprisings and violent state reprisals during the late nineteenth century.347 The Han press’s false 
claims resulted in widespread protests. After much misunderstanding, the issue was finally 
settled through coordination between the police, the central government, and Muslim leaders. 
This set of incidents came to be known as the “cases of insulting the religion” (wujiao an).  
In a particularly virulent episode in 1932, a Shanghai magazine carried an article titled 
“Why Muslims Do Not Eat Pork.” This article claimed that Muslims are in fact descended from 
pigs, so of course consuming pork would be the most unfilial act imaginable.348 Shanghai’s 
Muslim leaders organized protests in response, and some Muslims went so far as to attack the 
magazine’s editor. Eventually the publication was terminated. Similarly, in 1934, the newspaper 
Beiping xinbao published a story denigrating Muslims and the Prophet Muhammad in which it 
deliberately misprinted the character for “Muslim,” hui 回, adding the dog radical (犭) in front of 
it—essentially announcing its opinion that Muslims were subhuman. Related incidents—twenty-
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four in all, according to one count—persisted for the remainder of the 1930s and 1940s.349 
Finally, in September 1947, Beiping xinbao printed yet another article with the intentionally 
distorted hui character. This time, a crowd of local Muslim shopkeepers wrecked the 
newspaper’s offices. According to police reports, a crowd of perhaps three hundred obliterated 
the office, not even sparing the tea and teacups, and making a particular point of destroying the 
productive materials, including the ink, paper, type, and presses. The police brought the 
newspaper’s editor and several leading Muslims from the municipal Chinese Islamic Association 
in for questioning. Beiping xinbao submitted damages totaling several thousand yuan, as well as 
a statement characterizing the Muslim crowd as “surging forward fiercely with great 
momentum” (shengshi xiongxiong) and “proceeding fanatically while refusing to stand down” 
(bufu zhizhi kuangxing). Meanwhile, the Muslim leaders did not deny the actions of the crowd, 
but rather submitted a list of demands including a formal public apology and the permanent 
closure of the paper. Remarkably, within the space of a few weeks, the central government had 
taken the Muslims’ side, halted the police investigation, instructed them not to press any charges, 
and reminded all parties that the Republic of China was a country whose citizens enjoyed 
“freedom of religion.” There is no evidence that counterarguments were entertained.350 
These “cases of insulting the religion” illustrate the degree of popular misunderstanding 
toward Muslims in Republican China, as well as the fear and anxiety felt by Muslims about their 
belonging in the new nation-state. They show how tenuous and vulnerable Chinese Muslims’ 
position was: even something as basic as diet was open to broadsides in the mass media. At the 
same time, paradoxically, these incidents show how close elite Chinese Muslims were to the 
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GMD state: that is, close enough to smooth things over effectively and receive surprisingly 
lenient treatment. For the remainder of the years between the early wujiao incidents (1932 and 
1934) and the outbreak of war with Japan, Chinese Muslim elites began to turn their attention to 
the larger problem of popular misconceptions: attempting to educate the general public about the 
basics of Islam. After all, Halal was a major industry for Chinese Muslims, and Chinese Muslim 
leaders could not allow such a direct attack to go unchallenged, but rather had to show that Halal 
was in line with official regulations and priorities as well as mainstream values. They appear to 
have felt especially compelled to explain the reasons for abstaining from pork—which, after all, 
was probably the most widely consumed protein for the majority of China’s population.  
In the midst of these events, two leading Shanghai imams took it upon themselves to 
explain the actual reasons for Muslim pork abstention. Da Pusheng (1876-1965) and Ha Decheng 
(1888-1943) of Shanghai had helped organize the 1932 protests, but soon devised a more 
innovative approach to combating misperceptions about Islam among the general populace. 
Verbalizing what had originated as the spontaneous “moral economy of the Muslim crowd,” they 
presented their arguments in a series of Chinese-language radio broadcasts transmitted daily 
from June 25 to July 10, 1934.351 Da and Ha made the motives for this delicate public relations 
campaign clear enough: the frontispiece of the printed transcript of the broadcasts, made 
available in August 1934, quoted and translated into Chinese a line of Quranic advice on dealing 
with non-Muslims: “Invite them to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good stern 
instruction, and argue with them in the way that is best.”352 Similarly, in the preface, they said 
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they wished to “allow non-Muslims a window into the innermost realities of Islam” and “provide 
Muslims with a means of strengthening their resolve.”353 
Da and Ha’s medium is noteworthy: radio had only been introduced in China a decade 
earlier, and had just begun to gain widespread use in the late 1920s, particularly as a tool in the 
propaganda war between the GMD and the CCP. Da and Ha no doubt hoped to reach a wider 
audience than was possible through print. It should be noted that conservative Muslim clerics in 
other parts of the Islamic world did not always welcome the use of new technologies such as 
radio. Chinese Muslim leaders such as Da and Ha, however, belonged firmly to the Islamic 
modernist or Islamic reformist trend, which asserted that Islam is entirely compatible with 
science, innovation, education women’s rights, constitutional democracy, and so on.  
In the middle broadcasts (Six through Ten), Da and Ha not only laid out the textual 
justifications for pork abstention laid out in Quran and Hadith, citing the original Arabic as they 
went, but also presented several contemporary biomedical theories on the detriments of pork 
consumption. They hypothesized that in China and elsewhere, human beings began eating pork 
only out of necessity, despite its manifest uncleanliness, due to the scarcity of other protein 
sources. Nevertheless, pork was a “vector for transmitting infectious bacteria to humans.”354 
They elaborated that some diseases were spread through proximity to swine, others by 
consuming the meat. They cited the latest European and American biomedical studies and even 
provided names of relevant diseases in English or Greco-Latin. The diseases mentioned were as 
follows: 
 Broadcast Chinese Term (given/not 
given) 
Greco-Latin Term (given/not 
given) 
Common English Term 
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1 7 Chili Balantidium coli Bloody stool 
2  [not given] Faciolopsis buski Trematode 
3  Gouchongbing Ancylostoma duodenale [not 
given] 
Hookworm  
4 8 Yuanchong Dermatophytosis [not given] Ringworm  
5  [not given] Paragonimus Lung flukes  
6  Ganzhangzheng Clonorchiasis Liver flukes  
7  [not given] Gigantor hyschunsgigas [?] ? 
8 9 [not given] Metastrolyngus apri Lungworm  
9  Zhudandu Erysipelas Red skin  
10  Feilao [not given] Difficulty breathing 
11  Zhudou Variola suina Smallpox  
12  Tiaochong Cestoda [not given] Tapeworm 
13 10 Xuanmaochong Trichiniasis Roundworm  
FIGURE 1. Compiled from Da and Ha, Boyin, pp. 19-30 passim. 
 
In the several cases where Da and Ha provided Greco-Latin terms, the printed transcript gave 
these in both Roman letters and in transliteration using Chinese characters. Although actual 
audio recordings, if made, have not survived, the surrounding sentence structures in the printed 
transcript unambiguously confirm that they spoke these terms aloud on the radio.  
Da and Ha’s broadcasts did not invoke biomedical arguments as a morally absolute 
justification for Halal, but rather made clear their belief that Islam long predated and indeed 
anticipated the recent developments in biomedicine. In Broadcast Seven, they asserted:  
Medical specialists in all countries have, using scientific methods, conducted 
research illustrating the detriments to the human body of pork consumption, 
particularly the transmission of live parasites. When these parasites invade the 
body, they have an extremely harmful effect. Europeans and Americans now 
know the harm that pork consumption can cause. What they do not know, 
however, is that over thirteen hundred years ago, the Quran had already clearly 
laid out what materials should and should not be consumed, in order to protect 
people’s health. For example, Quran 3:172-173 states: ‘O believers! Eat of the 
sweet stuffs We have provided abundantly for thee, and give thanks to God if 
indeed you worship Him. It is forbidden, however, for you to consume dead flesh, 
blood, and the meat of pigs.’355 
 
                                                 
355 Da and Ha, Boyin, p. 22. 
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The power of Da and Ha’s argument rested in the fact that both systems of knowledge, 
biomedical and textual, had reached the same conclusion: that pork is bad for you. 
 Of course, Da and Ha were not working with entirely stable, transparent, or universally 
familiar information. It is worth noting that in the transcript, some of the Greco-Latin terms are 
misspelled. By contrast, the Arabic quotations from the Quran are spelled correctly. A reasonable 
explanation is that Da and Ha knew Arabic better than English, let alone Greco-Latin medical 
terms. On a superficial level, misspellings would not have mattered much in the audio 
broadcasts, since Da and Ha, again, used Chinese transliterations to approximate their 
pronunciation. Yet the misspellings are still revealing: in the specific context of Da and Ha’s 
argument, getting the scientific details right was less important than the overall sense of authority 
conveyed by the fact that Western biomedical science was on their side. As we will see in other 
examples, Western medical knowledge did not always play this role in Chinese Muslims’ 
arguments. This variability reflects the finding that regimes of scientific and medical knowledge 
were highly fluid in Republican China, and that the overwhelming influx of new materials and 
new information created anxieties about verification and authoritativeness. Far from abstract, 
these problems had direct implications for everyday life: the slightest proofreading error could 
lead one to ingest a poisonous substance rather than a palliative one. The overall picture was not 
simply a contingency-defying dichotomy between “modern Western science” and “indigenous 
Chinese science,” but a situation where “particular strategies deployed and the historical 
conditions shaping that deployment were strikingly local and highly specific.”356 This was 
                                                 
 
356 Eugenia Lean, “Proofreading Science: Editing and Experimentation in Manuals by a 1930s Industrialist,” in Jing 




certainly true of Da and Ha. In citing Western biomedical science that they understood 
qualitatively but not expertly, and fusing that knowledge with the quite different logic of 
scripture, the two imams turned conditions of epistemological confusion to their advantage. 
 There were additional reasons why anchoring their defense of Halal practice partly in 
Western-style biomedicine was a risky move for Da and Ha. As Ruth Rogaski has noted, even in 
urban centers such as Tianjin and Shanghai, perhaps three-quarters of the Chinese population 
still preferred traditional medical practitioners over Western-style ones.357 Referencing Western 
medical studies, and especially using English and Greco-Latin terms, walked a fine line between 
“arguing with them in the way that is best” and plain condescension, an assertion of greater 
worldliness and educational attainment than their listeners. With all the talk of worms and 
parasites, it was almost inviting pork eaters to be disgusted at themselves. One of the diseases, 
Clonorchis sinensis, was even named after “China.” If the goal was to mend fences with the Han 
majority, this might not have been the most advisable approach. Moreover, as Xiaoqun Xu has 
shown, proponents of Western-style medicine versus those of Chinese “native” medicine were 
engaged in a heated debate through the mid-1930s.358 For the hypothetical listener who may have 
been a proponent of Chinese native medicine, Da and Ha’s coming down so decisively on the 
side of Western-style biomedicine may have backfired, creating the impression that Chinese 
Muslims preferred “foreign” science to “national” science. Native physicians’ mobilization of 
notions of “national essence” and “cultural imperialist invasion” by Western medicine make it all 
the more surprising that Ha and Da would justify Halal in terms of Western biomedicine. 
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Da and Ha’s presenting Halal as sound biomedicine rather than sound Chinese native 
medicine was likely meant to ally Chinese Muslim leaders with certain Han elites, particularly 
government officials, who advocated Western science. Again, this was a gamble. As Xu has 
found, while the allies of Western-style doctors occupied numerous government positions, 
certain high-level GMD officials instead supported the native physicians.359 Acutely sensitive to 
the prevailing winds of Chinese officialdom, Chinese Muslim elites such as Da and Ha probably 
perceived that espousing a position in line with government officials, some of whom they knew 
personally, was the best policy for guaranteeing their community’s security.  
It was not long, however, before cultural nationalism asserted itself. At this point, in mid-
1934, the GMD’s New Life Movement, with its emphasis on preserving Chinese “essence” and 
“tradition,” was beginning to supplant earlier movements, most notably the May Fourth 
Movement, that had prioritized more universalist values of newness and progress. The New Life 
Movement’s turn toward cultural nationalism occasioned a shift in the discourse of weisheng, 
which Rogaski argues had come to mean “hygienic modernity” in the Republican era. While 
some Western-trained Chinese medical professionals remained among the chief proponents of 
hygienic modernity, more conservative voices had begun to participate in the weisheng discourse 
by the mid-1930s.360 These developments coincided with the victory of native physicians over 
Western-style ones in the contest for governmental support, detailed by Xu.361  
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At every turn, Chinese official ideology and larger China-centered debates informed 
Chinese Muslim arguments about medicine and health. An additional context outside China, 
however, shaped their arguments just as fundamentally. The body of thought known as Islamic 
modernism had long asserted Islam’s compatibility with science, dating back to a famous 1883 
debate in which the Muslim intellectual-activist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani challenged the 
Orientalist Ernest Renan’s conclusions regarding the modern Islamic world’s allegedly deficient 
rationality and scientific spirit.362 Beginning in the 1930s, and continuing past the turn to cultural 
nationalism in China, Chinese Muslims had the opportunity to engage with such arguments 
directly from a major source of Islamic modernist thought: Cairo’s al-Azhar University. 
 
Egyptian Reinforcements: The Transmission of Arabic “Scientific Exegesis” to China  
 
Before the twentieth century, only a small number of Chinese Muslims were able to travel to 
Egypt and study at al-Azhar, the renowned center of Islamic learning founded in the Fatimid 
Dynasty (909-1171). In the 1930s-40s, however, groups of Chinese Muslims had the opportunity 
to study there thanks to faster travel and communication technologies, as will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter Five. Increased contact resulted in the transmission of Islamic modernist 
thought from the Arab world to China, intensifying the perception of Islamic commonalities, but 
always rendering Arabic Islamic thought relevant to Muslim circumstances in China. One 
overlooked episode in this relationship is the translation of “scientific exegesis” (al-tafsir al-
‘ilmi), in which Azhar sheikhs presented Islam as compatible with science. This trend began in 
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late nineteenth-century Egypt with Muhammad ‘Abduh’s efforts to combine traditional textual 
scholarship with science popularization; another milestone was the Tafsir al-Manar (1901-35), a 
modernist interpretation of the Quran based on ‘Abduh’s thought and published by ‘Abduh’s 
disciple, Rashid Rida, in al-Manar.363  
By the 1930s, a new proponent of scientific exegesis had emerged to influence Chinese 
Muslims’ views of Islam and science. Muhammad Farid Wajdi (1875-1954) was an Azhar 
sheikh and from 1933 to 1952 editor of its journal Nur al-Islam (later Majallat al-Azhar, 1930-
81). Wajdi’s exegesis, The Quran Interpreted (al-Maṣḥaf al-mufassar), laid out, much as Da and 
Ha did, the ways in which Islamic practices not only cohered with but anticipated modern 
science. This tafsir, along with his ten-volume Encyclopaedia of the Fourteenth/Twentieth 
Century (Dāʾirat maʿārif al-qarn al-rābiʿ ʿashar al-ʿashrīn), provide abundant evidence of both 
strains of scientific exegesis identified by Marwa Elshakry: one demonstrating the rationality of 
Islam, the other using science to appreciate the wonders of Creation.364  
Wajdi incorporated scientific perspectives into much of his writing for Nur al-Islam. In 
1938, for example, he wrote a scientific defense of fasting quite similar to Da and Ha’s defense 
of Halal, entitled “The Scientific Perspective on Fasting” (al-Sayam fi nazar al-‘ilm). Ramadan 
was coming the following month, and Wajdi was offering some pre-holiday reflections for his 
readers based on a conversation in which a man asked him to explain the rapid rise of Islam in 
the seventh century. Wajdi writes that at the time, he was only able to answer the man’s question 
from a “social” perspective, citing the pragmatic effects of the five pillars of the Islamic faith as 
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the reason why Islam spread so quickly. Among these, Wajdi noted, fasting kept the early 
Muslims focused on a higher purpose than the needs of the body. Wajdi writes that upon further 
consideration, however, he realized that fasting in particular had not only a spiritual benefit, but a 
physical one as well, and ensured that the early Muslims were healthy enough to spread their 
message across vast territories. He goes on to explain the germ theory of disease, the structures 
of cells and microbes, and the conditions under which they may invade and weaken cells. This 
digression becomes more or less the main point of the article. After a second digression warning 
his readers of the detriments of artificial sugar, Wajdi concludes that “fasting, if undertaken 
correctly as dictated by the Sunnah, can be considered among the most important tasks for 
human health…an effective means for purifying both body and spirit.”365 
The Chinese Azharite Ma Zhicheng deemed Wajdi’s writings on medicine worthy of 
translation. Yuehua (1929-48), the preeminent Chinese Muslim periodical, published Ma’s 
translation of one of Wajdi’s articles in 1939. Wajdi’s original title was “The Practice of 
Medicine in Islam” (al-Tatbib fi-l-Islam).366 The title of Ma’s translation, “Understanding Islam 
through Medicine” (You yixue shuodao huijiao), implied that this was not simply a recounting of 
interesting facts, but a metaphor for the overall historical trajectory of Islam. 
Wajdi’s essay surveyed the major medical traditions of Eurasia, beginning with ancient 
Egyptian medicine and ending with pre-Islamic Arabic medicine (Ma translates jāhilī as yeman 
shidai, “the age of barbarism”) and early Islamic medicine. It opens by saying that 
Every people/nation has added a certain amount of superstition (Wajdi: al-
khurafiyya; Ma: mixin) to medical knowledge. Only the Muslim umma treated 
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medicine as an independent field; this is one of the many distinctions of the 
umma, and among most influential in our opinion, in view of ancient societies’ 
tendency to confuse medicine, spiritualism, and magic. Yes, Muslims past and 
present have come to adopt other cultures’ bad habit of mixing together forms of 
medical knowledge, but knowledgeable people who understand Islam have not 
gotten bogged down in this confusion.367 
 
Wajdi’s essay discusses each medical tradition in detail, asserting that all before Islam were 
tainted by a reliance on superstitious use of talismans, incantations, and other forms of 
spiritualist or black magic. Ancient Egyptian and Mesopotamian medicine, he says, was largely 
based on magic and incantations. Indian medicine was the “purview of monks,” Hebrew 
medicine was similarly “determined by religious belief rather than experience,” and Persian 
medicine was “derived from the classic texts of Mazdaism.” Greek and Roman medicine also 
had their fair share of superstition. All incorporated incantations and the notion of evil spirits.  
Finally, Wajdi turns to Islam, saying that in the beginning, Islamic medicine alone was 
free of superstition: “There is nothing in the Quran calling people to use incantations to treat 
illness; rather, it calls upon people to use medicine.”368 Wajdi follows with a quotation from the 
Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī Hadith collection: “There is no disease that God has created, except that He has 
also created its treatment.” He adds that Hadith encourage people to use medicine, and that there 
are no Hadith recommending incantations. He ends with a quip: “When the Caliph Abu Bakr 
became ill, they took him to a doctor, not a sorcerer!”369 In all of these arguments, Wajdi’s 
assumptions were those of ‘Abduh and Rida, who held that the first obstacle to progress in the 
Islamic world was not the West per se, but the “superstitious accretions” that prevented Muslims 
                                                 
367 Wajdi, “Al-Tatbib,” p. 635. 
 
368 Ibid., p. 640; Sahih al-Bukhari, 76.1. 
 
369 Wajdi, “Al-Tatbib,” p. 640.  
 
 214 
from taking advantage of European-style science, technology, and rationality. They maintained 
that the way to do this, however, was not to give up religion (as they felt Europeans had done), 
but to rediscover its initial spirit, which they said was identical to Europe’s present spirit of 
rationality and which had been lost over the generations. It has been argued that ‘Abduh and 
Rida’s elevation of the pious forebears (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ) over subsequent generations of 
Muslims was not a literal call to return to an earlier stage of development but rather a 
justification for pursuing progress in the present articulated in “religious” terms. Wajdi held that 
early Islam was most compatible with the scientific spirit, more so than either the preceding non-
Islamic traditions or the later Islamic ones, both of which suffered from irrational superstitions. 
Wajdi’s contribution was to view this long-standing polemic through the lens of medicine—and 
Ma Zhicheng’s translation imported this logic into the Chinese Muslim context. 
Ma Zhicheng’s translation of Wajdi’s essay on medicine produced a type of translingual 
conceptual convergence in which key terms were rendered equivalent through a cultural 
encounter that made such translation possible.370 In this case, Ma’s translation of Wajdi’s 
khurāfāt as mixin in Chinese linked these two concepts, both now considered equivalent to 
English “superstition.” Islamic modernists like Wajdi understood khurāfāt as the unorthodox, 
supra-doctrinal beliefs and practices rooted in non-Islamic traditions and added to Islam by 
generations of local Sufi leaders. Islamic modernist thought held that such beliefs needed to be 
supplanted by a version of Islam that was both more originary and more modern. Meanwhile, 
many GMD officials and other educated Chinese militated rather similarly against mixin, which 
they characterized as irrational and dangerous. On one level, mixin contrasted with zongjiao, or 
                                                 
370 In a different context, Lydia Liu has referred to this phenomenon as the creation of “super-signs.” Lydia Liu, The 
Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World-Making, especially Ch. 2. 
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“religion,” which was increasingly cast as rational, apolitical, and non-subversive.371 On another 
level, the Western-trained medical practitioners had also characterized native medicine as 
reflecting mixin, contrasted with modern biomedicine. Here, Ma used Wajdi’s argument about 
the rationality of Islamic medicine (its lack of khurāfāt) to prove that Islam in China should be 
classed alongside other safe, legible, rational forms of zongjiao, and not with threatening forms 
of mixin. In sum, a pro-scientific modernism intended to reform Islam in an Egyptian context 
was translated to defend Islam in a Chinese context: yet another way that Chinese Muslims’ 
transnational connections were made to serve their demonstration of belonging in China. 
 
Toward Narrativization: Bai Shouyi’s Study of Materia Medica as a Muslim 
“Contribution” to China372 
 
In the mid- to late 1930s, a variety of factors such as China’s worsening territorial situation and 
the Second Sino-Japanese War raised the stakes of national loyalty even higher for Chinese 
Muslims. Yet creative as Da Pusheng, Ha Decheng, Ma Zhicheng’s responses were, they did not 
succeed in articulating a comprehensive, politically correct relationship between the 
transnational character of Islam and the ideological strictures of modern Chinese nationhood. A 
more totalizing attempt at reconciliation between Muslimness and Chineseness, one that took 
history more fully into account, was needed. Da and Ha, in their preface to the broadcast 
transcripts, lamented: “The reason behind the cases of insulting the religion is that most Muslims 
live in the Northwest, cut off from the Han…we have not recovered the great spirit of the first 
Muslims who came to China, when the faith was spread peacefully through the sea trade.”373 In 
                                                 
371 Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes.  
 
372 An earlier version of the material in this section and the next appeared in Chen, “‘Just Like Old Friends.’” 
 
373 Da and Ha, Boyin, p. 2. 
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other words, Da and Ha argued, more intensive integration in China was the only way to avoid 
misunderstanding, and the more distant past offered a blueprint for how to achieve this. 
 Coincidentally or not working from that very point—the early history of the Sino-Islamic 
sea trade, whose significance Da and Ha identified but did not explore—the young Chinese 
Muslim scholar Bai Shouyi (1909-2000) solved the problem that Da and Ha had not: how to 
narrativize the historical relationship between Islamic and Chinese medicine: and therefore, 
metonymically, between Islam and China as a whole.374 Since medical practitioners’ verdict had 
come in against Western-style medicine by the mid-1930s, a change of focus was necessary if 
leading Chinese Muslims still wanted (“foreign”) Islamic medicine to serve their ethic of 
political and cultural integrationism. As Xu states, “modern doctors conceded that although 
native medicine was worthless, native drugs were potentially valuable.”375 Bai’s work filled the 
rhetorical gap left by Da and Ha precisely by studying Sino-Islamic materia medica exchange. 
He published his research in an essay in the journal Yugong (“The Chinese Historical Geography 
Semimonthly,” 1934-37), entitled “The Song-Era Muslim Aromatics Trade.”376 The essay 
argued that the Muslim maritime materia medica trade, which flourished during the Song (960-
1279), had contributed significantly to medical knowledge and practice in China. In contrast to 
Da and Ha’s broadcasts, Bai did not assert Muslims’ moral or intellectual superiority to Han 
Chinese, but merely implied that Chinese medicine owed a debt to Islam and Muslims.  
                                                 
374 Bai Shouyi is known primarily as a preeminent Chinese Marxist historian and historian of Chinese Islam whose 
magnum opus was the twelve-volume Zhongguo tongshi (Survey of Chinese History, 1989-92). For his biography, 
see Leïla Chérif-Chebbi, “Bai Shouyi”. In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three, edited by Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, 
Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson. Leiden: Brill, 2015, pp. 41–44.  
 
375 Xu, “‘National Essence’ vs. ‘Science,’” pp. 856. 
 
376Bai Shouyi, “Songshi yisilan jiaotu de xiangliao maoyi” [The Song-Era Muslim aromatics trade]. Special issue on 
Islam, Yugong banyuekan [Chinese Historical Geography Semi-Monthly] 7, no. 4 (16 April 1937): 47–77. On Bai’s 
relationship with Gu Jiegang and his embrace of Western academic methodologies, see Chérif-Chebbi (2015), pp. 
42-43. 
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Bai’s approach to the history of Sino-Islamic civilizational exchange typified a new 
spatialized understanding of the Islamic world, one that departed dramatically from the more 
cosmographical pre-twentieth-century Chinese Muslim concept of tianfang—translatable as 
“heavenly cube” (the kaʿba) or “heavenly region” (Arabia), though also as “Islam” itself.377 
Bai’s work rested on new disciplines of scientific and social-scientific knowledge that took data 
and evidence as the source of authority. Beginning in the 1910s and 1920s, developments in 
archaeology, the May Fourth Movement’s historical periodization of literature, and Chinese 
historians’ “massive search for new historical primary sources” furthered this seismic shift.378 
The new history adopted an objectivist, evolutionary approach and exhibited far greater 
geographical, chronological, and terminological specificity than earlier work, in a type of 
knowledge transformation that has elsewhere been called a “factualization of tradition.”379 
Across urban China, the rise of print media, the institutionalization of Western-style social 
sciences, and the influx of Western Orientalist writings absorbed, translated, and disseminated by 
new groups of journalists and academics, made possible a new type of writing about history. For 
Chinese Muslims, historiographical transformation opened new ways of seeing the Islamic world 
and new ways of asserting their role in narratives of Sino-Islamic civilizational exchange.  
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While Bai’s approach to time, space, and data was informed by Western scholarship, his 
approach to texts retained aspects of Chinese scholarly traditions. His textual method, following 
the eighteenth-century kaozheng (“evidentiary scholarship”) movement, involved ascertaining 
truth through philological comparisons, in this case of the information on an array of materia 
medica available in two main sources.380 The first was the geographical work Zhufanzhi 
(Records of Foreigners) by the Southern Song scholar Zhao Rukuo (1170-1231). The second 
was Friedrich Hirth’s and W.W. Rockhill’s heavily annotated 1911 English translation of Zhao’s 
original. Hirth and Rockhill gave Bai partial access to the writings of further late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century Orientalists, as well as Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Marco Polo, Ibn al-Bayṭār, Ibn Sīnā 
(Avicenna), Sulaymān al-Tājir and even the Greek physician-scholar Dioscorides—author of the 
foundational and widely-translated pharmacopoeia De materia medica—himself.381 
Bai catalogued thirty-seven aromatic materials and singled out twelve for discussion: 
frankincense, ambergris, liquid storax, rosewater, gardenia, costus, myrrh, cloves, sweet benzoin, 
benzoin, nutmeg and white sandalwood.382 Many of these were native to Southeast Asia, and all 
passed through it en route to Chinese ports. It was here that Zhao Rukuo, a maritime customs 
official in Southern Song-era Quanzhou, catalogued them and the people carrying them.383  
                                                 
380 On the kaozheng movement, see Benjamin Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects 
of Change in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).  
 
381 Independently, Bai also made use of Silsilat al-tawārikh, attributed to Sulayman al-Tājir (ninth century), 
translated in the Japanese publication Chigaku zasshi (Ch. dixue zazhi) in 1928, and later in 1941 in the Chinese 
periodical Zhongguo wenhua yanjiu huikan. Bai supplemented Zhao and Hirth and Rockhill with Berthold Laufer’s 
1919 work on Sino-Islamic trade. 
 
382 Bai, “Songshi yisilan,” pp. 54-66. Bai generally followed the translations given in Friedrich Hirth and William 
Woodville Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua, His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth 
Centuries, Entitled Chu-fan-chï (St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1911), pp. 191-239. 
 
383 Zhao Rukuo, Zhufanzhi [Records of foreigners] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, [c.1125] 1985).  
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Bai’s narrates Southeast Asia as the midpoint between Islamic and Chinese civilizations. 
For example, Bai quotes Zhao Rukuo’s passage on frankincense (ruxiang): 
Ju-hiang (“milk incense”)…comes from the three Ta-shi countries of Ma-lo-pa, 
Shi-ho, and Nu-fa, from the depths of the remotest mountain valleys. The tree 
which yields this drug may, on the whole, be compared to the sung (pine). Its trunk 
is notched with a hatchet, upon which the resin flows out, and when hardened, turns 
into incense, which is gathered and made into lumps. It is transported on elephants 
to the Ta-shi (on the coast); the Ta-shi load it upon their ships for barter against 
other goods in San-fo-ts’i; and it is for this reason that the incense is commonly 
collected at San-fo-ts’i …When the foreign merchants come to that place to trade, 
the Customs authorities, according to the relative strength of its fragrance, 
distinguish thirteen classes of incense.384 
 
Hirth and Rockhill identify Ma-lo-pa as Mirbat (present-day Oman), Shi-ho as al-Shiḥr (present-
day Hadramawt, Yemen), and Nu-fa as Zufar (Dhufar, present-day Oman): the world’s top 
producers of frankincense. San-fo-ts’i, meanwhile, refers to Samboja, or Srivijaya (650-1377).385  
Bai traces Muslim materia medica through several authoritative Song-era pharmaceutical 
compilations. On storax, found throughout Southeast Asia, he writes, “It is potent in calming the 
blood and the qi [vital flows]. For treating dizziness, inducing vomiting, and rectifying qi 
imbalances, it has an especially miraculous effect.”386 On cloves, native to the Maluku Islands: 
“The plant treats spleen depletion and fever in children and adults.” On nutmeg, native to the 
Banda Islands: “Among its uses is clearing and curing pale mucousy diarrhea. There is no other 
medicine that can cure this. Its effect is like magic.”387 Learning of the “Islamic origins” of such 
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commonplace materials, and seeing their usefulness attested in Chinese-language sources, would 
have left quite an impression on Chinese readers of the 1930s, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.  
Bai’s factual-philological approach clarified why scholars had failed to understand 
Islam’s multipolarity, for example in his discussion of the etymology of benzoin (anxixiang): 
The first volume of Zhufanzhi says anxixiang is a product of Arabia, whereas the 
second says it comes from San-fo-t’si. Hirth and Rockhill as well as Laufer 
translated it as benzoin or benjoin. This substance was unknown to Europeans 
before the mid-fifteenth century. But the English benjoin is a corruption of the 
Arabic luban jawi; the Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, and French words all more or 
less resemble the English. Luban jawi means “Java incense”; that is to say, Java as 
known to the Arabs, or present-day Sumatra. Laufer says anxixiang was in fact 
produced in Sumatra, Borneo, and other islands of the Malay Archipelago. In all 
likelihood, therefore, the Song-era Muslim merchants’ products did not come only 
from Arabia and the surrounding countries; for these merchants always did their 
best to maximize the paths they traversed and goods they obtained. This, after all, is 
what merchants do. It is not at all out of the ordinary. In earlier times scholars could 
not analyze such movements, so of course there are gaps in the records. It is just 
common sense.388 
 
In other words, Southeast Asia formed bridge between China and the Islamic world. Bai’s 
readers, accustomed to thinking of the Islamic world more as an abstract idea than as a 
geographical entity, could now see that that world was wide indeed.  
Bai’s scholarship, however, contained a profound irony—one that further politicized the 
relationship between Islam and medicine in the context of 1930s China. Whereas his evidence 
pointed to the diversity of the Islamic world and the multiregional character of medical 
exchange, his argument insisted that this history was significant primarily insofar as it illustrated 
Chinese Muslims’ Arab origins, subsequent Sinicization, and contributions to China. The 
contents of Bai’s essay indicate how these two aspects played off one another: 
I:  Muslims and the Pre-Song Aromatics Trade in the South Seas 
II:  The Importance of the Song-Era Muslim Aromatics Trade to South Seas Trade  
III:  The Song-Era Muslim Aromatics Trade and Its Uses to the Song State 
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 221 
IV:  The Song-Era Muslim Aromatics Trade and Contemporary Market Prices 
V:  Medicinal Uses in China of Products from the Song-Era Muslim Aromatics Trade 
VI:  Several Muslim Aromatics Merchants Active in Song China 
 
Rather than recovering a lost past for its own sake, Bai’s essay highlighted the transmission of 
medical products and knowledge from the Arab world to China via Southeast Asia. This 
narrative arc conveyed a politically useful message on behalf of Chinese Muslims in the 
Republican era, constantly obliged (as with Da and Ha) to explain their existence and justify 
their faith to non-Muslim audiences: they were both authentic Muslims and authentic Chinese, 
and they had contributed something, as Muslims, to Chinese “civilization” (wenhua or 
wenming). To this end, Bai’s essay cites Tang Shenwei’s Zhenglei bencao (1082), the Song-era 
pharmacopoeia, which catalogued numerous uses for frankincense, storax, costus, myrrh, cloves, 
benzoin, and nutmeg. Bai states with satisfaction, “Of the twelve aforementioned aromatics 
known to have been traded by Muslims, these seven had already been incorporated into medical 
practice in China… and were regarded in Song times as high-quality medicinal products.”389  
Periodization performed an important polemical function in Bai’s argument. The question 
of how to periodize Chinese history incited considerable controversy in Republican China, 
especially in the Peking University circles to which Bai belonged. As Xiaoqing Diana Lin notes, 
from its founding in 1917 through the mid-1920s, members of the Peking University history 
department debated how best to apply the Eurocentric “ancient-medieval-modern” framework to 
Chinese history. They clung to the notion that Han-led dynasties such as the Song represented 
the peak of Chinese civilization, but were equally eager to demonstrate that the Han race was 
continuing to evolve and progress in the present and had not declined despite centuries of 
Mongol and Manchu rule.390 In light of these priorities, a Chinese Muslim historian such as Bai 
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faced clear challenges. After all, large numbers of Muslims had entered China during the 
“foreign” Mongol Yuan (1271-1368), and many of the conventionally cited high points in 
Chinese Islamic history had taken place at that time or later. Bai’s essay navigated these Han-
centric politics of the past rather brilliantly, identifying a moment of Sino-Islamic florescence—
the Song-era aromatics trade—that not only predated the Mongols but in fact had augmented the 
glory of a period otherwise known as a Han golden age. Highlighting Muslims’ place in Chinese 
history was especially crucial in analogical, presentist terms: it implied that such a place also 
existed in the new Chinese nation-state. In the Republican-era context, the legitimacy derived 
from identifying the Song as (also) a Sino-Islamic golden age is hard to overstate.  
A crucial omission further clarifies Bai’s preference for the pre-Mongol era and emphasis 
on the maritime exchange. By the time Bai was writing, the Han Chinese scholar Chen Yuan had 
discovered in the depths of Beijing Library the Huihui yaofang (Muslim Pharmacopoeia)—the 
early-Ming pharmacological work translated by unknown scholars from Arabic, Persian, and 
other sources transmitted to China during the Yuan.391 Chen mentioned this work’s existence in 
his studies of Yuan-era Sinicization from 1924-35.392 Since the 1980s, scholars have canonized 
the Huihui yaofang as the single most representative work of Chinese Muslim medicine and 
pharmacy. Yet in the 1930s, Bai, who belonged to the same circles as Chen and even cited him 
in his essay, assigned no such exalted position to the Huihui yaofang. In fact, he did not mention 
it at all. Why? If Chen had already known about it for ten years, it is highly unlikely that Bai did 
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not himself know about it. Even an inability to read the entries—understandable, given that it 
lists materia medica by transliterating rather than translating their Arabic and Persian names into 
Chinese—would explain only the failure to discuss it in depth, not the choice to leave it out 
entirely. In all likelihood, Bai’s omission was more purposeful.  
While the Huihui yaofang certainly fits the need to illustrate Muslim contributions to 
Chinese civilization, Bai’s motives in writing his essay appear more specific than that. As argued 
above, Bai wanted to show that that contribution had begun at a very early stage, and had come 
about in a manner that reached a high bar of both Chinese and Islamic authenticity. Thus, 
alongside excerpts from dynastic records, Bai quotes Chen Yuan’s own writings on the Haiyao 
bencao of Li Xun—a ninth-century Sichuanese scholar-pharmacist of Persian origin. Bai’s 
opening section concludes with the loaded statement that “from the stories of Li Xun and others, 
we can see that there were already Muslim aromatics merchants living in China proper in the 
Five Dynasties (907-960), and among these were already some who used Chinese names and 
could write in Chinese.”393 In other words, Bai probably left out the Huihui yaofang, and the 
Yuan era as a whole, because it disrupted his smooth narrative of “Muslims in China” becoming 
“Chinese Muslims” at a very early point.394 Crucially, the Yuan and its texts were “foreign.” 
Because the Huihui yaofang is, again, not fully translated into Chinese but is rather a catalog of 
Arabic and other terms “spelled” with Chinese characters, it prohibitively inconveniences Bai’s 
argument that the inexorable Sinicization of Muslim medical people had already begun in the 
Tang or Five Dynasties; by contrast, the emerging conventional wisdom of the 1930s placed 
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Muslims’ Sinicization a full five centuries later, in the early Ming. Like other Chinese Muslim 
elites, Bai perceived that his community’s survival depended on writing a narrative of Muslims’ 
becoming Chinese, in which earlier Sinicization was for political purposes unquestionably better. 
At the same time, far from sacrificing one authenticity for another, focusing on the 
maritime exchange also allowed Bai to affirm Chinese Muslims’ authenticity as Muslims. Chen 
Yuan had debunked Chinese Muslim origin myths, which involved exchanges of emissaries 
between the Prophet Muhammad and the Tang emperor. Chen argued instead that Chinese 
Muslims descended from Central Asians arriving in the Yuan, implying that they were less 
authentic Chinese for being relatively late arrivals, and less authentic Muslims for being non-
Arab. Bai’s essay resisted Chen’s reasoning not only by showing that some Muslims had already 
become Sinicized long before the Yuan, but also by showing that those Muslims had descended 
at least partly from Arabs, the original Muslims: in other words, the best of both worlds.  
 
Medical Donations and Chinese Muslim Wartime Diplomacy 
Narratives of Sino-Islamic exchange and Muslim contributions to Chinese civilization soon took 
on new life in the context of China’s war with Japan. Between the outbreak of the Second Sino-
Japanese War in summer 1937 and the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia in winter 1941-42, 
the opportunity arose for an unprecedented, sustained encounter between Chinese and Southeast 
Asian Muslims. This opportunity grew out of China’s war strategy and Chinese Muslim elites’ 
relationship with the GMD. In pre-invasion Nanjing and the later wartime capital Chongqing, 
Chinese Muslim leaders worked closely with the government in pursuing China’s war aims. 
Under Bai Chongxi, a successful general and the highest-ranking Muslim in the GMD, Chinese 
Muslim elites retreating westward with the GMD formed an official organ known as the Chinese 
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Islamic National Salvation Federation (Zhongguo huijiao jiuguo xiehui).395 Enjoying direct 
involvement from Chiang Kai-shek, this organization launched several initiatives in support of 
China’s war effort. One of these was the Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation (Zhongguo 
huijiao nanyang fangwentuan, 1939-1941). Conscious of the need to compete with Japan for 
Muslim hearts and minds across Asia, the GMD relied on such Muslim delegations to fill a 
crucial vacuum in wartime foreign policy.396  
Led by Chinese Muslim polyglot Ma Tianying (1900-82), the delegation highlighted the 
mutually beneficial long-term interaction between Chinese and Islamic civilizations. The main 
tool at the delegation’s disposal was the narrative of movement and exchange, articulated by Bai 
Shouyi and others, that linked China with the Islamic world. This narrative allowed the 
delegation to build rhetorical bridges to their Southeast Asian counterparts. As importantly, it 
reflected desires to revive past “golden ages” and promote Islamic unity, desires shared by 
Islamic modernists across the world at this time. 
While abroad, Ma Tianying authored a Chinese-language tract to present to overseas 
Chinese, including a section on Islam’s role in world history that specially mentioned medieval 
Andalus’s “sages of philosophy and medicine” (zhexue yi sheng).397 It was probably not 
accidental that Ma mentioned the history of medicine in Islam. One of the Delegation’s 
accomplishments was organizing collections of medical supplies from overseas Chinese and 
Muslim communities in Malaya, to aid war relief in China. This endeavor takes on added 
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significance in light of Bai Shouyi’s research on materia medica: perhaps leading Chinese 
Muslims saw the wartime medical donations as a tangible way of reviving an aspect of the Sino-
Islamic past. The Delegation formed a Medical Collection Committee to oversee the process, as 
well as Muslim “China relief funds.” Such efforts were seen as a way to “utilize the strength of 
international Islam” and “counter the enemy.”398 Ma added that, while in Singapore, the 
delegation collected more than 11,000 yuan from the tea merchant and Sino-Malayan Cultural 
Association member Lin Qingnian and other overseas Chinese, and 5,000 yuan from Huang 
Shufen and others in Johor. The Malay Muslim China Relief Fund and the Sino-Singaporean 
Preparedness and Relief Fund also donated.399 One estimate puts the total value of donations at 
800,000 yuan.400 These donations testify to Chinese and Muslim Malayans’ desire to assist 
China’s war effort and, perhaps, to the resonance of the Delegation’s civilizational narrative. 
 
Conclusion: From Han Islamophobia to Muslim Sinophilia 
 
In China’s Republican era, Chinese Muslim elites undertook a discursive Sinicization of Islamic 
medicine in response to contingent political pressures. At first, Chinese Muslim elites countered 
Islamophobic attacks in the media by synthesizing multiple types of authority, textual and 
biomedical. This pluralistic approach became untenable, however, when cultural nationalism and 
territorial crisis compelled Chinese Muslim elites to state their loyalty to the Chinese nation more 
unambiguously. In this context, the translation of Islamic modernist “scientific exegesis” offered 
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new tools for asserting the rationality of Islamic medicine. It was Bai Shouyi, however, who 
fully politicized and narrativized the history of Islamic medicine in China, transforming the rich 
past of Sino-Islamic exchange into a metaphor for Chinese Muslims’ belonging in and 
contributions to China, while rhetorically safeguarding their communal distinctiveness. Bai’s 
theme of “contribution” found ready application in wartime Muslim diplomatic missions, which 
made Islamic medicine literally a component of “saving the nation.” This recurring theme of 
civilizational contribution has proven just as effective in the PRC era. Its institutionalization 
continued in the late 1940s, and resumed again after the Cultural Revolution, in the concept of 
“Chinese Islamic medicine” (huiyi), in the many Chinese Muslim hospitals and pharmacies 




CHAPTER FOUR: UNIVERSALISM CO-OPTED 
 
 
Dexin told us he departed from the capital on the twenty-second day of the tenth 
month of the year 1257 according to the Islamic calendar, or the twenty-first reign 
year of the Daoguang Emperor [i.e. December 1841]. On the sixteenth day of the 
eleventh month, he crossed beyond the frontiers of China… 
Eventually reaching Arabia, he lived several days on the coast of Yemen, 
traveling all the while by boat…On the eighth day, he reached Jidda. By the 
Islamic calendar, this was the seventeenth day of the fourth month of the 
following year. Here he stayed again by the coast, and took the opportunity to 
visit the tomb of Eve. Then, finally, he would go to Mecca. He rode by camel for 
two nights, for a third by horse. He set out from Jidda on the evening of the 
twenty-eighth day of the fourth month, and reached Mecca at first light on the 
first day of the fifth.  
Mecca: at last he had arrived…He visited the city itself as well as the tomb 
of the Prophet [in Medina], and for the first time glimpsed the ka‘ba. He lived for 
a time in sight of the ka‘ba, which is surrounded by a palatial mosque. 
-Ma Rulong, Chaojin tuji [Record of a Pilgrimage], 1864401 
 
Arise, arise! Muslims of China! Let us lift up our Quran!  
Follow the path of our Prophet! Hoist the standard of righteousness,  
defend our traditional values, and see the enemy—Japan—for who he is.  
He dons a false face; he deceives our brethren the world over.  
Defeat him we must; we will bear his treachery no more!  
Forward, Muslims, forward march! 
Arise, arise! Muslims of China! Let us raise our fine swords, loose our battle cry,  
United in patriotic conviction, fulfilling destiny, defending the nation, 
And recognizing our enemy: Japan. 
Mercilessly he sprays his artillery, in cold blood butchers; thinks he can swallow 
us whole.  
We reject his invasion. 
Forward, Muslims, forward march! 
-“Chinese Muslim War of Resistance Song,” march in F minor, 1939402 
 
 
Introduction: Beyond China? 
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402 Lyrics by Wang Mengyang, music by Ma Zibai. Printed on multiple occasions in Zhongguo huijiao jiuguo xiehui 
yuekan [Chinese Islamic National Salvation Association Monthly] (Wuhan, Chongqing, Nanjing: 1938-48). The 
author of the lyrics, Wang Mengyang, was a regular contributor to Yuehua. 
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Ma Dexin, a tea merchant and Islamic scholar from Dali, Yunnan, was the first Chinese Musflim 
in modern times to leave an extant travelogue regarding his Hajj to Mecca, made in the 1840s. 
As the above passage from his travelogue suggests, moving “beyond the frontiers of China” was 
a significant event in the journey. What could moving physically beyond China mean for 
Chinese Muslims in modern times? 
The answer to that question changed dramatically in the next hundred years. A century 
after Ma’s journey, in summer 1939, the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation, which 
had retreated with the GMD government to Chongqing in the face of the Japanese push into the 
interior of 1937-38, sponsored the Chinese Azharites to make their own Hajj journey, the overt 
purpose of which was to intercept a Japanese-sponsored Hajj delegation and carry out anti-
Japanese propaganda among the world’s Muslims gathered in the Hijaz.403 In the intervening 
decades, the Hajj for Chinese Muslims had gone from being nearly impossible to being 
instrumentalized in the wartime policy of the GMD and its elite Chinese Muslim allies.  
The war with Japan represented a point of no return on China’s Muslims. Once again, the 
size of China’s Muslim population was believed (or at least asserted) at the time to be fifty 
million, or one tenth to one eighth of the total population. Especially given the fact that so many 
Muslims had suddenly found themselves living under Japanese rule in Manchuria, the elite 
Chinese Muslims who were still in GMD-controlled territory were obliged to demonstrate 
absolutely unequivocally that they could be of service to the nation in its moment of greatest 
need. In the words of Yufeng Mao, “The perceived size of the population, coupled with the 
concentration of Muslims in the much-contested northwestern provinces of Xinjiang, Gansu, and 
                                                 
 
403 This mission is detailed in Yufeng Mao, “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation: Chinese Pilgrimage Missions 
to Mecca during World War II,” Journal of Asian Studies 70/2 (May 2011): pp. 373-95. 
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Shaanxi, as well as in Manchuria in the northeast, made the loyalty and support of the group’s 
elites especially important to various political forces, particularly Japan and the Nationalist 
regime.”404 In addition, Rana Mitter’s discoveries about the extent of the GMD police state’s 
activities during the war further encourage the conclusion that Chinese Muslims remaining in 
GMD-controlled territory, and closely connected to the government no less, had little choice but 
to demonstrate their support for the war effort in every possible way. As if the war itself were not 
dangerous enough, leaving doubt as to one’s loyalties could be equally perilous. At the very 
least, taking part in the war allowed Muslims to recast some negative perennial stereotypes in a 
more positive light, as in the “Chinese Muslim War of Resistance Song” above. Muslims were 
for the time being no longer cast as a “fierce and brutal people,” but rather as possessing 
admirable martial qualities and “traditional values.”405 While the GMD government tended to 
treat Muslims as crucial allies throughout the war, however, is unclear what level of recognition 
Chinese Muslims may have received from Chinese society at large in the wake of their efforts.  
 The most important of these demonstrations was the Chinese Muslim wartime diplomatic 
delegations: the Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation (Zhongguo huijiao jindong fangwentuan, 
1937-39), Chinese Islamic Hajj Delegation (Zhongguo huijiao chaojin tuan, summer 1939), and 
Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation (Zhongguo huijiao nanyang fangwentuan, 1939-41). 
                                                 
 
404 Mao, “Muslim Vision,” p. 380. 
 
405 Jonathan N. Lipman, “A Fierce and Brutal People: On Islam and Muslims in Qing Law,” in Empire at the 
Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, edited by Pamela Kyla Crossley, Helen F. Sui, 
and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); As Yufeng Mao has observed, this inversion 
of Islamophobic stereotypes dated back at least as far as the Chinese Muslim student delegations to Japan in the first 
decade of the twentieth century: In 1906, a group of Sino-Muslim students in Japan first pointed out that, because of 
their martial tradition, discipline, and solidarity, they possessed the qualities necessary to save China (Wang [1908] 
1988). Here the students used “martial tradition,” “discipline,” and “solidarity” in place of earlier terms such as 
“fierce and brutal.” Thus, China’s weak position in international politics allowed Muslims to turn this stereotypical 
view on its head. Mao, “Muslim Vision,” p. 377. 
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Each of these delegations was led by worldly, multilingual, articulate, and trusted Chinese 
Muslims connected to or directly serving in the GMD government. The Chinese Islamic National 
Salvation Federation (Zhongguo huijiao jiuguo xiehui), established in autumn 1938 in Wuhan, 
assumed responsibility for coordinating the delegations from then on.  
These missions would not have been possible, however, unless the Hajj and travel to the 
Middle East had already been rendered physically easier yet conceptually circumscribed. Before 
turning to the wartime delegations, therefore, this chapter first traces the larger transformation of 
the Chinese Muslim Hajj from early modern to modern times, focusing in particular on an under-
studied episode—the Hajj journey of Imam Ma Songting and Yuehua editor Zhao Zhenwu in 
1932-33—that epitomized both Chinese Muslims’ burgeoning transnational connections and 
their increasing involvement in state- and nation-building back home. In other words, the Hajj 
and wartime delegations were yet another area in which Chinese Muslims’ increasing contact 
with Muslims outside China went hand-in-hand with increasing initiatives by the Chinese state 
and Chinese Muslim elites to channel such transnational Islamic connections to suit the purposes 
of nationalism, integrationism, and in this case, national security.  
This chapter, however, moves beyond presenting the wartime delegations in terms of a 
real or even a perceived “contribution” to China’s wartime effort. Instead, it places greater 
emphasis on two alternative modes of interpretation that more fully historicize this notion of 
“contribution,” and to an extent challenge its status as an all-encompassing analytical framework. 
The first mode highlights the tremendous geographical, geopolitical, and sociocultural scope of 
the delegations’ activities. Many of their interactions with and representations of Middle Eastern, 
South Asian, and Southeast Asian Muslims (and non-Muslims), both planned and spontaneous, 
cannot be explained by Chinese or elite Chinese Muslim interests alone, and must therefore be 
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contextualized with respect to ontological and epistemological formations other than “China.” 
The delegations elicited a wide range of thoughts, reactions, and sentiments from some of the 
era’s most important Muslim political and intellectual leaders, not all of which related to the war 
or to China. In addition, the delegation members themselves served as unlikely first-hand 
witnesses to several events of world-historical significance other than the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, including the Palestinian Revolt of 1936-39, the late-1930s upsurge of the Pakistan 
movement, the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and the mass exodus of Jews from Europe. The 
second mode, which restores “China” to the equation, concerns the delegations’ intrinsically 
performative quality: despite pointing in multiple directions, the very same abovementioned 
interactions and representations nevertheless compelled the delegation members to articulate 
their political positions on China, Islam in China, and the Islamic world in new ways.406 
Ultimately, the delegations were far less significant for their tangible impact on China or the war, 
                                                 
 
406 Kelly Hammond similarly describes the Japanese-sponsored Hajj delegation of 1939 (see below) as 
“performative,” defined as “meaning that the specific time and place when [the Japanese delegation leader] Tang 
Yichen’s hajj occurred had an effect on…‘social and cultural transformations’ going on around him and were 
reflected in his recording and editorializing of his journey.” Kelly Anne Hammond, “The Conundrum of 
Collaboration,” p. 202. On performativity, Hammond further cites Derrida’s Of Grammatology (1967) as well as 
Simon Coleman and John Eade, “Introduction to Reframing Pilgrimage,” in Reframing Pilgrimage: Cultures in 
Motion, edited by Simon Coleman and John Eade (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 17. 
In the case of the GMD-sponsored delegations discussed below, I would characterize performativity 
somewhat more literally as acting, and representing oneself as having acted, in accordance with the expectations of a 
given audience or authority—in this case, the GMD government and the Chinese Muslim elites of the Chinese 
Islamic National Salvation Federation. I concur, however, with the applicability of this concept to this history and in 
particular wish to highlight the parallelism of the GMD- and Japanese-sponsored delegations.  
My understanding more generally of the nature of the GMD-affiliated delegations also echoes Hammond’s 
conclusions regarding the Japanese-sponsored one. As she states: “Tang’s journal offers a glimpse into the tensions 
and stresses of traveling on the brink of war in Europe and a window into the everyday experiences of being a 
Chinese hajji during the war. It also underscores the fraternity among Muslims from China that often overrode any 
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Japanese Empire respectively got what they wanted out of the trip: the North China Muslims got a free hajj and the 
Japanese established diplomatic relations with the Saudis, leading to Japanese-Saudi negotiations for an oil 
concession in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia almost immediately after Tang and his companions returned to China.” 
Hammond, “Conundrum of Collaboration,” pp. 197-98. 
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and far more significant as a bold and unequivocal assertion of GMD-affiliated Muslims’ 
exclusive right to speak for all China’s Muslims, as well as of Chinese Muslims’ loyalty, their 
reliability, and above all, their Chineseness. 
 
Modern Chinese Muslims and the Hajj: From Cosmography to Geography 
 
In China, the essence of Islam has long been associated with Mecca. This is attested by Chinese 
Muslims’ centuries-old use of the term tianfang—literally “heavenly cube” (i.e. the kaʿba) or 
“heavenly region” (i.e. Arabia)—as one of the most enduring metonyms for both the region and 
the religion. Despite this strong if vague discursive significance, Mecca as a living place with 
social and political realities remained distant for most of Chinese Islamic history. The same 
could be said of large portions of the Islamic world. Indeed, only a handful of intrepid Chinese 
Muslims actually made the Hajj in the five centuries of isolation between the fateful introversion 
of the Ming and the advent of modern steam travel. Thanks to steamships, the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries saw a dramatic increase in the number of pilgrims performing the 
Hajj.407 Particularly for Muslims living in the “peripheral” regions of Islam, steam technology 
allowed the Hajj to enter the realm of practical possibility for a much greater number of believers 
than before. What had been an ordeal of several years in premodern times now became a journey 
of weeks or months. As a result, whereas before the far-flung Muslim communities in eastern 
China or the eastern Malay Archipelago may have sent only one or two Hajjis to Mecca per 
generation, now they could send several per year. Eric Tagliacozzo calculates that by the early 
twentieth century, “fully half of all pilgrims…in any particular year might be coming from very 
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distant places, and almost certainly by sea in these cases.”408 For Chinese Muslims especially, 
reaching Mecca by sea was cheaper, faster, and safer than following traditional land routes. 
Although Chinese Muslims were slightly less well-positioned than their Southeast Asian 
counterparts to capitalize on the new opportunities afforded by steam travel, the consequences of 
Hajj specifically and of journeys to the Middle East generally had undeniably multiplied by the 
third decade of the twentieth century.409 
 During the war with Japan, however, pilgrimage largely became enveloped within the 
motivation to demonstrate Chinese Muslims’ loyalty, and utility, to the Chinese nation. Just 
slightly before that point, other Chinese Muslim travels to the Middle East helped set the stage 
for that transformation. A highly consequential but under-studied episode in the history of 
modern Chinese Islam that speaks to these questions is the Hajj and travels of ‘Abdul Rahim Ma 
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Songting (a.k.a. Ma Shouling, 1895-1992) and ‘Abdullah al-Siddiq Zhao Zhenwu (a.k.a. Zhao 
Bin, 1895-1938), undertaken from November 1932 to May 1933. This journey was discussed in 
Chapter One in terms of its consequences for Chinese Muslim textual transnationalism. Here, the 
question of what actually happened during the journey is of greater significance. 
The social stature of the two leading figures speaks to the importance of their Hajj 
journey. We have already met Zhao Zhenwu in Chapter One. Ma Songting of Beijing’s Niujie 
Muslim community was well-versed in the Arabic-language classics, helped found the Chengda 
Academy, and came to be considered one of modern China’s “Four Great Imams.”410 While Ma 
Songting was the senior figure in terms of religious scholarship, Zhao appears to have been the 
principle organizer of meetings and activities.  
Beyond making the Hajj, the objectives of Ma and Zhao’s journey were to deliver a new 
group of Chinese Muslim students to al-Azhar and to build contacts throughout the region that 
could inform the new Arabo-centric and Islamic modernist orientation of the urban coastal 
Chinese Muslims, discussed in Chapter One.411 In terms of these objectives, the journey was a 
tremendous success. Ma and Zhao made face-to-face contact with individuals they had 
previously known only through print media or at most written correspondence. These included 
many of the leading figures of the day: Muhammad Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, and the other sheikhs 
of al-Azhar; Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, editor-in-chief of al-Fath; King Fu’ad I of Egypt; Hajj 
Amin al-Husseini, grand mufti of Jerusalem; King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz ibn Saud, ruler of the newly 
unified country of Saudi Arabia; and others. The meetings in Egypt in particular resulted not 
                                                 
 
410 Zhongguo huizu mingren cidian, pp. 186-87.  
 
411 Zhao’s travelogue, Xixing riji [Diary of a Journey West], originally published in Yuehua, is the main source of 
information surviving about their journey. 
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only in an increased commitment from al-Azhar and the Egyptian crown to the Chinese 
Azharites, but also in the dispatching of the two Egyptian instructors to China mentioned in 
Chapter One.412 Finally, as also mentioned in Chapter One, before leaving Cairo, Zhao 
purchased a set of Arabic type from the publishing house Matba‘at Sharikat al-Tamaddun al-
Sina‘iyya, which upon his return to China would allow Chinese Muslims to print in Arabic for 
the first time in history. In short, Ma and Zhao’s Chinese Hajj journey embodied the ethos of 
transnationalist integrationism in a new way, containing both genuine aspirations to Islamic unity 
and indications of the narrower interests of elite Chinese Muslims in China at the same time.  
Having made their travel arrangements through the American Express Company in 
Shanghai, Ma and Zhao boarded the steamer Conte Rosso on 9 December 1932, accompanied by 
the five new Chinese Muslim students bound for al-Azhar.413 Understanding the momentousness 
of such an endeavor, Zhao wrote at this time that “Before, those without money could not make 
the Hajj, but those with money were too afraid to do so.”414  
Ma and Zhao first experienced a moment of difficulty in Singapore. Attempting to pay a 
visit to Syed Ibrahim bin Omar Alsagoff, a leader of Singapore’s Hadrami Arab community, they 
were forced to wait a long time before being received abruptly and with confusion as to their 
purpose. Zhao states that he and Ma had hoped simply to pay their respects and to ask for 
assistance making contacts in Hijaz. Zhao notes, however, that Alsagoff did not rise from his 
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desk to greet them, and that when they attempted to explain themselves in broken Turkish to 
Alsagoff’s Turkish-speaking assistant, they were told that he was very busy. Their frustration 
with the barriers of language, culture, and status are apparent.415  
Later that same day (15 December 1932), Ma and Zhao enjoyed a much better reception 
with Abdul Wahid Aljelany, editor-in-chief of the Arabic-language weekly al-Huda. Published 
on Singapore’s Haji Lane, a center of the local Arab community, al-Huda was incidentally the 
foreign publication received in greatest quantity by Yuehua following Zhao’s epistolary outreach 
efforts of 1930-31. As with Alsagoff, there were some communication issues with Aljelany—
Zhao was apparently nervous and could not adequately express himself in Arabic or English, 
instead handing Aljelany a pre-printed written explanation of their purpose. Nevertheless, the 
exchange bore immediate fruit as Aljelany visited at length with Ma and Zhao and even offered 
to put them in touch with his father in Port Said, in order to assist them with their Hajj. Aljelany 
provided them a letter of introduction and wrote directly to his father advising him of the 
Chinese Muslims’ impending arrival in Egypt.416 In addition, as Ma and Zhao would later learn, 
Aljelany cabled the Egyptian paper al-Balagh to notify Muslims there about Ma and Zhao’s 
itinerary, mentioning them by name.417  
                                                 
 
415 Zhao, Xixing riji, p. 19. Ironically, during the Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation of 1939-41, Syed Ibrahim 
and other members of the Alsagoff family (and the Hadrami elite generally) warmly received the delegation in 
Singapore. Moreover, by that point, there is evidence that Syed Ibrahim had progressed in his understanding of the 
relationship between Chinese Islam and Islamic history generally; on at least one occasion, he referenced China as 
an example of the peaceful spread of Islam: “Those who do not study the true history of the Islamic conquest believe 
that Islam was spread by force, but a glance at India, the Malayan Archipelago, the Netherlands Indies, and China 
would clear up this misconception, because Islam, which spread among the population of no less than 200,000,000 
was nothing but the result of preachings and direct contact with traders, who possessed no other power beyond 
imparting knowledge. “Muslim Party in Honour of Prophet’s Birthday: ‘Islam was Spread by Peace’ Declares 
Speaker,” Straits Times, 5 May 1939, p. 14. Quoted in Chen, “‘Just Like Old Friends,’” p. 716. 
  
416 Zhao, Xixing riji, pp. 20-21. 
  
417 Ibid., p. 66. 
 
 238 
Connections based in print media represented on way in which Ma and Zhao 
experienced, and indeed activated, a concrete example of the interconnectedness of the Islamic 
world at this time. Beginning with their interaction with Aljelany, Ma and Zhao began to leave in 
their wake a trans-local trail of interest in their movements on the part of news-reading Muslims. 
By the time they arrived in the Middle East, they had already become minor celebrities, often 
being recognized and approached by strangers based on stories that had appeared about their 
travels in the Arabic press. Aljelany, for his part, published a three-part article in al-Huda about 
Chinese Islam, beginning on 2 January 1933, with the first installment appearing on the front 
page. Given that this was only three weeks after Aljelany’s meeting with Ma and Zhao, and that 
al-Huda had published nothing about Chinese Islam in its two years of existence up to this point 
despite having correspondents in China writing about Chinese affairs generally, it is more than 
reasonable to assume that the interaction with Ma and Zhao inspired the article. Notably, the 
article summarized the origins of Chinese Islam while giving scant treatment to the thirteen 
hundred years that followed its arrival there, instead arguing that other than the few Muslims, 
“the Chinese do not have ‘religion’ as conventionally understood, but a mixture of philosophies 
into which enters a good deal of superstition.”418 If this did in fact reflect relatively unfiltered 
views imparted to Aljelany by Zhao, it speaks to Zhao’s desire for Muslims outside China to 
view Islam as having a privileged position in that country. On a different level, Aljelany’s 
publication of the article (particularly the first installment on the front page) suggests Arabic-
speaking audiences’s receptiveness to news about Chinese Muslims.  
The feelings of connectedness Zhao recorded cannot go entirely unqualified. For one, the 
issue of madhhab occasionally arose in each place Ma and Zhao visited. They took some pride in 
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their status as Hanafi, and evidently regarded the Shafi‘i believers predominating in the Indian 
Ocean to be less doctrinally serious. Practical as well as doctrinal considerations also fed into 
this bias: Zhao recorded that when attending jum‘a at the Hussein Mosque in Cairo on 6 January 
1933, the “imam was Hanafi, so we had an easier time following along.”419 The preoccupation 
with differences of “school,” however, did not prevent Ma and Zhao from visiting the tomb of 
Imam Shafi‘i in Cairo or being impressed by its architecture.420  
On the other hand, somewhat incongruously given both their preference for the Hanafi 
madhhab and acceptance of the Shafi‘i—yet somewhat more understandable in light of their 
newfound enthusiasm for “correct belief”—Ma, Zhao, and their Chinese Azharite counterparts 
expressed unreserved approval on several occasions for ‘Abdul ‘Aziz ibn Saud’s Wahhabi-
inspired reforms to the Hajj, which they saw as necessary checks to “unorthodox practices.”421 
On their first visit to the Great Mosque in Mecca on 28 February 1933, Zhao commented 
“Before, there were four imams leading prayer, one for each madhhab; now there is only one, 
standing in front of the Rock of Abraham (maqam Ibrahim), leading all those present in prayer. 
They will no longer be able to break into their separate groups. For this unification of practice, 
we must give credit to the Wahhabism of Ibn Saud!”422 Furthermore, later in their Hajj, after the 
symbolic stoning of Satan, Zhao reported that one of the soon-to-be Chinese Azharites 
accompanying them inquired “Why use different sized pillars to represent Satan’s size if we 
don’t know Satan’s size?’ He had asked some of the imams this question, but none had a 
satisfying answer! If this is an example of the pernicious habit (Ch. e’xi; Ar. bid‘a) of 
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preoccupation with material iconic likenesses, then we must get rid of it!”423 This statement 
prompted Zhao to recall a speech the imam Ma Zicheng had made at a Chengda graduation 
ceremony, in which he said (according to Zhao) “In the beginning the text was clear; men alone 
made it unclear! In the beginning the Sunna of the Prophet was easy to follow; strange customs 
alone made it treacherous!”424 In sum, Ma, Zhao, and their associates evidently felt that ‘Abdul 
‘Aziz and the Wahhabis had imposed a welcome measure of order and orthodoxy on the Hajj, 
and in some cases were even insisting that that process could be carried on further. 
Alternative conceptions of Islamic unity emerged in Cairo, where Ma and Zhao 
encountered Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, editor-in-chief of al-Fath. At 8:00p.m. on 10 January 
1933, Ma and Zhao attended a tea party hosted by the Society of the Straight Path (Jam‘iyyat al-
Sirat al-Mustaqim), where al-Khatib served as secretary. In addition to the members of the 
society, in attendance was Kamal Kassab, a Palestinian who had served as minister of education 
in Hijaz; the Azhar Sheikh Muhammad al-Khidr Hussein, a Tunisian; and ‘Abdullah bin Ahmad, 
a Hadrami. The specific topics of conversation are not known, but Zhao recorded that Muhibb al-
Din quoted Quran 21:92 (“Indeed this, your community, is one community”) and 49:10 (“Verily 
all the believers are brothers”), clarifying that this did not refer only to the Muslims of a 
particular place, but to Muslims everywhere. Al-Khatib continued: “Witness, here today at our 
gathering, we have Palestinians such as Kamal Kassab, Tunisians such as Sheikh al-Khidr 
Hussein, Syrians such as myself, Hadramis such as ‘Abdullah bin Ahmad, and Chinese such as 
these gentlemen [Did he learn their names?]. But, belonging to the same religion, we have 
                                                 
 





forgotten our differences of nationality and love one another as brothers.”425 Al-Khatib then 
made a point of drawing a comparison to the ansar who awaited and aided the muhajirin in 
Medina, commenting that “They did not see Mecca and Medina as separate places, because all 
they cared about was that they were the original companions of the Prophet.”426 Al-Khatib 
implied that the dynamic should be no different in the present between Muslims of various 
countries. 
Al-Khatib had shown interest in the Chinese Muslims from before Ma and Zhao’s 
journey. Zvi Ben-Dor Benite notes that al-Fath had published one short article titled “Islam in 
China,” probably authored by al-Khatib, in 1926, and another on the same topic by Dr. Khalid 
Sheldrake, the famous British convert to Islam, in 1929.427 Later, during the first year of the 
Chinese Azharites’ study in Egypt, al-Khatib had Ma Jian write a proper history and present 
description of Islam in China.428 Ma Jian continued his discussion in a front-page feature later 
that year.429 Thereafter, al-Khatib and Sheikh Ibrahim al-Jibali of al-Azhar encouraged Ma Jian 
to translate the Analects of Confucius into Arabic, and even published a biography in al-Fath 
calling him “the perfect Muslim.”430 Clearly, in other words, al-Khatib’s interest in Chinese 
Islam, for one, had already been primed well before Ma and Zhao’s arrival in Cairo on 1 January 
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1933. One additional point worth mentioning here is that, much like Abdul Wahid Aljelany in 
Singapore’s al-Huda, al-Khatib—and Ma Jian, with his encouragement—referred to their object 
not as “Chinese Islam” but as “Islam in China.”431 
In addition to al-Khatib’s textualist ecumenism, interwar Egypt contained other forms of 
advocating unity not entirely coterminous with Islam. For example, another figure who took 
interest in Ma and Zhao was Ahmad Zaki Pasha (1867-1934), a historian and philologist then 
serving as Egypt’s minister of education. In addition to his scholarship, including attendance at 
the International Congress of Orientalists, Ahmad Zaki Pasha was known for his pan-Arabism 
and pan-Easternism, and was the first secretary-general of the Society of the Eastern Bond 
(Jam‘iyyat al-Rabitah al-Sharqiyyah). This organization’s membership also included Rashid 
Rida, Ahmad Shafiq Pasha (1860-1940, first vice-president of the Egyptian University), Mustafa 
‘Abd al-Raziq, Sheikh Muhammad Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, and others. Its journal, al-Rabitah al-
Sharqiyyah, gave regular coverage not only to the Arab world but also to Asian countries 
including China, India, and Indonesia.432 In any case, Ma and Zhao were introduced to Ahmad 
Zaki Pasha by an Indian named Liyajuddin, and met the Egyptian official in his home. While the 
meeting was symbolically important, Zhao’s description makes it sound as though he and Ma 
were a bit beleaguered by Zaki Pasha’s loquaciousness: having hoped to ask him about education 
in Egypt, they instead sat through anecdotes about Chinese tea and other stories.433 
                                                 
431 One could argue quite reasonably that the phrase “Chinese Islam” (zhongguo huijiao) sounds more natural in 
Chinese, whereas the phrase “Islam in China” (al-Islam fi-l-Sin) sounds more natural in Arabic. On the other hand, 
the notion that Islam was the more fixed of the two categories—reflected in the Arabic but not the Chinese—
represents an instance of untranslatability that cohered with al-Khatib’s apparent belief in the fundamental unity of 
the umma. 
 
432 For example, “The Awakening of the Asian Peoples: The Russo-Japanese War – the nationalist movement in 
China: its evolution, stages, and victory – Nationalist movements in the Far East – The Asian Community” al-
Rabitah al-Sharqiyyah 1.2, pp. 1-6. 
 
433 Zhao, Xixing riji, pp. 70-71. 
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The most compelling rhetorical affirmation of Islamic unity came on 20 January 1933 
when King Fu’ad himself invited Ma, Zhao, and other Chinese Muslims in Cairo to attend the 
last jum‘a of Ramadan as his guests at the Mosque of ‘Amr (the oldest mosque in Egypt and in 
Africa) in Fustat. Zhao describes the scene as follows: 
We were with the other attendees from al-Azhar, so the usher seated us in the 
middle of the front row to the left of the mihrab. The position could not have been 
more central. A portion of the hall to the far right was partitioned with cloth to 
allow the women to pray.  
Every stratum of society was represented. Royal guards were stationed at 
each pillar, and black servants with spray bottles filled the hall with perfumes; 
several white-clad servants were burning sandalwood incense, moving about left 
and right in front of the mihrab, spreading the redolent fragrances.  
At 11:30, the reader (qari‘) began reciting from Surat al-Kahf. Then, at 
12:05, we heard a cannon blast, and counted along as it sounded twenty-one 
times. When it reached fourteen, the king entered to the accompaniment of 
military music, followed by a vast retinue. The congregants rose as he proceeded 
forward, and upon arriving before the mihrab he turned and bowed to the people, 
and then was seated… 
The king did not lead prayers himself, but rather appointed Sheikh al-
Alawi [?],a famous scholar of the Hanafi madhhab, seeing as the king is himself 
Hanafi. In Egypt, the Shafi‘i madhhab is more numerous, whereas the Hanafi is 
more powerful.  
Sheikh al-Alawi’s khutbah consisted of a reminder of the need for the 
unity of all believers, which he opened with the verse ‘Cling fast, ye one and all, 
and do not let go the great cord of God.’ The meaning of this verse is that all 
believers [Ch. mumin] must bring their hearts together in unity.434  
 
The scale and symbolic weight of this occasion are considerable, taking place during Ramadan in 
Egypt’s oldest mosque. Moreover, the very prominent position given to the Chinese Muslims at 
this most important of jum‘a prayers suggests that the monarchy and the clerical establishment 
                                                 
 
434 Ibid., pp. 64-65. Chinese Muslims had long been familiar with the verse from the khutbah from Al Imran (Quran 
3:103): “Cling fast, ye one and all, and do not let go the great cord of God.” As stated in Chapter Two, this verse 
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addition, Pang Shiqian quotes this same verse in the introduction to his Arabic work China and Islam as part of a 
larger discussion asserting that “What has happened to the Muslims in China is the same as what has happened to 
their brothers in all countries.” 
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could still derive a measure of legitimacy by presenting themselves not only as national rulers 
but as leading figures in transnational Islam.435  
The following day, 21 January 1933, Ma, Zhao, and two Chinese Azharites had the 
opportunity of an audience with King Fu’ad. Having arrived at Abdeen Palace at the appointed 
time, Ma Songting read a statement in Chinese:  
Your Royal Highness: We four represent Chinese Islamic Progress Association 
Director Muhammad Yusuf De Shan, Beiping Chengda Academy Board 
Chairman Imad al-Din Ma Hongkui, and Chengda Dean Muhammad Ali Tang 
Kesan. These three leaders in turn represent the sincere gratitude of China’s fifty 
million Muslims. We are indebted to Your Majesty for bestowing us this 
opportunity to be received in your presence, and are greatly honored. It is hard for 
us to remember a more auspicious occasion.  
We present you humble gifts, letters, and photographs on behalf of the 
three aforementioned leaders, so as to express the profound feeling your favor 
elicits among all the believers (mumin) in China, and our gratitude for hosting the 
first group of students from China to study at al-Azhar.  
We wish to say that Your Majesty is an example to posterity in terms of 
remembering Islam, and that this is truly a great boon to believers (mumin) 
everywhere, and for this reason we are emboldened this year to send a second 
group of students to undertake study at al-Azhar.436  
 
King Fu’ad agreed to accept new Chinese Azharites and to send Egyptian imams to China, with 
the stated purpose being “to assist our Chinese brethren in managing their religious affairs.”437  
 During a brief stop in Jerusalem, Ma and Zhao had a productive meeting with the grand 
mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who referred them to some contacts in the Hijaz (see later sections 
of this chapter as well as Chapter Six regarding Chinese Muslims’ interactions with al-Husayni). 
Ma and Zhao proceeded to Mecca, arriving in late February 1933. Early on, they paid a visit to 
the Saudi deputy minister of foreign affairs, Sulayman, introduced to them by al-Husayni. Zhao 
                                                 
435 Martin S. Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses (Columbia UP, 1986). Although the 
moment of the so-called Caliphate congresses had already faded by this point, such scenes recall the brief moment in 
1926 when Egyptians contemplated claiming leadership of a revived Caliphate. 
 
436 Zhao, Xixing riji, pp. 67-68. 
 
437 Ibid., p. 68. 
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says Sulayman “expressed disapproval upon hearing that we were visiting other countries…he 
said: ‘The purpose of the Hajj is to meet one’s Muslim brethren from all over the world in a 
single place; the customs, clothing, languages…each one is different. If you take care during 
your visit here, you can grasp the basic outline of Islam’s conditions in all places.’”438 
Sulayman’s primary concern was for the religious legitimacy of the new Saudi state, which had 
conquered the Hijaz in 1925 and only formed a unified country in 1932. Not yet entirely secure 
about Saudi rule over the Holy Cities, he undoubtedly wished to discourage visitors to the region 
from giving too much credence to alternative centers of Islamic authority. 
 Motives aside, however, Sulayman’s statement about the Hajj itself was not inaccurate as 
far as Ma and Zhao were concerned. It would be an understatement to say that the pilgrimage 
clearly held emotional weight. After journeying from Mina to Mount Arafat on 4 April, Ma, 
Zhao, and the approximately sixty Chinese Hajjis that year found their tent, marked with a green 
flag and the flag of the Republic of China. There they held a special prayer: “Once we had 
completed the salat al-‘asr, the lead Chinese Hajji conducted all the Chinese pilgrims, with our 
faces turned in the direction of the ka‘ba, in a specially long prayer, including the tawbah and 
others, to the point that everyone became hoarse and tears streamed down their faces.”439 That 
night, they joined their coreligionists gazing at the night sky and gathering pebbles for the 
stoning of the Devil. Returning from Mount Arafat to Mina, they recounted the tale of Abraham 
and Ishmael, dwelling on Abraham’s unwavering faith in God and refusal to be deterred by 
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Satan. Zhao was moved to comment: “I think Sima Qian’s Shiji or Columbus’s discovery of the 
New World do not compare with this story.”440 
In addition to completing the ritual stations, Ma and Zhao also continued (as Sulayman 
promised) to encounter fellow Muslims from several countries, particularly Indians and Jawis. 
On 9 April, during Eid al-Adha, a Jawi youth named Abdul Wahid Hassan stopped them, having 
found information on their journey in Egyptian and Palestinian newspapers. Zhao agreed to meet 
with him the following day, at which time Zhao told him about “Chinese Muslims’ current 
conditions and about old and new educational circumstances, specifically about the Chengda, 
Wanxian, Mingde, Xiejin, and Beiping Xibei Gongxue”; he also told him about Chinese Muslim 
social conditions and publications. Abdul Wahid then told Zhao that educational reform and the 
division between old and new was very similar in Java, and noted that the overseas Chinese 
(huaqiao) in Java “love Islam and want Chinese Muslims to come to Java to help them 
convert.”441 While it would appear that Ma and Zhao were occasionally taken aback by the 
enthusiasm of perfect strangers, such serendipitous encounters no doubt contributed as much if 
not more than formal events to their perception of the interconnectedness of the Islamic world. 
 Ma and Zhao’s Hajj, of course, also carried direct implications for the status of Islam in 
China. Under normal circumstances, Republican-era Chinese Muslim elites generally only went 
abroad with the intention of returning to China. Zhao Zhenwu’s purchase of the Arabic type is 
the most obvious example, for (as argued in Chapter Two), it enabled not only Yuehua, but also 
government organs such as the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, to print in Arabic. The 
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other effect of Ma and Zhao’s journey, however, was to lay a groundwork of personal 
connections that benefitted Chinese Muslim diplomatic efforts during the war with Japan. 
 
The Wartime Delegations: Propaganda, Espionage, Fraternity, Performance 
 
During China’s war with Japan, elite Chinese Muslims’ narrative of Islam’s peacefulness and 
contributions to China, the origins and pre-war development of which were detailed in Chapters 
Two and Three, now took on a clear new significance. The Chinese Islamic National Salvation 
Federation (Zhongguo huijiao jiuguo xiehui), established in Wuhan in October 1938 as Muslim 
leaders retreated inland with the GMD government, produced numerous publications that 
tirelessly reiterated this narrative of contribution and highlighted example after example of 
Muslims’ support for China’s war effort. 
As importantly, the National Salvation Federation coordinated a number of concrete 
wartime initiatives involving high-profile Chinese Muslims. One set of initiatives was the little-
known “Northwest Propaganda Corps” (Xibei xuanchuan tuan), sometimes also called 
“Northwest Morale Corps” (Xibei xuanwei tuan) organized apparently in 1937, 1938, and 
1939.442 On 21 September 1938, in one of the better-documented occasions, one of these 
Northwest Propaganda Corps under one Wang Yuebo worked with military officials in Xi’an 
under General Jiang Dingwen to organize an event at Revolution Park in Xi’an, claimed to have 
been attended by 50,000 people. It was an excellent photo opportunity, with images published in 
Dongfang huakan along with Chinese and English captions. Speeches were delivered, slogans 
were chanted. Sun Jinyun, representing the Muslims of the Northwest, gave an address 
“explaining the significance of the occasion.” After that, Wang’s speech declared that “the 
                                                 
 
442 The sources are not clear on how many of these there were. The ZGHJJDFWTRJ and other private materials refer 
to them at various points, but not always in a manner that allows them to be pinpointed chronologically.  
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Chinese Mohammedans of the Northwest would never become tools of the aggressor.” Finally, 
Da Pusheng—who had just opened his Islamic school in nearby Pingliang, and who was 
identified in Dongfang huakan as a “leader of the local Mohammedans”—offered a “prayer for 
an early Chinese victory” before the assembled crowd. A flag exchange ceremony also took 
place: one silk banner with an Arabic inscription and GMD sun-and-sky emblem was presented 
to the officials of the Northwest Propaganda Corps, while four similar silk banners were 
presented “by the Muslims of the Northwest” to General Jiang, all accompanied by a military 
band before a “saluting audience.” The event closed with a parade through the city. In the 
meantime, “propagandistic literature” was produced for those in attendance, featuring the GMD 
emblem and Quranic excerpts such as 2:190 (“Fight in the way of God those who fight against 
you, but do not commit excesses”), 2:194 (“Whoever has assaulted you, assault him in the same 
way”), and 2:216 (“Fighting has been enjoined upon you though it be hateful to you”), written in 
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IMAGE 1: Dongfang huakan’s coverage of the 21 September 1938 Northwest Propaganda Corps 
event in Xi’an. Clockwise from top left: Wang Yuebo of Northwest Propaganda Corps receiving 
flag with Arabic inscription and GMD emblem; bilingual propaganda materials with Quranic 
excerpts; parade; Da Pusheng leading the “victory prayer.” Source: Dongfang huakan. 
 
 
While all that was taking place, the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation was 
also organizing diplomatic missions of Chinese Muslims (in many cases, members of the 
diplomatic missions would participate in the Northwest Propaganda Corps upon returning to 
China). The first diplomatic initiative, known as the Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation 
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(Zhongguo huijiao jindong fangwentuan), took shape in Nanjing in November 1937, only a 
matter of weeks before the city’s fall. The Near East Delegation originally planned to be abroad 
for six months, but noted that “if necessary, the time can be extended mid-journey.”444 The total 
eventually reached over fourteen months (26 November 1937 to 25 January 1939). The 
delegation’s stated purpose was to “propagandize our country’s resolve in the War of Resistance, 
to oppose all forms of Japanese imperialism, to articulate the important status of our Chinese 
Muslim brethren in China, and to bear the great responsibility of saving our nation from 
destruction.”445 In 1942, Tang Kesan summarized the mission felt that the mission had been a 
success, and summarized it as follows: 
Some Muslim countries of the Near East did not yet understand clearly China’s 
cause in the war…Due to the fact that China has fifty million Muslims and that 
we share a common set of beliefs, we felt that the Muslim countries of the Middle 
East should be sympathetic to us, and appreciate what we had to say if we were to 
impress upon them China’s cause in this War of Resistance. In an attempt to 
thwart the Japanese barbarians’ [wokou; derogatory] despicable conspiracies, we 
organized a “Near East goodwill delegation” to raise awareness among the 
countries of the Near East and to carry out propaganda [toward them] [dao qi 
jindong ge guo, congshi xuanchuan].446 
 
The Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation published a detailed diary and report 
of the Near East Delegation’s activities in 1941-42.447 These materials, accounting for every 
single day abroad in over six hundred pages, accomplished much more than simply informing 
the government that the missions had been completed successfully. They also provided an 
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opportunity to reinforce in no uncertain terms that loyalty to China formed a distinctive and 
integral component of Chinese Muslims’ identity. That is, they were a “large and important 
portion of the Chinese nation, who are ordinarily law-abiding and have no quarrel with anyone,” 
were acting “under the guidance of the central government” in order to “unify hearts and minds” 
and “win the support of Muslim countries” for China’s cause in the war.448 An early public 
statement by the delegation, later republished as a preface to its diary, felt obliged to add that 
“Muslims in all parts of occupied North China are bravely rising up [against the enemy].”449 As 
Yufeng Mao points out, this statement even distanced Chinese Muslims from Mongolians, 
Manchus, and Tibetans, alleging that these groups either had ignobly accepted Japanese 
occupation or lived too far from the coast to make a difference in the war, asking rhetorically 
“Who could [sic] carry the grave responsibility of saving [the nation] and ensuring [its] survival? 
Only the Han and the Hui.”450 Even before they set sail, the delegation helped give leading 
Chinese Muslims the political legitimacy to make such assertions, some of which were contrary 
to fact.451 The statement further noted that “For over twenty years, Japan has focused 
considerable attention on Muslims, sending emissaries, some of whom falsely converted to 
Islam. They infiltrated the Northwest, living alongside Muslims there, always acting deceitfully 
to realize a sinister plot. Muslims, however, patriotically refused to accept any of this. After the 
Mukden Incident of 1931, the Japanese even formed an Islamic association at Changchun, 
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pressuring Muslims of the Northeast to join. The Northeast Muslims swallowed this insult, 
wrongfully accepting the plan under Japanese oppression.”452 
Again, personnel was policy. The Near East Delegation’s five members were carefully 
chosen wealthy, worldly, and well-connected Chinese Muslims from the urban coastal regions, 
members or allies of the GMD party and government, and supporters of Chinese Muslims’ 
modernist movement. Highly educated and articulate, and exceedingly genteel in their writing 
(even when composing in a second, third, or fourth language), they embodied a gentlemanly 
Islam that formed an important component of the “public Islam” that served the Chinese 
Muslims well in numerous contexts. 
The delegation leader, Wang Zengshan (1903-61), son of an old Muslim family of 
Linqing, Shandong, graduated from Beijing’s Yenching (Yanjing) University, and then 
proceeded to study abroad in Turkey at the University of Istanbul in the mid-1920s. This period, 
of course, was the height of Ataturk’s virulently anti-Islamic and anti-traditionalist reforms—a 
time when most foreign Muslim students were beginning to avoid study in Istanbul, its madrasa 
system abolished by the new nationalist state. Chiang Kai-shek, the GMD, and even some of its 
elite Chinese Muslim allies, however, admired Turkey’s “successful modernization,” and 
disregarded or failed to recognize the anti-Islamic character of the reforms. Upon returning, 
Wang served several years as a government official in Xinjiang, evidently applying his 
knowledge of Turkish (and perhaps contacts made in Istanbul as well). He also became a 
member of the GMD government’s Legislative Council.453 As Mao notes, in 1931 Wang 
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accompanied Dai Jitao, president of the GMD Examination Yuan and a major advocated of the 
integration of frontier peoples, on a tour of Xinjiang.454 When not in Xinjiang, he was also active 
in the new capital, Nanjing, where he published the pro-government periodicals Zhongguo 
huijiao qingnian xuehui huibao (Chinese Muslim Youth Society Bulletin, 1936-37) and Huijiao 
qingnian yuebao (Muslim Youth Monthly, 1936-37). Early in the war, the second bulletin was 
renamed Huijiao qingnian (1938-47) and published by Shi Juemin from Lanzhou, Gansu, 
including sections in Arabic and Turkish meant to educate local Muslims in patriotism and the 
“Three Principles of the People”—part of the government’s wartime Sinicization efforts directed 
at frontier Muslims (see Chapter Two).455 Wang’s knowledge of Turkish and experience in the 
Middle East were cited as the reason for his selection as head of the Near East delegation.456 
Immediately before or during the delegation’s mission, Wang became a member of the Chinese 
Islamic National Salvation Federation, along with two other delegation members—and, again, 
many of the Chinese Muslims’ most prominent military, political, religious, intellectual, and 
communal leaders.457 He was also listed as a member of Chen Lifu’s Frontier Cultural Progress 
Association, along with many of the same figures from the National Salvation Federation as well 
                                                 
454 Mao, “Muslim Vision,” p. 385. Mao adds that this visit to Xinjiang resulted in about a dozen Uyghur Muslim 
youths being recruited to study in Nanjing. As we saw in Chapter Two, bringing frontier students to study in the 
Han-dominated coastal regions was an important integrationist strategy on the part of the GMD government. On 
Dai’s work with Tibetan Buddhists, see Tuttle, Tibetan Buddhists. 
 
455 The front cover of the Chinese Muslim Youth Society Bulletin featured Quran 9:41.  
 
456 Tang Kesan, foreword to ZGHJJDFWTRJ. 
 
457 Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing) 五 (2) – 130. Again, the leadership of the Chinese Islamic 
National Salvation Federation was as follows: (1) President: Bai Chongxi (2) Directors: Tang Kesan, Sun Shengwu, 
Shi Zizhou, and Ma Liang (3) Supervisors: Da Pusheng, Wang Jingzhai, Ha Decheng, and Ma Songting, the “Four 
Great Imams” (4) Managers: Ma Tianying; Zhang Zhaoli; Ai Yizai, a patron of the Muslim community of Beijing; 
Bai Shouyi; Wang Mengyang and Li Tingbi, both authors and editors for Yuehua; Shi Juemin, associate of Wang 
Zengshan and editor-in-chief of his Nanjing-then-Lanzhou-based Chinese Muslim Youth Society Bulletin; and 
several Chinese Azharites including Sha Guozhen (head of the Chinese Azhar missions), Na Zhong (a prolific 
Yunnanese translator), and Ding Zhongming (future Taiwanese ambassador to Libya).  
 254 
as several leading Han government officials (see Chapter Two).458 After returning from his work 
with the Near East delegation, Wang was again stationed in Urumqi as head of the GMD 
government’s Xinjiang Civilian Affairs Bureau (Xinjiang sheng minzheng ting).459 
The Near East Delegation’s vice president was Ma Tianying (1900-1982). Born in 
Beijing, but also of an old Shandong Muslim lineage, Ma was a prominent businessman and 
scholar. He was educated at the College Français de Pekin and pursued further study in Paris.460 
After returning to China, he worked from 1923 to 1931 as a supply manager on the Longhai 
Railway at Xuzhou and Haizhou, the line’s eastern terminus near Shanghai (see Chapter Two).461 
After that, he was based primarily in Shanghai, where he worked as a teacher at the Nieh Chich 
Kuei Public School and helped Da Pusheng and Ha Decheng organize protests in response to the 
Islamophobic materials published in the non-Muslim Chinese press (see Chapter Three).462 
Yufeng Mao states that the Near East Delegation was Ma’s idea, proposed to the GMD 
government and Muslim leaders in fall 1937.463 Like Wang Zengshan, Ma became a member of 
the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation by virtue of his work with the delegation. 
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After returning from the Near East Delegation, Ma was a member of the Northwest Propaganda 
Corps (Xibei xuanchuan tuan), which attempted to boost support for the war effort across the 
Northwest, and which Chiang Kai-shek briefly joined in person. From late 1939 to early 1941, 
Ma led the Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation, whose purpose was also to propagandize 
China’s cause in the war in neutral Muslim countries, and to seek wartime medical aid (see end 
of Chapter Three). Like Wang Zengshan, Ma continued working as a GMD official after the war, 
in this case as the new consul-general in Ipoh, Malaysia.  
The remaining members were less prominent but still significant. The third was Zhang 
Zhaoli, also a member of the National Salvation Federation, and an occasional author for Yuehua 
and other Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese publications.464 The fourth was Xue Wenbo, a more 
frequent contributor to Yuehua, and a consistent supporter of frontier development who had 
spend considerable time promoting GMD and Chinese Muslim modernist agendas in the 
Northwest.465 The fifth was Wang Shiming, a Chinese Azharite and former Chengda student who 
had traveled to Egypt with Ma Songting and Zhao Zhenwu in 1932, and joined the Near East 
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Delegation from there. Wang was selected in particular for his “mastery of Arabic.”466 After five 
years in Egypt, his conversational abilities far exceeded those of any of the other four delegation 
members, making him an indispensable asset.467 
In addition to these five, two other leading Chinese Muslims temporarily joined the Near 
East Delegation from Egypt, remaining with the group through their Hajj in February 1938. The 
first was Da Pusheng. Da, already sixty-one years old, had escaped the Japanese invasion, taking 
a loan of 3,000 yuan and leaving the country by himself in December 1937. Like Wang 
Zengshan and Ma Tianying, Da had heard that Japan was dispatching propaganda agents to the 
Islamic world, and was determined to counter it. In addition to the Hajj, he stopped in Egypt and 
India to argue China’s case in the war. Upon returning to China, he coordinated directly with 
Chiang Kai-shek to reopen his defunct Shanghai Islamic Normal School in Pingliang, Gansu (see 
Chapter Two).468 The second was Sha Guozhen of Yunnan’s Mingde Upper School, leader of the 
Chinese dormitory (riwaq) at al-Azhar in Cairo from 1931, who used his position as leader of the 
Chinese Azharites to propagandize in Arabic about China’s cause against Japan, both after the 
Mukden Incident in September 1931, and again after returning from his Hajj.469 
The Near East Delegation members were of course all Muslims, but they were also all 
fundamentally political actors fulfilling a political role. Personal piety and early education aside, 
                                                 
466 ZGHJJDFWTRJ, pp. 58-59; Mao, “Muslim Vision,” p. 382.  
 
467 Xue Wenbo admitted as much when they picked up Wang Shiming in Suez: ZGHJJDFWTRJ, p. 70. 
 
468 Da Jie, “Da Pusheng ahong zhuanlue.” 
 
469 Muhammad Ibrahim Shah Kwujin [a.k.a. Sha Guozhen], “Burkan al-sharq al-aqsa kama yusawwiruhu ahad al-
Siniyyin [The Cauldron of the Far East, as Described by a Chinese],” al-Ma'rifa al-Masriyya, 1 November 1932, pp. 
1329-30; “Risalat muslimi al-Sin ila muslimi al-‘alam ‘an haqa’iq al-harb al-siniyya al-yabaniyya al-qa’ima [A 
Letter from the Muslims of China to the Muslims of the World on the Facts of the Present Sino-Japanese War],” al-
Risala, 23 May 1938, p. 870-71. 
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they were not trained as imams or ulama. Though highly knowledgeable of the affairs of Chinese 
and global Islam and frequent commentators thereupon, they were not experts in a formal 
religious or academic sense. Even Wang Shiming, despite being trained at Chengda and al-
Azhar, became a GMD diplomat at the first Chinese consulate in Saudi Arabia in the early 
1940s.470 Indeed, the GMD and National Salvation Federation may have been wary of staffing 
the Near East Delegation with “religious” personnel. It is ironic, therefore, that this delegation as 
well as the later Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation consistently identified themselves to 
various authorities abroad as a “religious and not a political delegation.” In truth it was the 
opposite. As the Near East Delegation’s own statements as well as its members’ careers plainly 
show, the purpose of the mission was to build upon or appeal to sentiments of Islamic solidarity 
in order to make an argument on behalf of China’s national interests. Such activities paid 
dividends for their own relationships with the GMD government, as well as for the sociopolitical 
security of Muslims in China.471 
                                                 
470 Wang’s statement on Quran translation in Chapter One suggests that he may have been more interested in 
“politics” than “religion” from the beginning. 
 
471 The GMD government, specifically Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Lifu, sponsored equivalent initiatives by Chinese 
Buddhists toward India. In 1939, Zhu Jiahua (1893-1963), a member of the GMD Central Executive Committee and 
chair of the Sino-Indian Cultural Society, met Jawaharlal Nehru during the latter’s visit to China. In October of that 
year, Zhu and Chen Lifu wrote to Chiang Kai-shek arguing that the Sino-Indian Cultural Society could be used as a 
“‘front organization’ to promote contacts between the GMD and the [Indian National Congress] ‘through seemingly 
benign religious, academic and educational exchanges.’” Shortly thereafter, the Buddhist monk Taixu undertook a 
government-sponsored “goodwill mission” to India similar to that of the Chinese Muslims. Tansen Sen, India, 
China, and the World: A Connected History (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), p. 312; Brian Tsui, “The 
Plea for Asia—Tan Yunshan, Pan-Asianism, and Sino-Indian Relations,” China Report: A Journal of East Asian 
Studies 46.4 (November 2010): p. 356. As Sen notes, the document in question is introduced in Brian Tsui, “China’s 
Forgotten Revolution: Radical Conservatism in Action, 1925-1949,” (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2013), 
p. 242. Materials regarding GMD-sponsored Buddhist delegations to India and the South Seas can be found at 
Academia Sinica’s Modern History Archive: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collection 020-019908-0001 (the 1940 
mission) and 11-29-19-05-004 (the 1944-45 mission also involving Taixu).  
Taixu’s career and writings suggest that the GMD government saw him as playing an analogous role vis-à-
vis Tibet to that of the Chinese Muslim elites vis-à-vis the Northwest and Xinjiang. Many of Taixu’s writings were 
published by the Nanjing-based Xin Yaxiya (“New Asia”) group, a major node of pro-government intellectual 
production regarding China’s frontiers that, among other materials, also published Tang Kesan’s Fu Kang riji (Diary 
of a Journey to Kham, 1934; see Chapter Two). 
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Actual pay mattered as well. According to documents from the GMD Ministry of 
Defense, each member of the Near East Delegation received funds to cover accomodations (600 
yuan each for Wang Zengshan and Ma Tianying, 400 each for Xue Wenbo and Zhang Zhaoli), 
steamer passage from Hong Kong (400 yuan each), clothing (550 yuan each; they usually wore 
matching white linen suits and fez-style hats featuring a star and crescent), “guest expenditures” 
(1170 each, except for Wang Shiming, 810; presumably to cover meals or tea with those they 
met), and living stipends (2000 for Ma, 1500 each for Xue and Zhang, 800 for Wang Shiming; 
Wang Zengshan apparently elected to forego his living stipend). The total, then, was 2,720 yuan 
for Wang Zengshan, 4,720 for Ma, 4,020 each for Xue and Zhang, and 2,160 for Wang Shiming, 
or 17,640 yuan for the five men combined.472 These were large sums for individuals at the time, 
but small compared to the GMD government’s other wartime expenditures.473 
The delegation used their long stretches of time at sea to prepare propaganda materials in 
Arabic, English, and Turkish, which they then published upon arrival in the relevant countries.474 
Based on what is known of the delegation members’ language skills, the lead authors must have 
been Wang Shiming for the Arabic, Ma Tianying for the English, and Wang Zengshan for the 
Turkish, though the five men undoubtedly conferred on all versions prior to their publication. 
Ostensibly intended to convey identical information about China’s war with Japan and Chinese 
Muslims’ role therein, the three versions in fact display considerable discrepancies. Wang 
                                                 
 
472 “Zhongguo huijiao jindong fangwentuan jianyi shu [Policy Recommendations of the Chinese Islamic Near East 
Delegation] (May 1939),” KMT Archives, Ministry of Defense Collection 003/824. 
 
473 Mitter, China’s War with Japan. 
 
474 The Arabic version was printed by the well-known publishing house of ‘Isa al-Babi al-Halabi in Cairo; the 
Turkish version was printed Alaeddin Kiral Basimevi in Ankara; the English version was probably printed in India, 
but this was not specified in the surviving materials.  
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Shiming’s Arabic version opened with a bismillah and referred to the Near East Delegation as a 
“Chinese Islamic fraternal delegation” (ba‘that al-ikha’ al-islamiyya al-siniyya). The text 
provided a lengthy exposition of Islam’s arrival in China by the land and sea routes; of Islam’s 
subsequent history in China; and of the present conditions of Islam in China, including 
“expanding and reforming education,” “strengthening relations with Muslims of the world,” 
“publishing periodicals,” “translating the Quran,” “uniting Muslims in China,” and “[promoting] 
Muslim youth activities.” Wang did not address China’s present situation or the war with Japan 
until the eleventh page. This prioritization bears the imprint of Wang’s time at al-Azhar, which 
above all stressed Islamic educational reform and Muslims’ cooperation. Wang’s Arabic version 
also closed with a discussion, absent from the other versions, of “what Chinese Muslims 
anticipate after the war,” which included both more equal representation in China and expanded 
relations with Muslims outside China.475  
By contrast, Ma Tianying’s English version appealed strongly to Islamic fraternity, but 
less so to Islamic “religion” per se. Ma appears to have modeled the text on Indian Muslims’ 
English writings, employing phrases such as the “call to world Muslims” and the “brillian[ce] of 
Islam in the Far East.” Unlike the Arabic version, Ma’s English text provided only a three-
paragraph survey of Islam’s past and present in China before turning to the war with Japan at the 
bottom of the second page, and continued on that theme for the remaining five pages, stressing 
especially Chinese Muslims’ sacrifices in the war. Citing Quran 2:190 (“Fight in the way of God 
those who fight against you, but do not commit excesses”), Ma distinguished between China’s 
                                                 
475 Wang Shiming et al., “Risalat ba‘that al-ikha’ al-islamiyya al-siniyya ila al-‘alam al-islami ‘an al-islam wa-l-
muslimin fi-l-sin [Letter of the Chinese Islamic Fraternal Delegation to the Islamic World Regarding Islam and 
Muslims in China] (1938),” filed with “Policy Recommendations Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation (May 
1939),” KMT Party Archives (Taipei), Ministry of Defense Collection 003/824. 
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defensive resistance struggle versus Japan’s war of aggression: “We are within the limits, but 
Japan is over the limits.” In addition, the businessman Ma warned his English-speaking readers 
that Japan planned to prey upon world markets “by pushing out her cheap but un-durble goods,” 
calling upon them to produce domestically and boycott Japanese-manufactured products.476  
Wang Zengshan’s Turkish version fell between the Arabic and English in terms of its 
attention to the war. It also presented the Chinese Muslims most overtly as representatives of the 
Chinese nation, and that Chinese nation as one where Islam and Muslims were important but 
subordinate. This version printed side-by-side official portraits of Sun Yat-sen, Lin Sen, Chiang 
Kai-shek, Bai Chongxi, and the Near East Delegation members, something the other versions 
appear not to have done. At the same time, however, it identified the delegation members using 
entirely Turkified versions of their names: Celâleddin Vanzinšan, Ibrahim Matienyin, Davud 
Šuevinpo, Yusuf Cancaoli, and Saad Vanšimin. Unlike the Arabic, but like the English, the 
Turkish text did not begin with a bismillah, but opened only with “Dear Coreligionists” (sayin 
dindaslar).477 
The delegation’s written propaganda materials were not limited to the above. In May 
1938, toward the end of their stay in Cairo, the delegation learned of the opening of the Tokyo 
Mosque that same month, a project supported by the Central Asian Islamic activists Abdürrešid 
Ibrahim (1853-1944) and Muhammaed Abdülhay Kurban Ali (a.k.a. M.G. Kurban Galiev, 1892-
1972).478 The delegation rushed to produce a letter in Arabic, which noted that some dignitaries 
                                                 
476 Ma Tianying et al., “The Call to World Muslims from China, with Compliments of Chinese Muslim Near-East 
Goodwill Mission (1938),” p. 5, filed with “Policy Recommendations Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation (May 
1939),” KMT Party Archives (Taipei), Ministry of Defense Collection 003/824. 
 
477 Celâleddin Vanzinšan [a.k.a. Wang Zengshan] et al., “Çin Müslümanlari – Yakm Šark Muhadenet Heyeti [The 
Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation] (1938),” filed with “Policy Recommendations Chinese Islamic Near East 
Delegation (May 1939),” KMT Party Archives (Taipei), Ministry of Defense Collection 003/824. 
 
478 Esenbel, “Japan’s Global Claim”; Hammond, “Conundrum of Collaboration,” pp. 195-96. 
 261 
from around the Islamic world had attended the mosque’s opening ceremony. Reiterating the 
warning that Japan’s overtures to Islam and Muslims were cynically motivated and imperialistic, 
the letter stressed that “the Japanese cling categorically to their pagan faith and Buddhist 
traditions (mutamassikun bi-dianatihim al-wathniyya wa taqalidihim al-budhiyya kull al-
tamassuk), and accept no religious doctrines other than this.” From here, the letter appealed to its 
readers on the basis that Islam was “a religion of moderation (din mu‘tadil)” and a “straight path 
that aids the downtrodden (sirat mustaqim yusa‘id al-mustad‘afin)” and “treats people with 
justice and equality (al-‘adl wa-l-musawa).” As such, it was inherently opposed to colonialism, 
which it said Japan was practicing.479 
Quite separately from these determined multilingual appeals, the Near East Delegation’s 
representation of its own propaganda activities itself performed a propagandistic function toward 
the GMD government and China’s Muslims. In April 1939, after returning to China, Wang 
Zengshan wrote a letter to Chiang Kai-shek to provide a concluding report on the delegation’s 
work. He summarized the delegation’s accomplishments as “rectification of mentalities (xinli 
gaizheng), rectification of public opinion (yulun gaizheng), [encouraging] of sympathy for our 
country’s war of resistance, [encouraging] boycott of Japanese goods, collection of medical 
donations, calling upon organizations, explaining our country’s needs in the war of resistance to 
dignitaries and youths in all countries, establishing a Sino-Egyptian Cultural Association (Zhong-
Ai wenhua xiehui), and establishing relations between our country and the countries of the 
                                                 
 
479 “Zhongguo huijiao jindong fangwentuan wei dongjing jianzhu qingzhensi kaimu dianli gao shijie huimin shu 
(alabowen) [The Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation Message to the World’s Muslims Regarding the Opening of 
the Tokyo Mosque (in Arabic)] a.k.a. “Ba‘that al-ikha’ al-islamiyya al-siniyya ila al-mamalik al-islamiyya [Letter 
from the Chinese Islamic Fraternal Delegation to the Islamic Countries] (May 1938).” Filed with “Policy 
Recommendations Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation (May 1939),” KMT Party Archives (Taipei), Ministry of 
Defense Collection 003/824. 
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Middle East.480 While the delegation did indeed undertake all these activities and even saw some 
bear fruit, the list is somewhat redundant, and, strictly speaking, does not establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the delegation fundamentally altered the course of China’s war effort. The 
claim that the delegation successfully changed people’s minds was particularly generous, and on 
the whole is not supported by Xue Wenbo’s descriptions of the delegation’s meetings. In general, 
those who already sympathized with China continued to do so, and those who did not may have 
engaged in protracted discussions but did not clearly change their positions. The claim of having 
“rectified mentalities” was, rather, primarily an attempt to affirm to Chiang Kai-shek and the 
GMD government that foreign Muslims accepted the delegation as representing the Muslims of 
China and, on that basis, that the delegation was capable of influencing the opinions of those 
foreign Muslims. Indeed, the main concrete accomplishment of the delegation was merely to 
gain the GMD government’s approval to continue its propaganda activities. Wang’s letter asks 
Chiang Kai-shek to form a “Near East cultural association” (Jindong wenhua xiehui) that could 
“print Arabic and Turkish periodicals in order to connect our country with the countries of the 
Near East…and propagandize based on the current conditions of the war of resistance (yi 
goutong woguo yu jindong ge guo jian zhi wenhua…ji xuanchuan kangzhan shikuang).” It is 
unclear whether the GMD government formed a Near East cultural association, but the Chinese 
Muslims in Chongqing did continue disseminating propaganda in Arabic and other languages, 
both in writing and by radio broadcast.481 
                                                 
480 By contrast, as Kelly Hammond has shown, the Japanese-sponsored Hajj delegation, though less well-
credentialed both religiously and politically than the GMD-sponsored delegation, nevertheless helped set in motion 
Saudi Arabia’s granting Japan an oil concession. Hammond, “Conundrum of Collaboration,” pp. 197-98. 
 
481 Wang Zengshan to Chiang Kai-shek, “Guofang zuigao weiyuanhui: Zhongguo huijiao jindong fangwentuan 
baogaoshu [Supreme Committee for National Defense: Report of the Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation] (May 
1939).” Filed with “Policy Recommendations Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation (May 1939),” KMT Party 
Archives (Taipei), Ministry of Defense Collection 003/824. 
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Unsurprisingly, the Near East Delegation’s journey itself brought far more ambiguities, 
curiosities, vicissitudes, and impromptu exchanges than its propaganda would suggest. Despite 
the ostensible single-mindedness of their mission, the delegation members could not help but 
exhibit some excitement, even in their official diary, at this opportunity for sustained contact 
with the peoples of the Islamic world—in their words, “court and commoners” (chaoye renshi) 
alike. They meant this literally: among others, they held meetings with members of the Alsagoff 
family, an Indian Ocean commercial empire and patriarch of the Singapore Hadrami community; 
King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Saud, king of Saudi Arabia; and Hajj Amin al-Husayni, grand mufti of 
Jerusalem; they also attempted to meet with Muhammad Ali Jinnah, future president of Pakistan. 
At the same time, the diary also recorded their interactions with longshoremen, drivers, students, 
and various other “ordinary” people from each country they visited. Meeting with Muslim heads 
of state clearly served the delegation’s performative, charismatic function with respect to the 
GMD government and other Chinese audiences, demonstrating spectacularly that Chinese 
Muslim leaders were indeed respected and respectable enough to command the attention of such 
powerful and illustrious figures. Relatedly, such meetings also implied a strong statement to the 
various communities of Muslims in China, that the elite Chinese Muslims allied to the GMD 
were the sole legitimate representatives of Islam in China to both the government and the 
world’s Muslims.  
 
The Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation in the World 
Meanwhile, however, the Near East Delegation’s interactions with ordinary people are more 
difficult to explain solely in terms of the war with Japan or Chinese Muslims’ relations with the 
Chinese state. It is hard not to conclude that, in spite of themselves and their politics, they were 
simply happy to be where they were, meeting the umma face to face. The “commoners” across 
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the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia tended to treat the delegation members in a 
friendly and welcoming manner. For many, the war, which had not yet broken out in Europe or 
North Africa, was for the time being an afterthought. Correspondingly, the delegation did not in 
fact spend all of its hours and days abroad trying to convince them otherwise. Indeed, they 
seemed to discuss the conflict with Japan somewhat less as their journey wore on. Moreover, the 
journalists, students, workers, and several non-Muslim expatriates they encountered, either 
through planned, semi-planned, or unplanned meetings, tended to view them as representatives 
of the very same Islamic and Easternist solidarities they thought they were instrumentalizing.  
Despite his fervent anti-Japanese positions, Ma Tianying kept an autograph book 
throughout the delegation’s journey (and continued to do so when he led the South Seas 
Delegation) that attests to the diverse ways in which the delegation was received and perceived. 
Among his Chinese Muslim associates and admirers, Ma even went by the nickname “Mister 
Awaken-the-East” (xingdong xiansheng).482 The earliest autographs came from the delegations’ 
Chinese Muslim associates themselves. On the first page, Wang Jingzhai left Ma some elegant 
calligraphic exhortations that speak to the multiple moral and political levels on which the 
delegation operated: “Protect the nation and love the faith (huguo aijiao), do not lag behind 
others (bu luo renhou), make friends and stand up for righteousness (jiaoyou zhong yi), continue 
always seeking knowledge (qiuzhi you heng).” The first phrase alludes to the Hadith “Patriotism 
is an article of faith (hubb al-watan min al-iman), which Wang Jingzhai is credited with having 
translated into Chinese; the last echoes and inverts the (doubted) Hadith “Seeketh knowledge 
even unto China (utlub al-‘ilm walaw bi-l-Sin).” Several significant figures were among those 
                                                 
482 Digital copies of the autograph book’s pages are available in Ma Tianying Papers, Centre for Malaysian Chinese 
Studies (Kuala Lumpur), Personal Collection, MTY.C4.1. 
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who signed the book and offered their well-wishes: Khalid Sheldrake, the famous British convert 
to Islam; the assistant to the private secretary of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz; and the Chinese Azharites’ 
Arabic instructor, Muhammad al-Zifzaf, who had also met Ma Songting and Zhao Zhenwu in 
1933.483 Several Chinese Azharites also contributed Arabic and Chinese inscriptions. The words 
of anonymous strangers, however, were perhaps the most telling. Some focused on the war, 
while others viewed the delegation more in Islamic or anticolonial terms, or a mix of these. 
Abdul Rahman Siddiqi of Calcutta wrote in English, “If there are a dozen men like Ibrahim [Ma 
Tianying] in China, Japan will be drowned in the Pacific Ocean and China will become the 
leader of Asia and the whole world.”484 An Indian named Ajit Mukherji wrote, also in English, 
“If China becomes really free from the foreign devils, India cannot long remain a slave.”485 
Meanwhile, a nurse named J. Thompson, stationed in Lahore, wrote in English expressing what 
could be subtle skepticism of the delegation’s propagandizing: “Wish you the best of luck in 
your Sino-Japanise [sic] War.”486 Others still saw the delegation primarily in terms of Islamic 
unity and solidarity: with no mention of the war, Mohamed Massoud of Rod-el-Farag, Cairo, 
wrote in Arabic that “I thank God for the opportunity to have met these great leaders of the youth 
of China, [and hope] your delegation’s concerted efforts will result in the strengthening of 
relations between Chinese Muslims and the Muslims of Egypt and the Near East.”487 In addition 
to collecting autographs, the delegation also bestowed gifts. For example, in an article on 
Chinese art published in the Egyptian cultural magazine al-Risala (see Chapter Five) in 1940, 
                                                 
483 Ma Tianying Papers MTY.C4.1. C19380001.24, C19380001.49, C19380001.74. 
 
484 Ma Tianying Papers MTY.C4.1. C19380001.40. 
 
485 Ma Tianying Papers MTY.C4.1. C19380001.4. 
 
486 Ma Tianying Papers MTY.C4.1. C19380001.19. 
 
487 Ma Tianying Papers MTY.C4.1. C19380001.34. 
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Zaynab al-Hakim, daughter of the Egyptian poet Tawfiq al-Hakim (1898-1987), recalled 
receiving a magnificent Chinese (Muslim?) wood carving presented to her by the delegation.488  
What actually happened during the Near East Delegation’s journey? Quantitatively, they 
spent over a third of their time on the road, 165 of 436 days. The other 271 days were spent in 
meetings.489 According to Mao, before departing from Hong Kong on 11 January 1938, they met 
with several Muslim leaders who had escaped Manchuria and the Japanese-occupied eastern 
cities.490 They then spent six days in Vietnam, celebrating jum‘a in Saigon, sampling Indian, 
Malaysian, and local food, and taking time to visit an Indian Buddhist temple as well as the zoo, 
all the while making passing observations about local overseas Chinese and the relationship 
between Chinese and Vietnamese “civilization.”491 Ma Tianying’s knowledge of French may 
have proven useful in situations where Chinese did not suffice.  
From Vietnam, the delegation proceeded to Singapore, arriving on 18 January. Although 
they stayed only for that day, they found time to meet with the founder and president of the All-
Malaya Muslim Missionary Society, Maulana Muhammad Abdul Aleem Siddiqi al-Qadri, its 
vice-president, Syed Abubakar bin Taha Alsagoff, and its secretary “Moonshi.”492 They also 
                                                 
 
488 Zaynab al-Hakim, “al-Fannan [The Artists],” al-Risala 343, 29 January 1940, pp. 178-79. Al-Hakim wrote: “I 
remember a gift of Chinese art, a masterpiece of the imagination, presented to me by the Chinese Islamic Fraternal 
Delegation, which resided in Cairo in March and April of 1939 [1938]. The medium of the image was wood, carved 
in a floral design, depicting birds plunging into water, and three standing on the shore. Their varying characteristics 
drew my attention. One of them was covering its eyes, not wanting to see anyone or for anyone to see it; the second 
was suffering from terrible sadness, but remained standing; the third stood on one leg in some fatigue, lowering its 
wings to rest.” 
 
489 The delegation’s full itinerary appeared in its report, appended to the diary: ZGHJJDFWTBG, pp. 4-8. 
 
490 Mao, “Muslim Vision,” p. 383. 
 
491 ZGHJJDGWTRJ, pp. 15-25 passim. 
 
492 These three men are identified in Chinese characters in the ZGHJJDGWTRJ as “Suidige,” “Alesagufu,” and 
“Mengshi,” along with their titles, and the Romanizations “Alasaguf” and “Moonshi” for the latter two. They had 
been introduced to these individuals by a Mr. Sun, chairman of Hong Kong’s Chinese Muslim Cultural and Fraternal 
Organization (Zhonghua huijiao bo’ai she), identified here as the Xianggang bo’ai she, the equivalent of Jam‘iyyat 
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retained contact information for Hugh Milner of the Straits Times, as well as several of 
Singapore’s Chinese-language publications.493 While in Singapore, they picked up a copy of 
Genuine Islam, the English magazine of the All-Malaya Muslim Missionary Society.494 
Departing Singapore the following morning, Xue Wenbo recorded that they read the magazine 
while “gazing from a distance toward Sumatra, amidst scattered clouds and waveless glass-like 
seas.” They were surprised to find that contained a good deal of commentary on Islam in China, 
not all of which was entirely favorable, such as “China’s Muslims may number as many as fifty 
or sixty million, but they have not yet been particularly successful in spreading the faith in their 
country.” Xue followed this with a long entry strongly implying that the comment was 
                                                 
al-rahma in Arabic, though it is unclear whether the organization used an Arabic title. The organization, the largest 
of its kind in Hong Kong, was founded in 1917 and still exists today at Chan Tong Lane, 7, Wan Chai: 
http://www.cmcfa.com/. The Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation would also meet with Alsagoff and Moonshi 
upon their arrival in Singapore in December 1939. 
 Maulana Muhammad Abdul Aleem Siddiqi al-Qadri (1892-1954) was an Indian-born Muslim claiming 
descent from Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the first Caliph of Islam. He was an accomplished and revered Islamic scholar 
who had studied with the Sufi master Maulana Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921), founder of India’s Barelvi 
Movement. He eventually traveled to forty countries across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the 
Americas, including China. He arrived in Singapore in 1930 and established the All-Malaya Muslim Missionary 
Society (now known as Jamiya Singapore) in 1932. He is buried at the Jannatul Baqqi in Medina. “Maulana Abdul 
Aleem Siddique”: http://www.aleemsiddique.org.sg/index.php?/Info/maulana-abdul-aleem-siddique.html.   
 Syed Abubakar bin Taha Alsagoff (1882-1956), born in Hadramawt, Yemen, studied in Mecca, but moved 
to Singapore to conduct da‘wa in 1927. He served as the first headmaster of the recently formed Madrasah Aljunied 
on Victoria Street, sponsored by another prominent Singaporean Hadrami family, from then until 1955. See Syed 
Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, “The Role of Hadramis in Post-Second World War Singapore—A Reinterpretation,” 
Immigrants and Minorities 25/2 (2007): 163-83. 
“Moonshi” is (in all likelihood) Dr. Hafeezudin Sirajuddin Moonshi bin Hakeem Abdul Hamid (1895-
1965). Born Surat, Bombay, India; came to Singapore in early childhood. Studied at Raffles Institution before 
enrolling for medicine. Graduated from King Edward VII College of Medicine in Singapore in 1916. Entered private 
practice a month following graduation and was the first to operate a Muslim clinic in Singapore. See Faridah Abdul 
Rashid, Biography of the Early Malay Doctors 1900-1957: Malaya and Singapore (Xlibris, 2012), pp. 127-28 (e-
book edition). 
 
493 ZGHJJDGWTRJ, pp. 35-36.  
 
494 Ibid., p. 37. Ma Jian and the Ma Tianying would both later publish English-language articles in Genuine Islam, 
the latter during the Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation.  
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wrongheaded and reminding readers that Muslims had refrained from proselytization throughout 
China’s history.495  
Finally, sailing northward through the Red Sea, the delegation at first proceeded to Suez 
to rendezvous with Da Pusheng, Sha Guozhen, and Wang Shiming. There they immediately 
changed steamers, boarding an Egyptian Hajj vessel called the Qasr bound for Jidda. They timed 
their journey to coincide with the month of the Hajj, departing Suez for Jidda on 3 February 1938 
(3 Dhul Hijjah 1356) and arriving two days later.496  
Meanwhile, the GMD Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not bothered to inform Qiu 
Zuming, its consul-general in Cairo, of the delegation’s itinerary or the nature of its mission; Qiu 
cabled the ministry on 8 February 1938, by which time the delegation was already in Mecca, 
saying “Received message Near East Delegation coming, head Wang Zengshan, members Zhang 
Zhaoli, Xue Wenbo, Ma Tianying. Have not yet received orders regarding this delegation. Have 
not yet received communication from them on whereabouts. Please telegram at earliest 
convenience and specify if this is a governmental delegation or a private one.” Trusted by the 
GMD government to the point of neglect, the delegation was acting very much on its own.497  
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497 An additional explanation for the GMD’s lack of coordination may have been a suspicion that their Cairo 
consulate was unreliable. On 20 February 1939, the GMD Central Executive Committee (zhongyang zhixing 
weiyuanhui) had ordered two Muslim agents in the Middle East, Isa Yusuf Alptekin (1901-95; Ch. Aisha), the 
former general secretary of the national assembly of the East Turkistan Republic (1933-34) now serving the GMD 
government, and Ma Fuliang (see below), to investigate and report on corruption in their Turkish embassy and Cairo 
consulate. To be clear: the GMD Executive Yuan was using Muslim spies to report on non-Muslim consular 
officials abroad; in Īsa’s case, this was perhaps a test of loyalty as much as a fact-finding mission. Pan Zhiping, 
“‘Dong Tu’ de ‘sanwei xiansheng’ yu guomin zhengfu [The ‘East Turkistan Three’ and the GMD Government],” 
Shixue jikan (May 2016): http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6d558a460102wo7p.html. 
 Isa and Ma sent their report to the Central Executive Committee from Cairo on 30 August 1939. They 
attached copies of letters written in French between consul-general Qiu Zuming and Moïse Lévy de Benzion (1873-
1943), the Alexandrian-born Sephardic Jew and Cairo department store owner whose large art collection was 
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In another sense, of course, the delegation members were not alone at all, but finally 
“reunited” with the world’s Muslims. Their experience aboard the Qasr raises the question of 
how they perceived other Muslims during their travels. Xue Wenbo’s comments in the diary mix 
racial and class prejudice with attempts to avoid such prejudice. Xue was evidently struck by 
differences in dress and physical appearance: unlike Da, Ma, Wang Zengshan, or Wang Shiming, 
he and Zhang had probably never met Arabs, Africans, or Indians before this point. Xue 
remarked awkwardly that “All Muslims are brothers; [therefore] the passengers do not see the 
[African] ship attendants as servants.” He later affirmed that “Everyone on this ship was Muslim, 
and an Islamic spirit of equality (Yisilan pingdeng jingshen) prevailed,” adding once more that 
“No one would dare see the attendants as servants (ren bu gan yi nupu shi zhi ye).”498 One 
wonders how the ship attendants might have responded to such statements if given the 
opportunity. 
As for how Da, Sha, and the delegation members were perceived and treated by their 
fellow Muslims, Xue’s diary entries are consistently positive. They passed their time aboard the 
Qasr partly in conversation, and partly listening to Egyptian music broadcast over the ship’s 
loudspeakers, which Xue found “sweet and agreeable.” People also made their own music, with 
“trumpeters and drummers playing when the time came to board the ship.”499 The Hajjis aboard 
                                                 
plundered by the Nazis. De Benzion had been renting Qiu a (presumably luxurious) apartment at 6 Rue Kasr el Nil 
(Shari‘ Qasr al-Nil) in downtown Cairo, apparently without the Chinese government’s approval. 
 Significantly, the same order from the Central Executive Committee instructed Īsa and Ma to investigate 
“the feelings toward our country’s war of resistance among Istanbul’s Xinjiang exiles and communal schools.” 
 Academia Sinica Modern History Archive (Taipei), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collection 11-WAA-
00005. The same file indicates that GMD diplomatic coordination was better with the countries of Southeast Asia 
during the Chinese Islamic South Seas Delegation.  
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the Qasr were mostly Egyptian, including seventy-eight from the Egyptian University (i.e. Cairo 
University) and thirty-four from al-Azhar. Xue Wenbo noted that they “expressed the utmost 
sympathy for our delegation’s mission” (ji biao tongqing). Interacting with the Egyptian 
students, Xue recalled Ma Songting telling him: “The young people of Egypt are well-endowed 
with both national and religious consciousness.”500 Regardless of what else may have actually 
transpired aboard the ship, Xue’s recordings contained implicit lessons for both Chinese 
society—that Muslims abroad treated Chinese Muslims as equals to a greater extent than non-
Muslim Chinese in China did—and for China’s Muslims themselves—that they should emulate 
the Egyptians and strive to be both better Muslims and better citizens of China.  
The delegation members’ experiences aboard the Qasr were not limited to shocks of 
unfamiliarity or shocks of recognition. Rather, their interactions during these two days on the 
Red Sea offered opportunities for serious discussions of the fate of Islam in China and the 
Islamic world as a whole. As it happens, an Egyptian University student named Hassan was also 
aboard, introduced to the delegation by Ma Jian, the Chinese Azharite from Yunnan (see Chapter 
Five). On 4 February, Hassan in turn introduced Da Pusheng and the delegation to his group 
leader, who was none other than the Egyptian intellectual Ahmad Amin (1886-1954).501 Xue 
recalled: “Sitting in the midst of a crowd with an extremely serene expression, wearing glasses 
and a red cap,” Amin was escorting the Egyptian University Hajj delegation, along with another 
lesser-known Egyptian University historian named ‘Abdul Wahhab al-Tujairi.502 Amin invited 
the Chinese Muslims to sit and inquired about their mission. Xue noticed that Amin already 
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knew a considerable amount about Islam in China. Amin remarked: “I have heard that there are 
fifty million Muslims in China. This is excellent. They will have a great role to play in the new 
dynamism we see in China. Yet some of China’s Muslims still feel that this will not be the case? 
How could that be?” According to Xue, he and his colleagues took the opportunity to reinforce 
their standard account of Islam in China and its modern predicament. In the past, they said, 
China’s Muslims “faced certain restrictions,” and thus remained weak and culturally 
underdeveloped. But today,  
with their belief in Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People, the position of 
the Chinese Muslim nationality (Huimin zhi minzu) approaches equality, and has 
left its former conservatism behind for the path of progress. What they need most 
now is to seek knowledge. Seeking knowledge in turn consists of two 
components: a domestic (guonei) component of improving Muslim education, and 
an international (guoji) one of connecting with the world’s Muslims…Muslims 
[outside China] care deeply about their religion. We have exchanged periodicals 
with them, and sent students abroad [to study with them], and invited [their] 
instructors to come to China, and collected books [from them], progressing in 
leaps and bounds. But even after all this work, after the many efforts we have 
made for our country, the Muslims of China remain ungrateful to us.503  
 
Listening to all of this, Professor al-Tujairi challenged them: “The general consensus today is 
that the world’s Muslim nations must form a great alliance, pursuing self-preservation internally 
and resisting imperialism externally. But I am not satisfied with this thinking. In what specific 
sense can such unity be achieved? What say the Muslim leaders in your venerable homeland?” 
Da Pusheng responded:  
Islam’s emphasis on unity expresses itself most clearly on the social level. A great 
distance separates what might be possible in theory from what is achieved in fact. 
There are only two forms an alliance [of Muslims] could take. One is establishing 
a Caliphate. But after the Caliphate was abolished, Muslims lost heart, and could 
only gaze from afar at their fellow Muslims elsewhere, without a means of 
returning to their former condition. The other is to form a representative 
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institution, with committees from each Muslim country and Muslim region…This 
latter form of unity could indeed be more effective.504 
 
We cannot know if this is exactly what was said, or what else may have been said. All we know 
is that Xue recorded for his Chinese readers, the GMD and Chinese Islamic National Salvation 
Federation, that the delegation dutifully communicated, in the presence of an Egyptian Muslim 
intellectual luminary, the position of China’s Muslim leaders that only “social” and associational 
unity, but not political unity, would be possible between the world’s Muslims going forward. 
Regardless of these potential differences of opinion over the question of Islamic unity, 
Ahmad Amin, perhaps moved by his face-to-face interaction with the Near East Delegation, 
published Sha Guozhen’s anti-Japanese propaganda letter “to the Muslims of the world” in al-
Risala (1933-), a major Cairo-based Islamic journal he edited, three months later. In the letter, 
Sha referred to Japan as the “younger sister of China” that had borrowed Chinese culture, and as 
a colonialist and imperialist power in contrast to the naturally peace-loving Chinese.505  
Reaching the Hijaz, the delegation completed their Hajj on 6-10 February 1938. Before 
the end of the second day, they paid a visit to the offices of the influential journal Umm al-
Qura.506 Before disembarking, however, they encountered a small group “flat-faced men, not 
resembling Near Easterners,” who appeared “not yet accustomed to the steps of prayer.” 
Conferring with Sha Guozhen, who had handled the passport applications for the Chinese 
Azharites, the delegation concluded that these could not be Chinese, but were “suspicious 
Japanese vagrants” (keyi zhi riben langren) posing as Muslims. Listening in on their 
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505 Muhammad Ibrahim Shah Kwujin [a.k.a. Sha Guozhen], “Risalat muslimi al-Sin ila muslimi al-‘alam ‘an haqa’iq 
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conversations, they identified one as Mohamet Salih Suzuki. While another claimed to be from 
Manchukuo, Xue stressed in the diary entry that “These men must be from Japan. It is doubtful 
that they were Chinese traitors (hanjian).”507 
The ritual stations of the Hajj itself were apparently exempted from the delegation’s anti-
Japanese propaganda, but the periods of rest in between were not, nor were the days following 
completion of the Hajj. Their encounters with Gansu, Russian, and Uyghur Muslims at Mecca 
demonstrate clearly how the delegation’s anti-Japanese propaganda intersected with preexisting 
GMD and elite Muslim interests toward Northwest frontiers (see Chapter Two). On 8 February, 
prior to setting out for Mount Arafat, a group of Muslim “coreligionists” (jiaobao) from Gansu 
Province visited the delegation at the Chinese Hajjis’ sleeping quarters. Xue wrote that these 
Gansu Muslims had “been poisoned by Japanese propaganda in Arabia, to the effect that Islam 
represented a separate nation-state [from China].”508 The delegation was apparently unable to 
convince them otherwise. Xue noted that these Muslims had faced considerable hardship, and 
acted like a “slavish conquered people” (wang guo nu). He wrote in the diary that the encounter 
made him “resolve to serve my country upon returning from the Hajj,” and conclude that he must 
“further develop my abilities to carry out the War of Resistance.”509  
Similarly, on 15 February, the delegation encountered a group of “countryless Tatar 
exiles from Russia” (E’guo Tata’er zhi liuwangzhe) led by Musa Jarullah.510 These men 
wondered if China’s alliance with the Soviet Union would be detrimental to Islam. According to 
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Xue, the delegation replied that China followed the Three Principles of the People, not 
Communism, and that the GMD’s alliances with the CCP and the Soviet Union were due to 
wartime exigencies. They asked rhetorically: “When it was first founded, Turkey signed an 
agreement with Russia, but has Turkey since become Communist?”511  
Finally, as Yufeng Mao notes, Wang Zengshan used part of the delegation’s time to meet 
with and attempt to influence Uyghur expatriates in the Hijaz. In this meeting, Wang impressed 
upon the Uyghurs that the GMD government would treat them better than any other power and 
allow them autonomy (minzhi zhuyi). Unconvinced, the Uyghurs produced a Japanese journal 
showing the flags of Japan, Italy, and Germany, as well as a logo featuring a sun and moon, 
together representing opposition to Communism and Japan’s friendship with the Islamic world. 
They argued that the Axis would be a better protector for Muslims. They argued with Wang 
Shiming in Arabic, and perhaps in modified Turkish with Wang. Ma Tianying eventually rose 
from his chair and argued (it is unclear in what language) that Japan was an imperialist country 
and no friend to Muslims, and that any appearance of friendship was only part of its larger 
imperial plot. Pointing to an image of a Japanaese airplane on the cover of the journal, Ma asked 
how many of their fellow Muslims had been killed in Shanghai and Nanjing by such machines. 
The parties apparently did not reach a resolution; Xue closed the entry stating that the 
conversation went on for quite some time before they all finally parted ways.512  
In the meantime, the delegation had its first audience with King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz on 11 
February, but this turned out to be only a perfunctory exchange of greetings. The king “inquired 
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little about the situation of Islam in China,” Xue noted.513 Some days later, Xue encountered a 
man who told him about the ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s “destruction of ancient relics,” which Xue thought 
was a “wicked idea that neglected and would embitter the people, and harm belief” (gou tong 
renmin zhi xienian er shang xinyang).514 Then, on 21 February, the delegation received a second 
chance at an audience with the king. Wang Shiming delivered a “salam on behalf of all the 
Muslim organizations of China” and wished the king success in his “national movement.” After 
listening to Wang describe China’s war with Japan and its significance for Chinese Muslims, the 
king remarked that all Muslims are brothers, and he extended his sympathy, “for we live in vile 
and nasty times.”515 
Soon it was time to move on. The delegation again boarded a steamer for Suez. This 
time, they continued on to Cairo, arriving on 10 March. On their third day, they met with the 
leaders of the Young Men’s Muslim Association (Jam‘iyyat al-shaban al-muslimin, founded 
1926), noting that Ma Songting had joined the organization during one of his visits to Egypt.516 
Eleven days later, on 23 March, the sixth contingent of aspiring Chinese Muslim ulama (known 
as the “Farouq delegation” due to the Egyptian king’s personal sponsorship) arrived in Cairo to 
commence their studies at al-Azhar. Xue noticed that their leader, Imam Pang Shiqian (see 
Chapters One, Five, and Six), “wore a round skullcap and a long robe covered by a short jacket, 
exactly the same as he would back in China, and bore a refined scholarly expression.”517 
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The Near East Delegation had already been meeting with several Azhar sheikhs in the 
preceding weeks, and found that their views varied widely. On 13 March, they called upon 
Sheikh Muhammad Ma’mun al-Shanawi (1878-1950), head of the Faculty of Law (Kulliyyat al-
shari‘a), who did not have much to say about the war, but told them that Christianity was an 
imperialist religion and that Muslims would fall prey to its cultural invasion if they did not hold 
fast to their beliefs. Similarly, the head of the Faculty of Theology (Kulliyyat usul al-din), whom 
Xue described only as “fat,” told them that the Japanese menace to China could not be greater 
than the imperialist menace to the “weak nations” of the world. When the topic shifted to the 
purpose of theology—which Chinese Muslims at the time rendered as zhexue, usually the 
equivalent of “philosophy”—Ma Tianying interjected that “Japan’s only zhexue was killing.”518 
The delegation found Sheikh Ibrahim al-Jibali, deputy director of the Faculty of Theology and a 
mentor to Ma Jian (see Chapter Five), a more receptive audience. Curiously, Xue noticed that 
“two thirds of the photos in al-Jibali’s office were of Chinese people”; the sheikh himself stated 
that the Chinese were the best of his foreign friends. He advised the delegation to promote 
Arabic education among Chinese Muslims, for then they could understand the religion correctly 
and connect better with their fellow Muslims. As for the war, according to Xue, al-Jibali “was 
greatly concerned about it, and prayed to God that China’s hardship would soon be lifted, and 
that it would eventually achieve victory.”519 That same day, they also met with Sheikh 
Muhammad al-Khidr Hussein, also of the Faculty of Theology, who displayed a similar concern 
                                                 
 
518 Ibid., pp. 165-66; Sheikh Muhammad Ma’mun al-Shanawi is identified in the diary as Maimeng in Chinese 
characters, Romanized as “Memun.” 
 
519 Ibid., pp. 167-69; Benite, “Taking ‘Abduh to China.” 
 277 
for Chinese Muslim education and associations, though he had less to say abou the war than al-
Jibali.520 
The delegation remained in Egypt for sixty-six days, the longest of any Middle Eastern 
country. They took time between meetings to visit the Qal‘a of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, the 
Opera House, the Pyramids, the City of the Dead, the Hussein Mosque, and several other sites. 
They also attended several tea parties: one hosted by Timur Bey, at which they met Taha 
Hussein; another at which an unnamed Egyptian poet composed a poem in their honor, translated 
by Ma Jian; another by the Egyptian Feminist Union (al-Ittihad al-nisa’i al-misri, established 
1923), attended by associates of Huda Sha‘rawi (but apparently not Sha‘rawi herself); and yet 
another at which they met the Azhar scholar Mustafa ‘Abd al-Raziq, who told them he was 
“quite familiar” with Wang Jingzhai and Ma Songting.521 On 6 April, they also met with 
representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, though it appears Hassan al-Banna was not in 
attendance (Xue noted, however, that the Farouq delegation of Chinese Azharites had also been 
invited).522 Cairo had begun to feel familiar by late spring 1938; Xue Wenbo wrote about 
“feeling reluctant to leave.”523  
The delegation did not disembark in Palestine, but merely stopped at the port in Jaffa 
before continuing directly to Beirut. By this point, Mandate Palestine was in its third year of 
revolt against the British Mandate. By August of that year, the British military commander wrote 
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that “the situation was such that civil administration of the country was, to all practical purposes, 
non-existent.”524 Britain would further increase its military operations that fall.  
On 21 May, in Beirut, the delegation met with Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Xue described the 
mufti as “clearly an international man of Islam,” adding that he had been “forced into exile by 
imperialism…but was determined neither to surrender nor cooperate.”525 Xue’s account of their 
interaction includes no overt discussion of the war; rather, al-Husayni tells them only that Islam 
has lost its former “all-encompassing power” despite Muslims’ representing a fifth of the world’s 
population. According to Xue, al-Husayni drew a distinction between doctrinal (jiaoyi) versus 
“actual” unity (shidi lianluo), saying that Muslims in the present times needed the latter. He also 
spoke approvingly of Chinese Muslims cooperation with non-Muslim Chinese, for, he said, 
Islam’s mission was one directed at the entire world.526 
The delegation spent a week each in Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad, and two weeks in 
Iran. They traveled by air from Damascus to Baghdad, Baghdad to Tehran, and Tehran to 
Isfahan. Other than Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who had met with Ma Songting and Zhao Zhenwu in 
1933, the delegation was not as thoroughly well-connected in the Levant, Iraq, and Iran as they 
were in Egypt. Nevertheless, they managed to meet with important figures and organizations 
here as well, including the president of Syria, Hashim al-Atassi, the Bureau Arabe, and the 
Jam‘iyyat al-hidaya al-islamiyya. They also visited the tombs of Imam Hanafi and King 
Faisal.527 The Iran portion of the trip was the most touristic, and required visas that had taken 
                                                 
524 Report by General Robert Haining, 30 August 1938, cited in Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the 
Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Boston: Beacon, 2006), p. 107; Lesch, Arab Politics, p. 223.  
 
525 ZGHJJDFWTRJ, p. 288. 
 
526 Ibid., pp. 289-91. 
 
527 Ibid., pp. 300-01, 303-04, 319.  
 279 
some time to process in Cairo.528 From Isfahan, they traveled by air to Bushehr and by steamer 
from there to Bombay. 
The delegation spent more time in British India (including parts of today’s Pakistan) than 
any other single country, including Egypt. They stayed in Bombay, Lahore, Lucknow, Bathinda, 
and Calcutta, traveling all the while by rail. The length of time was partly due to their waiting for 
Turkish visas.529 India was also potentially easier to navigate than the Middle East, however, 
because there the Chinese Muslims could speak English (Ma Tianying in particular). They held 
slightly more meetings per unit of time in India than in the Middle East, a discrepancy that grows 
if we consider the greater travel distances required in India.  
The delegation’s time in India offered an additional opportunity to make appeals to 
Uyghur expatriates. On 20 September, the delegation paid a visit to the Bombay Xinjiang Fellow 
Provincials Association (Xinjiang tongxiang hui), including an Imam Hamid, with whom they 
spoke at length about differences between Sunnis and Shia, as well as Indian Muslim groups that 
did not fall in these two categories.530 In February 1940, this association would send four 
students—identified only as Muhammad Hassan, Abdul Khaliq, Nur Muhammad, and Sa‘d—to 
study at al-Azhar. They may have been acting on the delegation’s recommendation, particularly 
that of Wang Zengshan, who again was deeply involved in Xinjiang’s affairs and may have 
hoped that absorbing al-Azhar’s Islamic modernism and interacting with the Chinese Azharites 
would help cultivate an integrationist disposition among educated Uyghurs.531 Pang Shiqian 
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recorded these students’ presence in his memoir, referring to them and seven others as the 
Chinese Azharites’ “Xinjiang classmates” (Xinjiang tongxue).532  
The delegation attempted to call upon Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the All-India 
Muslim League, on their second day in Bombay (3 July 1938) as well as their last (10 October), 
and hoped for a meeting in the interim.533 Though guided by the Chinese consul-general Chen, 
they failed to meet him, though received multiple well-wishes from the League. This was the last 
reason for their long stay in India. The late 1930s, of course, saw a growing momentum on the 
part of the Pakistan movement. The 1937 Singh elections had confirmed for Jinnah that a single 
country with a political system based on equal representation could potentially exclude Indian 
Muslims from their own government. Furthermore, Muhammad Iqbal, whose categorical support 
for the Pakistan idea Jinnah had increasingly come to accept, had died on 21 April. It was a 
formative moment overall, but the timing did not favor the Chinese Muslims.  
Although the non-Muslim Chinese press appears not to have paid significant attention to 
it, the Pakistan movement presented a potentially acute conceptual problem for China’s 
integrationist Muslim elites. The Chinese Muslims had been aware of the situation of Indian 
Muslims for some time. In the 1920s, Shanghai-based Chinese Muslim publications contained 
particularly frequent coverage of Indian Muslim affairs. In the early 1930s, Hai Weiliang, a 
Chinese Muslim from Hunan who was studying at the Nadwat al-‘Ulama in Lucknow (after 
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living attending Aligarh in Delhi, and before moving to Cairo to study at al-Azhar; see Chapter 
Five) published several articles in Yuehua and elsewhere translating and analyzing Iqbal’s 1930 
“Allahabad Address,” credited with inspiring the idea of Pakistan.534 As Hai made clear, Indian 
Muslim leaders were in the process of reaching the diametrically opposite conclusion from 
China’s Muslim leaders: that Muslims could not live alongside non-Muslims in a large nation-
state that was representative in theory but majoritarian in practice.535 Some of Hai’s writings in 
Al-Fath and al-Jami‘a al-islamiyya indicate that he would have favored such a fate for China’s 
Muslims, particularly at the moment when the First East Turkistan Repubic gained independence 
(1933-34). For its part, however, the GMD government may have felt sufficiently assured that 
China’s Muslims would not rise up against the state as they had in the nineteenth century. 
Indeed, such a feeling of assurance was a basis for the GMD’s deputizing Chinese Muslims and 
instrumentalizing Islam in order to appeal to Indian Muslims, even as they did the same with 
Chinese Buddhists toward Indian and Southeast Asian Buddhists. In the 1930s and 1940s, this 
multi-pronged, “civilizational” approach appeared more sound to the GMD than simply dealing 
with India as a “Hindu” nation. 
The delegation departed Bombay aboard the steamer S.S. Conte Verde—which, when 
traveling in the opposite direction, was transporting Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria 
to Shanghai. These efforts would increase dramatically after Kristallnacht (9-10 November 
1938), which occurred two weeks after the delegation returned to the Middle East.536 At Suez, 
they transferred to the Bulgarian cargo ship S.S. Varna, which would be torpedoed in 1941. 
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The last major stop was Turkey. The delegation visited Istanbul and Ankara from mid-
October to late November 1938. On 24 October, their first day in Istanbul, they met Abdul Aziz, 
a “Xinjiang man with a firm concept of nationalism.” Learned in Turkish, Persian, and Arabic, 
Abdul Aziz was a supervisor of Xinjiang students studying abroad in Istanbul. The following 
day, they paid a visit to Istanbul University (which had become a state school, then known as the 
İstanbul Darülfünûnu, in 1924, when Wang Zengshan was a student there).537 On 10 November, 
the delegation’s last day in Istanbul, they received word that Mustafa Kemal had died of illness. 
Maintaining the group’s curious refusal to see Ataturk as a secularizing or Westernizing figure, 
Xue Wenbo declared this a “great loss for the Islamic nations and the East.”538 
The delegation made a brief sightseeing detour to Greece. On 20 November, they 
boarded a steamer to return to Egypt. “Many of the passengers are Jewish,” Xue wrote, “perhaps 
two-thirds.” It was now ten days after Kristallnacht. He added: “They are bound for Palestine. 
The conflict between Arabs and Jews there unfolds rapidly. They are leaving a perilous place for 
a chaotic one. There is no inherent conflict between Arabs and Jews in nationality or religion, but 
imperialism favors the Jews economically and exploits the Arabs. Now it causes them to kill one 
another incessantly. In the end, how many victims will there be?”539 
 
Dueling Delegations? The Japanese- and GMD-Sponsored Hajj Missions 
                                                 
536 The S.S. Conte Verde was one of four ships operating on Lloyd Triestino's Far East Line from 1932, running 
between Trieste and Shanghai via Suez, Bombay, Colombo, Singapore, and Hong Kong, in twenty-four days. 
Triestino’s ships brought 17,000 Jews from Germany and Austria to Shanghai from 1938 until Italy joined the war 
on 10 June 1940, resulting in the closure of the line. Scuttled by its Italian crew in Shanghai in 1943, the Japanese 
used it for a time until it was scrapped in 1949. Elizabethe W. Cope, “Displaced Europeans in Shanghai,” Far 
Eastern Survey 17/23 (8 December 1948): pp. 274-276; James R. Ross, Escape to Shanghai: A Jewish Community 
in China (New York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 42-50; David H. Kranzler, “The history of the Jewish refugee 
community of Shanghai 1938-1945,” (PhD dissertation, Yeshiva University, 1971).  
 
537 ZGHJJDFWTRJ, pp. 481-83. 
 
538 Ibid., p. 500. 
 
539 Ibid., p. 515. 
 283 
 
The Japanese Empire had been following news of the Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation. In 
response, it organized its own delegation in December 1938, as the Near East Delegation was en 
route back to China. The Japanese military had formed a Chinese General Islamic Association in 
Manchuria in July 1937, which sponsored the so-called 1939 “North China Hajj Delegation” 
(Huabei chaojin tuan).540 Led by the Chinese Muslim Tang Yichen, this delegation’s purpose 
was to undo the work of the GMD-sponsored Near East Delegation by swaying Middle Eastern 
opinion in Japan’s favor and demonstrating that Muslims in Japanese-controlled territories were 
living in peace and security.541 As Kelly Hammond explains, however, Tang was a businessman 
from an old and established Muslim family of Beijing, and material interests rather than ideology 
informed his collaboration with the Japanese Empire.542 Though willing to defend the Japanese 
to a point, he was also sensitive to criticism of his complicity, and eagerly asserted that his Hajj 
delegation was religious and not political.  
From the beginning, the GMD-affiliated Chinese Muslim elites naturally regarded Tang’s 
Japanese-sponsored delegation as politically motivated. In early January 1939, Sun Shengwu—a 
Chinese Muslim official in the Executive Yuan, member of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs 
Commission, head of Beijing’s “Northwest Public School” (Xibei gongxue), and co-managing 
                                                 
 
540 Kelly Hammond provides an excellent analysis of the implications of the term Huabei: “Tang’s choice of the 
word Huabei (華北) to describe the region under Japanese occupation is an interesting one: much less loaded than 
Manchukuo (C. Manzhouguo 滿洲國), the term was familiar, innocuous, and also vague. Although Beiping was not 
in Manchukuo, it was still under Japanese occupation and his choice of the word “Huabei” evokes shared cultural 
rather than divisive political geography and indicates that he was completely aware of the political sensitivity among 
his intended readers with regard to the puppet state of occupied China and Manchukuo. By using the word “Huabei” 
Tang skirts this politically sensitive topic, while providing his readers with a clearly defined and historically familiar 
geographical entity that essentially corresponded with the area being occupied by the Japanese. These tensions and 
vocabulary choices highlight that Tang's hajj account was not a real-time journal but a reedited, apologia in response 
to the criticism Tang received following his return.” 
 
541 Mao, “Muslim Vision,” pp. 385-86. 
 
542 Hammond, “Conundrum of Collaboration,” pp. 194-96. 
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director of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation (see Chapter Two)—learned of 
Tang Yichen’s Japanese delegation and began working to thwart it. On 5 January, he wrote to the 
Executive Yuan asking to form a counter-delegation. The following day, Executive Yuan 
Secretary Wei Daoming recommended using the Chinese Muslim students in Egypt, noting 
“Chiang says ‘Permission granted. Please proceed.’” On Sun’s advice, the GMD minister of 
finance Kong Xiangxi cabled the Cairo consulate to secure 500 British pounds in funding. Sun 
also somehow managed to contact Imam Ha Decheng, who had remained in occupied Shanghai 
due to his old age, asking him to do whatever he could to delay Tang Yichen’s delegation, which 
was due to depart from there. Ha made contact with Tang and his delegation and apparently 
treated them hospitably, offering to act as their guide. Tang’s account of these events states that 
Ha tried to help them obtain visas to Egypt through the British Consulate, but that the consular 
officials refused them; Sun Shengwu’s version states that Ha himself persuaded the British not to 
grant the visas.543 They eventually gained steamer passage out of Shanghai, but were forced to 
travel via Ethiopia. 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted consul-general Qiu Zuming in 
Cairo, noting that Tang Yichen’s delegation was traveling aboard the Conte Rosso.544 They 
described the Japanese-sponsored delegation as “puppets” (weilei).545 At the same time, Sun 
                                                 
 
543 Mao, “Muslim Vision,” p. 386; Hammond, “Conundrum of Collaboration,” p. 209. Mao cites Sun Shengwu, 
Huijiao luncong [Essays on Islam] (Taipei: Zhonghua wenhua chuban shiyeshe, 1963), p. 321; Hammond cites Tang 
Yichen, Maijia xunli ji [Record of Meetings and Rituals in Mecca] (Beiping: Zhongguo huijiao zonglianhehui, 
1943). Noriko Yamazaki, “Chūni sensō-ki no chūgoku musurimu shiyakukai ni okeri `shin'nichiha' musurimu ni 
kansuru - kōsatsu – chūgoku kaikyō gōkai no Tang Yichen o chūshin ni,” Monthly Journal of Chinese Affairs 65/9 
(2011): p. 8. 
 
544 From the same steamer company as the Conte Verde used earlier by the Near East Delegation. 
 
545 By contrast, Pang Shiqian did not use the term “puppets” in his report to the GMD Ministry of Foreign Affairs or 
in his memoir of the delegation written after the fact, though he did refer to them as “the representatives of the 
illegitimate government” (wei zhengfu pai de daibiao). “Huijiao chaojin tuan [The [Chinese] Islamic Hajj 
 285 
Shengwu, Tang Kesan, Da Pusheng, and Ma Songting wrote to Pang Shiqian and Ma Jian, 
relaying the Executive Yuan’s instructions to form a Chinese Azharite Hajj delegation to 
intercept and counter the Japanese-sponsored one.546 The next five days were spent purchasing 
steamer tickets, preparing passports, and being vaccinated against smallpox and other diseases.547 
On 23 January, twenty-eight Chinese Azharites boarded an Egyptian Hajj vessel, the Zamzam, to 
Jidda. The Chinese Azharites carried two flags, one the Republic of China, the other a 
“delegation flag” featuring the phrase “Chinese Islamic Hajj Delegation” in Chinese and Arabic 
(Zhongguo huijiao chaojintuan / Firqat al-hajj al-siniyya), written in white letters on a green 
background. Pang noted that Egyptians who saw them approved of the flag—“‘Ma sha’ Allah!,’ 
many shouted”—and expressed their “sympathy and hopes” for the delegation. On 24 January, 
aboard ship, the Chinese Azharites “shared a prayer for Chinese Islam and China’s war of 
resistance” with the Egyptian Azhar students and the three Azhar sheikhs accompanying them.548  
The Chinese Azharites’ Hajj experience was full of contradictions. They were quite 
literally prosecuting the war by day, and affirming Islam’s peacefulness by night. On the 
                                                 
Delegation] (January 1939),” Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives, 11-WAA-00049; Pang, Aiji 
jiunian, pp. 119-40 passim. 
 
546 Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collection 11-WAA-00049. In 
his account of the Hajj delegation, Pang Shiqian wrote that he received a telegram from Sun, Tang, Da, and Ma on 
18 February, but the government documents show that it must have been 18 January. Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 119. 
 
547 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 120. 
 
548 Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collection 11-WAA-00049; 
Pang, Aiji jiunian, pp. 120-22 (preparations; flags), 124 (group prayer); Mao, “Muslim Vision,” p. 387. 
 Before departing, an individual Pang identifies only as “Fa-suo-cai, the Hijazi consul in Cairo” (the Saudis 
had ruled the Hijaz for over a decade by this point, so the modifier is an unusual one) assisted them. Pang says only 
he and Ma Jian were permitted to meet with the consul, and gives the impression of a somewhat awkward 
interaction. Pang recalls telling him: “The Muslims of China have always shown great concern and respect for the 
Hijazi royal family, as well as respect for your office, because his highness is the central figure of the Islamic world. 
When the Muslims of China come to Mecca each year to perform the Hajj, they are always very well treated in your 
estimable country.” The consul said there was no need to be polite, that it was his job to assist Hajjis. Pang, Aiji 
jiunian, pp. 120-21. 
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morning of January 25, the delegation wrote a letter to the Chinese Islamic National Salvation 
Federation informing them of their itinerary. Yet in the evening, as the Zamzam approached land 
and the group donned their white ihram attire, Pang remarked “Islam is great and vast enough to 
turn all classes equals and make peoples of different languages and customs into one.”549  
 
 
IMAGE 2: The GMD-sponsored group at Suez. Source: Academia Sinica Modern History 
Archives (Taipei). 
 
The GMD government in fact sent a second team of Muslims to Mecca, which meant 
multiple streams of intelligence, and thus a form of insurance against any conflicts of loyalty this 
mission might cause. When the Chinese Azharite delegation arrived in Mecca on 27 January, 
they were joined by two GMD Muslim agents who had been sent abroad in October 1938 to 
investigate corruption at the GMD’s Turkey embassy and Cairo consulate (see above), as well as 
to assist with the GMD’s anti-Japanese efforts abroad. The first agent was Īsa Yūsuf Alptekin 
(Ch. Aisha)—again, the former leader of the East Turkistan Republic (1933-34), but now a 
member of the GMD Judicial Yuan and the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation. 
                                                 
549 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 125. 
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Alptekin had come to know Wang Zengshan in the early 1930s, when Wang was recruiting 
Uyghurs to study in Nanjing and develop pro-government, Islamic modernist periodicals 
analogous to those of the coastal Chinese Muslim modernist elites. The second agent was Ma 
Fuliang, a Chinese Muslim scholar, about whom less is known.550 The two men were abroad 
until March 1940, when they returned to Chongqing after visiting Mumbai, Calcutta, Cairo, 
Mecca, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Burma. 551 The Chinese Azharite delegation 
appears to have been on entirely friendly and cooperative terms with Alptekin and Ma, but the 
potential for each side to inform on the other cannot have been lost on any of them. 
The Chinese Azharite delegation’s performative nature is clear from the briefing it 
provided the GMD government on 12 March. In the report, Pang Shiqian and Ma Jian wrote to 
the GMD Ministry of Foreign Affairs that after conferring with Isa Alptekin and Ma Fuliang on 
27 January, they decided to join forces with a group of Hajjis from northwestern China (Xibei 
jiaobao chaojinzhe), bringing the Chinese Hajj group’s total number to over one hundred. 
“Acting as one,” Pang and Ma said, “we were able to make a more forceful impression (yiqi yi 
zhuang shengshi).”552 Given the efforts of the Chinese Muslim elites to integrate northwestern 
frontier Muslims into China, and given that Japan had made inroads among certain Muslims 
there, it was an extremely important symbolic statement of Chinese Muslims’ unity (at least to 
the GMD government and Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation) for the predominantly 
                                                 
550 Pan states that Ma Fuliang was born in Xinjiang, whereas Hammond says he was from Beijing. The latter appears 
correct given Hammond’s clarification that Ma and Tang Yichen recalled common acquaintances in Beijing and 
shared a fondness for the city’s foods. 
 
551 Pang Shiqian and Ma Jian to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Huijiao chaojin tuan [The [Chinese] Islamic Hajj 
Delegation] (January 1939),” Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives, 11-WAA-00049; Second 
Historical Archives of China (Nanjing), 五 (2) – 130; Pan, “‘Dong Tu’ de ‘sanwei xiansheng.’”  
 
552 Pang and Ma, “Huijiao chaojin tuan.”  
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coastal Chinese Azharites and the northwestern Hajjis to confront the Japanese-sponsored 
delegation as one—whether that is what actually happened or not.553 
Relatedly, although their mission was ostensibly to conduct anti-Japanese propaganda 
and spy on Tang Yichen’s Japanese-sponsored Hajj delegation, it appears the Chinese Azharites 
may have used some of their time in Mecca instead to make pro-GMD appeals to Xinjiang 
Muslims. Pang’s memoir of the Hajj mission (only published in 1950 with Aiji jiunian, and 
therefore likely written in the mid- to late-1940s) recalls a meeting with several “Xinjiang 
coreligionists” (Xinjiang jiaobao) on 28 January. Pang says the Chinese Azharites and these 
Xinjiang Hajjis “discussed the problem of Islam in China at great length,” adding that  
Islam in the interior [neidi] must be connected with Islam in Xinjiang. Their 
position was that to solve the problem of Xinjiang, it would be necessary to place 
great emphasis on educating the masses, as well as to reassure Xinjiang Muslims 
living in exile abroad…Xinjiang Muslims have no desire to scramble for power or 
profit, nor do they have political aspirations. What they hope for is only religious 
freedom and social stability. Should it not be easy to realize these aspirations, at 
the very least?554 
 
This should not be considered a statement of support for Xinjiang’s permanent integration into 
China. Writing in the late 1940s, during the Chinese Civil War, it would have been extremely 
dangerous for Pang to advocate anything other than Xinjiang’s being part of China, regardless of 
whether it was the GMD or the CCP who eventually prevailed. Moreover, if any non-Muslims 
were hypothetically to read his book, he may even have been trying to protect Xinjiang from 
whoever ended up winning the civil war by reassuring Chinese-speaking audiences that Xinjiang 
had “no political aspirations.” In any case, if the Chinese Azharites’ encounter with the Xinjiang 
Hajjis indeed unfolded as Pang describes, then one could argue that the Chinese Azharites’ were 
                                                 
553 Pang and Ma, “Huijiao chaojin tuan,” p. 50, Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Collection, 11-WAA-00049. 
 
554 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 129. 
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not only in Mecca to serve the GMD’s anti-Japanese war aims, but also to serve its longer-term 
aspirations to dominate China’s non-Han frontiers. 
The GMD-sponsored Chinese Azharite delegation eventually did make contact with the 
Japanese-sponsored North China delegation. There is evidence that Pang and Ma exaggerated or 
embellished this aspect of their report as well. As Yufeng Mao has found, Pang and Ma reported 
that they successfully invited the Japanese-sponsored delegation to dinner on 28 January, at 
which time they were allegedly able to convince Tang Yichen and his associates that they had 
made a “huge mistake.” The group supposedly swore “by their faith to never again serve Japan,” 
but as Mao notes, the Japanese delegation continued to serve Japanese interests after returning to 
occupied Beijing.555 Pang gave a different account in his memoir, however, saying only that “we 
all knew one another; we spoke for a long time of the news of our family and friends in Beiping, 
and of the situation of the enemy in North China. They told us they were only here to perform 
Hajj, and for no other purpose, for after all, they could not understand the [local] language.”556 
When placed directly side-by-side, Tang Yichen’s memoir (published 1943), Ma and 
Pang’s report to the GMD Ministry of Foreign Affairs (sent March 1939), and Pang’s memoir 
(published 1950) allow for some corrective speculations, and also raise additional questions. 
Tang’s account of his group’s interactions with the GMD-sponsored Chinese Azharite Hajj 
delegation do not characterize those interactions in as confrontational, one-sided, or triumphalist 
a manner as Pang and Ma’s report.557 More than anything else, this reflects the relatively 
                                                 
 
555 Mao, “Muslim Vision, p. 387; Pang and Ma, “Huijiao chaojin tuan,” p. 50, Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern 
History Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collection, 11-WAA-00049.  
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uncompromising ideological expectations of the GMD government, and the Chinese Azharites’ 
sense that they needed to accommodate those expectations, even at the expense of “reality.” 
Again, as for the men themselves, many knew each other, realized they knew of each other, or 
knew people in common. The two groups interacted on multiple occasions in Mecca and Jidda 
from late January to mid-February 1939. The overall impression is that this was a confusing 
experience for everyone involved, and perhaps a somewhat passive-aggressive one. Tang’s 
account recalls multiple instances in which the Chinese Azharite group expressed sentiments of 
brotherhood and goodwill toward the Japanese-sponsored delegation, only to follow that up with 
sudden interrogations as to the “political” nature of the delegation—all while denying, until a 
relatively late point, that the GMD was sponsoring their own delegation and that they were 
reporting back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Chongqing. 
Tang recounted one such frought interaction with Pang Shiqian and the GMD-sponsored 
group on the evening of 30 January 1939 (10 Dhul-hijjah 1357). This was the beginning of Eid 
al-Adha, the Festival of Sacrifice. Tang’s account claims that his group shared their meal of 
roasted lamb with the GMD-sponsored group. Even this, however, became yet another occasion 
filled with dissonance: expressions of goodwill and affection alternating with interrogations 
about political motives.558 Shortly after 8p.m., the moon had already risen high in the night sky, 
and Tang wanted to find a spot to enjoy the cool breeze. Tang says Pang accompanied him on his 
walk, and the two delegation leaders looked for a quiet place to sit. Tang wrote that he thought 
Pang merely wished to observe the moon, but “in fact he had some words he wanted to share”:  
Imam Pang said: ‘We have been good friends for many years. I will therefore 
speak candidly with you about a certain matter.’ 
 ‘By all means, speak your mind,’ I said.  
                                                 
558 Tang, Maijia xunli ji; Hammond, “Conundrum of Collaboration,” p. 227. Pang’s description of this Eid in Aiji 
jiunian does not mention dinner with Tang’s delegation. Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 131. 
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 Pang said: ‘I have heard your group has come to Mecca on a mission. Is 
this true?’ 
 ‘Indeed,’ I said, ‘Our mission is to fulfill the obligation of Hajj, one of 
Islam’s Five Pillars.’ 
 He said: ‘What I mean is, there is no political mission? I am speaking 
honestly with you! My group have come here from Cairo at this time, eighteen 
people in all, on orders to observe you. With respect to our obligation of Hajj, we 
could have completed that at any time [due to our living in Egypt]. However, we 
received a telegram, and moreover received five hundred pounds wired to us only 
two or three days later, for which we otherwise have no need, all for the purpose 
of coming to Mecca at this time to observe your movements. The telegram 
accused you of having been involved in a fight [on your journey], and of having 
murdered people. We knew, however, that you have consistently devoted 
yourselves to Islam for the past twenty or thirty years. I was extremely eager, 
therefore, to see you today and ask for clarification.’559 
 
This interaction echoed a similar conversation Tang had had a few days earlier with the Chinese 
Muslim GMD agent Ma Fuliang, who had also mentioned the accusations of Tang’s group being 
involved in an “incident” in Singapore and a murder in Bombay.560 Tang wrote that he replied to 
Pang “without the slightest alarm,” saying he believed that the Chinese Azharites were 
understandably happy to see them after not having spoken for two or three years, that they were 
eager to hear news from the Muslims of North China, and that they must feel bad that Muslims 
from North China had not been able to make the Hajj in recent years. Tang added that he felt 
“tremendously distressed and hurt” (feichang nanshou er shangxin) by the accusations Pang 
mentioned.  
                                                 
559 Tang Yichen, Majia xunli ji, pp. 133-34.  
 Tang may have misremembered the number of people in the Chinese Azharite Hajj delegation, which was 
twenty-eight and not eighteen, according to Pang and Ma, “Huijiao chaojin tuan,” p. 50, Academia Sinica (Taipei), 
Modern History Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collection, 11-WAA-00049. It may also have been a 
misprint.  
 
560 Tang, Maijia xunli ji; Hammond, “Conundrum of Collaboration,” p. 225. Hammond also concludes that “This 
rumor-mongering by the GMD agents potentially indicates that these agents were expected to report on nefarious 
intentions of the [Japanese-sponsored] group[,] but when they were unable to provide their superiors with factual 
information they simply made things up.” 
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Pang says nothing about this encounter in his report to the GMD Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs or in his memoir—both of which are otherwise reasonably detailed, and both of which 
included an entry for 30 January.561 Therefore, if Tang’s above account is reasonably accurate, 
was Pang trying to shame Tang into giving up his mission and defecting to the GMD’s side? 
Was Tang trying to do the same to Pang? Was Tang trying to discredit Pang by describing their 
interaction, on the outside chance that Pang would fail to mention it, and that the GMD would 
then somehow obtain Tang’s memoir, and wonder why Pang had failed to mention it? Or was 
Pang trying to warn Tang for his own sake that he was being watched and had been accused of 
wrongdoing? On the other hand, if the scene is primarily Tang’s fabrication, was Tang 
attempting to portray the Chinese Azharites as less inherently pro-GMD than they claimed to be, 
and therefore open to overtures from the Japanese Empire? If Japan were to make an additional 
overture to the Chinese Azharites, Tang Yichen would have been the man for the job—and 
perhaps he would have gotten to see his old friends again. The fact that Tang knew about the five 
hundred pounds wired to the Chinese Azharites suggests that some interaction like this did take 
place. Either way, the various strands of motives are impossible to separate. If anything, 
however, the Chinese Azharites appear to have feared the GMD’s opinion somewhat more than 
Tang feared that of the Japanese. 
The two delegations appear more naturally concerned for one another as fellow Muslims 
from China than they appear categorically committed to the missions of their respective 
sponsors. Yet at the same time, both sides still cooperated to a high degree with their sponsors’ 
objectives. Before parting ways, Tang reports that the two groups shook hands, exchanged 
                                                 
561 Pang and Ma, “Huijiao chaojin tuan,” Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Collection, 11-WAA-00049; Pang, Aiji jiunian, pp. 130-31. 
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Qurans, and conveyed that they were happy to have met one another in this faraway land. The 
two delegations also took a group photo together at Mount Arafat, dressed in their white ihram 
attire. Pang and Ma retained a copy of this photo, numbered and labeled the Japanese-sponsored 
delegation members, and attached it to their report to the GMD Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see 
Image 3).562 Pang and Ma’s report also passed along a large amount of general intelligence on 
the Hajj to the GMD Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally, it proposed establishing a GMD 
consulate in Jidda, in order to manage all Chinese Hajji affairs thenceforth. The GMD did in fact 
set up this consulate by October 1939, appointing the Chinese Azharite and Near East Delegation 
member Wang Shiming as its first consul-general.563 The Chinese Azharites thus played a 








                                                 
562 The Japanese-sponsored group appears to have been the only one with its own camera, and it took many more 
photos than the GMD-sponsored one. Hammond, citing Tang Yichen’s travelogue, says the photo at Mount Arafat 
was taken with the Japanese group’s camera, and that Tang promised to send a copy of the photo to the Chinese 
Azharites after he had it developed in Beijing, but never got around to doing so. If this is true, it is unclear how Pang 
and Ma obtained the photo. Theirs was either taken with a separate camera, or Tang did indeed mail them a copy. 
The first possibility seems more likely, given that Pang and Ma sent their report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
on 12 March 1939, less than a month after their return to Egypt on 14 February. Hammond, “Conundrum of 
Collaboration,” p. 231. 
 
563 This news was proudly announced in the journal of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation: “Guonei 
duanxun: Wang Shiming jun rongren Jida lingshi [Domestic News Brief: Mr. Wang Shiming Honored with the Post 




IMAGE 3: The GMD- and Japanse-sponsored delegations’ group photo at Mount Arafat, which 
Pang Shiqian and Ma Jian labelled and submitted to the GMD Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Source: Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives. 
 
 
The South Seas Delegation: Islamic Modernist History as Chinese Diplomacy 
In the same issue in which it publicized Wang Shiming’s appointment as GMD consul-general at 
Jidda, the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation announced the formation of a “South 
Seas Delegation” (nanyang fangwentuan, December 1939-January 1941). Similar in conceit to 
the Near East Delegation, the South Seas Delegation consisted of three Chinese Muslim men tied 
to the government, business, military, publishing, and religious sectors. The National Salvation 
Federation chose Ma Tianying as the delegation’s leader; in Singapore and Malaya, Ma came to 
be known as Hadj Ibrahim Ti-ying (or T.Y.) Ma. Ma served the delegation with his eloquence, 
experience, and embodiment of the gentlemanly ethos of interwar public Islam. The second 
member was Wu Jianxun, also known as Othman Kien-Hsun Woo, an army officer and Yuehua 
contributor. Of the three, Wu was most directly responsible for disseminating the delegation’s 
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anti-Japanese propaganda; he was also in charge of compiling the delegation’s diary. The third 
was the imam Ma Dawu of Guangzhou (Canton), who also went by Yakoob Matawu—valuable 
to the delegation especially for his knowledge of both Arabic and Cantonese.564  
The South Seas Delegation differed from the Near East Delegation in two important 
respects. First, it made the “religious” dimension of Islam more integral to its work through the 
inclusion of Imam Ma Dawu, who opened many if not all the delegation’s hundreds of meetings 
with a recitation of the Fatiha—something Xue Wenbo did not mention in his catalog of the 
Near East Delegation’s meetings. Second, and relatedly, the South Seas Delegation offered a 
selective but concerted narrative of long-standing Sino-Islamic “civilizational” engagement in 
Southeast Asia, typified by trade, cultural contact, and above all the early-fifteenth-century 
maritime voyages the Yunnanese Muslim general Zheng He made on behalf of the Ming 
dynasty. In one of its communications to Malayan Muslims and overseas Chinese in Malaya, the 
delegation proposed the creation of a bilateral cultural association honoring that history: 
To our Brethren in Islam and to our Fellow-Countrymen in Malaysia:  
Mohammad SAN PAO [i.e. Admiral Zheng He] of Yunnan came to 
Malaysia in the year of 1405. He has done [sic] a lot for the education of, and the 
introduction of Islam to, the People of Malaysia. At the same time he brought 
many Chinese to the Islands and the Peninsulas of [the] South Seas. These 
Chinese have prospered up to these days in Malaysia.  
For commemorating the great and noble works done by the greatest 
navigator in the Far-East and for looking up [sic] the good friendship between 
Muslims and the Chinese Residents, we beg to propose the formation of a Society 
or Association which may be named, “Sino-Muslim Cultural [wenhua] Society” 
founded in memory of Mohammad SAN PAO.565 
                                                 
564 The medical donations collected by the South Seas Delegation were discussed in Chapter Three. The larger story 
of the South Seas Delegation is introduced in detail in Chen, “‘Just Like Old Friends,’” pp. 707-23. 
 
565 This letter was published in side-by-side English and Chinese versions; the English version is reproduced here. 
As stated in Chen, “‘Just Like Old Friends,’” p. 730n62: “This letter appears to have been published with the 
CISSD’s 1939 diary. I cannot account for the use of the term ‘Malaysia’ rather than ‘Malaya’ in the English version; 
perhaps it resulted from Chinese Muslims’ exposure to Orientalist sources that had used this term since the 
nineteenth century, but I have not found direct evidence of this. The Chinese term used by the CISSD, and by 
Guomindang (later Taiwanese) of cial documents at least until the country’s of cial change of name in 1963, was 
malaiya, not malaixiya.” 
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Each of the three men composed a preface to the delegation’s diary. Of the three, Ma Dawu’s 
placed this “civilizational” exchange in relationship to a modernist understanding of the history 
of Islam:  
Huijiao or, as it was originally known, yisilan [Islam], meaning “peace”, is a 
religion possessing a spirit of interdependence [huzhu jingshen]. If a country or 
people has a true spirit of interdependence, it can ourish and grow strong.... You 
could say that Islam is a religion that bene ts state and society alike. You could 
also say that it is a world religion that humanity cannot do without. When we 
recall past eras, we see that peoples and countries, upon accepting Islam, became 
stronger and more prosperous [jiu fuqiang xingsheng qilaile]. This is an 
undeniable feature inscribed on the pages of history. In the present century, 
however, Muslim countries are among those that have fallen behind. Having lost 
the true spirit of Islam is probably a reason for this falling behind. Thus Muslim 
countries must work to safeguard this spirit.566 
 
Ma’s statement suggests that the South Seas Delegation had thought through more thoroughly 
than the 1937-39 Near East Delegation or even the January-February Chinese Azharite Hajj 
delegation how to integrate into its diplomatic work a historical argument informed by Islamic 
modernism. According to this logic, the periods of florescence in Islamic (and even human) 
history owed to Muslims developing a peaceful “spirit of interdependence,” whereas Muslim 
societies tended to fall behind when they were relatively cut off from one another. In the context 
of the South Seas Delegation, Ma’s statement implied that the way to honor that legacy and 
uphold that pattern in the present was for the Muslims of the South Seas to come to the aid of 
their fellow Muslims in China and to support China’s war against Japan. That the South Seas 
Delegation managed to collect a very large sum567 in medical donations from the widest possible 
                                                 
 
566 Ma Dawu, “Preface (III),” ZGHJNYFWTRJ, p. x. 
 
567 Mainland Chinese scholars report that the amount was 800,000 yuan. Ma Tianying later stated in private 
communications that the figure was in fact 800,000 U.S. dollars. It is unclear which account is the accurate one. 
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range of political, commercial, and cultural leaders in Singapore and Malaya suggests that this 
narration of a shared Sino-Islamic past indeed realized its intended effect. 
 
Conclusion: Culture and Power 
 
The period after the inauguration of modern steam travel but before the Second Sino-Japanese 
War is crucial for our understanding both of the Chinese Hajj specifically and of modern Chinese 
Muslim identity generally. The Hajj of Ma Songting and Zhao Zhenwu is one highly 
consequential episode in modern Chinese Islamic history where a reading of events centered on 
the umma and an alternative reading centered in China are both possible. Whereas the umma-
centric reading highlights how post-Ottoman aspirations for transnational Islamic unity had not 
yet faded from consciousness, the Sino-centric reading illustrates how an emerging alliance 
between the Guomindang government and elite Chinese Muslims co-opted the authority of 
Islamic modernism in an era when nationalism and state-building processes were on the rise.   
 While Ma Songting and Zhao Zhenwu’s Hajj and travels in many ways set the stage for 
the Near East, Hajj, and South Seas Delegations, in another sense the wartime delegations 
represented something entirely new: again, an instrumentalization and deputization of Islam and 
Muslims in service of the nation. From the GMD government’s perspective, there was little to be 
lost from these delegations: the mission required no commitment of wartime materiel or 
permanent diplomatic installations, only salaries for the members and some logistical 
coordination. Redirecting the policies of the countries they visited was beyond these delegations’ 
reach. At most, they achieved certain “softer” objectives, such as the collection of medical 
materials and donations from Muslims and overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.  
From the perspective of the Chinese Muslim elites, however, there was everything to be 
gained from these delegations. Ultimately, the delegations were less significant for effecting a 
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contribution to the war with Japan, and much more significant for affecting such a contribution. 
Perhaps the Chinese Muslim elites hoped that such a dramatic demonstration of effort and 
sacrifice for China in its moment of greatest existential threat would leave no doubt as to the 
loyalties of China’s Muslims, which in turn could help make them safer from Islamophobia and 
violence once “peace” returned. Quite independently from their tangible impact, the delegations 
illustrate the enormous level of trust the GMD government placed in Chinese Muslim elites, and 
Chinese Muslim elites’ high valuation of that trust, in their capacity as intermediaries between 
China and the Islamic world. This trust included the assumption that the delegations would not 
engage in subversive activities abroad, and that they would police and censor themselves while 
traveling far beyond the point where the GMD could surveil them. This trust was born of 
necessity: the Chinese Muslim elites were indeed the best candidates to conduct this diplomatic 
work, and the GMD government relied heavily on them in a time of desperation, tight budgets, 
and minimal overseas capacity. In sum, the greatest impact of the delegations was not on China 
or its war effort, but on the Chinese Muslims themselves. These delegations represented an 
alternative approach to the project of “making Islam Chinese,” one that did not require years 
toiling to re-educate local Muslims on the frontiers. Instead, they introduced a dynamic in which 
Chinese Muslims largely presented themselves to their fellow Muslims and the wider world as 
Chinese who happened to be Muslim, rather than as Muslims who happened to be Chinese.  
 Perhaps sensing this subtle yet momentous transformation, the aspiring Chinese Muslim 
ulama at al-Azhar—living in Cairo during the period immediately before, during, and 
immediately after the war—had a chance to rethink whether the project of Sinicization and the 
notion of Muslims’ “contribution” to the nation-state formed a sufficient basis for a modern 
Chinese Muslim identity. For certain Chinese Azharites, the answer remained “yes”: some of 
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them appear to have seen their time in Egypt in relatively instrumental terms, as an extension of 
the narrative of contribution and of their political work in China, especially to educate and 
integrate the Muslims of the Northwest frontiers; these were the ones who tended to enjoy 
greater career success upon returning to China. For others, however, their unprecedentedly deep 
engagement with Islamic modernist thought at al-Azhar and in Cairo’s intellectual environment 
offered an opportunity to identify new, firmer conceptual foundations on which to be truly 


























CHAPTER FIVE: A MEETING OF MINDS: THE CHINESE MUSLIMS IN CAIRO 
 
 
When the Guomindang government consolidated its rule in Nanjing in 1928, some 
Muslims felt the need to bring their sentiments in line with the new era. Sheikh Nur 
Muhammad Da Pusheng…Ustaaz ‘Abd al-Hakim Sun Shengwu [and others] founded a 
national Muslim association in Shanghai in 1929, with two objectives: strengthening the 
bonds between Muslims and supporting Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People 
in building the new state. These efforts, however, did not yield significant results.  
–Pang Shiqian, 1945, in Arabic568 
 
At one point when I was speaking with Sheikh al-Maraghi, he asked me, “I have heard 
that your students will take up political work upon returning to their country?” “Some of 
them,” I answered. He replied, “They have studied religion; religion is the cause for 
which they should work. God Almighty said: ‘It is not for the believers to go forth into 
battle all at once. A group of them should always remain to grow in their understanding 
of the religion and to warn their people when they return, that perchance they might be 
cautious.’ Taking part in politics is unavoidable, but perhaps other brothers of yours 
could be sent to do that work. The cause of religion wanes by the day. The Prophet, peace 
be upon him, said: ‘When Muslims leave home, they must also return.’ But we must not 
lose hope. As the Quran tells us, those who despair are without belief.” 
–Pang Shiqian, 1950, in Chinese, recalling the words of Mustafa al-Maraghi569 
 
 
Introduction: The Chinese Muslims in Cairo 
 
The preceding chapters have illustrated various aspects of Chinese Muslims’ engagement with 
and application of Islamic modernism in the first four decades of the twentieth century. Chapter 
One surveyed the rise of Islamic modernist institutions and traced how leading ulama identified 
Islamic modernism by around 1930 as the most correct and relevant body of thought to follow. 
Chapter Two analyzed how this engagement with Islamic modernism informed Chinese 
Muslim’s participation in Guomindang frontier nation-building, especially but not exclusively in 
the realm of wartime frontier education. Chapter Three introduced how Islamic modernism 
                                                 
568 Tawadu‘ (Pang), al-Sin wa-l-Islam, p. 84.  
 
569 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 96. The first quotation from al-Maraghi is Quran 9:122 (al-Tawbah, i.e. Repentance). In al-
Maraghi’s last sentence, Pang quotes him as though he is quoting Quran 60:13 verbatim; the actual phrase differs 
somewhat, but nevertheless implies Pang’s meaning: “O you who have believed, do not make allies of a people with 
whom God has become angry. They have despaired of [reward in] the Hereafter just as the disbelievers have 
despaired of [meeting] the inhabitants of the graves.” 
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provided a set of polemics and temporal and spatial logics to help counter Han Chinese 
Islamophobia and re-narrate Sino-Islamic history in terms of Muslims’ “contributions to Chinese 
civilization.” The end of Chapter Three and Chapter Four detailed how that narrative of 
contribution shaped GMD-sponsored Chinese Muslim diplomacy toward Muslim countries 
during the war with Japan, in the context of the nationalization of the Hajj and the increasing 
regulation, co-optation, and deputization of Chinese Muslim travel abroad.  
The present chapter introduces a new dimension in the relationship between the dynamics 
of borderless textual transnationalism emphasized in Chapters One and Three and those of 
bordered co-optation emphasized in Two and Four, turning to the history of the Chinese Muslim 
student delegations to al-Azhar, Cairo’s millennium-old center of Islamic learning. The young 
Chinese Muslim ulama’s journeys to Cairo in the 1930s and 1940s were arguably the most 
significant and complex episode in Chinese Muslims’ rediscovery of the Islamic world outside 
China, their engagement with Islamic modernism, and the enlistment of those activities within 
the now familiar matrix of elite Chinese Muslim integrationism, Chinese nationalism, GMD 
nation-building, and wartime exigencies. The Chinese Azharites’ story epitomizes the ways in 
which Islamic modernism represented the fruition of Chinese Muslims’ growing transnational 
connections, yet still subtly honed the tools for making Islam Chinese. 
After providing the necessary background on al-Azhar and its modern reforms, this 
chapter focuses on three questions: First, who were the Chinese Azharites? What motives and 
mechanisms explain their unique stories and superlative (yet co-optable) achievements? Second, 
what was the intellectual and social world that received them in Cairo, at al-Azhar and beyond? 
What Arabic-speaking audiences were interested in what they had to say about China and Islam 
in China, and why? Third, what did the Chinese Azharites learn from that world? How did 
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Islamic modernist thought, absorbed from the source, promise to inform and refine the 
integrationist politics of their elite Chinese Muslim and GMD sponsors? What elements of that 
Islamic modernism, in the view of the Chinese Azharites, mattered most to Islam in China? 
On the one hand, the Chinese Azharites’ journeys “in search of knowledge” (Ar. talab al-
‘ilm; Ch. qiuxue or qiuzhi) represented an unprecedented opportunity for engagement with a 
major Muslim society and a major center of Islamic thought. These journeys had the potential, 
they felt, to reverse Chinese Muslims’ centuries of isolation from the Islamic world outside 
China. Did they succeed? To answer this question, this chapter considers the perspectives of the 
Arabic-speaking Middle Eastern Muslim actors with whom the Chinese Azharites met and 
whose works they read. It traces in depth the status of “China” and Chinese Islam in modern 
Arabic and Islamic thought in the Middle East. As will be detailed below, these topics 
consistently drew the attention of several well-known Egyptian and Arab intellectuals, ulama, 
monarchs, publishers, and Muslim activists, including the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 
On the other hand, the inescapable question of Chinese Muslims’ status in China, and 
particularly the fate of the Northwest frontiers, overshadowed and fundamentally shaped even 
this otherwise multifaceted episode. The Azhar missions began in the early 1930s at the same 
time as the GMD’s Northwest frontier development, and many Muslim leaders who were 
involved in the one were also involved in the other, especially the administration of Chengda 
Academy. Tang Kesan, Ma Songting, Da Pusheng, Bai Chongxi, and others assumed that the 
Chinese Azharites would return to China after their studies in order to improve the quality and 
quantity of Chinese Muslim instructors sent to the Northwest to educate, Sinicize, and integrate 
the Muslims living there.570 Again, as the thinking went, Chinese Muslim ulama returning from 
                                                 
570 Though not always articulated explicitly, statements such as the Fu’ad Library committee’s book request letter 
from Chapter Two make clear how study in Egypt was in fact designed to serve the interests of nation-building and 
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Egypt could train cadres of instructors to open frontier schools, teach an Islamic modernist 
curriculum, rectify erroneous Sufi traditions, and thereby transform “superstitious” and 
“irrational” frontier Muslims into good modern Muslims and patriotic Chinese citizens. This is 
what Chinese Muslim leaders meant when they said that students were going to al-Azhar to gain 
deeper knowledge of Islam in keeping with “modern trends.”  
The Chinese Azharites possessed the potential to make that initiative considerably more 
sophisticated. So far, the GMD state and its elite Chinese Muslim allies had approached frontier 
Muslims with a program of blunt Sinicization through Chinese language instruction and 
indoctrination in the Three People’s Principles. As Pang Shiqian’s first statement above suggests, 
some members of the younger generation of Chinese Muslim ulama felt that their leaders’ efforts 
to cooperate with the GMD government, form national-level communal organizations, and 
support frontier development had been somewhat superficial. After all, the Sinicizing approach 
to the frontiers, as well as Chinese Muslim leaders’ perhaps transparently embellished 
professions of nationalism, had not worked. Frontier Muslims were certainly not leading better 
lives, and many were rising up in rebellion against the GMD government during the war years. 
Moreover, the intercommunal violence and Islamophobia discussed in previous chapters 
continued unabated throughout the 1930s and 1940s.  
Egypt and al-Azhar offered numerous solutions to the challenges facing Islam and 
Muslims in China. Shaped in multiple ways by their experiences in Cairo, the Chinese Azharites 
exemplified the ways in which modern Chinese Muslims’ exploratory, non-hierarchical 
                                                 
frontier development. More generally, most foreign students attended al-Azhar with the intention of bringing their 
knowledge back to their home societies, but the journey tended to be more strictly bi-directional for the Chinese 
Azharites than for most other Muslim students there, who would often take detours to live and study in other regions 
before re-settling, if they did, in or near their places of origin. 
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transnationalism intersected with pedagogical, hegemonizing integrationism. In at least one case, 
however, a Chinese Azharite attempted instead to posit an expanded commitment to Islamic 
modernist conceptions of human reason as an alternative basis for helping Islam and Muslims in 
China to survive and, hopefully, achieve a measure of moral and material progress. 
 
The “Beating Heart of the Islamic World”: Al-Azhar and its Modern Reforms 
 
Al-Azhar, regarded as the greatest center of learning in Islam, was established in the Fatimid 
Dynasty (297-567AH/909-1171AD) during the reign of the Caliph al-Mu‘izz li-Din-illah. It was 
the first large mosque in the newly founded city of Cairo. Construction lasted from 
359AH/970AD until 361AH/972AD. Over the centuries, Egypt’s many rulers—Fatimids, 
Ayyubids (1171-1250), Mamluks (1250-1517), Ottomans (1517-1918), and the dynasty of 
Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha (1805-1953)—expanded and renewed al-Azhar’s institutions and 
physical structures on an ongoing basis. The traditional system of instruction involved students 
approaching sheikhs with whom they wanted to study, sitting at their feet on the grounds of the 
mosque, and listening to lessons in groups or “study circles” (halaqat).571 Over time, al-Azhar 
developed new rules and regulations as the number of students increased and as the courses of 
study grew more complex. In the late Ottoman era, however, early generations of modernist 
reformers such as Hassan Al-‘Attar and Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi increasingly agreed that traditional 
madrasa education was insufficient to meet modern challenges; this critique grew in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century under the influence of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani.572 These 
                                                 
571 See Indira Falk Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the Evolution of Modern Sunni Islam 
(I.B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 17-19 on halaqat. There were few formalities such as registration, examinations, or degrees. 
Although the Fatimids were Shia, curricula were eventually set by authorities in each of the four major Sunni 
schools of interpretation and jurisprudence (madhhab, pl. madhahib) as they saw fit. Pang, Aiji jiunian, pp. 1-3. 
 
572 Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism, Chs. 3-4. 
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critiques culminated in al-Azhar’s first “general law” (qanun), promulgated in 1288AH/1872AD 
under the Sheikh al-Azhar Muhammad ‘Abbas al-Mahdi and certified by the Khedive Ismail 
Pasha (r.1863-79). At this point, examinations were instituted for the first time, administered by 
a committee nominated by the Sheikh al-Azhar (i.e. “Rector” or intellectual head of the 
institution). Successful students would obtain the shahada and the rank of ‘alim (“Islamic 
scholar,” divided into three grades). Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), eventually regarded as al-
Azhar’s greatest modernist reformer, was himself a student at al-Azhar during this period, 
passing his exams in 1877.573  
 Several additional reform laws followed under the Khedive ‘Abbas II (r.1892-1914) and 
Fu’ad I (r.1922-36), instituting a new curriculum blending Islamic and “modern” modes of 
learning, encouraged by the Sheikh al-Azhar at the time, Hassunah al-Nawawi, as well as 
Muhammad ‘Abduh.574 The organizational system and curriculum in effect for most of the 
Chinese Azharites’ time in Cairo was based on “Law 26” (Qanun raqam 26) of 1936. This law 
stipulated that studies at al-Azhar would be divided into four levels: (1) a primary school level, 
lasting four years, after which the student would obtain a primary school diploma (2) a high 
school level, lasting five years, the prerequisite for which was the primary school level, and after 
which the student would obtain a high school diploma (3) a college level, lasting four years, the 
prerequisite for which was the high school level (4) a Research Institute. The college was divided 
into three faculties: (1) The Faculty of Law (Kulliyyat al-shari‘a) (2) The Faculty of Theology 
(Kulliyyat usul al-din) (3) The Faculty of Letters (Kulliyyat al-aadab).575 Each of these faculties 
                                                 
573 ‘Abd al-Muta‘al al-Sa‘idi, Tarikh al-Islah fi-l-Azhar wa safahat min al-jihad fi-l-islah [A History of the Reform 
Movement at al-Azhar, with Major Episodes in the Struggle for Reform] (Cairo: Matba‘at al-I‘timad, 1943), pp. 34-
35.  
 
574 Gesink, Islamic Reform, Ch. 6; Tarikh al-islah fi-l-Azhar, pp. 58-59, 73. These included the “Law of 1314” 
(qanun [sanat] 1314), “Law 10” (Qanun raqam 10, 1908). 
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taught Quran, Hadith, and logic, but approached them from distinct disciplinary perspectives. 
Beyond these core subjects, the three faculties diverged, with the Faculty of Law emphasizing 
principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) and the comparative study of the four madhahib; the 
Faculty of Theology emphasizing tawhid, ethics, and philosophy; and the Faculty of Letters 
emphasizing the structures, history, and literary production of the Arabic language. The shahada 
in each of these faculties would be granted upon the students’ passing all its subordinate fields 
(eight in all for law; ten for theology, fifteen for literature). Upon obtaining the college-level 
shahada, a newly minted ‘alim could pursue advanced studies in the Research Institute, which 
was divided into two departments: (1) The Specialized Subjects Department (qism al-
takhassus),576 consisting of Justice, Da‘wa, and Education subdivisions, and (2) The Research 
Department, consisting of subdivisions for sharia, tawhid, Quran and Hadith, history of Islam, 
and Arabic language.577 The main purpose of the Research Institute was to refine al-Azhar’s 
pedagogy and content at all levels, college, high-school, and primary. 
 While prioritizing the Islamic sciences in content, the form of al-Azhar’s modernist 
curriculum drew upon an increasingly global pedagogical consensus typified and propagated by 
institutions such as Columbia University’s Teachers’ College in the age of John Dewey, well-
known for directly or indirectly influencing generations of students from China, the Middle East, 
and elsewhere. This influence is visible not only in the inclusion of subjects such as psychology, 
education, physical education, and so on, but even more fundamentally in the rigid subdivision 
of the curriculum by discipline and time, in the institutionalization of standards for content and 
                                                 
575 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 4; Tarikh al-islah fi-l-Azhar. 
 
576 Several Qism al-takhassus documents are available on www.alazharmemory.org.  
 
577 Pang, Aiji jiunian, pp. 5-6. 
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student performance, and in the conviction that all subjects technical or non-technical could and 
should be taught “scientifically.”  
Al-Azhar’s purpose was to improve knowledge of Islam and the Arabic language, or in 
Pang’s words, to “develop Islamic civilization for every corner of the world.”578 This mission 
made al-Azhar not only a unique institution, but a unique community. According to Pang (and no 
doubt many of his colleagues), al-Azhar was a source of “correct thought,” of “answers to all 
manner of questions regarding Islam,” and of intellectual and pedagogical “standards” that could 
be profitably applied to Muslim societies elsewhere.579 Al-Azhar’s official periodical, Nur al-
Islam (later known as Majallat al-Azhar, 1930-), distilled much of this thought, these answers, 
and these standards, and was read, discussed, and translated by modernist Muslims everywhere. 
According to Pang, its library, constructed starting in 1897, housed forty thousand volumes by 
the 1940s, “perhaps fifteen thousand of these [were] manuscripts, including major classic works 
and treasured rare editions, many written by the authors themselves.”580 Al-Azhar’s prestige 
derived not only from rigor or authority, but from its universalizing aspirations, its pluralistic 
atmosphere, and its breadth of audience. The school’s laws stated that it would admit Muslims 
regardless of nationality at all levels. Pang noted that students were not divided by nationality 
(except for residential purposes), and that foreign students in fact “received special treatment.”581 
Moreover, he asserted, “The foreign and Egyptian students get along equally well. They do not 
                                                 
578 Ibid., p. 9. 
 
579 Ibid., p. 14. For the closest comparison to the case of the Chinese Azharites, see Mona Abaza, “Some Research 
Notes on Living Conditions and Perceptions among Indonesian Students in Cairo,” Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 22/2 (September 1991): pp. 347-60; Michael Laffan, “An Indonesian Community in Cairo: Continuity and 
Change in a Cosmopolitan Islamic Milieu,” Indonesia 77 (April 2004): pp. 1-26. 
 
580 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 11. 
 
581 Ibid., p. 9. 
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segregate themselves, but work together on their research and studies.” After completing their 
studies, the non-Egyptian students would “return to their home countries to propagate Islamic 
culture and act as guides for their people.”582 Overall, al-Azhar gave life and weight to the 
Quranic statement, often invoked by the Chinese Azharites and their counterparts in Cairo, that 
“Verily all the believers are brothers” (innama al-mu’minuna ikhwatun, 49:10, al-Hujurat). “Al-
Azhar,” Pang felt compelled to add, “is the beating heart of the Islamic world.” 
 
Journeys in Search of Knowledge: Careers and Thought of the Chinese Azharites 
 
Foreign students were a prominent presence at al-Azhar in the first half of the twentieth century. 
According to Pang’s count, there were 613 foreign students from 36 countries studying at al-
Azhar in 1940, or 4.5 percent of the total 13,673 students enrolled at all levels. Assuming that the 
foreign students were disproportionately weighted at the college level, and that many of the 
primary- and high-school-level students were at al-Azhar’s branch locations in other cities and 
provinces, the proportion of foreign students among their immediate peers in Cairo could have 
been much higher, perhaps 25 percent.583 The foreign students lived in special dormitories 
organized by country or region, known as riwaq (pl. arwiqa).584 Overall, al-Azhar’s funding, 
                                                 
582 Ibid. 
 
583 I am assuming that the primary- and high-school-level students were predominantly though certainly not 
exclusively Egyptian. I am also assuming that foreign students at the lower levels would be more likely to come 
from neighboring countries, especially Sudan, Libya, Palestine, and Syria. At the extreme, if all 613 foreign students 
were enrolled in the college (unlikely, but important for the sake of argument), they would represent 31 percent of 
the total 1,963. As a comparison, in 2013, Harvard University stated that approximately 20 percent of the incoming 
undergraduate class of 2017 were foreigners, including foreign citizens, U.S. duals, and permanent residents. 
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2013/03/college-admits-2029-5-8-percent-of-applicants/.  
 
584 Originally organized by the Fatimid Caliph al-‘Aziz Billah (r.975-996AD) and located in the vicinity of the 
Azhar Mosque, the riwaq system was a form of pious endowment (waqf, pl. awqaf), with each one generally 
established by a wealthy patron from the same country or region as the riwaq’s students. For a detailed picture of the 
riwaq system in modern times, see Abaza and Laffan on the Indonesian community, as well as Gesink, Islamic 
Reform, Ch. 7. 
 
 310 
including for students’ stipends (from 3LE to 20LE per month, depending on seniority and 
achievement), came from the royal coffers, the national treasury, the Ministry of Pious 
Endowments, and the charity of senior officials and other notable figures. Stipends for the sixth 
and final delegation of Chinese Azharites (1938-46), led by Pang, were provided by King Farouq 
I out of his personal funds.585 
 
Turkey 75 
Maghrib (Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria) 136 










China  28 
Yemen 34 




Java (including Java, Sumatra, and Malaya) 57 
TOTAL 613 
Table. Al-Azhar’s foreign students, 1940. Source: Pang, Aiji jiunian, pp. 10-11. 
 
A few observations are warranted. First, the sheer range of countries is remarkable. The 
countries of the Middle East and North Africa understandably sent more students than other 
countries and regions, but perhaps neither as absolutely nor as disproportionately as one would 
expect. China was sending more students than Iraq, for example. Second, the fact that China sent 
far more students than India reflects the relatively high quality of Indian Islamic educational 
institutions, and the relative weakness, real or perceived, of Chinese ones. Third, as was already 
                                                 
585 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 15.  
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well-known, a huge number of students came to al-Azhar from Java—significant for the present 
study because the Chinese Azharites appear to have gotten along particularly well with the Jawi 
students, due to perceptions of cultural affinity, of similar “remoteness” from the core lands of 
Islam, of shared experiences of European imperialism, and of the similar challenges facing 
reform-minded modernist Muslims in their countries, especially toward the field of education.586 
  Before the Chinese Azharites, Muslims from China had in fact traveled to Egypt from 
time to time and participated in these transnational networks, usually only one or two at a time, 
for at least a century.587 The first who definitely reached Egypt was Imam Ma Dexin (a.k.a. Ma 
Fuchu, 1794-1874), a merchant and scholar from Dali, Yunnan. Ma reached Egypt on 5 Shawwal 
1260/17 October 1844 after making the Hajj.588 His travelogue, Chaojin tuji (Record of a 
Pilgrimage), was published in Yunnan in 1864 by Ma Rulong.589 The work is unusual in that it 
gives proper nouns in both Arabic script (indicated in italics below) and character-based Chinese 
transliteration (also indicated below) within the Chinese text. Upon arriving in “Mi-si-er” (i.e. 
Misr, generally meaning Egypt, but here meaning Cairo), Ma observed that:  
                                                 
586 Mona Abaza, “Some Research Notes on Living Conditions and Perceptions among Indonesian Students in 
Cairo,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 22/2 (September 1991): pp. 347-60; Michael Laffan, “An Indonesian 
Community in Cairo: Continuity and Change in a Cosmopolitan Islamic Milieu,” Indonesia 77 (April 2004): 1-26. 
 
587 The previous chapter discussed Ma Huan of Yunnan, who reached Mecca with the Zheng He expeditions in the 
early fifteenth century; Ma Laichi of Linxia, Gansu, who studied in Yemen with an Indian Naqshbandi sheikh in the 
1730s and returned to establish the Huasi order of the Naqshbandiyya at Linxia’s Huasi Gongbei; and Ma Mingxin, 
who established a branch of the Jahriyya in the same region. Available evidence, however, suggests that these 
figures did not reach Egypt. Fletcher, “The Naqshbandiyya”; Lipman, Familiar Strangers. 
 
588 Ma left China in 1257/1841 and reached Mecca the following year. Pang says he reached Egypt in 1836, which is 
impossible, and probably a typo. Ma visited Alexandria, Istanbul, and Palestine before returning to Egypt briefly in 
November 1261AH (late 1845AD), making another journey to Mecca, and returning to Egypt a third time in Dhul-
hijjah 1262 (late 1846).  
 
589 Ma Rulong was a powerful Muslim general in Yunnan’s Muslim rebellions of 1856-72 who switched sides to 
support the Qing in 1862, two years before he published Ma Dexin’s Chaojin tuji. While it is impossible to know 
how much Ma Rulong may have altered the text to accord with his political change of heart, perhaps it was enough 




Misr/Mi-si-er is an enormous city. At the present time, its ruler is Muhammad 
‘Ali/Mu-han-mo-de Er-li. Great wisdom and great heroism are his. He excels in 
both thought and action. In his dominion of Misr/Mi-si-er, he establishes [new 
institutions], stores up [funds], sells [goods], and expands [the state]. He also 
supports all manner of learning, crafts, and industry. He studies Firansi/Fu-lang-
xi [French] society. Anything that is needed, he makes; he does not go begging 
things from others. His kingdom is Muslim/Mu-si-lin, with a large population. 
There are over one hundred mosques in the city. The most imposing and 
magnificent of these is the Jami‘ al-Azhar/Zhuo-mi-er-a-zi-xie. The followers of 
numerous sages and schools of thought reside in this country. Among the graves 
of its notables is the tomb of al-Shafi‘i/Sha-fei-er, which the people often visit.590  
 
Pang states that Ma received one to two years of formal education in Cairo, presumably at al-
Azhar.591 Unfortunately, Ma’s Chaojin tuji does not specify, but it would seem entirely possible 
given the long stretches of time he would spend in each locale, and given the amount of 
information omitted in his tantalizingly concise account.592 Equally provocatively, al-Azhar 
claims that the Chinese dormitory, or riwaq al-Sin, was established in the nineteenth century—
later than those of most major Muslim countries, but considerably earlier than we might 
expect.593 It remains unknown who may have established and funded this Chinese riwaq.  
 Chinese Muslims returned to al-Azhar in the early twentieth century, at which point they 
began relying on al-Azhar more concertedly as a basis for educational reforms in China. As 
discussed in Chapter One, from 1905 to 1907, Imam Wang Kuan (Wang Haoran) and his “most 
brilliant pupil” Imam Ma Debao, made a journey to both Egypt and Istanbul. Upon returning to 
                                                 
590 Ma Fuchu, Chaojin tuji, p. 8. See Petersen, Interpreting Islam in China, especially pp. 113-21. 
 
591 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 16.  
 
592 Ma states that he went to Mecca yet again in 1263, where he met a Javanese man named Ahmad Mushaffi‘. He 
left Jedda for Southeast Asia in mid-1263/1847. He spent time in Aceh and Singapore, and met “Sayyid ‘Umar of 
Hadramawt” in Singapore, i.e. Syed Sharif Omar bin Ali Al Junied (d.1852), the patriarch of the al-Junied family in 
Singapore. He then went north through India and Afghanistan before turning westward yet again, arriving in 
Damascus, Tripoli, and back in Egypt, intending to make the Hajj again. The narrative terminates here. 
 
593 “Al-Ba‘athat al-ta‘limiyya li-talabat al-duwal al-islamiyya fi-l-Azhar [Islamic Countries’ Student Delegations to 
al-Azhar],” Azhar Memory. http://alazharmemory.eg/topics/topicsDetails.aspx?id=43#. 
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Beijing, these two imams began to implement a reformed style of Islamic education at Niujie 
Mosque emphasizing Quran, Hadith, and Arabic language education. In the following two 
decades, al-Azhar’s role increased after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Ataturk’s 
abolition of traditional Islamic educational institutions in Istanbul. Imams Ha Decheng and Zhou 
Zibin, as well as Imam Wang Jingzhai and his apprentice Ma Hongdao, all spent time in 
Egypt.594 Pang relates that “these figures all traveled to Egypt to study as individuals, often 
without a fixed plan.”595 The formal, bilaterally state-sponsored, and meticulously planned 
Chinese Azharite delegations of the 1930s and 1940s therefore represented a chance to build on 
and systematize a heretofore piecemeal process of transmission and institutionalization. 
 The Chinese Azharites, thirty-five individuals in total, traveled to Egypt in six groups of 
one to fifteen people each, the first arriving in December 1931 and the last departing in April 
1946. In general terms, they were all male, almost all in their twenties, and all extremely 
hardworking students. They possessed a relatively high level of proficiency in both Chinese and 
Arabic, a key criterion for selection; most knew some English, French, or perhaps Japanese as 
well. They studied in all three of al-Azhar’s college-level faculties, though many required 
remedial Arabic lessons first. Most gained their shahada. It is remarkable, and a testament to 
their determination and assiduousness, that their proficiency in Arabic sufficed to achieve this, 
particularly given the near impossibility of learning Egyptian colloquial Arabic in China.596 In 
                                                 
 
594 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 16. Pang adds that around the time of the First World War, Zhao Yingxiang of Jiezhou, 
Gansu, and Ma Kaitang of Xing’an, Shaanxi, also traveled to Egypt and formally enrolled in a course of study at al-
Azhar—illustrating that reformism linked to al-Azhar, generally a concern of urban coastal Chinese Muslims, could 
at times extend into the interior. 
 
595 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 16. 
 
596 Ma Songting and Zhao Zhenwu agreed with al-Azhar and King Fu’ad I to bring two Azhar instructors to China in 
1933 to teach at Chengda, but there is no evidence that these instructors provided formal instruction in 
conversational Arabic. 
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addition, many were prolific writers and translators, continuing to publish in Chinese in Yuehua 
and other venues during their time in Egypt, and in some cases publishing original articles, 
books, or translations in Arabic as well. Many also enjoyed public success upon returning to 
China between 1939 and 1947, becoming involved in frontier education reform, diplomacy, 
higher education (especially Arabic instruction and historical research), translating, writing and 
publishing, local or national Muslim institutions, or Muslim community leadership, while in 
some cases also continuing to work as ulama.597 The Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1958 and the 
Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, however, brought a sharp downturn in the fortunes of some. 
Certain aspects of the Chinese Azharites’ stories have been rehabilitated and celebrated since the 
1980s, usually with a high degree of selectivity, as exemplars of “patriotic religious figures.” 
While perhaps not immediately obvious, politics mattered for the Chinese Azharites even 
more than academic or professional achievement. Crucially, almost all of them hailed from 
China’s majority-Han coastal cities or agrarian regions—Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Hunan, 
Hebei, Henan, Shandong, and Shanxi—or from Sichuan or Yunnan, which tended to be tied into 
the same networks despite their relative distance from the coast. Only three of the thirty-five 
came from the frontiers: two from Xinjiang and one from Chahar (a now defunct province 
comprising portions of present-day Ningxia and Inner Mongolia). Moreover, thirty-four of the 
thirty-five, including the three from Xinjiang and Chahar, were trained at Islamic modernist 
institutions in China: Yunnan’s Mingde High School, Beijing’s Chengda Academy (run by Ma 
                                                 
 
597 Specifically, before 1949, the Chinese Azharites earned teaching positions and helped establish Arabic 
departments at Peking University (Beijing daxue), National Central University (Zhongyang daxue), Nanjing Eastern 
Languages Institute (Nanjing dongfang yuyan zhuanke xuexiao), Yunnan University (Yunnan daxue), and so on. 
After 1949, they worked at Peking University (where Ma Jian established the Arabic Department), Beijing Foreign 
Languages University (Beijing waiguo yuyan daxue), Beijing Normal University (Beijing shifan daxue, where Pang 
Shiqian established the Arabic Department), and the People’s Liberation Army Foreign Languages University 
(Jiefangjun waiguo yuyan daxue). See Chinese Azharites 80th anniversary edited volume, intro p. 4. 
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Songting and Tang Kesan, with input from Wang Jingzhai), or Shanghai’s Islamic Normal 
School (operated by Ha Decheng and Da Pusheng).  
Rather tellingly, the thirty-fifth—Hai Weiliang a.k.a. Badr al-Din al-Sini, born to humble 
origins in rural Hunan, educated in India after the primary level, proceeding directly from there 
to Egypt, and therefore neither conditioned by GMD politics nor compelled to take a 
qualification exam in China prior to studying at al-Azhar—was the only Chinese Azharite who 
was overtly critical of the Chinese state, and who openly advocated Islamic solidarity in a 
political form. This was especially the case when Hai wrote in Arabic, a language in which he 
gained greater fluency and wrote more prolifically even than Pang Shiqian. Hai’s hero was Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani, a figure he lauded in both his Arabic and Chinese writings.598 
At least in public, however, most of the Chinese Azharites professed nationalistic 
sentiments and supported reforming Islamic education across China. They may have had little 
choice in the matter. Funded partly by the GMD Ministry of Education (making them ostensibly 
answerable to Chen Lifu from 1938-44), and required to complete a “politics” section on their 
qualification exams (in fact, that was the first section of the exam), they might have been less 
likely to be selected if they had displayed anything seeming like political loyalty to Islam 
(whatever that might mean).599 
In addition, it is politically significant that the Chinese Azharites, unlike the peripatetic 
Ma Dexin, traveled directly to Egypt at the beginning of their studies and returned directly to 
China at the end, with only very short stops in between in port cities such as Aden, Colombo, 
                                                 
 
598 Chen, “Islam’s Loneliest Cosmopolitan.”  
 
599 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 25. 
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Singapore, or Hong Kong (on the other hand, it is also politically significant that they still 
managed to meet during those brief transfers with friends they had met in Cairo).  
 Pang’s description of the preparations for the sixth delegation provides a detailed picture 
of the selection process that had developed by the late 1930s. Although Mustafa al-Maraghi, the 
new Sheikh al-Azhar from 1935, had originally refused to accept additional Chinese delegations, 
al-Azhar eventually provided a quota of twenty students for the sixth delegation, to be drawn 
from the most promising students at Chengda. Due to the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), 
breaking out just as the sixth delegation was being formed, only fifteen of these slots could be 
filled.600 The selection committee, organized by Ma Songting and consisting of Wang Jingzhai 
and other prominent imams from northern China, required certain qualifications based on 
guidelines from al-Azhar: namely, that the students believe in Islam, that they possess “suitable 
proficiency” in Arabic, that they be graduates of senior high school or a high-level teacher-
training institution, that they provide a diploma, and that they pass a medical examination.601 
Significantly, available original documents from al-Azhar showing the requirements for foreign 
students make no mention of “political” qualifications; this portion of the qualification exam was 
added on the Chinese side. Above and beyond what al-Azhar requested, Chengda also required a 
list of Arabic classic texts already read; tests of Arabic composition, translation, grammar, and 
conversation; a test of doctrinal knowledge; tests of Chinese and foreign history and geography; 
tests of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and hygiene; an oral interview; a statement of 
                                                 
 
600 Ibid., p. 27; Yufeng Mao, “Selective Learning from the Middle East,” in Lipman, ed., Islamic Thought in China, 
p. 149. Interestingly, Pang notes that Shan Kexing and Ma Xiang, two Chengda students who achieved selection and 
traveled with the group as far as Hong Kong could not participate because they were called back to work at the 
Gansu Education Bureau. 
 
601 Nizam qubul al-ghuraba’ [Regulations on the Admission of Foreign Students]. Azhar Memory. 
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intended time abroad, from five to eight years; the signed permission of their “head of family”; 
and a personal photo.602 
 The first delegation of Chinese Azharites arrived in Cairo on 20 December 1931, 
traveling aboard the André Lepon, the same French steamer that had transported the young Deng 
Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai to France in fall 1920.603 The four students in this first delegation—Ma 
Jian, Na Zhong, Lin Zhongming, and Zhang Youcheng—all came from Yunnan.604 Muslims had 
long played a special role in Yunnan’s history: in 1273, Qubilai Khan appointed Sayyid ‘Ajall 
Shams al-Din of Bukhara as its governor, at which time many Muslims settled in the province, 
which had never before been part of “China.”605 The Muslim-dominated trade routes in tea and 
other goods that connected Yunnan to Burma, India, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean meant 
that Yunnan, despite being landlocked, was in more regular contact with the outside Islamic 
world than most other regions of China, and specifically with the same maritime networks to 
which China’s urban coastal Muslims would also be drawn in the twentieth century. This 
dynamic reached a new milestone in 1930, when the Yunnan Islamic Progress Association 
(Yunnan huijiao cujinhui) contacted al-Azhar asking if it could send them a student delegation, 
to which al-Azhar agreed.  
Sha Guozhen (1884-1970), director of pedagogy at Kunming’s Mingde High School 
(Mingde zhongxue), affiliated with the Yunnan Islamic Progress Association, led this first 
student delegation and became director of the Chinese riwaq at al-Azhar until Pang Shiqian took 
                                                 
 
602 Pang, Aiji jiunian, pp. 23-25. 
 
603 Benjamin Yang, Deng: A Political Biography (M.E. Sharpe, 1998; Routledge, 2015), Ch. 3. 
 
604 At this point, Ma Jian was studying at the Shanghai Islamic Normal School, but his hometown was Mengzi, 
Yunnan.  
 
605 Jackie Armijo, “Shams al-Din.” 
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over the position in 1941. Sha’s generation of Yunnanese Muslim scholars had studied in a new-
style madrasa system created by Ma Dexin’s lead disciple, Ma Lianyuan (1841-1903), who 
returned to Yunnan in 1872 after making the Hajj, just as the Panthay Rebellion was ending, and 
for several years proceeded to reform Yunnan’s scripture-hall education system “with great 
success.”606 The Yunnan Islamic Progress Association emerged out of this institutional 
framework and ideological orientation. After the Qing’s defeat of the rebellion’s two 
independent Muslim states and its massacre of thousands of Yunnan’s Muslims, Ma Lianyuan 
and his associates had little choice but to focus on non-subversive pursuits such as education 
reform. The Yunnanese Chinese Azharites were direct inheritors of this legacy. 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the first delegation from Chengda, and the second 
overall, was delivered by Ma Songting and Zhao Zhenwu during their journey to Egypt, arriving 
in December 1932. Its members were Han Hongkui, Wang Shiming, Jin Diangui, Ma Jinpeng, 
and Zhang Bingduo. The third, arriving in March 1934, came again from the Mingde High 
School in Yunnan, and consisted of Na Xun (brother of Na Zhong), Ma Junwu, and Lin Xinghua. 
The fourth, arriving in May 1934, was from the Shanghai Islamic Normal School, and consisted 
of Jin Zichang, Ding Zhongming, Hu Enjun, Lin Xingzhi, and Ma Youlian. 
 Several of these figures were superlative in their intellectual production as authors and 
translators. Ma Jian was perhaps the most prolific. He published well over one hundred Chinese 
articles in Yuehua, Yisilan xuesheng zazhi (the periodical of the Shanghai Islamic Normal 
School), and other periodicals, both while in China and while in Cairo. In Cairo, he also 
                                                 
 
606 Gao Fayuan and Yao Jide, eds., Zhongguo xuesheng liuxue aiji 80 zhounian jinian wenji [Essays 
Commemorating the Eightieth Anniversary of the Chinese Muslim Student Delegations to Egypt] (Kunming: Yunnan 
UP, 2011), pp. ii-iii. Ma Lianyuan died in Kanpur, India, teaching there for a time while intending to make another 
Hajj (in his sixties). His tomb still exists in Kanpur. 
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translated the Analects of Confucius into Chinese, published in Arabic in the journal al-Fath in 
the mid-1930s. Al-Fath also published a book based on Ma Jian’s 1934 well-attended lectures on 
Islam in China (see below). Ma also translated T.J. de Boer’s History of Philosophy in Islam 
(1901), Hussein al-Jisr’s al-Risala al-hamidiyya fi haqiqat al-diyana al-Islamiyya (A Hamidian 
Tract on Islam’s Basis in Fact), Muhammad ‘Abduh’s Risalat al-tawhid (Treatise on the 
Doctrine of God’s Unicity), and ‘Abduh’s al-Islam wa-l-Nasraniyya ma‘a-l-‘ilm wa-l-madaniyya 
(Islam and Christianity Compared in Learning and Urbanity) into Chinese. Ma’s most notable 
achievement, however, was his complete translation of the Quran into Chinese, the first Chinese 
version to be based primarily on the Arabic original, published in 1946. 
 Ma Jian’s colleagues from the first four delegations undertook projects of similar scope 
and ambition. Na Zhong translated Ahmed Amin’s (1886-1954) eight-volume history of the 
Arabs and Islam, Fajr al-Islam (The Dawn of Islam, 1928), Duha al-Islam (The Forenoon of 
Islam, 1933-36), and Zuhr al-Islam (The High Noon of Islam, 1945-53), from Arabic to Chinese 
as Alabo-Yisilan wenhua shi (The History of Arab-Islamic Civilization). He also translated 
Phillip K. Hitti’s History of the Arabs (Alabo tongshi). His brother Na Xun, meanwhile, 
translated the Thousand and One Nights into Chinese (Yi qian yi ye). Finally, Ma Jinpeng, 
introduced in Chapter Three as the translator of Sheikh Muhammad Farid Wajdi’s “scientific 
exegetical” writings on the medical benefits of fasting, was also the translator of the Rihla of Ibn 
Battuta (1304-69), a work of special significance given that the famous traveler spent 
considerable time in China, commented on its Muslim populations, and preferred to live in 
Muslim quarters while there.607 Between these three individuals and the works they translated, 
the dual emphasis on literature and history stands out, as does the contrast between the Arabo-
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centric (Na Zhong/Ahmed Amin/Phillip Hitti, Ma Junwu/Taha Hussein) versus trans-Asian (Ma 
Jinpeng/Ibn Battuta) conceptions of Islamic history.  
 As already indicated, Hai Weiliang (1912-?) of Hunan, who arrived relatively 
unannounced in February 1935 as the one-person “fifth delegation,” was unique among this 
already remarkable group—probably the first Chinese Muslim since Ma Dexin to travel and 
study in both India and Egypt. While still a teenager studying Islamic classics in Shanghai, Hai 
joined a delegation departing by steamship for the Hajj. Rather than returning to China, he 
disembarked in Calcutta, where a Medinan imam found him room and board at an inn across 
from one of the large mosques. Hai soon moved to Delhi and audited classes at the Jamia Millia 
Islamia (founded in 1920 by Indian Muslim leaders), supported by university director Dr. Zakir 
Hussain Khan (Al-Fath 565: 20). Teaching himself English and Urdu, Hai enrolled at Aligarh, 
where he wrote a thesis on Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Principles of the People.” Nearing age twenty, 
Hai moved again from Delhi to Lucknow to study at the Nadwat al-‘Ulama, founded in 1894 and 
committed to teaching the orthodox Islamic sciences exclusively in Arabic. In Lucknow, Hai 
began to publish essays on contemporary Islamic-world politics in Yuehua and slightly later in 
al-Fath (1926-48) under his Arabic name, Badr al-Din al-Sini. At the same time, he produced a 
book-length study in Urdu entitled The Chinese Muslims (Chini-Musalman, 1935), under the 
equivalent name Badruddin Chini.608 Hai departed India in 1934 and joined his Chinese 
colleagues at al-Azhar in Cairo, studying philosophy,609 history, and Arabic, while also 
continuing to submit to Yuehua and al-Fath. Hai’s arrival independent of a planned government-
                                                 
 
608 Badruddin Chini [a.k.a. Hai Weiliang], Chini Musalman [Chinese Muslims] (1935). This Urdu text was endorsed 
by the leading Nadwa scholars Sayyid Sulayman al-Nadwi and Mas‘ud ‘Ali al-Nadwi. 
 
609 In this context, the Chinese term zhexue, usually signifying “philosophy,” may refer to “theology” i.e. usul al-din, 
though the modern field of “philosophy,” both Islamic and otherwise, was also offered at al-Azhar and required for 
students in the Faculty of Theology. 
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sponsored delegation caused some administrative confusion at al-Azhar, delaying his stipend 
disbursement. Sha Guozhen wrote promptly and assertively to Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-
Zawahiri, Sheikh al-Azhar at the time, to request that Hai receive an allowance “without 
differentiation between him and the Chinese students who have arrived before him…[to be 
processed] as soon as possible.”610 While at al-Azhar, Hai conducted research for his Arabic 
magnum opus al-‘Alaqat bayn al-‘Arab wa-l-Sin, based on the work Arab o Hind ke Ta‘alluqaat 
(Relations between the Arabs and India) by the Nadwa scholar Sayyid Sulayman al-Nadwi.611 
The work was eventually published in Cairo in 1950, and seven years later appeared in Urdu as 
Chin o Arab ke Ta‘alluqaat. 
Known as the “Farouq delegation,” the sixth and final Chinese Azharite delegation was 
led by Pang Shiqian and consisted of fifteen students from Chengda. Apart from Pang himself, 
the members of this delegation were not quite as distinguished as the earlier Chinese Azharites, 
but they nevertheless carried on the same types of work.612  
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612 Ma Jigao of Sichuan, for example, translated some Chinese literary works and children’s stories for al-Thaqafa, 
owned and published by Ahmed Amin. Ma Hongyi of Shanxi, meanwhile, focused on the study and translation of 
Hadith, as discussed in Chapter One. 
 In addition to the thirty-five Chinese Muslims at al-Azhar, Pang’s Nine Years in Egypt lists a group of 
eleven “Xinjiang classmates” as also present in Cairo, arriving between February 1940 and December 1945. The 
“sending institution” for the first four is given as the “Bombay Xinjiang Fellow Provincials Association” (Mengmai 
Xinjiang tongxianghui), which the Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation had made contact with in September 1938 
(see Chapter Four). Unfortunately, like Xue Wenbo, Pang did not provide the English or “Turki” name of this group. 
The Xinjiang group included one female, Khadija, noted as being the wife of a student named Qasim; by 
contrast, as far as we know, the Chinese Muslims as well as the other Xinjiang students did not travel with any 
family members. Many did eventually have spouses and children, but most were in their early twenties at the time of 
their studies in Cairo, and probably still single.  
 
 322 
 Pang Shiqian also stands out among the Chinese Azharites. An imam from the old 
Muslim village of Sangpo, Henan, Pang was an instructor at Chengda and a regular contributor 
to Yuehua from its first issues in 1929. Years before he traveled to Egypt himself, Pang 
published translations in Yuehua of Azhar Sheikh Muhammad al-Khidr Hussein’s “History of 
Islam.” Once in Cairo, Pang enrolled in al-Azhar’s Faculty of Law (Kulliyyat al-sharia). In 
summer 1939, he and Ma Jian led the anti-Japanese “Chinese Islamic Hajj Delegation” discussed 
in Chapter Four. In 1940, Pang was appointed lecturer in al-Azhar’s “Chinese Culture Lecture 
Series,” which he described as “the first series of its kind on China anywhere in the Islamic 
world.”613 Pang became head of the Chinese Azharite delegations in 1941, and head of the 
Chinese riwaq after Sha Guozhen returned to China. In addition, he served as a “consultant on 
Eastern affairs” for King Farouq I, who again was highly involved in al-Azhar’s affairs and 
provided the stipends for the sixth Chinese Azharite delegation. Finally, Pang came to know 
Hassan al-Banna of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Jama‘at al-ikhwan al-muslimin), 
probably through Azhar sheikhs involved in the Brotherhood, such as Muhammad al-Khidr 
Hussein, whose abovementioned work Pang translated. Pang eventually became a member of the 
Brotherhood’s Islamic World Outreach Division (Qism al-ittisal bi-l-‘alam al-islami), and, at al-
Banna’s invitation, the author of the Division’s first publication, al-Sin wa-l-Islam (China and 
Islam, 1945). After returning to China, Pang also published Heping zhi shiming (The Mission of 
Peace, 1948), a Chinese translation of Azhar Sheikh Yusuf al-Dijwi’s apologetic work, Risalat 
al-salam wa rusul al-Islam (literally, “the message of peace and the prophets of Islam”), as well 
as the memoir Aiji jiunian (Nine Years in Egypt, 1950), containing notes on al-Azhar and the 
Chinese Azharites, the journey back to China from Egypt, and reflections on various issues 
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related to Egypt, Islam, China, and Islam in China, including affirmations of core principles and 
polemics of Islamic modernism. 
One purpose of the Chinese Azharites’ Chinese articles and Arabic-to-Chinese and 
English-to-Chinese translations was to make a more complete picture of Islam accessible to 
Chinese Muslims in China, who were generally more likely to be literate in Chinese than in 
Arabic. Another purpose, however, was to make Islam more legible to non-Muslim Chinese, 
both state and society—a task accomplished in part by asserting the commensurability of Arab-
Islamic and Chinese “civilizations.” The fact that many of the Chinese Azharites’ translations 
were published by the Commercial Press (Shangwu yinshuguan) of Shanghai, China’s largest 
and most prestigious publishing house, evinces this latter motive.614 Meanwhile, the Chinese 
Azharites’ Arabic articles and Chinese-to-Arabic translations were intended to inform Arabic-
speaking audiences about China and Islam in China, topics of considerable curiosity for certain 
audiences and prominent thinkers. Having finally made sustained contact with Muslims outside 
China, the Chinese Azharites wanted to ensure that they were not forgotten. 
 Other Chinese Azharites followed alternative but equally prominent paths in diplomacy. 
Wang Shiming of Tianjin, a student from Chengda, was appointed as the GMD Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ first consul-general to Saudi Arabia, stationed in Jeddah during the war (see 
Chapter Four). Ding Zhongming also worked as a GMD diplomat and eventually became 
Taiwan’s ambassador to Libya. Despite his unique background, Hai Weiliang was also recruited 
by the GMD Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the war, stationed first in Tehran (1942-1947), 
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then in New Delhi (1947-1949). After the formation of the PRC, Hai continued to serve for three 
more decades as a Taiwanese diplomat, rarely spending much time there before his retirement in 
1988.615 
 Others still served in domestic positions in the GMD government and Muslim national 
associations during wartime. Zhang Bingduo (1915-2004) of Henan, a Chengda student from the 
second delegation, returned to China in 1938 after six years in Cairo. According to an interview 
with Zhang’s son, the internationally recognized artist Zhang Hongtu, Zhang Bingduo joined 
other Muslim students in Chongqing, where he “broadcast to the world in Arabic about the 
Japanese invasion.” After that, the elder Zhang moved to Pingliang, Gansu—familiar from 
Chapter Two—where his grandfather Zhang Wenzheng had owned a fur and leather business. By 
this point, Da Pusheng’s Pingliang school had been nominally converted to state-run status, but it 
retained many of its Muslim instructors and much of its original Islamic curriculum. For the next 
several years, Zhang taught, translated, authored a book on Hadith, and helped establish new-
style schools for Muslims around Pingliang, in Ningxia, and south to Guilin, focusing on 
promoting Arabic instruction. Hongtu, the second of his five children, was born at Pingliang in 
1943. During the Chinese Civil War, Zhang continued moving the family from Pingliang to 
Shanghai, Suzhou, Nanjing, and Zhengzhou (an important city from which modernist Muslims 
mobilized educational reform efforts, and where Pang Shiqian spent some time). He also 
completed the Hajj twice during this period. Despite considering escape in 1949, Zhang was 
persuaded to stay in China.616  
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 Some questions about the Chinese Azharites’ daily lives in Cairo are warranted. One 
concerns language difficulties. While it would appear, as mentioned above, that the Chinese 
Azharites did not receive specific training in Egyptian colloquial Arabic, Pang does not mention 
difficulties of communication in his memoir, nor does he discuss the differences between 
colloquial (‘ammiyya) versus formal Arabic (fusha)—a ubiquitous discussion point for non-
native students of Arabic in more recent times. Another question concerns the Chinese 
Azharites’ daily routines. They appear to have generally stayed in the vicinity of al-Azhar. They 
did make trips to the pyramids and even to a farm in the Nile Delta, but such excursions were 
probably carefully planned; solitary or spontaneous exploration of the city would almost 
certainly have been discouraged, as well as dis-incentivized by the students’ modest stipends.  
A third question concerns racial perceptions and misperceptions, and the degree of the 
Chinese Azharites’ openness to Egyptians and other non-Chinese acquaintances, and vice versa. 
In general, one expects that some occasional misunderstandings must have occurred, though if 
so, Pang does not emphasize them in Aiji jiunian. On the contrary, Pang states that the Chinese 
Azharites befriended and worked with colleagues from multiple countries at al-Azhar. Aiji 
jiunian mentions that on his way back to China in 1946, Pang visited Nu‘man, who had been at 
al-Azhar until three years before that and was now appointed minister of education in Yemen.617 
Later in the journey, Pang met with Tan Sri Hajj Hassan Yunus (1907-68), the future Mufti of 
Johor, whom he had befriended at al-Azhar.618 While reports of overt racial tension or hierarchy 
                                                 
have been Pang Shiqian, Ma Jian, or Bai Shouyi, all of whom were in Beijing at the time, but this cannot be proven 
with the available sources. 
 
617 It is unclear who this actually is. Al-Azhar’s Yemen rosters from 1936 list an ‘Abdullah ‘Umar Nu‘man, but this 
may not be the same.  
 
618 Pang refers to the individual only as “Hassan,” but context confirms it must be the future Mufti of Johor. 
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are difficult to find in Pang’s Aiji jiunian, it does seem that a special connection formed between 
the Chinese Azharites and the Jawi Azharites, due to perceived affinities of culture and 
geography, and perceived discrepancies between them and their Arab and Egyptian hosts. Such 
perceptions in turn owed themselves to Arabs’ superiority in the Arabic language, their status as 
the world’s first Muslims, and to nationalism. 
For example, at one point Pang observes that Mustafa al-Maraghi, Sheikh al-Azhar from 
1935 to 1945, “was a nationalist (guojia zhuyi, “nation-statist”), and therefore was not overly 
attentive to the affairs of foreign students.”619 To be fair, however, Pang recalls elsewhere in 
Nine Years in Egypt a reasonably in-depth interaction with al-Maraghi discussing the Chinese 
Azharites’ post-graduation plans. Furthermore, in July 1935, not long after assuming the position 
of Sheikh al-Azhar, al-Maraghi had in fact published a message in the Egyptian daily al-Ahram 
responding to a letter from none other than Da Pusheng. Titled “From the Sheikh al-Azhar to the 
Muslims of China,” the message noted that “An organization of the people of China recently sent 
a letter to the Sheikh al-Azhar, from the head of one of the Islamic associations there, Mr. Nur 
Muhammad [Da Pusheng], in which they describe some of the disagreements over madhhabs 
and jurisprudential viewpoints that are afflicting them, and requesting from his excellency that he 
might do them the honor of hosting additional official study delegations at al-Azhar.”620 The first 
five Chinese Azharite delegations had arrived during the tenure of al-Maraghi’s predecessor, 
Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri.621 Perhaps Da’s letter was intended to test the waters with 
the new Sheikh al-Azhar, as much as to convey information about Islam in China. 
                                                 
619 Pang, Aiji jiunian, pp. 76-77.  
 
620 “Min Shaykh al-jami‘ al-Azhar ’ila muslimi al-Sin [From the Sheikh al-Azhar to the Muslims of China],” al-
Ahram, 21 July 1935, p. 9.  
 
621 Zhao, Xixing riji, mentions some direct interactions with al-Zawahiri (who happens to have been the grandfather 
of Ayman al-Zawahiri). 
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 In sum, study at al-Azhar was the highest level of Islamic education the Chinese 
Azharites could achieve—far superior to anything available in China. Al-Azhar’s reformed 
system of education allowed the Chinese Azharites to study Islam with unprecedented 
systematicity. The Chinese Azharites had tremendous respect for Egypt’s education system 
compared to China’s, especially for Muslims. In Pang’s words,  
Of all the world’s examples of Islamic education, that of China’s Muslims must 
be the most backward. In Egypt, by contrast, twenty percent of people receive 
some form of education. In Syria, it is forty percent. Among Chinese generally, 
the number is ten to twelve percent; for China’s Muslims it is five to six percent. 
This is for primary education. As for higher education, it’s a non-starter…The 
works of Egypt and India’s religious scholars are guides to Muslims all over the 
world in religious thought. The sustenance for the religious spirit of the Muslims 
of my country, China, is terribly lacking. From the earliest Chinese translations of 
Islamic texts to the present, only four or five hundred volumes have been 
produced—an average of one per year. Today, in all of China, how many are fully 
versed in the religious sciences? Muslims’ cultural level has risen in recent years, 
but they need spiritual sustenance. Our rate of production has been very low. I 
hope our friends in all corners will help us with this work!”622 
 
 
“China” in Arabic-Islamic Thought, and “Egypt” in Chinese Muslim Thought 
 
The Chinese Azharites did indeed make friends “from all corners” in Cairo. At al-Azhar, they 
neither lived in a vacuum nor merely studied Islam in the formal sense. Rather, they also learned 
new ways of speaking about Islam, about China, and about current global affairs conditioned by 
their Egyptian environment. It would have been impossible to study up to nine years at al-Azhar, 
let alone live that long in Cairo, without absorbing something from this larger atmosphere. At the 
same time, the relatively established presence of a large group of Chinese Muslims in Cairo 
provided answers to a question that had long been taking shape among intellectuals writing in the 
Arab press: What is China? And who are the Chinese Muslims? Thus the sophisticated self-
                                                 
 
622 Pang, Aiji jiunian, pp. 17-18. Pang also expressed admiration for Lucknow and Deoband. Ironically, the Chinese 
term in the last sentence of this passage is 多斯弟们—probably from Persian doost, “friend.” 
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narratives that Chinese Muslim elites had wielded in China came to serve the new purpose of 
explaining China and Chinese Islam to Arabic speakers. This new discursive process both further 
opened up and further reinforced the ethos of transnationalist integrationism.  
 The ways in which Arab thinkers answered the two interrelated questions of China and 
Islam in China underwent three discernible phases from the late nineteenth century through the 
Second World War. First, there was a relatively long “Orientalized” phase from the late 
nineteenth century through the First World War, characterized by limited knowledge, a sense of 
China’s remoteness and mysteriousness, and an inchoate but emerging Arab sense of 
identification with China. Second, there was a more universalist, nationalist, and modernist phase 
during the 1920s and early 1930s, characterized by Egyptians and Chinese viewing each other as 
fellow nation-states pursuing progress in the shadow of imperialism and in the wake of 
revolution. Third, there was a highly complex and protracted “civilizational-historicist” phase 
from the late 1920s through the 1950s, characterized by an upsurge in mutual knowledge and 
direct contact; by Islamic, Easternist, and Arabist inflections; by discourses of florescence or 
“golden ages” versus “decline”; and by forms of “re-Orientalization” in which Eastern nation-
states were seen as the inheritors of “ancient civilizations.” 
 These three phases of Arab views of China closely paralleled the evolving question of 
Egyptian and Arab identity itself. This was arguably one expression of a broader phenomenon 
known then and now as the nahda, or “awakening,” a new era of translation, literary production, 
and expanding mass media that sought to articulate and rearticulate the modern identities of 
Arabic-speaking societies in the context of anticolonialism and rapid socioeconomic change.623 
                                                 
 
623 Studies of the nahda and its relationship to Arab and territorial nationalisms are numerous and cannot all be cited 
here. Some representative works include Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Oxford 
UP, 1962; Cambridge UP, 1983). Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon, eds., 
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From the rise of the Arabic press in the last quarter of the nineteenth century through the First 
World War, the uncertain fate of the Ottoman Empire loomed large for Arabic-speaking 
intellectuals. Thus, during the first phase, such intellectuals viewed China as an old empire 
similarly besieged.624 Attention shifted in the second phase, as Egypt’s nationalist movement 
expanded following Ottoman collapse and the 1919 Revolution, producing a new debate 
                                                 
The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia UP, 1991); James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, eds., 
Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (New York: Columbia UP, 1997); Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, 
Contemporary Arabic Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia UP, 2010); 
Shaden M. Tageldin, Disarming Words: Empire and the Seductions of Translation in Egypt (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011); Stephen Sheehi, “Towards a Critical Theory of al-Nahdah: Epistemology, Ideology, and 
Capital,” Journal of Arabic Literature 43 (2012): pp. 269-98; Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss, Arabic Thought beyond 
the Liberal Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the Nahda (New York: Cambridge UP, 2016). 
 
624 This was especially the case in Shakib Arslan’s multi-part essay “Mustaqbal al-Sin [The Future of China],” 
which appeared in the journal al-Muqtataf in 1900-01. On al-Muqtataf generally, see Ami Ayalon, The Press in the 
Arab Middle East: A History (Oxford UP, 1995), pp. 36, 53-54. On Arslan generally, see Cleveland, Islam Against 
the West. 
 “China” in classical Arabic thought often stood, in a manner somewhere between the literal and the 
figurative, for the limits of the known world. Hence the popularity of the Hadith “Seeketh knowledge even unto 
China” (utlub al-‘ilm walaw bi-l-Sin) even despite its doubted authenticity. The use of the hypothetical conditional 
particle walaw in the phrase (literally, “even if it were in China”) concedes that “China” may be unreachable. The 
fact that many Arabs empirically did reach China as far back as the early ‘Abbasid (750-1258) or mid-Tang (618-
907), that many more were transferred to Beijing following the Mongols’ conquest of Baghdad in 1258, or that a 
handful of Chinese Muslims had traveled to the Arab lands before modern times apparently did not shake the 
general impression of China’s foreignness and inaccessibility. The journeys of Sulayman al-Tajir or Ibn Battuta may 
have resulted in some degree of familiarity, but only against a backdrop of unfamiliarity. On Chinese and Islamic 
societies’ premodern knowledge of one another, see Hyunhee Park, Mapping the Chinese and Islamic Worlds: 
Cross-Cultural Exchange in Pre-modern Asia (New York: Cambridge UP, 2012). 
China remained unknown for Arabic-speaking audiences into the late nineteenth century, continuing to 
appear as a symbol for the farthest frontier of the Islamic world. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh 
spoke of China in such terms in al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa, the “pan-Islamist” journal published in Paris: Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh, “al-Wahda al-Islamiyya [Islamic Unity],” al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa [The Firmest 
Bond], p. 8. ‘Abduh painted China in similar terms elsewhere, for example in Muhammad ‘Abduh, “Intishar al-
Islam [The Spread of Islam],” al-Manar, May 1918, p. 81; originally published in Risalat al-Tawhid [Treatise on the 
Doctrine of God’s Unicity]. 
During the first phase of Arab views of China (1870s-1918), several other voices had grown interested in 
China and Islam in China for multiple reasons. This included the Levantine Christians, who were especially 
interested in the history of Nestorian Christianity in China, as well as Muslim writers who were increasingly 
interested in anti-imperialism in China as well as Islam in China. See for example As‘ad Khalil Daghir, “Saur al-Sin 
al-‘azim [The Great Wall of China],” al-Muqtataf, 1 November 1889, pp. 92-94; “Al-Mas’ala al-Siniyya [The China 
Question],” al-Manar, 1315/1898, pp. 24-25.Luis Shaykhu al-Yasu‘I, “Al-Sin wa-l-mas’ala al-siniyya [China and 
the China Question],” al-Mashriq, 15 September 1900, p. 850; ‘Inayatullah Ahmadi, “Ahwal Muslimi al-Sin: 
Jam‘iyya islamiyya fi Bikin [Conditions of the Muslims of China: An Islamic Association in Peking],” al-Manar, 11 
October 1912, pp. 790-99. 
See also Michael Keevak, The Story of a Stele: China’s Nestorian Monument and its Reception in the West, 
1625-1916 (Hong Kong UP, 2008), pp. 102-09. 
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emerged about the nature of Egyptianness.625 Through the 1920s, many of Egypt’s leading 
intellectuals argued that Egyptian culture was fundamentally tied to the Mediterranean and 
Europe, and that the nation’s destiny ought to be understood with respect to a unique, territorial 
identity and relatively secular, Westernizing principles. Accordingly, Egyptian and Arab China 
observers in this period tended to view it as an old society undergoing transformation into a 
modern nation-state via an equivalent process of revolution and “awakening” (indeed, Chinese 
intellectuals saw their country’s trajectory in similar terms at this time). 
Secular, Westernizing, territorial nationalism failed to resonate with large portions of the 
Egyptian people, however, and as in other colonized and semi-colonized societies, the question 
of how to become stronger and politically independent without losing sight of “culture” and 
“tradition”—modernizing without Westernizing—took center stage. Many Egyptians alleged, for 
example, that Turkey had sacrificed too much of its culture in the quest for progress, and that an 
alternative model was needed. Moreover, many Egyptians saw a role for Islam in daily life and 
in the character of the nation-state, expressed above all in the wide appeal and rapid rise of the 
                                                 
625 I do not mean to elide Egyptianness and Arabness here. At the same time, Egypt figures prominently in the 
sources (especially after the First World War), and one could make the case that Egyptian intellectuals saw greater 
similarities between China and themselves than did Arab writers elsewhere. 
Characteristic writings from this second phase are, for example, Hussein Labib, “Tarikh al-ta‘lim wa-l-
tahdhib fi-l-Sin [History of Education and Training in China],” al-Muqtataf, 1 June 1927, p. 659; Duktur Tshin 
[Chen], “Al-Wataniyya al-Siniyya wa ghayatuha [The Aims of Chinese Nationalism],” al-Majalla al-Jadida 
(November 1929), pp. 76-77. 
 Other Egyptian articles on China focused on the themes of “revolution” and “awakening”: for example, 
Ahmad al-Mukhtar’s translation of an obscure English article, published in al-‘Usur in January 1930 under the title 
“China’s Intellectual Awakening” (Nahdat al-Sin al-fikriyya). This translation introduced Arabic audiences to the 
thought of Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Liang Shuming, and Chen Duxiu, including Chen’s accusations that 
Confucianism was merely “illusions and superstitions”—translated as al-awham wa-l-‘ibadat wa-l-khurafat, labels 
also used by Islamic modernists to condemn Sufism, and by Arab secularists to condemn religion generally. Ahmad 
al-Mukhtar, “Nahdat al-Sin al-fikriyya: hiya al-asl fi thawratiha al-siyasiyya [China’s Intellectual Awakening: The 
Root of its Political Revolution],” al-‘Usur, 1 January 1930.   
Ayalon describes al-Majalla al-Jadida as one of several publications founded in the mid- to late 1920s, 
also including Khayri Sa‘id’s al-Fajr (1925-27) and Isma‘il Mazhar’s al-‘Usur (1927-30), that “advocated a 
secularist ‘Egyptianist’ orientation” and “debated issues of religion vs. secularism, Egyptian identity 
(‘Pharaonicism’) vs. Arabism, territorial vs. pan-regional nationalism, and democracy vs. dictatorship, reacting to 
developments in other countries in the region and elsewhere and examining possible implications for their own 
society.” Ayalon, The Press, p. 81. 
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Muslim Brotherhood. They also felt connected by language, culture, and interest to the Arab 
countries, a sentiment heightened in particular by the case of the Palestinians. In addition to 
being Muslims and Arabs, many Egyptians also felt that they belonged to an even broader 
community of peoples known as the “East” or “Easterners,” old and culturally rich societies that 
had recently fallen under European colonialism and behind European advancements. These 
positions, maintained especially by Egypt’s middle and lower classes, grew more prominent in 
the 1930s when Egypt was hit by the Great Depression. In this context, otherwise secular, 
Westernist, territorial-nationalist Egyptian intellectuals largely embraced Islam, Arabism, and 
Easternism in their literary production.626  
In other words, in the early 1930s, Egyptian intellectuals, and to an extent Egyptian 
society at large, were undergoing a shift in ideological orientation from a relatively secular, 
territorial, European-facing, “Egyptianist” nation-state nationalism to a more expansive, 
Easternist, and Islamically inflected Egyptian nationalism. To varying degrees, notable Egyptian 
thinkers who had supported the Egyptianist orientation in the 1920s, such as Muhammad Husayn 
Haykal, now embraced the Islamo-Easternist one. This shift reflected a number of developments 
in interwar Egypt, most importantly the rise of a new, middle-class mass audience that Israel 
Gershoni and James Jankowski termed the “New Effendiyya.” This segment of the population 
was literate and politically engaged, but less Westernized than the Egyptianist intellectuals, 
skeptical of the role of traditional elites, hard-pressed by the Great Depression, and in favor of a 
more prominent role for Islam in Egyptian public life. The emergence of this social group 
                                                 
 
626 Gershoni and Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation; Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social 
Order in Modern Egypt: A Biography of Muhammad Husayn Haykal (Albany: SUNY, 1983). See also Richard P. 
Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford UP, 1969); Beth Baron, The Orphan Scandal: 
Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2014). 
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manifested itself in new periodicals and associations, above all in the rise and rapid expansion of 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The New Effendiyya 
saw Egypt’s destiny not with Europe or the Mediterranean, but with the Arab countries, the 
Islamic world, and the “East,” ancient and wise, but recently fallen under the yoke of European 
colonialism.  
These dynamics, too, shaped Egyptian and Arab views of China, which was now recast 
not simply as a fellow modernizing nation-state, but as a fellow ancient civilization morally 
superior to the imperialist-colonialist West. A tension remained in Egyptian and Arab views of 
China, however—one that echoed the tensions between the territorial versus Islamo-Easternist 
visions of Egyptian identity. China could certainly be seen as a fellow nation-state (equal but 
separate, one might say) or as a fellow civilization (similar but separate). On such bases, 
furthermore, China might be deemed similar to the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, the Arab world, or 
even the “Islamic world.” The fact remained, however, that China was also organically 
connected to the Islamic umma. This was true by virtue of China’s large Muslim population, 
despite its never having properly belonged to the Dar al-Islam. How should Egyptian and Arab 
intellectuals account for the fact that Muslims lived in China in such great numbers, and for so 
many centuries? What would the fact of the Chinese Muslims’ existence mean for one’s 
definitions of “Islam” and “China”? 
The Chinese Azharites arrived in Cairo at the precise moment when the tensions between 
narrow territorial nationalism and broad supranational nationalism were coming to the fore, both 
in Egyptian and Arabs questions about themselves generally, and their questions about China 
specifically. The Chinese Azharites certainly fit in most naturally with Cairo’s Islamo-
Easternists, such as Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib’s al-Fath circle or the Muslim Brotherhood, who 
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arguably sought to use them to show their “pan-Islamic” credentials. Yet they also neither 
shunned nor were shunned by figures considered to be relatively secular, “Egyptianist” Egyptian 
nationalists such as Taha Hussein. In short, the Chinese Azharites’ presence helped answer some 
of the long-standing questions of Egyptian and Arab thinkers, but at the same time, the tension 
between territorial versus supranational nationalism they found in Egypt also mirrored the 
challenges Chinese Muslims faced in China. The question on everyone’s mind was whether 
identities larger than that of the nation-state could coexist with it. 
 Egypt’s emerging Islamo-Easternist orientation was of immediate relevance to the 
Chinese Azharites. As discussed above, the decade after the First World War had been an 
exuberant phase of nation-state nationalism and of radical cultural reform movements, both of 
which vilified the old and exalted the new. The 1930s, by contrast, witnessed a movement away 
from this universalist-nationalist modernist consensus, instead reviving the notion of 
“civilization” and respect for the old. By this time, however, the definition of civilization had 
become more plural: the sense that the world war had broken Europe’s monopoly coincided with 
the argument that the world consisted not of multiple nations on a single scale of Civilization, 
but that each nation represented different and equally valuable civilizations. In this context, the 
historical accomplishments of various cultures received renewed attention, and the “ancient 
wisdom” of figures such as Confucius was celebrated rather than vilified (in fact, Confucius and 
“Chinese philosophy” were the topic of a two-part essay published by ‘Ali al-‘Anani in the 
journal al-Ma‘rifa al-Misriyya in 1932 titled “Chinese Wisdom”).627 As a result, China was to an 
                                                 
 
627 ‘Ali al-‘Anani, “al-Hikma al-Siniyya (1) [Chinese Wisdom],” al-Ma‘rifa al-Misriyya, 1 February 1932, pp. 14-
16; ‘Ali al-‘Anani, “al-Hikma al-Siniyya (2): Kunfushiyus [Chinese Wisdom: Confucius],” al-Ma‘rifa al-Misriyya, 
1 March 1932, pp. 329-32. This development in the Arabic press paralleled the re-embrace of Confucius in China 
rooted ultimately in Chiang Kai-shek’s use of classical Chinese culture and Confucian principles as the basis for a 
cohesive Chinese national identity and as an alternative to Communist ideology. 
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extent re-Orientalized in the eyes of Arabic-speaking audiences, such that the Chinese Azharites 
were obliged to explain and represent both China’s classical civilization and its modern 
transformation to those Arabic audiences—ironically, all while they were trying to cultivate 
themselves as Muslims.  
 Rashid Rida’s al-Manar (1898-1935) was one of the most sustained Islamic modernist 
periodicals of the early twentieth century, and an early and consistent voice for the Islamo-
Easternist orientation that gained prominence in the 1930s. That said, al-Manar’s attention to 
China and Islam in China was uneven and perhaps surprisingly sparse in comparison to the 
periodical’s considerable output. As mentioned above, al-Manar gave occasional coverage of 
political events in China from its first year, framed in an anti-imperialist tone, and it also 
published some translated essays regarding Islam and Muslims in China.628  
There was one instance in which a Chinese Muslim may have contributed directly to the 
pages of al-Manar. In mid-1930, Rida published a letter in al-Manar titled “An Important Letter 
from China Regarding the Muslims Living There,” identifying the author as Uthman bin al-Hajj 
Nur al-Haqq al-Sini al-Hanafi from Guangdong. Addressing Rida as the editor of al-Manar and, 
erroneously, as “president of the People of the Sunna,” the author declared that the Muslims of 
China are “weak of faith and ignorant of the Islamic sciences, the Quran, and Hadith, and are 
                                                 
628 Umar Ryad notes that Rida wrote some observations about China in al-Manar in 1901 that prefigured Arabic 
thinkers’ later concern with Chinese “civilization”: “[Rida] contended that the people of China were not like ‘cattle’ 
trampling each other, or like ‘fish,’ the big eating the small with no restraint. They had a civilization and values of 
their own; either before or after the existence of the Israelites. They were even more advanced than the Israelites in 
science, culture, and order, [and] more advanced than the Christians themselves whose religion advanced them in 
nothing but animosity, hatred, disagreement, discord, war, and murder during the so-called ‘Dark Ages,’ while the 
Chinese lived in peace and harmony. The same was true for the Hindus. He argued that there is no harm for Muslims 
to believe that the Chinese religion and Hinduism were of divine origin, just as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is 
not forbidden to believe that God had sent down messengers for those people in order to guide them to ‘eternal 
happiness.’ But they intermingled their religions with inherited pagan tendencies, the same as the Christians did with 
their originally divine and monotheistic religion.” Umar Ryad, Islamic Reformism and Christianity, pp. 194-95; 
from al-Manar, 4/17 (Sha‘ban 1319/November 1901), p. 156. 
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abandoning prayer and other faithful obligations…most of them do not understand true belief 
(iman), but rather are mere blind imitators of earlier examples (muqallidun).” Calling al-Manar a 
“sun whose face we cannot see,” the author asked Rida to purchase copies of al-Manar to be 
translated into Chinese. In his response, published together with the original letter, Rida 
graciously agrees to send copies of al-Manar as a “gift among other gifts.” He also asks the 
author to realize that he is not a leader of the Muslim community, and that the community in fact 
has no leader, the “fault for which lies with them as their current state is one of chaos, though it 
is hoped that a renewal will take place among them in this age such that order [nizam] can be 
restored.”629 Whether the letter was the authentic composition of a Chinese Muslim or not, its 
message was generally consistent with what the Chinese Muslims hoped to gain through greater 
contact with Muslims outside China and especially through study in Cairo. 
 In the first decade of the twentieth century, Rida’s al-Manar was relatively unusual for its 
attention to China and Islam in China, exceptions such as Shakib Arslan and the Lebanese 
Christian notwithstanding. By the early 1930s, however, the rising tide of Islamo-Easternism was 
bringing attention to China from other corners. For example, the Society of the Eastern Bond 
(Jam‘iyyat al-Rabita al-Sharqiyya), a semi-secret organization of prominent Egyptian and Arab 
figures founded in Cairo in 1928-29, published a journal also titled The Eastern Bond (al-Rabita 
al-Sharqiyya, 1928-31) that gave above-average coverage to the affairs of Islamic and Asian 
countries beyond the Middle East, including China. The Society was an apparently eclectic but 
relatively conservative collection of prominent Islamic authorities, non-religions intellectuals, 
Egyptian elites and royalists, and representatives of other Muslim countries. Its nearly thirty 
                                                 
 
629 Uthman bin al-Hajj Nur al-Haqq al-Sini al-Hanafi to Muhammad Rashid Rida, “Risala muhimma min al-sin fi 
hal man fiha min al-muslimin [An Important Letter from China Regarding the Muslims Living There],” al-Manar 
31 (al-Muharram 1349/May-June 1930), p. 75. 
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members included Rashid Rida; Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, current Sheikh al-Azhar; 
Mustafa ‘Abd al-Raziq, future Sheikh al-Azhar; Ahmad Shafiq Pasha (1860-1940), the first vice-
president of the Egyptian University educated at the Khedival Law School and Sciences-Po, who 
served as editor of al-Rabita al-Sharqiyya; Mansour Fahmy, a French-influenced Egyptian 
sociologist who had published a study on the condition of women in Islam in 1913. The 
Society’s administration also included Turkish, Persian, and Coptic “adjutants.” The introduction 
to the first issue of al-Rabita al-Sharqiyya stated: “This is a journal whose title indicates plainly 
the cause in which it believes, and the end toward which it strives.”630  
 From the early 1930s, “supply and demand” began to meet: the aspirations of Arabic 
audiences to know more about China and Islam in China increasingly coincided with the Chinese 
Azharites’ efforts to explain those same topics in Arabic. Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib’s journal Al-
Fath (1926-48) became one of the earliest Arabic publications to give truly sustained attention to 
Islam in China and to publish writings by Chinese Muslims (as mentioned in Chapter One, it was 
also the first Middle Eastern Arabic periodical regularly imported by Chinese Muslims in China). 
Al-Fath described itself as the “Mirror of the Islamic World.” It was an Islamic transnationalist 
publication par excellence, vocally committed to Islamic unity in broad, political terms.631 Al-
Khatib repeatedly asserted that Islam transcended national and racial boundaries, ubiquitously 
employing the favorite Quranic refrains of Islamic transnationalists: that “Indeed this, your 
community, is one community” and “Verily all the believers are brothers.”632 The journal’s main 
                                                 
 
630 “Al-Rabita al-Sharqiyya [The Eastern Bond],” al-Rabita al-Sharqiyya, 1 Jumada al-Ula 1347 [15 October 1928], 
p. 1. 
 
631 Lauzière cites it (perhaps somewhat misleadingly) as a chief example of “Islamic nationalism” in the Arabic 
press, which he clarifies by contrasting it with “territorial-statist nationalism,” meaning it involved “the valorization 
of a unique Muslim ‘culture’ and a primordial attachment to the umma as a whole, with a view to liberating it 
politically, regardless of how many sovereign states might emerge.” Lauzière, Making of Salafism, p. 100. 
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contributors included a long list of figures known for sharing al-Khatib’s Islamic transnationalist 
priorities: Rashid Rida; Shakib Arslan; Hajj Amin al-Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, 
controversial for his eventual Axis connections; Taqi al-Din al-Hilali, the peripatetic and 
similarly controversial Islamic scholar; ‘Umar Tusun, an Egyptian prince who supported the 
Caliphate movement; Mas‘ud ‘Alim al-Nadwi, a scholar at the Nadwat al-‘Ulama in Lucknow; 
Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood; and Mustafa al-Sibai, founder of 
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Notably, Al-Fath often disputed the sheikhs of al-Azhar, whose 
journal Nur al-Islam gave comparatively less coverage to Muslims outside the Middle East.633 
By contrast, as Zvi Ben-Dor Benite notes, al-Khatib had shown interest in Chinese Islam from an 
early point, and sustained that interest well into the 1930s.634 In fact, one could say Chinese 
Islam functioned as al-Fath’s prime symbol for the expansiveness of the Islamic world. 
Al-Fath developed particularly close connections to the Chinese Muslims. Ma Jian came 
into contact with al-Khatib while in Cairo, and published several articles in al-Fath under the 
name Muhammad Makin al-Sini, including an obituary of Ma Fuxiang, a discussion of Islamic 
education in China, an assessment of the “position of Muslims in China proper (al-Sin al-
asliyya) toward the revolt in Turkistan, and an overview of the Chinese Islamic Youth 
Association formed in Beijing in 1929.635 Al-Fath also published Ma’s translation of Confucius’ 
                                                 
632 Zhao, Xixing riji, p. 54; Quran 21:92, 49:10. 
 
633 A decline in coverage, however, eventually set in for both Nur al-Islam and al-Fath. Apart from clear exceptions 
such as their delegation to India in 1938, l-Azhar was never really concerned with publishing expositions on 
Muslims’ conditions in other countries; rather, they felt (not undeservedly) that al-Azhar’s positions on Islamic 
questions applied equally to all the world’s Muslims, and therefore that their writings were intrinsically global. As 
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indication of the breadth of its Islamic transnationalism. As tensions grew in Europe and as the British violently 
suppressed the nationalist revolt in Palestine of 1936-39, however, even al-Fath turned its attention away from fully 
transnational concerns to these more proximate issues. 
 
634 Benite, “Taking ‘Abduh to China,” p. 256. 
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Analects, which notably rendered the Chinese concept of ancestors as “al-salaf al-salih”—the 
term for the “pious forebears,” or the earliest generations of Muslims, held by both modernist 
and conservative Salafis to epitomize their various ideals of thought and practice.636  
Ma Jian became further involved with al-Khatib when the latter formed the Islamic 
Consociate Society (jam‘iyyat al-ta‘aruf al-islami) in Cairo in early 1934, headquartered at the 
same offices as al-Fath.637 One of the Society’s goals, stated in Article Two of its charter, was 
“to improve the bonds of mutual knowledge between the Muslims of the world.”638 The rationale 
was that if Muslims possessed reliable information about their coreligionists in faraway lands, 
they would realize that the supranational connections of the umma superseded parochial loyalties 
to one’s nation-state. One way the Society intended to realize their goals was by “including 
members from every Islamic country, and every country possessing an Islamic minority, in the 
Society’s center in Cairo.”639 This reference to Muslim-minority countries speaks to Chinese 
Muslims’ deliberate inclusion in the initiative. Before long, Ma Jian was elected one of the ten 
                                                 
635 Muhammad Makin al-Sini, “A Loss for Muslims in China: General Ma Fuxiang,” al-Fath Year 7, No. 318, 11 
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Arabic,” al-Fath, Year 9, No. 423, 21 Shaban 1353, pp. 6-7, 11; the translation continued to appear in regular 
installments until Year 9, No. 445, 13 Safar 1354. Ma Jian also wrote a biography of Confucius to accompany the 
first installment: Muhammad Makin al-Sini, “Confucius,” al-Fath, Year 9, No. 423, 21 Shaban 1353, p. 22. The 
advertisement for the book version, Kitab al-hiwar li-Kunfushiyus, filusuf al-Sin al-akbar [The Book of Dialogues of 
Confucius, Great Philosopher of China], appeared on the back cover of al-Fath, Year 10, No. 470, 10 Shaban 1354. 
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inaugural members of the Society’s administrative council.640 Ibrahim Sha Guozhen, head of the 
Chinese riwaq at al-Azhar, also became a member.641 
Through these connections, Ma Jian gained some celebrity among Cairo’s most 
prominent Islamic transnationalist thinkers and activists. Thanks to Ma’s relationship with al-
Khatib, the Chinese Muslims finally encountered Rashīd Riḍā in summer 1934, a year before the 
latter’s death, through the good offices of al-Fath. The Islamic Consociate Society chose Ma Jian 
to deliver the first set of lectures in its series on “Islamic issues and facts about Islam.”642 
Members of the Islamic Consociate Society attended, as did members of the Society of the 
Eastern Bond. A recollection of the event published in al-Fath stated:  
Mustafa Sabri Efendi, former Sheikh al-Islam of the Ottoman Empire, and Sayyid 
Muhammad Rashid Rida, were both in attendance…Muhammad Makin al-Sini 
[Ma Jian] gave his presentation in clear Arabic. When he was done, Rida stood 
and said ‘You have done a truly excellent job. It has been years since I have heard 
a lecture from which I benefitted as much as I did from this one.’643 
 
Ma’s lectures were later published as the book Nazrah jami‘a ila tarikh al-Islam fi-l-Sin wa 
ahwal al-muslimina fiha (“A Comprehensive Overview of the History of Islam in China and 
Muslims’ Conditions There”), published by al-Khatib’s Salafiyya Press in 1935. An 
                                                 
640 The inaugural members of the Islamic Consociate Society’s Administrative Council were: (1) Mahmud Bey 
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641 “The Islamic Consociate Society,” al-Fath, Year 9, No. 401, 16 Rabi al-Awwal 1353, p. 22. 
 
642 Makin al-Sini (Ma), Nazra jami‘a. 
 
643 al-Fath 403 (1934): p. 4. 
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advertisement of the book in al-Fath called Ma Jian an “inquisitive and virtuous scholar” (al-
‘alim al-fadil al-muhaqqiq) and even a “perfect Muslim” (al-muslim al-kamil).644 In his foreword 
to Ma Jian’s book, al-Khaṭīb echoed: 
We consider it a tribute to this work that when its author delivered it as a lecture 
to the Islamic Consociate Association (Jamʿiyyat al-taʿāruf al-ʾislāmī) the 
venerable scholar Sayyid Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā was in attendance, and said 
that he had not heard such a worthwhile lecture in years, and that he hoped that 
the Association would continue to provide such enjoyable lectures on various 
Islamic countries, in which valuable information would be synthesized about 
Islam and the conditions of Muslims in all countries, amounting to a compendium 
on those countries that would serve the need of Muslims to know one another, 
which will lead in turn to even bigger and more enjoyable activities.645 
 
Shortly after the publication of Ma’s Nazrah jami‘a, al-Fath published a letter from Shakib 
Arslan in Geneva, wishing “blessings to Mr. Makin al-Sini” and complimenting him on his 
book.646 Among other things, these vivid exchanges challenge the stereotype that Rashid Rida 
and others had adopted more of an Arab chauvinist orientation in their later years, at the expense 
of a more expansive, multiracial vision of Islamic unity. Ma Jian’s interactions with al-Khatib, 
Rida, and Arslan also illustrate the ways in which the Chinese Azharites’ aspirations to write 
themselves into prevailing definitions of the Islamic world coincided with Arabic audiences’ 
desire to know more about China and Islam in China in the context of the newly ascendant 
Islamo-Easternist orientation.647 
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 Hai Weiliang was also close to al-Fath’s Islamic transnationalist circle. In 1933, even 
before arriving in Egypt, Hai Weiliang began publishing under the name Badr al-Din al-Sini in 
both al-Fath and in the Jaffa-based daily al-Jami‘a al-Islamiyya, owned by Hajj Amin al-
Husseini. Hai had no doubt been introduced to these publications while at the Lucknow Nadwa, 
where they were consumed voraciously. In the meantime, Hai also learned about the Chinese 
Azharites’ mission through correspondence with Zhao Zhenwu, editor of Yuehua.648 Hai was 
introduced to al-Khatib either through Zhao, who met with al-Khatib in Cairo in 1933 (see 
Chapter Four), or through the Nadwa scholars.649 Hai’s extensive writings in al-Fath focused in 
particular on the fate of East Turkistan Republic, which declared independence from China in 
1933-34, but was crushed by Ma Zhongying’s Chinese Muslim forces on behalf of the 
Guomindang government—a moment of deep disillusionment for Hai that he communicated 
vividly to the readers of al-Fath. After the failure of the East Turkistan Republic, Hai continued 
to publish articles in al-Fath about the history of Chinese Turkistan (material that was also 
published in Chinese in Yuehua).650 Hai’s writings in al-Jami‘a al-Islamiyya, which often made 
the front page, covered similar topics with equal forcefulness, referring to the East Turkistan 
issue as an “independence movement” (harakat istiqlal) and occasionally as a “jihad.”651 In one 
article, he further specified that “the issue of Chinese Turkistan is not simply one between the 
                                                 




650 Badr al-Din al-Sini (a.k.a. Hai Weiliang), “Ta’sis dawla islamiyya min asfal al-pamir ila sur al-sin” [The 
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(14 February 1934), 14-15; “Limadha tharat Turkistan al-siniyya?” [Why did Chinese Turkistan Rebel?]. Al-Fath 
391, 5 Muharram 1353 (19 April 1934), 11-12; “Al-Islam fi Turkistan al-siniyya” [Islam in Chinese Turkistan]. Al-
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651 Badr al-Din al-Sini, “al-Turkistan al-Siniyya: wa ma yajib an ya‘rif al-‘Arab wa-l-Muslimun ‘anha: kutibat 
khususan li-l-Jami‘a al-Islamiyya [Chinese Turkistan: What Arabs and Muslims Must Know: Exclusively for al-
Jami‘a al-Islamiyya],” al-Jami‘a al-Islamiyya, 8 tashrin al-awwal 1933/18 Jumada al-akhira 1352, p. 1. 
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Chinese government and Muslims, but rather one between independent countries, and the land 
on which it takes place is land contested by multiple countries.”652 
The Chinese Azharites engagement with Cairo’s Islamic transnationalist thinkers, 
publishers, and activists continued to expand from here, in tandem with those figures’ continued 
writings about China and Islam in China. For the rest of the late 1930s and into the 1940s, a 
relatively short-lived but remarkable florescence occurred, even despite the growing 
assertiveness of fascist movements, mounting anxieties about a second world war, and final 
outbreak of that war. The intensity, bi-directionality, forms, topics, and types of actors involved 
in Sino-Arabic exchange all increased. Islam, Chinese history and culture, literature and poetry, 
and travel were all of interest. Al-Risala (1933-) and al-Thaqafa (1939-), both published by 
author and Azhar graduate Ahmad Amin, carried numerous articles about China as well as pieces 
by Chinese Azharites.653 
Egyptian and Arab authors proceeded to write about their curiosity for humanistic topics 
such as Chinese art and history.654 Some, such as the Palestinian scholar Kalthum ‘Awda (1892-
1965) of Nazareth, wrote an essay for al-Hilal about Arab communities living in Central Asia 
based on her travels there in summer 1935 with the Conference of Russian Arabists, an 
organization she helped develop (she noted “they speak a dialect close to that of the people of 
Iraq”).655 Other authors, some well-known, began writing theatrical works, short stories, and real 
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655 Kalthum ‘Awda, “27,000 Arabi fi jawar bilad al-Sin – rihla fi Asiya al-wusta [27,000 Arabs Living Near the 
Borders of China: Travels in Central Asia],” al-Hilal, 1 January 1937.  
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or fictional travel accounts of China.656 Some of this literary production was catalyzed by the 
activities of Chinese Muslims; for example, Munira Sayyim Shah, editor of the magazine 
Majallat al-Katla al-Islamiyya, wrote the one-act play titled Za’ir al-Sin (“The Roar of China”), 
mentioned in Chapter Four, written as a pro-Chinese wartime propaganda tract with Ma 
Tianying’s input during the Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation’s visit to Egypt from March to 
May 1938.657 Meanwhile, the Egyptian Islamic thinker ‘Abbas Mahmud al-‘Aqqad, better known 
for his opposition to fascism, took an interest in the story of Pearl Buck’s work in China, 
publishing an article about this in al-Thaqafa; ‘Aqqad later wrote about the “wisdom of China” 
for al-Risala as well.658 The Egyptian poet ‘Abd al-Rahman Sidqi (1896-1973) also wrote 
several articles about China for al-Thaqafa in the early 1940s.659  
Some of the Chinese Azharites themselves became involved in historical and literary 
exchanges. Hai Weiliang published an article in al-Risala in January 1938 on the history of 
religious connections between the Arabs and China, an early product of the research that 
eventually led to his book al-‘Alaqat bayn al-‘Arab wa-l-Sin.660 In May 1941, Ma Junwu, 
translator of Taha Hussein’s The Days, also produced a translation of a Chinese short story, 
published in al-Thaqafa.661 In 1944-45, the Sichuanese Chinese Azharite Ma Jigao published 
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some poetry and children’s stories in al-Thaqafa.662 During this time, Na Zhong also began 
translating Ahmad Amin’s three-volume history of Islamic civilization. 
 The most significant and substantive of all interactions between the Chinese Azharites 
and Cairo’s Islamic activists, however, was that of Pang Shiqian and Muslim Brotherhood 
founder Hassan al-Banna (1906-49). Again, Pang Shiqian’s al-Islam wa-l-Sin was the first 
publication commissioned by the Muslim Brotherhood’s “Islamic World Outreach Division” 
(qism al-ittisal bi-l-‘alam al-islami), of which Pang was a member. No doubt with al-Banna’s 
direction, Pang dedicated al-Sin wa-l-Islam to King Farouq I, whom Pang served as a “consultant 
on Eastern affairs.” Calling his book the “fruit of your planting and an ember of your inspiring 
light,” Pang’s dedication read: 
This book is the first product of the Islamic World Outreach Division of the 
central administration of the Muslim Brothers. God willing, a complete series on 
the history and conditions of all Muslim lands will follow it, set down by hands 
working under your esteemed protection. Perhaps they will find herein something 
to give shape to their aspirations and light their way. 
My Liege: As King of Egypt and the Egyptians, you are an exalted figure 
in the hearts of Easterners and Muslims. May you remain ever mindful of the 
awakening of the East and of Islam, and evermore guardian and protector of the 
global umma of the Quran.663 
 
Al-Banna hoped Farouq would be an ally in strengthening Egypt’s Islamic character.664 By 
strengthening ties with the Chinese Muslims, Islamic transnationalists such as al-Banna could 
lend credence to the argument that Islamic connections formed the most important basis of 
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political community, and that Muslim leaders’ attention ought not to be completely diverted by 
the ties of race or nation. 
Building on his numerous other writings and statements on the topic, al-Banna’s 
foreword to Pang’s book systematically discussed this tension between the various forms of 
human community: the “community of Islam” (al-jami‘a al-Islamiyya), the “bonds of the East” 
(al-rabita al-sharqiyya), the “bonds of race” (al-rawabit al-qawmiyya), and the “community of 
the (territorial) nation-state (al-jami‘a al-wataniyya).665 According to al-Banna, the hierarchy 
clearly unfolded in that order, even if the experiences and sentiments informing each level could 
partly overlap. Yet Islam remained for al-Banna, as for al-Afghani and ‘Abduh, the “firmest 
bond” (al-‘urwa al-wuthqa), whereas differences among human beings were ultimately arbitrary. 
This view, al-Banna wrote, was manifest in Quran and Hadith, as in the Surat al-hujurat: “O 
humankind! Indeed, we have created you male and female and made you into peoples and tribes 
that you may know one another; the noblest of you in the sight of God shall be the most 
righteous.”666 No worldly contingency could supersede the fact that “A Muslim is a brother to a 
Muslim.” Al-Banna paraphrased these scriptural excerpts in a manner directly relevant to the 
Chinese Muslims and to the Islamic transnationalist worldview seeking to claim them: 
All the practical teachings of Islam confirm these specific doctrinal meanings and 
these general human ones. Prayer, alms-giving, Hajj, fasting, charity, beneficence, 
and everything else Islam commands of people, exists merely to strengthen these 
social bonds between Muslims and to strengthen forms of human understanding 
in their souls. As a result of all this, no matter how far-flung their countries 
[mahma taba‘adat awtanuhum], distant their dwellings, or different their races or 
colors, all Muslims innately feel as though they are a single umma and a single 
people whose unity is that of basic doctrine [‘aqidah]. It has been instilled in the 
hearts of the children of Islam that neither natural obstacles, nor geographical 
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boundaries, nor political considerations, nor personal quarrels, can ever come 
between them, for God the Blessed and Sublime willed it so—a single umma—
with His words: “Behold! This, your umma, is one umma; and I am your Lord, 
thus to Me alone shall you pray.” Thus, an Egyptian Muslim should never see a 
Chinese Muslim as anything other than a respected brother and close friend.667 
 
Thus, through scripture and his own interpretations, al-Banna argued that Islam was the only 
non-contingent level of community among the four.  
The other three levels, by contrast, while possessing elements of legitimacy, had all taken 
shape due to specific and mutable worldly conditions. The bonds of the East, he explained, 
resulted primarily from the “arrogance of the West: its pride in its material power, its science, its 
knowledge, its florescence, all the effects it has wrought thanks to the modern natural sciences.” 
At the same time, however, al-Banna begged his readers that “It would only be fair to recall that 
the East too has its cosmopolitanism, its civilization, its philosophy, its spirituality, its books, and 
its prophets and saints; that it is still a beacon of science, knowledge, principles, and belief; and 
indeed that the world turns not on physical material alone, nor is ruled solely by fire and 
steel.”668 Meanwhile, al-Banna stated, the Arabs, much like “the Yellow Race…or Slavs, Latins, 
or Anglo-Saxons,” were currently pursuing a form of racial and cultural solidarity—Arab 
nationalism, though he did not use that term—based on their common language and lifeways, as 
a means of self-strengthening in the face of modern challenges. Al-Banna maintained, however, 
that this form of solidarity was not a negation of Islamic community, but rather “a building-block 
in that larger edifice.” Finally, the notion of the territorial nation-state had emerged recently due 
to the fact that “every people demands its rights to freedom and a dignified life.”669 Echoing the 
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Brotherhood’s motto that “Islam is the solution,” al-Banna concluded by claiming that “As for 
the problem of the state and the system of rule, [the Quran] solves this in eight words in Surat Al 
‘Imran: “Consult your people; once decided, trust in God.”670 As non-Arab friends and 
colleagues seeking to become better Muslims, the Chinese Azharites enabled al-Banna to offer 
striking and concrete proof that Islam indeed exceeded all other forms of human solidarity. 
 In sum, the Chinese Azharites were able to connect with and spark interest among 
multiple audiences in Cairo, even ones that were actively competing and disagreeing with one 
another: for example, the Azhar sheikhs versus the Islamic transnationalist activists, or Salama 
Musa versus the proponents of an Islamo-Easternest orientation. This, combined with the 
multiple instances of humanistic interest Egyptians, Chinese Azharites, and other Arabic-
speaking actors expressed toward one another, offers abundant proof that Arab Sinophilia should 
not be seen simply as a reactive and uninformed symptom of Arab anticolonialism. Rather, Sino-
Egyptian and Sino-Arabic contacts represented the maximalist end of Islamic transnationalism 
and even relatively secular nationalist Egyptian bi-culturalism. 
 
“What is to be Done?” Al-Azhar’s Significance for Modern Chinese Islam 
 
As forceful as the rhetoric of the Arabic press could be, the ultimate purpose of the Chinese 
Muslims’ journeys to Cairo was to study at al-Azhar. Al-Azhar provided the Chinese 
Azharites—and by extension, via writings, translations, and correspondences, their associates 
back home—with readily applicable positions on the relationship between Islam and modernity 
and answers to various questions concerning Islam. As we saw in Chapter Three, this included a 
number of counter-Orientalist polemics that, when translated into Chinese, could equally be 
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made to defend Islam against Han Chinese misunderstandings and Islamophobia. At the same 
time, Cairo and the Arabic press formed an inescapable context for the Chinese Azharites’ 
approach even to formal questions of Islamic knowledge, as well as for al-Azhar generally. After 
all, Rida’s al-Manar, Ahmad Amin’s al-Risala, and other prominent Islamic periodicals 
vigorously debated the Azhar sheikhs and indefatigably reported on developments within the 
institution along with commentary on their political significance. In fact, al-Azhar’s journal, Nur 
al-Islam (from 1936 known as Majallat al-Azhar), founded only in 1930, probably would not 
have come into existence without pressure from the Arabic press to make the institution more 
transparent to a rapidly expanding public sphere.671 Together—or rather, by virtue of their 
various convergences and divergences—al-Azhar’s Islamic scholarship and Egypt’s social and 
intellectual milieu offered the Chinese Azharites a vision of Islam that could work for China.  
To see how this was the case, we should begin by reminding ourselves how the Chinese 
Azharites understood the challenges facing them. Ma Jian, echoing Shakib Arslan, stated in a 
section of Nazra jami‘a titled “reasons for the backwardness of Muslims in China” that these 
reasons were three: “ignorance, disagreements, and poverty.”672 Pang Shiqian, however, gave the 
most consistent thought to the question of what must be done for Muslims in China. He framed 
the problem in his introduction to al-Sin wa-l-Islam, in terms that combined Arabic intellectuals’ 
focus on “progress versus backwardness” (Pang’s al-Sin wa-l-Islam referenced Arslan’s 
Limadha ta’akhkharat al-muslimun) with al-Azhar’s modernist polemic: 
When scholars and thinkers seek out the causes that led Muslims first toward 
progress and then to stagnation and decline, the plain and simple truth will surely 
emerge that the pious forebears [al-salaf al-sālih] possessed the ability to exert 
ijtihad: the capacity for reason and clear-sightedness in all matters including their 
                                                 
 
671 Gershoni and Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation. 
 
672 Makin al-Sini [Ma Jian], Nazra jami‘a, p. 73. 
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understanding of social reality, which propelled their progress…As for the period 
of decline, they claim that “the door of ijtihad had closed”—a fatal flaw that has 
brought upon Muslims untold woes, such that their lives have grown dark, their 
minds provincialized and degenerate…  
What has happened to the Muslims in China is the same as what has 
happened to their brothers in all countries. It is imperative for reformers and 
modernizers wishing to remedy this and protect their interests to undertake 
research and study before they seek to describe and prescribe. I therefore wrote 
this book as a description of the conditions of Muslims in China, that they might 
know themselves and their brothers throughout the world, that they might assess 
their ills and prescribe a treatment, that they might progress with the noble 
caravan of life and stand with their Muslim brethren as one hand in the world, in 
accordance with His word: “Cling fast, ye one and all, and do not let go the 
mighty cord [i.e. Quran/covenant] of God.” 
What we seek is a return to the golden age [al-‘asr al-dhahabī] of Islam 
and Muslims. We will achieve this only through a return to reason [ijtihad] and 
invention [istinbāt], for these are the bases of success, the pillars of progress [al- 
taqaddum], the great movers of the world. As for blind imitation [taqlīd], it is the 
bringer of weakness, the harbinger of stagnation, the first step on the path toward 
perdition and demise.673 
 
According to Pang, Muslims in China needed both moral awakening and material advancement. 
They shared this need with Muslims everywhere, but their circumstances were more desperate 
than most, and other Muslim societies had embarked earlier on finding solutions, which Chinese 
Muslims could now learn from and apply. The key was the Islamic modernist argument that 
original, true Islam was synonymous with reason and the pursuit of progress in all its forms. 
To restate the problem at the heart of this study: by the early twentieth century, and 
certainly by the 1930s, Chinese Muslim leaders had reached the conclusion that Muslims in 
                                                 
 
673 Tawadu‘ [Pang], China and Islam, pp. xv-xvi. This translation originally appeared in Chen, “Re-Orientation,” pp. 
35, 45. 
 In May 1946, when he and his associates were beginning their journey home, Pang articulated the problem 
in somewhat different terms. Meeting with a Professor ‘Abd al-‘Aziz at the home of [Mustafa] ‘Abd al-Raziq, Pang 
reported: “He was curious about the conditions of Islam in China: ‘How many Muslims live in China?’ I answered, 
‘Fifty million, or one-tenth of the total population.’ He asked again: ‘What is the cultural level of Muslims compared 
with non-Muslims?’ I answered: ‘Backward!’ He asked: ‘Why?’ I said: ‘There is one main reason why China’s 
Muslims have fallen behind the rest of the world’s Muslims, and that is that they have taken the lesson of “not 
desiring after the things of al-dunya” too literally.’” Relating a Hadith to the effect of “Al-Dunya (this world) is the 
garden of al-akhira (the world to come),” Pang continued, “‘We of course do not oppose the lesson of “not desiring 
after the things of al-dunya,” but Islam is a religion of both this world and the next. In this regard it is entirely unlike 
Buddhism, for example.’ The professor listened closely without responding.” Pang, Aiji jiunian, pp. 34-35. 
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China could not form their own country. The suppression of the nineteenth-century Muslim 
uprisings had made this clear. Meanwhile, improving Han Chinese tolerance of Islam was 
likewise not a task that would be accomplished overnight. The only option left for Chinese 
Muslims was to assert their “right to difference” while bearing the responsibility for gradual 
change on their own shoulders. But how? Unlike for their forebears, the Han Kitab authors, it 
was not enough for the Chinese Azharites to simply demonstrate that Islam was conceptually or 
aesthetically compatible with Confucianism or Chineseness. Moreover, Chinese nationalism and 
rigid Guomindang ideology required that loyalty to the nation-state be exclusive and absolute. 
“Simultaneity,” “reconciliation,” “moral equivalence”: the ambiguity of these Han Kitab projects 
was now a luxury of the past. The challenge for Chinese Muslims in the twentieth century was to 
reconcile Islam not with abstract “Chineseness,” but with the far more uncompromising nation-
building program of the Guomindang. This program emphasized not only nationalism, but 
modernity, rationalism, and science. This program itself was non-negotiable; the only question 
was how to uphold it in an authentic Islamic way.  
This is where al-Azhar came in. Its positions on a wide range of issues espoused the very 
same values of modernity, rationalism, and science as the Guomindang. Al-Azhar’s journal and 
its pedagogy formed an arsenal of modernist positions waiting to be translated. Issue by issue, al-
Azhar offered Chengda and similar institutions an incomparable form of authority with which to 
push the modernist agenda forward throughout the country, especially among the allegedly 
undereducated and superstitious Sufis of the Northwest. Defining Muslims’ own ignorance as the 
problem, and education and enlightenment as the cure, allowed Chinese Muslims, like their 
counterparts from other countries, to pursue what they saw as positive social change in an 
Islamically authentic manner under conditions—European colonialism, Chinese nationalism, and 
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so on—where the question of political alternatives was indefinitely deferred and could not be 
raised directly.674 For the foreseeable future, the best way to survive in China was to learn to be 
better Muslims—which conveniently meant espousing the same modernist values as the Chinese 
state. This was why the Chinese Muslims came to al-Azhar. After all, Muhammad ‘Abduh 
himself had said that Muslims’ best chance of progressing in the world—in contrast to the 
Christians, who had grown materially powerful while abandoning faith—lay in using reason to 
arrive at a more perfect understanding of their Islam.675 
 What were the main issues in this arsenal of modernism? First and foremost, reason: 
especially independent human reason exerted vis-à-vis doctrine, law, and even questions of 
everyday life (ijtihad, as defined by Islamic modernists). Reason implied that “blind imitation of 
earlier examples” (taqlid) was to be frowned upon and had led to Muslims’ moral and material 
decay. Reason implied that Islam was compatible with science: thus “Islam and science” or 
“religion and science” formed the second major issue in the modernist arsenal. Third, new 
histories of Islam emerged as a result of the assertion of Islam’s rationality against both domestic 
and foreign foes: for example, that the earliest Muslims were practitioners of ijtihad, or that later 
generations were accomplished scientists who, among other things, contributed to the European 
renaissance and scientific revolution.676 Fourth, this new interpretation of Islamic history often 
involved emphasizing the achievements of Arab Muslims, and privileging Arabic as the 
language of Islam’s earliest and most authoritative texts.677 Fifth, Islamic modernists often 
                                                 
 
674 Gesink, Islamic Reform, p. 7, describes this period as a “liminal time” and “critical juncture” for Egypt, when it 
was “not quite totally under Ottoman control and then not quite totally under British control” 
 
675 Hourani, Arabic Thought; Gesink, Islamic Reform, p. 170. 
 
676 Gershoni and Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, pp. 86-90. 
 
677 Ibid., pp. 90-94. 
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emphasized that true Islam respected women’s rights and democratic forms of government—
again, against the accusations of Orientalists and detractors, and in spite of the erroneous 
practices of certain members of the Muslim community. Sixth, writing, publishing, translation, 
and above all the reform of traditional Islamic educational institutions was the key to 
modernizing and strengthening Muslim communities everywhere. 
 It has been argued that modern Islamic thought—sometimes misleadingly called 
Salafism—can be divided into two modes, “modernist” and “purist,” with modernists placing 
greater emphasis on the constellation described above, and purists placing greater emphasis on 
“orthodoxy” conventionally conceived, and particularly on the doctrine of God’s unicity (al-
tawhid).678 Does such a division hold? The case of the Chinese Azharites suggests that it may 
not. Consider the stated “Islamic program” (manhaj islami) of al-Manar, the foremost Islamic 
modernist periodical, and that of Yuehua, the foremost Chinese Islamic modernist periodical: 
 Al-Manar 
 
1.  Rectification of doctrine (al-‘aqida) and opposition to pernicious 
innovations and superstitious accretions (al-bida‘ wa-l-khurafat);  
2.  [Improving] education and learning in accordance with the views of the 
Imam Muhammad ‘Abduh; 
3.  The issue of the Arabic language: opposing those who seek to use 
colloquial (al-‘ammiyya) instead of formal Arabic (al-fusha), or to write 
Arabic in Latin letters; 
4.  Al-Manar’s position with respect to Western civilization: (1) Islamic 
countries should imitate Europe with respect to modern sciences, industry, 
and technological innovations, [but] (2) making relentless war against 
Europeans’ incursions into Islamic countries, including through moral 




1.  To implement Islamic doctrines consistent with modern (xiandai) trends;  
                                                 
 
678 Lauzière, Making of Salafism. 
 
679 Al-Manar, 1, pp. 1-2. 
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2.  To introduce news about Muslims (huimin) in other parts of the world;  
3.  To improve awareness of Muslims in China (zhongguo huimin) and 
improve their status;  
4.  To explain the misunderstandings between the new and old Muslim sects;  
5.  To strengthen a conception of the nation-state (guojia guannian) among 
Muslims in China;  
6.  To promote education and a better livelihood for Muslims in China.680 
 
Both lists contain elements that Lauzière would call “modernist” and “purist.” Nevertheless, in 
both cases, the purist orientation is extremely difficult to separate from the modernist one, and 
notably, the term tawhid does not appear (the first item in al-Manar’s list only indirectly implies 
it). In addition, it is clear that the modernist and purist strains were both directed at the reform of 
erroneous beliefs and practices, which in both cases meant especially Sufism and “tradition.” 
Yuehua, furthermore, stresses the modernist orientation even more than al-Manar. 
 The remaining sections turn first to the question of whether the Chinese Azharites, and 
leading Chinese Muslims generally, were advocates of tawhid in the purist sense. It then traces 
the Chinese Azharites’ engagement with the other core concept of Islamic modernism, ijtihad. 
 
The Ambiguities of Tawhid 
 
Conventionally, tawhid has been defined in a number of ways. Morphologically, the Arabic word 
tawhid is the second-form verbal noun derived from the root w-h-d, as in wahid, or “one.” 
Semantically, the derivative carries both a basic transitive meaning (“to make one, to unify”) as 
well as a declarative or “deeming” meaning (“to affirm the oneness of something”). Tawhid 
refers both to the fact of God’s oneness and to the human practice of recognizing that oneness.681 
                                                 
 
680 Yuehua 1.1; originally translated in Mao, “Chengda,” p. 157 (I have made only minor adjustments). 
 
681 As such, tawhid is sometimes misleadingly translated as the transparent equivalent of the Christian-centric term 
“monotheism”; tawhid is in fact a narrower and more specific category than “monotheism.” Many Muslim 
proponents of the modern understanding of tawhid pointed out that Christianity’s version of monotheism fell short 
of true tawhid due to the concept of the trinity, considered a corrupting compromise with paganism. See for example 
Muhammad Farid Wajdi, “Mu‘akasat al-muslimin fi tawhidihim [The Opposite of Muslims in their ‘Tawhid’],” 
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Theologically speaking, it is the principle expressed in the first half of the shahada (la il’aha illa 
Allah, “There is no god but God”). The word tawhid itself does not appear in the Quran, but God 
is repeatedly described as being one and without equal, for example in the Surat al-Ikhlas. 
Tawhid refers to the notion that God is uniquely, ultimately, and unqualifiedly divine and 
powerful: the opposite of shirk, or associating or likening entities other than God with God. 
Polemically speaking, a dogmatic, militant, anti-Sufi view of tawhid first emerged through the 
mid-eighteenth-century alliance between Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the Saudi royal 
family, who were known for destroying the tombs of Shia, Sufis, and others on the grounds that 
no entity should receive human reverence other than God. “Purist” Islamic thinkers in the 
twentieth century, eyeing the Wahhabis’ doctrinal consistency with a mix of anxiety and envy, 
eventually construed tawhid in opposition to kalam (“dialectical theology”). Modern purists 
came to see this refutation of kalam as additionally rooted in the works of Ibn Taymiyya (1250-
1328) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350); or, more precisely, they sought to rework those 
authors so as to present the concept of tawhid more unequivocally at the expense of kalam.682 
Tawhid is generally considered the most important element of some purists’ anti-Sufi polemic.683 
The same purists tended to view Sufis’ “pernicious innovations and superstitious accretions” (al-
bida‘ wa-l-khurafat) as manifestations of shirk. Purists felt that Sufis were wrong in creed and 
therefore wrong in deed.684  
                                                 
Majallat al-Azhar 9/1 (Muharram 1357 i.e. March 1938), pp. 38-40. This issue’s publication happened to coincide 
with the arrival of Pang Shiqian’s Chinese Azharite delegation, which arrived on 23 March 1938. The 
abovementioned  
 




684 D. Gimarat, “Tawhid,” Brill Encyclopaedia of Islam 2. The nature and history of tawhid encourages the 
assumption that this concept dominated Islamic thought from the beginning to modern times. Shahab Ahmed and 
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 The trajectory of Chinese Azharite Zhang Bingduo, for one, would appear to conform to 
such conventional definitions of tawhid. Arriving in Cairo with the second delegation in 
December 1932, Zhang proceeded to study Quran and Hadith, perhaps hinting at a purist 
orientation. Far less ambiguously, when Zhang returned to China, he refused to bow before 
portraits of Sun Yat-sen, and on one occasion even smashed a figurine of the Prophet at 
gathering of his Chinese Muslims associates. The basis for such actions was that Islam 
supposedly did not permit objects or practices that threatened shirk and violated tawhid. 
Remembered by his son Hongtu as stoic and uncompromising, Zhang also opposed Hongtu’s 
aspiration to be an artist. This militant aniconism recalls the activities of the earliest Wahhabis.685 
 Did Zhang’s actions represent a broader ideological orientation on the part of the Chinese 
Azharites—or al-Azhar, for that matter? In Chapter One, we learned that the Shanghai Islamic 
Bookstore categorized ‘Abduh’s Risalat al-tawhid, the creed al-‘Aqai’d al-Nasafiyya, and 
Taftazani’s Sharh al-Nasafiyya as works of tawhid, though without specifying what that meant. 
Additionally, in Chapter Two, we saw that Da Pusheng clearly defined tawhid as affirmation of 
God’s unicity and implicitly defined it against the alleged errors of Sufis and traditionalists. Did 
the Chinese Azharites share this position? Basic theological tawhid is of course a main tenet of 
Islam, but how central was polemical tawhid to Chinese Islamic modernism? To what extent did 
modern Chinese Muslims agree on the meaning and implications of tawhid? 
 It is generally believed that Ma Wanfu (1853-1934), an ethnically Mongolian Dongxiang 
Muslim of Hezhou (Linxia), Gansu, and founder of the Chinese “Ikhwan” movement, was the 
                                                 
others, however, warn against such an assumption. Many make the point that to do so would be an ahistorical 
retrojection of Saudi puritanicalism. Ahmed, What is Islam, pp. 137-40 (including notes). 
 
685 The Chinese Muslims rarely if ever identified as “Salafi” in this period. 
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first to introduce a Saudi-inspired modern purist orientation to China. According to Jonathan 
Lipman, Ma made the Hajj and studied in Mecca from 1888 to 1892, where his studies “certainly 
included fundamentalist ideas such as those of ‘Abd al-Wahhab.”686 Lipman notes, however, that 
Ma neither renounced the Hanafi madhhab nor lived under Saudi rule in Mecca, which at the 
time remained under Ottoman control. The real evidence of Ma’s ideological transformation 
emanates from his actions after returning to China, where he opposed Sufi as well as non-
Muslim Chinese influences, and advocated a rigid scripturalism. There is little if any textual 
evidence, however, for how Ma viewed the concept of tawhid. 
 One of the earliest usages of the term tawhid in modern Chinese Muslim sources 
occurred in an exhortative text by Ma Lianyuan of Yunnan. Ma, however, tawhid as an anti-
Christian rather than anti-Sufi position. Ma’s two-volume work was titled Tabtin al-tathlith wa 
tathbit al-tawhid (“Suppress the Trinity and Affirm Unicity,” 1899/1316AH/Guangxu 25), with 
the additional Chinese title Chu san chong yi (“Worship the One, Dispense with the Three”).687 
In it, Ma writes that he felt “compelled to affirm the principle of God’s oneness” in order to 
discourage Muslims from heeding a propaganda tract on the trinity that Jesuit priests had 
translated into Chinese and Arabic two years earlier, titled Manar al-Haqq (“The Beacon of 
Truth”). In Ma’s words, “He who remains silent on the actual truth is a miserable devil.” 
Because Ma wrote the work entirely in Arabic, he gave no Chinese equivalent for the term 
tawhid. It is abundantly clear, however, that Ma defined tawhid in opposition to the Christianity 
rather than in contrast to Muslims with whom he disagreed.688 
                                                 
686 Lipman, Familiar Strangers, p. 203. 
 
687 A copy eventually came into the possession of Rev. Claude L. Pickens, Jr., and can be found in the Pickens 
Collection at Harvard-Yenching Library. While similar works appeared in Arabic elsewhere in the world, this 
appears to be an original composition in Arabic by Ma Lianyuan. 
 
688 It is less clear what sources, other than the Quran, may have informed his arguments. 
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 Two decades later, the short-lived periodical Qingzhen zhoukan (“The Pure and True 
Weekly,” 1921), published by the Islamic Bookstore (Qingzhen shubao she) at Beijing’s Niujie 
Mosque, was apparently the first among modern Chinese Muslim periodicals to use the term 
renzhu (“acknowledging the [one true] Lord,” accepted as the present-day equivalent to tawhid) 
to mean tawhid.689 Niujie was where the Imam Wang Kuan taught Da Pusheng, Ma Songting, 
Zhao Zhenwu, and other disciples. In this particular article, however, the discussion of God’s 
oneness focused on distinguishing Islam from Christianity, much the same as Ma Lianyuan’s 
tract from Yunnan. It asserted that the Quran provided the basis for tawhid, but it made no 
mention of Sufism or superstition. At the end of the essay, the author added an appendix 
containing a revealing statement, one that runs counter to polemical notions of tawhid: 
“Philosophy” (zhexue) comes from the Greek word for “love of knowledge.” 
Works on philosophy translated into Chinese explain this in detail. When the 
Prophet Muhammad first spread our faith, and shortly after his death, the Arabs 
did not pay much attention to philosophy. Greek philosophy emphasized the 
distinction between true and false. As a mode of thinking, it was already quite old. 
There were many contradictions between it and the theology of our faith, known 
as “acknowledging the Lord” (renzhu zhi xue). The learned members of the faith 
were not fearful, however, but rather undertook to translate Greek philosophy into 
Arabic…they could then debate it more easily, and Greek philosophy became 
absorbed as a mode (dao) of Arabic thought. Making use of Greek philosophy in 
those times is like making use of psychology, logic, or aesthetics in our own. It 
does not contradict the essence of Islam (qie bu bei huijiao zhi benzhi).690 
 
In other words, when modern Chinese Muslims began writing about the concept of renzhu as the 
equivalent of tawhid, they viewed it in the basic theological sense (e.g. in contradistinction to the 
Christian trinity) and, significantly, as a principle that could accommodate other forms of truth. 
                                                 
 
689 Yuan Sou, “Ren zhu [Acknowledging the One True Lord],” Qingzhen zhoukan, 1/2 (1921), pp. 13-14. Yuan Sou 
(“smelly bog”) was clearly a pen name; it is unclear who the author might have been, but generally speaking, Niujie 
at the time was the abode of Wang Kuan and his disciples such as Da Pusheng and Ma Songting. 
 The term renzhu also appeared in Chinese periodicals in non-Islamic contexts dating back to the 1870s. 
 
690 Yuan Sou, “Dianli zeyao – renzhu (si) [Selections from the Classics – renzhu (4)],” Qingzhen zhoubao 1/7 
(1921), p. 15. 
 358 
Again, there was no indication that renzhu’s meaning here was in any way exclusionary or 
fundamentalist. Quite the opposite: here, a history of tawhid’s relationship with philosophy was 
being used as a metaphor for the modernist program of keeping Islam open to foreign knowledge 
(this was far from a unanimous position, however; in the same issue of the same journal, a 
different author emphasized that renzhuxue was the “basis for all morality”).691  
 The 1930s brought increasing use of the term renzhu to mean tawhid in Chinese Muslim 
periodicals in Beijing, Yunnan, Hunan, Tianjin, and elsewhere. It also saw growing instances of 
renzhu sparking debates among Muslims, rather than between Muslims and Christians. In 1932, 
Yuehua published a short article summarizing the views of an imam named Li Zhengyuan, which 
identified renzhu as the primary source of disagreement between the “old” and “new” factions.692 
The following year, Bai Yunxiang wrote an article for Chengda’s campus bulletin titled 
“Refuting Those who Acknowledge Spirits or Multiple Gods Rather than the One True God.”693 
While Bai still reserved most of his critiques for atheists and Christians, his division of the world 
not by religion itself but by “those who believe in no god, those who believe in multiple gods, 
and those who believe in the one true God” opened a space to oppose fellow Muslims who did 
not sufficiently adhere to the doctrine of tawhid. Bai’s article was also one of the earliest uses of 
the phrase “acknowledging that God is one and has no equal” (ren zhu du yi wu er), which by the 
late twentieth century became a standard expression among Chinese Muslims. 
                                                 
 
691 Fan Huaitang, “Lunshuo – renzhu lun [Theoretical Discussion – renzhu], Qingzhen zhoubao 1/7 (1921), pp. 4-5. 
 
692 “Renzhu cuiyan – Li Zhengyuan ahong zhi yiwen [The Pure Discourse of Renzhu – A Text Left by Imam Li 
Zhengyuan],” Yuehua 4/8 (1932), p. 20. The old, he said, believed that God cannot be described in the same manner 
as ordinary beings and things. The new, meanwhile, maintained that while God was epiphenomenal and non-
material, He was also equally present in all things. 
 
693 Bai Yunxiang, “Lunzhuo: bo renling shuzhu yu fo renzhu [Theoretical Discussion: Refuting spiritism and 
associationism and rejecting renzhu],” Chengda xueshenghui yuekan 3/3 (1933), pp. 4-8. 
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 The occasion was ripe for al-Azhar and the Chinese Azharites to provide some clarity on 
the meaning of renzhu and tawhid. At that very time, Ma Jian, then aged twenty-seven, had 
begun translating Muhammad ‘Abduh’s Risalat al-Tawhid (Treatise on the Doctrine of God’s 
Unicity, 1898) into Chinese. The translation first appeared serialized in Yuehua in 1933-34, and 
was later published in book form by Shanghai’s Commercial Press under the alternative title 
Huijiao zhexue (“Islamic Philosophy”).694 Ma wrote in Chinese in his translator’s introduction in 
Yuehua that he had asked the Azhar Sheikh Ibrahim al-Jibali for his recommendations on the 
latest works of renzhuxue, upon which Sheikh al-Jibali directed him to ‘Abduh’s Risala.695 Ma 
Jian, however, was not necessarily in a fully authoritative position to carry out such a 
translation.696 Although he regularly sought al-Jibali’s guidance in clarifying certain points about 
‘Abduh’s Risala and even “asked him to correct his notes,” he does not say explicitly whether al-
Jibali condoned the translation itself. Furthermore, while Ma had been the only Chinese Azharite 
of the original four skilled enough in Arabic not to be sent to remedial language classes prior to 
embarking on the standard curriculum,697 his enrollment status in al-Azhar’s Faculty of Theology 
(Kulliyyat usul al-din) in fact remained ambiguous even in December 1934, his third year in 
                                                 
694 Benite, “Taking ‘Abduh to China,” p. 259. 
 
695 Ma Jian, trans., Renzhu dagang (1), Yuehua 5/27 (1933), p. 11. 
 
696 Yufeng Mao’s assertion that “Because of his long-term dedication to Islamic studies, Ma Jian excelled 
immediately upon commencing his coursework” is evidently a generous interpretation. Ma’s biographer indicates 
that Ma indeed struggled in his early years at al-Azhar, relying on Egyptian classmates to help him with what he did 
not understand, and staying on campus during the summer vacation in order to “review and systematize the 
knowledge he had studied during the year.” Yufeng Mao, “Selective Learning,” p. 153; Li Zhenzhong, Xuezhe de 
zhuiqiu: Ma Jian zhuan [The Pursuit of Scholarship: A Biography of Ma Jian] (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin 
chubanshe, 2000), p. 34. In general, the extent to which the Chinese Azharites may struggled in their studies has 
tended to be downplayed. 
 Ma’s abovementioned choice to translate Hussein al-Jisr’s al-Risala al-hamidiyya fi haqiqat al-diyana al-
Islamiyya (A Hamidian Tract on Islam’s Basis in Fact), a traditionalist work denying Darwinism and maintaining 
conservative views on issues such as slavery, polygamy, and jihad, should also call into question the nature and 
consistency of his Islamic modernist commitments.  
 
697 Mao, “Selective Learning,” p. 153. 
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Cairo, at which time his translation of ‘Abduh’s Risala was essentially complete. In October 
1934, al-Azhar’s High Council had issued Ma a notice that they had still not decided whether 
they could accept his secondary school diploma, prompting him to write to the Sheikh al-Azhar, 
Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, in a state of some distress and confusion after two months 
of waiting for a result.698 There was also a question of whether he should attend the first or 
second year in the Faculty of Theology (he had started off in the second, but the sheikhs had 
recommended he transfer down to the first).699 This is significant, for according to its curriculum 
enacted in 1931, the Faculty of Theology only began teaching tawhid in the second year.700 
 Soon thereafter, Imam Ma Ruitu undertook his own translation of ‘Abduh’s Risala, 
published by Zhonghua shuju in 1937. As Zvi Ben-Dor Benite notes, unlike the Yuehua or 
Commercial Press titles of Ma Jian’s translation, Ma Ruitu titled his work Huijiao renyi lun 
(“Islam’s Discourse of Acknowledging the One”).701 Abandoning renzhu in favor of renyi 
further suggests that Chinese Muslims did not have a stable definition of renzhu in this period. 
 Five years later, Pang Shiqian himself would reveal the full extent of that ambiguity. In 
1942, Pang wrote an article on the topic of renzhu for Huijiao wenhua (“Islamic Civilization,” 
1941-43), a journal published by the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Association after 
retreating to Chongqing with the GMD government. Several Chinese Azharites, former members 
                                                 
 
698 Ma Jian to Shiekh al-Azhar [Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri], 2 December 1934. www.alazharmemory.org.  
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700 “Khitta wa manhaj al-dirasa li-kulliyyat usul al-din [Curriculum and Syllabus for the Faculty of Theology],” 
1349/1931, pp. hah, 1-3. 
 
701 Benite, “Bringing ‘Abduh to China,” p. 261. 
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of the diplomatic delegations, Chinese Muslim intellectuals including Bai Shouyi, and Chinese 
Muslim leaders such as Tang Kesan and Bai Chongxi all wrote for the journal. The journal’s 
audience was not only Muslims, but the GMD government and other Han leaders residing in the 
wartime capital. Pang’s article, however, titled “Renzhu xue yu renzhu xuejia” (“renzhu and its 
adherents”)—which we might expect to be the Chinese translation of al-tawhid wa-l-
muwahhidun (“tawhid and its adherents”)—was not a discussion of tawhid at all. Rather, it was a 
loose translation of the first few sections of a long series of essays published in Nur al-
Islam/Majallat al-Azhar by Dr. Muhammad Ghallab, a French-trained historian of philosophy 
teaching in al-Azhar’s Faculty of Theology, on the topic of “al-Kalam wa-l-Mutakallimun” 
(“Dialectical Theology and its Adherents”). Ghallab’s work surveyed all the major groups and 
figures who practiced dialectical theology in classical Islamic history, from the Mu‘tazila to the 
Ikhwan al-Safa, al-Farabi, Ibn ‘Arabi, and others—figures some modernists, including ‘Abduh, 
sought to rehabilitate in the name of pointing out the greater intellectual openness of the past.702  
 How could Pang’s use of the term renzhu diverge so considerably from that of Ma Jian, 
his fellow Chinese Azharite? Does the problem lie in the term renzhu, in the term tawhid, or in 
our own external understanding or misunderstanding of them? It is partly in the term renzhu, 
which could mean both “knowing God” (in the Sufi sense of coming to know the divine partly 
                                                 
 
702 Muhammad Ghallab, “al-Kalam wa-l-Mutakallimun [Dialectical Theology and its Practitioners],” Majallat al-
Azhar, 12/1-10, 13/1. Ghallab was building on a priority identified especially by Muhammad ‘Abduh. As Marwa 
Elshakry states in Reading Darwin in Arabic, Islamic modernists emphasis on the compatibility of Islam and science 
was part of what tled them (especially Muhammad ‘Abduh) to revitalize ‘ilm al-kalam: “The need to revitalize ‘ilm 
al-kalam was particularly necessary, ‘especially in these days,’ when the faith was under attack from critics of 
Islam, wrote ‘Abduh in 1877. He argued that reasoned proofs of God’s existence would prove to be Islam’s 
strongest bulwark against critics and doubters. Such a theology was alos urgently needed to address current ‘spiritual 
ailments,’—and to ensure that Islam would be free of intellectual ‘stagnation’ (jumud), a charge…he as to frequently 
use against the majority of the ‘ulama, particularly those at al-Azhar. ‘Abduh thus saw a revitalization of kalam, 
through the use of reasoning (nazar wa-istidlal), dialectics (jadal wa-munazara), and logic (mantiq) as the best 
means to preserve the faith in modern times.” Elshakry, Reading Darwin in Arabic, p. 181. 
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through esoteric, “mystical” means available only to the initiated), and “acknowledging God” (in 
the modernist sense of tawhid). It is also partly the original Arabic term tawhid: after all, 
‘Abduh’s Risala was not primarily a discourse on God’s oneness at all, but rather an exposition 
and explanation of some of the key aspects of Islam as seen from ‘Abduh’s modernist viewpoint, 
consisting above all of an argument for human freedom of thought.703 Some even accused 
‘Abduh’s Risala of denying the oneness of God, for example due to its argument that the Quran 
“as read” was created, not eternal.704 For ‘Abduh at least, tawhid did not imply rejection of the 
dialectical or “speculative” tradition of Islamic theology, but rather the embrace of it.705 By 
translating Ghallab, Pang was attempting to redefine tawhid in a manner similar to ‘Abduh: to 
recover a dynamic Sufi theology in order to argue that oneness should not be understood as 
singularity, but indeed that oneness is above all found in, and affirmed by, the infinite plurality 
and multiplicity of existence. 
 Politically, one thing is clear: Pang’s understanding of renzhu stood in marked contrast to 
that of his superior Da Pusheng, who maintained a rigid definition of renzhu as tawhid and 
viewed the concept of God’s oneness as the basis for the moral transformation and political 
integration of China’s frontier Muslims (discussed in Chapter Two). Pang shared the desire to 
transforming the lives and thought China’s Muslims, particularly those on the frontiers, but he 
did not share Da’s view that dogmatic adherence to tawhid formed a central pillar of that project. 
 In short, the term renzhu—which today is accepted by Chinese Muslims as transparently 
and uncontroversially signifying tawhid, including in the polemical anti-Sufi sense—in fact did 
                                                 




705 Gesink, Islamic Reform, p. 77, discusses ‘Abduh’s support for kalam.  
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not carry that meaning in a stable or consistent way for many of the foundational figures of 
modern Chinese Islam.706 The purpose of this extended narration of the relative absence of 
dogmatic tawhid from modern Chinese Muslims’ thinking is twofold. First, it illustrates that the 
principle of tawhid, normalized in more recent decades as one of if not the most important 
concept in Islam, was neither a major focus of the Chinese Muslim modernists or their Egyptian 
mentors, nor was its meaning, in Chinese translation or in the Arabic original, fully agreed 
upon.707 Second, it therefore implies that alternative Islamic modernist principles may have been 
seen as more promising bases for reforming Islam in China. 
 
Reason Triumphant: Ijtihad as an Alternative Vision for Islam in China 
 
Pang called reason “the pillar of progress” and the “great mover of the world.” Gesink argues 
that beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, under self-proclaimed modernist reformers such as 
Hassan al-‘Attar, Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Muhammad ‘Abduh, ijtihad’s 
meaning at al-Azhar expanded dramatically from “a legal method restricted to use by highly 
trained jurists” to a general “principle of intellectual investigation.” A concomitant 
circumscription occurred in the meaning of taqlid, which according to the modernists did not 
mean “adherence to precedent,” but rather “blind imitation of the past.”708 By the 1910s, even the 
most resistant sheikhs at al-Azhar tended to admit the need for some form of ijtihad. In the 
generation in which the Chinese Azharites studied in Cairo, al-Azhar was dominated by the 
                                                 
 
706 In fact, it is possible that the continued use of renzhu as tawhid in Muslim publications in Japanese-occupied 
Manchuria helped normalize the equivalence of those two terms.  
 
707 To borrow Gesink’s term, this is a “non-essentialist” history of tawhid. As Gesink observes with respect to 
Islamic modernist reforms in Egypt, “‘they’—the opponents to reform—were not clearly distinct from the assumed 
‘us’—the reformers” (p. 5). 
 
708 Gesink, Islamic Reform, pp. 7, 66-68. 
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disciples of ‘Abduh such as Mustafa al-Maraghi, who tirelessly reproduced the modernist 
polemic on the pages of Nur al-Islam/Majallat al-Azhar as well as in stand-alone works.709 
 The modernist polemic tended to imagine similar antagonists to the tawhid polemic: 
Sufis, “traditionalists,” and “conservatives.”710 The difference, of course, lay in the goals the two 
polemics saw themselves as serving. Up to the early twentieth century, those ulama who sought 
to preserve Sufi ways or who remained skeptical of a broadening definition of ijtihad (or the 
need for ijtihad at all) often did so not because they categorically feared change, but because 
they felt that the tried and true ways of Islam bore the agreement of generations of Muslims, and 
as such formed a basis for unity against the twin threats of imperialism and corrupting European-
inspired lifeways. Modernists of course agreed that the preservation of Islam was the ultimate 
goal, but they differed on the means to reach it. The conservatives, alleged or self-identifying, 
argued that ijtihad promoted disagreement, and therefore could open opportunities for nefarious 
external or internal forces to divide Muslims against one another. To this, the modernists replied 
that the progress of Islam mattered as much as, and ultimately was the only guarantor of, its 
preservation. Progress in turn required the ability to embrace change and learn selectively from 
the advancements of other societies, all of which demanded exertion of ijtihad. 
 The modernist polemic of ijtihad carried certain implications. One of these was a broad 
embrace of science and innovation.711 A second corollary concerned individual rights, cultural 
                                                 
709 Mustafa al-Maraghi, al-Ijtihad fi-l-Islam [Ijtihad in Islam] (1959; written prior to 1945); Yusuf al-Dijwi, al-Qawl 
al-sadid fi jawaz al-taqlid [The Final Word on Taqlid] (1934).  
 
710 Gesink, Islamic Reform; Ghazal, “Sufism, Ijtihad, Modernity.” 
 
711 As Pang remarked in Aiji jiunian, “Science progresses at a rate of a thousand miles per day. It has made 
particularly great strides in recent years, such as the discovery of penicillin and atomic energy. As science becomes 
more advanced, people can lead better lives.” Nevertheless, Pang immediately qualified that science itself should 
also be limited by ijtihad: “Science must be used to improve human life, not to kill or injure it. The recent use of the 
atomic bomb against Japan cannot be condoned. The Quran says: “Fight in the way of God those who fight against 
you, but do not commit excesses. God does not like those who act excessively” (2:190). Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 88. 
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values, and questions of ideal political systems: Islamic modernists repeatedly asserted that Islam 
respected the rights (and even the equality) of women, that it was compatible with democratic 
and representative forms of government, and even that it was more peaceful than other 
religions.712 Third and most crucially for the Chinese Muslims, the modernist polemic of ijtihad 
also implied new ways of imagining the past and processes of historical change. Vigorous ijtihad 
was cited as the cause of historical florescence, absence thereof as the cause of decline. As Pang 
said, “What we seek is a return to the golden age of Islam and Muslims,” for, as the thinking 
went, the earliest Muslims were the most open to and skilled in the practice of ijtihad. As we 
have seen throughout this study, the temporal logic of “florescence” and “decline” had far-
reaching consequences for Chinese Muslims, as for Muslims generally.713 
 Pang absorbed wholesale al-Azhar’s modernist discourse of ijtihad (as “independent 
human reason”). In his memoir Aiji jiunian (Nine Years in Egypt, 1950), he stated boldly that 
“There is nothing in religion that cannot be understood rationally…In fact, we must use reason to 
understand religion fully.”714 Like his mentors at al-Azhar, Pang accepted that the use of ijtihad 
fell within a certain hierarchy. Reproducing a familiar formula, he explained to his Chinese 
readers that Islamic law proceeds on the basis of the Quran, then the Hadith, then consensus (Ar. 
ijma‘; Ch. jueyi), then analogy (Ar. qiyas; Ch. bilei). Only after these are exhausted does Islam 
                                                 
 As noted in Chapter Four, the Northwest Propaganda Corps invoked the same Quranic passage in their 
September 1938 event in Xi’an, as did Ma Tianying in the English-language propaganda materials of the Near East 
Delegation, both of which condemned Japan’s war as one of aggression and defended China’s as self-defense. 
 
712 Muhammad Farid Wajdi, “The Caliphate and Democracy: A refutation of rumors on the nature of authority in the 
Umma and Islam,” Majallat al-Azhar, 10, pp. 36-38; Muhammad Farid Wajdi, “Women in Islam,” Majallat al-
Azhar 8/2, p. 139. 
 
713 Virtually all Chinese Muslim histories reflected this logic, from Pang’s al-Sin wa-l-Islam, to Bai Shouyi’s 
writings in Yuehua, to Hai Weiliang’s al-‘Alaqat bayn al-‘Arab wa-l-Sin, to Na Zhong’s translation of Ahmad 
Amin’s trilogy Fajr al-Islam (1929), Duha al-Islam (1934-36), and Zuhr al-Islam (1961-62). 
 
714 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 72. 
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“call on people…to deliberate new information and analyze and deduce new principles.”715 
Nevertheless, Pang adopted the relatively progressive view that the textual sources of Islamic 
law also existed in a dialectical relationship with reason, as he explained with respect to “Hadith 
and ijtihad”: 
The authenticity of any given Hadith rests upon the authenticity of its 
transmission. In no way can its meaning alone, judged in isolation on its 
conformity with reason, be taken as the standard. That would be a pointless 
exercise…On the other hand, we cannot do without reason entirely. Non-Hanafis 
say Abu Hanifa used only seventeen Hadith. We care not whether this saying of 
theirs is correct or incorrect; it is a fact, however, that Abu Hanifa did not use 
very many Hadith. For this reason, outsiders label him as one of the “rationalists” 
[lizhi pai]. The legal precepts formulated by Abu Hanifa were based on Quran and 
Hadith, or at least adopted the principle of not violating Quran and Hadith. His 
most trusted methods were qiyas and ijtihad [lizhi]. 
Dr. Muhammad Ghallab [Anliangbu boshi] told me his teacher was Sheikh 
al-Marsafi [Mai’ersaifei zhangzhe],716 who was also a professor at al-Azhar. The 
excellent but modest Ahmad Amin [Aihamode Aimin] was also al-Marsafi’s 
student. It is said al-Marsafi judged Hadith by their conformity with reason alone, 
without regard to their transmission. 
From these two cases, we can see that scholars ancient and modern both 
used reason as a means of judging Hadith. There are many other such figures. The 
literalist imitators [mangcong de zimian pai, i.e. al-muqallidun] are far too 
stubborn and inflexible. With time, they will discover on their own that they lack 
the means to resolve the issues of the day.717 
 
                                                 
 
715 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 77. 
 
716 Sayyid al-Marsafi (d.1931). Born in Cairo. Studied at al-Azhar, gaining the shahada in 1893. His work is 
considered an extension of his kin, Sheikh Hussein al-Marsafi. Considered a figure in the modern literary nahda. 
Taught Arabic for a time. In 1913, appointed as a musahhih at the Dar al-Kutub al-Masriyya. Returned to al-Azhar 
to teach in the 1910s. In 1924, became a member of Hay’at Kibar al-‘Ulama. Source: Azhar Memory 
(http://alazharmemory.eg/sheikhs/characterdetails.aspx?id=169).  
Al-Marsafi was ‘Abduh’s choice to be nominated for a vacancy on the Azhar Administrative Council in the 
late 1890s. Gesink, Islamic Reform, p. 132. 
717 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 72. The relationship could also be inverted, with scripture being construed to support 
reason. Pang elsewhere declared that “In the Quran, there are forty-nine verses that encourage human beings to use 
reason. There are many such statements in Hadith as well. Every ruling in Islamic law proceeds from both scriptural 
and rational proofs.” Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 88. 
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In contrast to his statement in al-Sin wa-l-Islam that the pious forebears (al-salaf al-salih) were 
the most capable practitioners of ijtihad, Pang in Aiji jiunian expressed greater confidence in 
human beings’ ability to employ reason:  
When the Prophet Muhammad sent Mu‘izz to Yemen to propagate the faith, he 
asked him: ‘By what means will you govern them?’ Mu‘izz replied: ‘By the 
Quran.’ The Prophet Muhammad continued: ‘And if you encounter that for which 
the Quran does not provide?’ Mu‘izz replied: ‘By the Hadith.’ The Prophet 
Muhammad asked again: ‘And if you encounter that for which the Hadith do not 
provide?’ Mu‘izz replied: ‘By virtue of my own judgement and understanding.’ 
To which the Prophet Muhammad said: ‘Correct.’” Modern people see these 
statements merely as a relic of the past, believing that only the early generations 
possessed the capacity to analyze and deduce, that “after the fourth century AH, 
the gate of analysis and deduction was closed,” and that after that, there was only 
blind imitation of the ancients. But there are many things that simply did not exist 
in ancient times. So what is to be done? To adopt the ways of the ancients and no 
more is to forsake Islam and its law.718 
 
This last statement was radical even by some modernist standards. While the discourse of ijtihad 
often elevated the earliest generations of Islam, the salaf, as paragons of ijtihad, here Pang used 
ijtihad as a basis for rejecting the Salafi impulse. Islam, by its nature, and by virtue of the nature 
of the universe, must move continually forward, and the only way to accomplish this was 
through the consistent application of human reason. Pang was increasingly equating ijtihad with 
Islam itself. 
 As is already apparent, Pang increasingly grew beyond being a mere passive recipient 
and partisan of ijtihad or of its scientific, historical, or political implications. Rather, he became a 
theorist of it in his own right, especially as concerned the fundamental questions facing Islam 
and Muslims in China. Pang’s application of ijtihad to the Chinese context shows through 
especially in his discussion of the “Ikhwanis” (Ch. Yihewani pai) in the final section of Aiji 
jiunian. China, Pang says, “already had divisions of sect before the formation of Ma Laichi’s 
                                                 
718 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 78. 
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Huasi order and Ma Mingxin’s Jahriyya order—but these were all fairly minor.” Even with the 
Huasi and Jahriyya orders, when their members occasionally moved eastward into Henan and 
Shandong, “the differences between them and the majority of Muslims have diminished.”719 
According to Pang, only Ma Wanfu’s Ikhwani movement, beginning in the 1890s, sparked 
lasting divisions. Ma Wanfu, Pang says, was “of the opinion that many of the ideas and practices 
of China’s Muslims were in violation of the sharia.” Pang specifies that Ma’s movement, known 
as the “Newest Teaching” (Xin xin jiao), sought to reform over thirty aspects of Islamic 
practice.720 
 Pang took each of these areas one by one, demonstrating concisely and by various 
methods—historical anecdotes, quotations from scripture, and so on—how the positions of the 
Ikhwanis lacked imagination and common sense, and how ijtihad could lead quite easily to 
superior approaches. For example, Pang recalled that some years earlier, Muslims in Shaanxi 
Province had been participating in the trafficking of opium, on the basis that certain old textual 
sources such as “Shami” (i.e. Sharh Durr al-Mukhtar, a work of fiqh by Ibn ‘Abidin, a.k.a. al-
Shami, 1198–1252AH/1783–1836AD) permitted the buying and selling of narcotic products 
despite forbidding their consumption by Muslims. Pang observed that “if al-Shami were to have 
seen the conditions of opium use in China, he would have known that its effects are even worse 
than those of alcohol, which is clearly forbidden.” Furthermore, Pang mentioned that a certain 
Imam Fu Pingma employed controversial yet effective measures to curb opium production, 
trafficking, and consumption in the Northwest. In approaching both the textual and the historical 
                                                 
719 Ibid., p. 97. 
 
720 Ibid., p. 98. The most important of these concerned (1) the problem of reciting the Quran and receiving reward 
(2) funerals (3) raising a finger during prayer (4) “becoming suddenly tense after performing du‘a” (5) growing a 
beard (6) prayer (7) women covering their heads (8) commemorating the Prophet (9) recitation of the Quran (10) 
opium and morphine (11) the problem of wearing white (12) the problem of observing the moon (e.g. to know when 
to begin Eid). 
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questions, Pang transforms ijtihad into an instrument for reconciling Islamic principles with the 
realities of a given sociocultural context. 
 The same type of reasoning could apply to questions of ritual. With respect to recitation 
of the Quran, Pang said that the Ikhwanis placed great stress on “correct” pronunciation. While 
acknowledging that recitation of course follows certain rules, Pang nevertheless says that it does 
not make sense to emphasize pronunciation at the expense of listeners’ comprehension. The 
Imam al-Ghazali himself, Pang points out, wrote that it was incorrect to emphasize recite style 
entirely at the expense of comprehension of meaning. In other words, ijtihad ensures sensitivity 
to the specificities of context (in this case, the differing accents of Muslims from different lands) 
and helps establish priorities (above all, the text must be understood).721 
 Pang made two immediate recommendations with a mind toward introducing more 
widespread use of ijtihad throughout China’s Muslim communities. The first was to improve 
Chinese Muslim publishing and translation activities by establishing a “Publishing and 
Translation Commission.”722 While complimenting exceptional publishing pioneers such as Zhao 
Zhenwu, Pang noted that even though the population of Muslims in China runs in the tens of 
millions, the number of translated books is very small—no more than three or four hundred. A 
“complete and well-ordered collection” (zhengbu congshu) of Islamic works translated into 
Chinese would encourage Chinese Muslims’ ability to confront challenges in a reasoned manner. 
Second, Pang proposed a systematic reform of hailifan (i.e. mosque instructor-assistants) 
                                                 
 
721 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 107. 
 
722 This idea was almost surely based on Ahmad Amin’s Ladjnat al-ta'lif wa l-tardjama wa-l-nashr ("Committee on 
Composition, Translation, and Publication"). See Emmanuelle Perrin, 《Le creuset et l’orfèvre : le parcours 
d’Ahmad Amîn (1886-1954)》Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée [En ligne], 95-98, avril 2002, 
mis en ligne le 12 mai 2009, consulté le 18 février 2018. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/remmm/238.  
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education in China. Pang recommended attaching a school to every mosque in China; educating 
hailifan in Chinese, Arabic, and the Islamic sciences with a standardized curriculum along 
modernist lines (presumably based on that of al-Azhar); administering a single nation-wide exam 
for the hailifan; and sending the most accomplished for further study in Cairo. He estimated that 
forty new schools in China’s major cities and provincial capitals could train three thousand new 
hailifan at a time.723 It is impossible to know whether such a plan would have strengthened 
Chinese Muslim communities in the manner Pang envisioned, however, for he returned to China 
in the midst of the GMD-CCP civil war, and the rest of his life was marked by attempts to 
safeguard Islam under the new Communist regime. 
 
Conclusion: Islamic Modernism’s Lost Generation 
 
The Chinese Azharites arrived in Cairo at the precise moment when nation-state nationalism was 
irrevocably taking hold across the Islamic world and beyond, and when the Second World War 
already loomed on the horizon. Nevertheless, they appeared on the scene as unlikely yet fervent 
latter-day claimants to the inheritance of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid 
Rida, Shakib Arslan, and others who maintained that the affinities of Islam and the East 
represented the “firmest bond,” and that nations and nationalism, even in China, could be made 
to coexist with rather than supplant what they perceived to be this timeless truth.  
Indeed, the Chinese Azharites’ studies in Cairo did not reflect exclusively hegemonic or 
Sino-centric motives. Rather, their non-hierarchical, umma-centric aspiration to know and feel 
connected to Islam and Muslims outside China persisted in its own right, sharpened by the 
anxiety of having been isolated from the larger Islamic world for five centuries. In light of these 
                                                 
 
723 Pang, Aiji jiunian, p. 64; see also Pang Shiqian, “Quanguo qingzhensi hailifa jiaoyu gailiang chuyi [A Modest 
Proposal for Improving Hailifan Education in Mosques Nationwide],” Yuehua 16/4-6 (1944). 
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aspirations and anxieties, their time at al-Azhar allowed them to articulate and experience 
organic forms of Islamic unity that were not tied to territorial states or specific political projects 
(such as the re-establishment of the Caliphate). As far as al-Azhar was concerned, Islamic unity 
resided instead in correct thought, belief, and action; a common effort to master the Arabic 
language; and the pursuit of mutual knowledge and cooperation without regard to nation or race. 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the GMD state and its elite Muslim allies, the 
Chinese Azharites offered an alternative to top-down Sinicization and homogenization of 
China’s frontier Muslims: that is, the Chinese Azharites could help deliver a more thorough, 
authentic, and authoritative Islamic modernist curriculum than any of their predecessors, backed 
by years of state-supported study in the Islamic world’s most prestigious institution, and sealed 
with the Azhar shahada.  
As Matsumoto Masumi has argued, Chinese Muslim elites felt that they could not 
criticize the Chinese state directly for intercommunal violence, Islamophobia, or Northwest 
Muslims’ low standard of living. Instead, they had little choice but to internalize the 
responsibility for such issues, arguing that if only China’s Muslims could be better educated, less 
insular and less backward, and more open to productive dialogue and coexistence with Han 
Chinese, their other problems would evaporate automatically. Building on the work of Chengda, 
the Four Great Imams, and Wang Haoran, the Chinese Azharites’ deep study of Islamic 
modernist thought provided a sounder basis than ever for the position that being better Muslims 
was the solution to the social, political, and cultural challenges facing China’s Muslims. 
While the “reconciliation,” “translation,” or “synthesis” of Muslimness and Chineseness 
is always a tempting framework, evidence suggests that this was not primarily how the Chinese 
Azharites viewed their role. Unlike the Han Kitab authors of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
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centuries, the Chinese Azharites mostly did not frame Chinese Muslims’ challenges 
ontologically. While it may be tempting to view the situation in such terms, the question of how 
to reconcile “Islam” and “China,” or how to be Muslim and Chinese at the same time, was not 
the Chinese Azharites’ primary concern—at least not directly. Of course, their mentors and 
colleagues in China did publish new editions of the Han Kitab works, and often described Islam 
in partly Confucian terms. On the whole, however, the Chinese Azharites and their associates at 
home adopted an alternative approach. In an era of rapid communication, mass media, and 
increased information about the outside world—and above all, nationalism—simply arguing that 
Islam was Chinese had become untenable; therefore, Chinese Muslim elites instead argued for 
Islam’s compatibility with what they saw as the core principles a universal “modernity,” 
principles they knew the GMD defended militantly: science, reason, and anti-superstition. 
Egypt played a special role in this commitment to Islamic modernism and reason. Beyond 
the walls of al-Azhar or the writings of its sheikhs, the contest between two alternative visions of 
Egyptian nationalism—the narrower, Europeanist, territorial nation-statist one versus the 
broader, Easternist, Islamically inflected one—reached its peak and apparent resolution during 
the 1930s and 1940s, the same as the period of the Chinese Azharite delegations. Not 
surprisingly, the Chinese Azharites often found themselves associating with proponents of the 
latter view, which scholars argue became dominant in the 1930s.  
Below that surface, however, it is important to note that the Islamic modernist polemic of 
reason the Chinese Azharites (especially Pang) adopted did not emerge only from al-Azhar itself, 
but also from the larger context of Cairo, Arab intellectuals, and the Arabic press. Even as 
formerly “Egyptianist” intellectuals turned toward an Islamo-Easternist orientation, however, 
they continued to insist on interpreting Islam as fundamentally rational, scientific, and modern. 
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For example, Muhammad Husayn Haykal stressed the Prophet’s extraordinary capacities for 
reason in his biography Hayat Muhammad.724 This was the grand compromise between the three 
poles of identity: nation-state nationalism could be repositioned to accommodate Islam, and 
Islam could be understood in a manner consistent with science, modernity, and reason—but 
science, modernity, and reason themselves were not required to budge. They remained absolute, 
ostensibly universal. In other words, a popularized version of Islamic modernism became the 
crucial mediator between territorial nationalism and more expansive identities through reference 
to an ostensibly unmovable universal modernity. From the Chinese Muslims’ perspective, 
grasping and applying this point was far more important than any single text they read or 
translated while in Cairo.  
Articulated in various ways by Egyptian intellectuals, Islamic activists, and the sheikhs of 
al-Azhar, the assertion of Islam’s rationality mirrored and reaffirmed the distinction the 
Guomindang itself had made between “rational religion” and “irrational superstition.” Whether 
in Arabic, Chinese, or otherwise, everyone was speaking the same language. In other words, the 
solution to the crisis of modern Chinese Muslim identity was broadly the same as the solution to 
the crisis of modern Egyptian identity, resting on the assertion of Islam’s fundamental rationality 
and compatibility with modern science, and therefore, the possibility of its coexistence with 
nationalism, whose inherent modernity was already assumed. 
One final observation must be made regarding the implications of ijtihad, particularly 
Pang’s expansive vision of it. In the words of Indira Gesink, 
It can be argued that lay ijtihad mitigates the coercive power of the state. While a 
state may claim to promulgate the correct interpretation of religious sources, lay 
ijtihad puts the tools of alternative interpretation and resistance into the hands of 
every individual. Individuals could circumvent restrictions imposed by the frozen 
                                                 
 
724 Gershoni and Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation. 
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juristic past through lay ijtihad…Taken to its logical conclusion, the modernists’ 
version of lay ijtihad constituted a democratization of religious knowledge that 
would motivate against arbitrary exercise of power.725 
 
While perhaps less than obvious, the above statement could apply just as easily to China’s GMD 
government and its elite Muslim allies as to any government or group of obstinate ulama in a 
Muslim country. We know from Pang’s brief but unambiguous statements in al-Sin wa-l-Islam, 
quoted at the head of this chapter, that he was skeptical of the blunt integrationist approach 
toward China’s Muslims being taken by Da Pusheng and other high-level Muslim figures close 
to the GMD. As argued in Chapter Two, politically and militarily minded men such as Da, Tang 
Kesan, Bai Chongxi, Ma Hongkui, Chen Lifu, and Chiang Kai-shek were not only attempting to 
Sinicize frontier Muslim populations, but also to tell them what forms of Islam would and would 
not be sanctioned. In advocating an expansive, continuous, and democratized ijtihad, sensitive to 
the particular conditions of Muslims in China, perhaps Pang was seeking not to transform 
China’s Muslims according to some predetermined image, but rather to empower them to 
critique and resist impositions and intrusions by any form of authority, political or religious, 
trying to tell them what “correct” version of Islam to believe and practice. While not all the 
Chinese Azharites shared his views, Pang clearly felt that a top-down nationalized Islam on the 
one hand, or a similarly dogmatic upstart Salafi scripturalism on the other, would be equally 
unsuitable for China’s Muslims. 
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CHAPTER SIX: RETURN OR EXILE 
 
 
China today is starting on the path to democracy. But it would appear that it does 
not yet have a suitable manner of dealing with its several million Muslims. It 
continues to follow oppressive and guarded policies that the future will not 
vindicate. In the recent war of resistance, Muslims made many sacrifices for their 
country. But what of their rights? No matter, rights are to be claimed, not simply 
given. At the San Francisco conference, all parties had equal representation, yet 
Muslims were kept from participating. In the upcoming Republican Congress, I 
fear Muslims will not be allowed to choose representatives in proportion to their 
numbers. The Communists’ minority nationalities policy appears correct; clear-
headed people might give it some consideration. 
-Pang Shiqian, “The Question of Muslim Representation,” late 1940s726 
 
Preparation of Arabic Coffee. Boil water. One spoon of coffee to be put in water 
and left until completely desolved [sic]. Add cardamom, qwantity [sic] to be 
slightly more than coffee. Mixture to be boiled a few minutes. 
-Ma Tianying, personal diary entry, in English, Ipoh, Malaysia, April 1964727 
 
 
Introduction: End and Beginning 
 
On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
at Tiananmen in Beijing. That same day, however, a very different set of circumstances was 
unfolding among the remaining GMD forces eight hundred miles to the south. From his base in 
Hengyang, Hunan, Bai Chongxi—Chiang Kai-shek’s army chief of staff since 1927, a hero of 
the war with Japan, and minister of war from 1946 to 1948—telegrammed the Central China 
Military Command Office at the GMD’s soon-to-be-abandoned headquarters in Guangzhou with 
an urgent secret message for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the midst of preparing for the 
final defense of his home province of Guangxi, Bai took time to reaffirm his support for a 
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proposal to dispatch a six-member “Chinese Islamic Near and Middle East Delegation” 
(Zhongguo huijiao jinzhongdong fangwentuan).728 
Since entrenching in Hengyang in August, Bai had been communicating about the 
proposed mission with the GMD central authorities and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Guangzhou, who in turn had been in touch with GMD consulates in Kabul, Ankara, Tehran, and 
Cairo. Bai said the mission called for “a Muslim possessing considerable experience in foreign 
relations” and on 24 September recommended Wang Zengshan for the job, citing his studies in 
Istanbul in the 1920s and leadership of the Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation of 1937-39. In 
addition to Wang, who was working for the Republican government in Xinjiang and had agreed 
to head the delegation on 8 September, the delegation would include a number of other familiar 
figures: Wu Jianxun, who had served with the 1939-41 South Seas Delegation; Na Zhong, the 
former Azharite; and three others. Their itinerary would take them to twelve cities in eleven 
countries over a period of sixty days: Cairo, Mecca, Sanaa, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Istanbul, 
Ankara, Tehran, Baghdad, Karachi, and Kabul. They would leave from and return to Guangzhou 
via Hong Kong. They requested a total budget of 50,000 USD. In addition to stipends and living 
and travel expenses, this budget would provide 18,500 USD for banquets and tea parties, as well 
as 3,000 USD for printing equipment and fees in order to produce propaganda materials in 
English, Arabic, and Turkish. The GMD and Chinese Muslim leaders clearly felt that the model 
of the wartime Near East and South Seas delegations was worth reproducing. 
While the personnel and itinerary would resemble earlier delegations, however, the 
purpose of this one was new.729 Both Bai and the MFA talked about the mission, and relations 
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729 Actually, it was not entirely new. Anti-communism did arise as a topic of discussion from time to time in the 
meetings of the wartime Near East and South Seas Delegations. 
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with Muslim countries in general, almost exclusively in terms of “strengthening the front against 
international Communism.”730 In his communications with the central authorities and MFA, Bai 
had stressed that Pakistan in particular had emerged since the 1947 Partition as an important anti-
Communist force in the Islamic world. Notably, all eleven countries on the Delegation’s 
proposed itinerary counted, for now, as ones skeptical of or openly opposed to the Soviet Union. 
Ten years down the road, that would no longer be true for half of them—a dramatic turn whose 
effects would deal a great blow to the Chinese Muslims in Taiwan. But that is getting ahead of 
the story. 
Due to the CCP’s victory on the mainland and the GMD’s evacuation to Taiwan, the 
proposed fall 1949 delegation never actually set sail. At the same time, however, the planning for 
it reflected the new world in which Chinese Muslims found themselves. As Bai wrote, a new set 
of realities was taking shape for China, the Islamic world, Chinese Muslims, and global 
geopolitics. The resumption of the Chinese Civil War from 1945 to 1949, the CCP takeover of 
the mainland, the founding of the People’s Republic, the Guomindang’s move to Taiwan, and the 
consolidation of those two new states over the subsequent decade thrust hard choices upon 
Chinese Muslims, as it did in one way or another for everyone in the country. To remain in 
mainland China (or to return, in the case of the diplomats and Azharites) meant uncertainty due 
to the unstable military situation and due to communism’s opposition, in theory, to all religion. 
To leave meant accepting and adapting to exile in Taiwan or, in many cases, in various Muslim 
or non-Muslim countries throughout Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. Of course, the 
reasons for choosing one or the other were not necessarily ideological. Family reasons, financial 
reasons, and sometimes pure accident played a role. Except for those Chinese Muslims who were 
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immediately employed by the GMD government and for whom staying in China would have 
meant prison or death, we cannot speculate about motives in any comprehensive way, but merely 
seek to understand the variety of results. 
What is clear is that each of these options—returning to China, moving to Taiwan, or 
relocating to a third country—placed new demands on Chinese Muslim identity that were not 
entirely dissimilar to the challenges they faced at the birth of the Republic or after the 
consolidation of power by the GMD during the Nanjing Decade. In one sense, the ruptures of 
1945-49 meant that there was no longer a single Chinese Muslim identity, if such a thing had 
ever existed. Additional fragmentations occurred, furthermore, within each of the three 
aforementioned options.  
If one left, was it better to move to Taiwan or to a Muslim country? The GMD’s special 
relationship with Chinese Muslim leaders meant that Taiwan perhaps represented the easiest path 
for one to remain both fully “Chinese” and fully “Muslim”—the cost, however, being the loss of 
one’s native land. Yet the GMD’s nationalism, while by definition not as destructive as the 
Mainland’s communism, also carried clear prescriptions for what Islam could and could not be. 
By contrast, living in a Muslim country surely offered the opportunity to experience Islam in 
new ways previously available only to the lucky few who could travel or study there. Yet it 
almost as surely meant feeling isolated and perhaps being left out of state and society.  
If one remained in China, was it better to keep one’s head low, or to work actively for the 
state or state-sponsored Islamic institutions and promote a vision of compatibility between Islam 
and Communism? In terms of basic security, the cost of doing so lay in the risk that the Party 
might become more rigid in its ideology and more aggressive toward perceived enemies—which 
is precisely what happened beginning in the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1958 and continuing 
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through the Cultural Revolution. As with other groups, many Muslims were persecuted or killed, 
as religion was considered inherently reactionary and contrary to the state’s projects.  
By the 1960s, Chinese Muslims in Taiwan and the Mainland, many of whom had worked 
and studied side by side for decades, were completely cut off from one another. Both groups 
were increasingly cut off from the Islamic world as well: as countries across Asia and the Middle 
East gained independence from European empires, each tended to follow its own path and to 
circumscribe the political role of Islamic internationalism. In the three main scenarios for 
Chinese Muslims described above—Taiwan, Mainland, or exile—ideology, Cold War, 
decolonization, and nation-statism placed inescapable constraints on what Islam, or at least 
public Islam, could and could not be.  
 
Keeping Islam Anti-Communist: Chinese Muslims in Taiwan Fight for Relevance 
 
The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and the renewed Chinese Civil War (1945-49) 
coincided with a partial generational shift for the urban coastal elites of the Chinese Muslim 
community. Zhao Zhewu, the editor of Yuehua, died prematurely in wartime Beijing in 1938, at 
age forty-three. Soon thereafter, Imam Ha Decheng died in 1943 in Shanghai, also Japanese-
occupied territory, only a few years after he had helped the GMD and his fellow Chinese Muslim 
leaders to stall Tang Yichen’s Japanese-sponsored Hajj delegation (see Chapter Four). Imam 
Wang Jingzhai died in Guiyang in early 1949, where he had traveled to visit his daughter and 
seek medical treatment.731 Tang Kesan—deputy of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, 
co-managing director of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation, and dean of 
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Chengda Academy—died in Nanjing in 1950. With the possible exception of Zhao Zhenwu, all 
of these men would probably have attempted to escape to Taiwan with the GMD government 
and most of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation leaders if they had been younger 
and in better health, but it is impossible to say. 
 In the Northwest, the Ma warlords’ forces put up some of the staunchest resistance 
encountered anywhere by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). While the eventual result was 
defeat or defection, in some cases this resistance extended well into the 1950s.732 The 
Northwest’s two leading Chinese Muslim figures, however, left China well before that point. 
Qinghai governor Ma Bufang, whose stronghold at Xining had remained relatively unscathed 
during the war, had come to receive significant material support from the U.S. military and CIA; 
one could argue that he was the United States’ earliest Muslim strongman client. Ma escaped 
from Xining to Hong Kong in early October 1949. Rather than relocating to Taiwan, he 
proceeded into exile with approximately two hundred of his kin and associates, first making the 
Hajj, then settling temporarily in Cairo from 1950 to 1957 (where his children received Arabic 
tutoring from Hai Weiliang). Ma was acting in a semi-official capacity while in Egypt, so when 
Egypt recognized the People’s Republic of China in May 1956, Taiwan made Ma its ambassador 
to Saudi Arabia. Ma served in this post from 1957 until 1961, when he was dismissed “on 
charges of corruption and incompetence.” Ma lived in Saudi Arabia until his death in 1975, and 
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did not “return” to Taiwan.733 Meanwhile, Ma Hongkui, governor of Ningxia and cousin of Ma 
Bufang, also escaped China in 1950 and resettled in Los Angeles (he had visited the United 
States previously for medical treatment), where he became a horse rancher and indulged his taste 
for ice cream up to his death in 1970.734 
The Uyghur leaders connected to the GMD government faced a variety of fates during 
the CCP takeover. Isa Yusuf Alptekin (see Chapter Four), a former leader of the First East 
Turkistan Republic (1933-34) and later GMD agent, returned to Xinjiang after the war and 
opposed the Second East Turkistan Republic (1944-46) on the grounds that it was a Soviet 
puppet; as the PLA approached Urumqi, he fled over the mountains to Kashmir and eventually 
resettled in Turkey. Muhammad Amin Bughra, another leader of the First East Turkistan 
Republic, was appointed by Chiang Kai-shek in December 1948 as vice-chair of the GMD’s 
Xinjiang provincial government, also charged with the task of opposing communist influence 
there. Muhammad Amin Bughra’s superior was Burhan Shahidi, who became chair of the 
Xinjiang provincial government in January 1949. Despite sometimes espousing anti-Soviet 
views, Burhan Shahidi decided to remain in China and was responsible for announcing 
Xinjiang’s surrender to the PLA in late September 1949. In the early 1950s, he also became a 
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founder of the Chinese Islamic Association in Beijing, cementing collaboration between Uyghurs 
and key Chinese Muslim figures who had remained in the PRC (see below). Finally, Masud 
Sabri, the third leader of the First East Turkistan Republic, had relocated to Nanjing following 
the defeat of the short-lived state, becoming a member of the GMD government; he also 
preceded Burhan Shahidi as chair of the Xinjiang provincial government.735 At least as far back 
as Feburary 1937, Masud Sabri and five associates had submitted a petition to the GMD 
parliament noting that “Europeans and Americans see Islam as a potential bulwark against 
communism.” He therefore proposed the creation of “exploratory delegations” (kaocha tuan) that 
could be sent to “all Muslim countries” to strengthen China’s ties with them on an anti-
communist basis, as well as to pursue cultural cooperation and support the “anticolonial 
struggle…of weak nations such as Turkey, Arabia, Iran, India, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and 
Egypt.”736 Masud Sabri may therefore have been the first person to come up with the idea of 
Chinese Muslim diplomatic delegations, before the outbreak of the war, and partly for anti-
communist reasons. Nevertheless, in 1949 he chose to remain in Xinjiang, where he was 
imprisoned and died in 1952. 
With the Ma warlords effectively out of the picture and with the GMD government’s 
most prominent former Uyghur allies electing not to move with it, Bai Chongxi was left as the 
sole figurehead of the Chinese Muslims in Taiwan. Bai was politically handicapped, of course, 
having fallen out with Chiang Kai-shek in 1948 after supporting Li Zongren for the vice-
presidency over Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-sen, and the favored choice of Chiang—which cost Bai 
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his position as minister of war. The specter of further marginalization, however, appears to have 
motivated Bai in his work on Chinese Muslim issues. For most of the 1950s, Bai energetically 
sought to galvanize the Chinese Muslims on Taiwan under the banner of anti-communism. As 
Bai’s own record carrying out the 1927 Shanghai Massacre suggests (see Chapter Two), anti-
communism was by no means a new cause for the Chinese Muslim elites. After 1949, however, 
anti-communism became fused to an unprecedented extent with public articulations of 
Taiwanese Chinese Muslim identity. Through the Chinese Islamic Federation (Zhongguo huijiao 
xiehui)—the new name of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation after the war, 
including after the move to Taiwan—Bai and his longtime associates Sun Shengwu and Shi 
Zizhou tirelessly propagated a conception of Chinese Muslims as some of Taiwan’s most 
dedicated Cold Warriors.737 
 With Bai’s support, and despite brief interruptions in 1949-50 as the GMD was forced to 
vacate “China’s” diplomatic installations around the world, several members of the slightly 
younger group of former Chinese Azharites and former Near East and South Seas Delegation 
soon regained stable employment as diplomats of Taiwan. Hai Weiliang, for example, found 
himself out of his job as a GMD diplomat in New Delhi, which is why he temporarily moved to 
Cairo in 1950 and came into contact there with Ma Bufang (Hai also took advantage of the 
interruption to finally publish his Arabic-language work, al-‘Alaqat bayn al-‘Arab wa-l-Sin, the 
product of research begun in the 1930s at the Lucknow Nadwa and at al-Azhar). Nevertheless, 
Hai was eventually reemployed as a Taiwanese diplomat from the mid-1950s to the late 1980s, at 
which point he retired to Taiwan despite not having lived there before.738 Like Hai, other 
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Chinese Azharites such as Na Zhong and Ding Zhongming continued to work as both scholars 
and diplomats, with Ding serving for a time as ambassador to Libya. The situation was simplest 
for those in countries that did not recognize the PRC for the time being, such as Wang Shiming 
in Saudi Arabia, who simply remained in their posts. Others, however, followed more eventful 
paths: toward the end of the war, Wu Jianxun of the wartime South Seas Delegation was sent as 
a representative of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Association to India, where he was 
briefly arrested in Calcutta under unclear circumstances, but eventually returned to Taiwan 
following India’s partition with the help of the GMD Ministry of Foreign Affairs.739  
The question for the Chinese Muslims in Taiwan, however, was not merely how to secure 
their material well-being as individuals, but how to ensure the ongoing relevance of their 
interwar and wartime vision of Islamic transnationalism, or transnationalist integrationism, to 
Taiwan’s international relations. For the decades in which the GMD held power on the 
Mainland, the state’s perceived imperative to retain control of the Northwest frontiers provided 
the Chinese Muslim elites an all-encompassing logic that could justify almost any cultural 
undertaking they could imagine, from education reform, to the Fu’ad Library, to study at al-
Azhar. While the war with Japan placed an even more acute pressure on Chinese Muslims to 
conform to the state’s political priorities, the imperative of frontier integration and development 
predated the war, persisted during it, shaped it, and ultimately outlived it. The Northwest 
frontiers did remain as a sort of phantom limb for the GMD and the Chinese Muslim elites in 
Taiwan as long as Northwest Muslims continued to resist the PLA and as long as Chiang Kai-
shek and his government still entertained the possibility of launching a “counter-offensive” on 
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the Mainland. In some ways, this dynamic persisted for a very long time: most significantly, the 
Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, relocated to Taiwan with the rest of the government, 
was only defunded in 2017—by which point an increasingly “Taiwan”-centered rather than 
“China”-centered Taiwanese nationalism had long wondered aloud why the institution was still 
necessary. Overall, however, the Northwest frontiers ceased to provide a concrete rationale for 
political and cultural action on the part of Chinese Muslim leaders in Taiwan in the 1950s. 
Confined to their tiny island, and with realistic hopes of retaking the Mainland slipping away, the 
only hope for Bai Chongxi and his associates to retain their former influence was to try to make 
their brand of Islamic politics and diplomacy useful not to frontier governance, but to the task, 
much larger still, of combating global communism. 
Bai Chongxi embarked on this rearticulation of purpose shortly after resettling in Taiwan. 
In August 1951, he published a brief tract titled A Work Plan of the Chinese Islamic Federation 
(Zhongguo huijiao xiehui gongzuo jiyao). In it, he first presented a (very) long list of Chinese 
Muslims’ contributions to the war effort against Japan, including:  
(1) The Northwest Propaganda Corps  
(2) The Near East, Hajj, and South Seas Delegations 
(3)  Direct enlistment in the military 
(4)  Supporting industrial production 
(5)  Supporting education reform (Bai singled out the Chengda Academy, Sun 
Shengwu’s Northwest School, and Da Pusheng’s Shanghai Islamic Normal 
School by name) 
(6) Receiving Chiang Kai-shek’s 1939 “Northwest Morale” mission 
(7) Providing intelligence from enemy territory 
(8)  Establishing the Pingmin Hospital in Chongqing 
(9) Rebuilding the Chongqing Mosque 
(10) Mobilizing the Chinese Muslim Youth Association (Bai singled out Xue Wenbo, 
Zhang Zhaoli, and Wang Mengyang by name) 
(11) Making recommendations to the GMD government and to Muslim countries 
regarding the formation of cooperative organizations 
(12) Carrying out diplomatic relations (Bai singled out “the Chinese Muslims who 
studied in Egypt and Turkey”) 
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(13)  Sending students to Egypt and Turkey (it is significant that Bai saw this as a 
contribution to the war effort separate from No. 12) 
(14) Completing the formation of a national Islamic association 
(15) Completing the translation of [Islamic] classics740  
 
In light of the overall argument of this study, it is especially significant that Bai identified 
Chinese Muslims’ educational and intellectual activities, both in and outside China, as ones that 
had contributed directly to the war effort. Now, from the perspective of the early 1950s, Bai 
argued that such activities, along with political and diplomatic contributions, were equally ones 
that could help the Taiwanese GMD in its ongoing struggle with the CCP. Bai commended 
Chinese Muslims for joining the GMD on Taiwan, and proposed 
(1) Dispatching new overseas delegations 
(2) Sending representatives to participate in international Islamic conferences 
(3) Disseminating anti-communist propaganda to all Muslim countries 
(4)  “Elaborating religious doctrines…in order to increase the moral power of 
religion to oppose communism”  
(5) Supporting the “Islamic world” in its advocacy efforts regarding certain 
contested territories, including Palestine, Kashmir, Hyderabad, Eritrea, 
Somaliland, and Junagadh741 
 
The fifth item stands out in particular for its expansiveness given the Taiwanese government’s 
limited capacity. This ambitious proposal indicates Bai’s confidence in his elite Chinese Muslim 
associates’ abilities to navigate complex issues of Islamic and international politics. At the same 
time, it also suggests the great lengths to which Bai was now willing to go in order to preserve a 
place for Chinese Muslims in Taiwan’s international relations: if the GMD were to be pulled into 
international conflicts over Palestine or Kashmir, the Chinese Muslim elites would be the only 
people on Taiwan qualified to show the way forward. 
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Bai added that it would be especially important to focus on relations with Egypt, “for it is 
the international center of Islam, and shares a close cultural relationship with our country” (he 
could not have anticipated that in less than a year, Egypt’s July 1952 Free Officers’ Revolution 
would set the country on a path toward the Soviet camp). In addition to Egypt, Pakistan mattered 
greatly as well. In Bai’s words, although Pakistan had “due to particular circumstances” already 
recognized the PRC (becoming the first Muslim country to do so), he hoped that the young 
nation could be persuaded to restore relations with the GMD government on Taiwan. Bai hinted 
that the reason for his optimism had to do not only with Pakistan’s Islamic character, but more 
specifically with certain “Muslim members of the former military government of Xinjiang,” who 
had escaped the advancing PLA by braving the high mountain passes and crossing into Pakistan. 
Some of these individuals, Bai said, would proceed from Pakistan to Taiwan to assist the GMD 
government, while others could be deployed directly to carry out the GMD’s work in a variety of 
Muslim countries.742 
The following month, Bai followed up on his Work Plan by delivering a radio address “to 
the Muslim world” that among other things drew attention in the U.S. media. In the address, Bai 
solidified several points that he hoped would form a new political consensus for the Chinese 
Muslims in Taiwan. First, he encouraged Muslims to “steer clear of India’s Premier Jawaharlal 
Nehru,” whom he accused of being “blind to Soviet imperialism, foolish and arrogant, and 
having ulterior designs on Kashmir.” Bai also claimed that the “Russian imperialist ogre” Stalin, 
and his “Chinese henchman Mao Tze-tung,” were seeking to engineer a third world war. 
Significantly, Bai claimed that he “spoke in the name of 50,000,000 Chinese [Muslims],” and 
urged all Muslims “regardless of race or nationality” to be “prepared to fight shoulder to 
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shoulder alongside the Western democracies.”743 The fact that Bai would so forcefully assert the 
anti-communist credentials of all Chinese Muslims, including those still living on the Mainland, 
suggests that he actually believed his ideas could make a difference to the outcome of the GMD-
CCP struggle and the fate of those Muslims; if he had been privately resigned to the new reality 
of the PRC’s existence, he may have been more reluctant to speak in a manner that would so 
clearly endanger his coreligionists remaining on the Mainland. On the other hand, the entire 
GMD leadership was understandably slow to overcome denial. 
The community of elite Chinese Muslims on Taiwan was already implementing many of 
these proposals before Bai even announced them. In 1951, much as Da Pusheng and Ha Decheng 
had done in the 1930s, the Chinese Islamic Association member Chang Zixuan issued a series of 
radio broadcasts titled “Twelve Lectures on Islamic Doctrine” (Huijiao jiaoyi shi’er jiang). The 
printed version of these lectures, published in book form, were endorsed by General Yan Xishan, 
who the previous year had briefly served as premier of the Republic of China. Though not an 
imam—as we will see, most of the imams stayed on the Mainland—Chang used scriptural 
evidence to present Islam’s positions on topics such as patriotism, seeking knowledge, peace, 
public service, obedience, industriousness, helping others, and last but not least, “wealth and 
capital” (fuyou zicai). This last lecture discussed the portions of the Surat al-Baqara regarding 
the practice of sadaqa (charity) in Islam, demonstrating that Islam supported both individual 
wealth and common welfare, and organically linked the two.744 In their choice of topics, 
scriptural excerpts, and interpretations, Chang’s lectures carefully portrayed Islamic doctrines as 
being inherently anti-communist, or at least as being more compatible with Chinese nationalism 
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according to the GMD. At the same time, Chang’s argument mirrored a much broader debate 
across the Islamic world at this time as to whether, or to what extent, Islamic economic thinking 
represented a middle ground between capitalism and communism.745 
The Chinese Civil War and the GMD’s move to Taiwan, an epoch-making rupture in so 
many other ways, nevertheless did not fundamentally alter the Chinese Muslim elites’ approach 
to its relationship with the GMD government. On Taiwan, the Chinese Muslims’ growing anti-
communist initiatives involved a different message but the same media compared with their 
activities before 1949. This makes some sense. To be sure, the discourses and practices that had 
characterized public Islam in Republican China had to an extent become habit, even second 
nature, by the late 1940s. At the same time, because anti-communism did not go hand-in-hand 
with domestic political openness or democracy during Taiwan’s first forty years under GMD 
rule, political conformity remained nearly as important for the Chinese Muslims as it had been 
during the Nanjing Decade and the war years. Having argued at great length and with great 
sophistication that Islam was compatible with Chinese nationalism, GMD frontier nation-
building, or anti-Japanese resistance, the Chinese Muslims on Taiwan now deployed the same 
rhetorical tools to demonstrate why Islam was anti-communist.  
This required some recovery of Chinese Muslims’ intellectual and material capacities: 
few if any of their Republican-era publications had survived the relocation to Taiwan; Yuehua, 
for instance, returned to Beiping following the world war, ceased printing in 1948 due to the civil 
war. In conjunction with Bai Chongxi’s proposals, however, the Chinese Islamic Federation 
began publishing a montly in 1952 under the Chinese title Chinese Islamic Federation Bulletin 
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(Zhongguo huijiao xiehui huibao) as well asthe Arabic title Lisan al-haqq (“the language of 
truth”). While possessing a natural ring in Arabic, this Arabic title also implied the newspaper’s 
opposition to any claims the PRC or the Soviet Union might make about Islam and Muslims. 
Indeed, this was precisely the content the newspaper emphasized. Issue after issue reported on 
topics such as the “communist bandits’ criminal oppression of Muslims” (gongfei pohai huijiao 
zuixing) and Chinese Muslims’ brave resistance.746 The paper also reported on current events in a 
variety of Muslim countries, but tended to reserve positive portrayals only for those that 
gravitated toward the United States, opposed the Soviet Union and PRC, and maintained 
relations with Taiwan, such as Malaya/Malaysia, Turkey, Iraq (before 1958), and Jordan (King 
Hussein’s visit to Taiwan in 1959 was an especially significant episode).747 
As indicated above, Bai Chongxi believed that sending Chinese Muslim diplomatic 
delegations abroad was the wartime practice most worth replicating in the battle against 
communism. While the “Near and Middle East Delegation” Bai had begun planning from 
Hengyang in fall 1949 did not come to fruition, he and the other Chinese Muslim elites on 
Taiwan began working almost immediately to revive the idea. In April 1950, fifty-five 
individuals led by a (Uyghur?) member of the Legislative Yuan and Chinese Islamic Federation 
named Abdullah (Ch. Abudula) petitioned the Executive Yuan regarding the possibility of 
organizing a Near East Delegation, “to increase our strength in foreign relations and garner 
support for a counter-offensive against the Mainland.”748 Abdullah and his associates asked if the 
                                                 
746 “Gongfei pohai huijiao zuixing [Communist Bandits’ Criminal Oppression of Muslims],” Zhongguo huijiao 
xiehui huibao/Lisan al-Haqq, 61, 15 October 1958, p. 1. 
 
747 On King Hussein’s visit: “Wei wo zongtong guibin: Yudan guowang Husheng fanghua: jiang jiejian benhui 
daibiao canguan Taibei qingzhensi [Our President’s Distinguished Guest: Jordan’s King Hussein Visits China: Will 
Inspect Taipei Mosque with Our Federation’s Representative],” Zhongguo huijiao xiehui huibao/Lisan al-Haqq, 65, 
25 February 1959, p. 1. 
 
748 Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives 11-WAA-00004.  
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Executive Yuan would raise the issue for discussion at their session on 14 April. He then 
elaborated on the reasoning behind the request:  
We all know that U.S. Secretary of State Acheson’s “comprehensive 
[containment] policy” means that the “United States must bring its full power to 
bear in containing the Soviet Union…and that the U.S. government and its allies 
must maintain a high degree of unity.” Given the importance that the mighty 
United States places on achieving international unity, we wish to draw attention to 
the countries of the Near East, such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, etc., all of which are now caught in a rather 
precarious position. This is the first reason why we wish to form, as soon as 
possible, a goodwill delegation to visit all the Muslim countries of the Near East.  
 The Soviet Union, a UN Security Council member state, has along with its 
satellites moved forcefully to cancel our Chinese delegate Jiang’s status. Many 
member states detested it when they treated Egypt with similar disrespect. We 
wish to remind you that we [Chinese Muslims] are still fifty million strong. When 
we cannot make a difference by supporting vetoes [in the UN Security Council], 
we must find new ways of thinking about our foreign relations. This is the second 
reason why we wish to form a Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation.  
 Last year, our government sent a delegation to twenty-two Catholic 
countries in South [and Central] America. Diversifying our friendships in foreign 
relations is a sound policy, and the more sympathy we earn from the peoples of 
free democratic nations, the better. This is a good precedent. This is the third 
reason why we wish to form a Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation. 
 Such an effort will be valuable for protecting Taiwan, facilitate the early 
stages of retaking the Mainland, and increase our strength in foreign relations.749  
 
Perhaps Abdullah and the Chinese Islamic Association knew that this message was well-timed. 
On April 22, the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a telegram from the UN 
Sinodelegate in New York reporting considerable hostility from the Soviets. When the 
Taiwanese representative (at that time occupying the “China” seat on the Security Council) 
accused the Soviets of sending military aid to the Chinese Communists, the Soviets called the 
Taiwanese representative’s words “slanderous” and referred to him as a “private individual 
                                                 
 
749 Sinica Modern History Archives 11-WAA-00004. It is unclear to which statement of U.S. Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson Abdullah’s petition might refer. If it is the 1949 policy paper United States Relations with China with 
Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949 (a.k.a. the “China White Paper”), I have not yet found the exact passage. 
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illegally claiming [the] status of representative.”750 Given the difficulties with the Soviets at the 
UN, the GMD government in Taiwan was eager for alternative avenues for pursuing their anti-
Communist foreign policy. The Chinese Islamic Federation in Taiwan appears to have 
anticipated that this would be a good time to propose a new Near East delegation—or perhaps it 
was a lucky coincidence. The delegation got as far as submitting passport applications for the 
proposed members, but these appear to have been left incomplete. Again the plan was delayed.751  
 The problem was this: Wang Zengshan—the proposed delegation leader—was absent 
when the plans were being discussed. At first Wang was in still in Xinjiang, where he had been 
working for the GMD as head of the Xinjiang Provincial Government’s Civil Affairs Bureau 
(Xinjiang sheng minzheng ting) at Dihua (i.e. Urumqi). According to Wang’s journal, he was 
busy in this post, overseeing the Xinjiang Hui Cultural Progress Association’s construction of 
mosques, coordinating an educational survey with the Association, and liaising with U.S. Consul 
to Xinjiang John Hall Paxton, whom Wang offered some advice regarding the Turkish/Turki 
language and script. From early to mid-1949, Wang anxiously followed the progress of the PLA 
westward to Xi’an and Gansu. On 21 May, he wrote “Secretary Liu says Nationalist troops 
stationed in Xinjiang number only 100,000. The central government is in grave danger.” The last 
entry in his journal was from 24 July 1949.752 Wang evaded CCP forces sometime in the fall of 
                                                 
 
750 Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives 11-WAA-00004, file 2, p. 16.  
 
751 Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives 11-WAA-00004, file 1 pp. 48-50 and file 2 pp. 1-15.  
 
752 Wang Zengshan, Xin zheng jiyao [Meeting Notes of the Xinjiang Government] (Dihua i.e. Urumqi: n.p., 1946-
49), in Wang Zengshan Papers, National University of Singapore Central Library. 
 Regarding construction of mosques: “9 May 1949: The Xinjiang Huizu Cultural Progress Association 
representatives met regarding prayer hall decoration. Still satisfied, but all present felt it lacked enough religious 
character. Therefore, among the texts they chose [to decorate the mosque] were the Quranic verses ‘Cling fast, ye 
one and all, and do not let go the great cord of God’” and ‘Verily all the believers are brothers.’” 
 Regarding education: “11 May 1949: According to the statistics of the [Xinjiang] Huizu Cultural Progress 
Association, the Hui of Xinjiang total 200,000. With regard to their educational attainment, 21 have studied abroad, 
15 have attended university, 384 have attended [some?] senior high school, 1,288 have attended [some?] junior high 
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1949, fleeing over the Karakoram Mountains with his family and fifteen “dependents” via 
Kashmir and Lahore, and finally settling in Karachi. In the following weeks, he was able to 
contact the GMD government, itself in the middle of evacuating to Taiwan, to inform them of his 
circumstances. Wang was the one Bai Chongxi was referring to when he alluded in his Work 
Plan to Chinese Muslim contacts in Pakistan who had escaped from Xinjiang.753  
On 9 January 1950, the reassembled GMD Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taiwan wrote 
to the Executive Yuan Secretariat to remind them that they and the Chinese Islamic Association 
had discussed organizing a Near East Delegation the previous September and had selected Wang 
Zengshan to lead it, but that this remained in the planning stages because Wang was forced to 
flee to Pakistan. In the same communication, the MFA passed along a request from Wang for 
material assistance for himself and his dependents, the purpose of which was to help him return 
to Taiwan to take part in anti-communist efforts from there before re-embarking with the 
delegation. By 21 February, the Ministry of Finance replied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
approving NT10,000 to be sent to Wang via the Chinese Central Bank branch in Karachi.754  
                                                 
school, 9,623 have attended [some?] primary school, and the illiterate number 182,134. Reading such figures, one 
cannot help but feel ashamed and distressed.” 
 Regarding Paxton: Wang states that on 17 May 1949, U.S. Consul to Xinjiang John Hall Paxton invited his 
family over for dinner and a movie. They discussed the U.S. media as well as the Turkish/Turki script and language, 
with Wang offering Paxton some clarifications. Wang lamented that ‘My country’s intelligence and power does not 
match that of the foreigners!” but at the same time commented, ‘How can the American diplomats expect to spread 
their propaganda in Xinjiang, with all its various peoples, without knowing Turki?’” 
 Paxton’s perspective can be assessed using the John Hall Paxton Papers (MS629), Sterling Memorial 
Library, Yale University, esp. Boxes 3-9. 
 
753 Described in Wang’s letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ye. Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History 
Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collection 020-021904-0008, p. 10. This file was declassified by the 
Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 2015. 
It is unclear whether Wang fled in the same group as Isa Yusuf Alptekin, though they did know each other 
and did leave at approximately the same time, by the same route. Rosey Ma, “Hj. Jelaluddin Wang Zengshan, 1903-
1961,” Wang Zengshan Papers, National University of Singapore Central Library.   
Rosey Ma’s biographical introduction to the Wang Zengshan Papers states that the family left in 
September, whereas Wang’s letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that it was November. 
 
754 Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives 020-021904-0008. 
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 Wang did not “return” to Taiwan after all, because an opportunity soon arose to capitalize 
on his accidental residence in Karachi by attending the inaugural meeting of the World Muslim 
Congress (Motamar-e Alam-e Islami, later spelled in a slightly more Arabized form, Motamar al-
Alam al-Islami) as a representative of Taiwan’s Chinese Islamic Federation. It appears Wang had 
been directly or indirectly in touch sometime in 1950 with Haleem Sahib, a professor and 
president of the Motamar. The Motamar had been working since India’s partition and the 
formation of Pakistan in August 1947 to revive the earlier Islamic world congresses of Mecca 
(1926) and Jerusalem (1931). It held its inaugural meeting at its headquarters in Karachi in 
February 1949, featuring a speech by Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan’s first prime minister. It 
selected the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Husayni (whom Wang Zengshan had 
met in Beirut in 1938 during the Chinese Islamic Near East Delegation; see Chapter Four) as its 
chair and Dr. Inamullah Khan as its secretary-general, and formed a committee to draft a 
constitution. Conference attendees included representatives from Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Syria, North Africa, and Junagadh. The conference dealt with two topical areas, “The 
Women of Islam” and “The Youth of Islam.”755 The Motamar probably considered such topics to 
be “social” rather than political, and a continuation of the Islamic modernist social mobilization 
models of the interwar period. By the early 1950s, however, the emerging Cold War was 
pressuring ostensibly cultural organizations such as the Motamar to “choose sides.” Whether it 
said so or not, the Motamar’s membership consisted of anti-communist Muslims. At the same 
time, such organizations attempted to carve out various forms of middle ground. For example, 
the Motamar became a proponent of the argument that Islamic economic thought represented a 
                                                 
755 Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives 11-WAA-00004, file 2, pp. 33-34; 
http://www.motamaralalamalislami.org/history.html. 
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“third way” between capitalism and communism, an argument that we have seen the Chinese 
Muslims in Taiwan were already making.756 
The issue of the world’s Muslim minorities also grew in importance in the context of this 
early Cold-War Islamic internationalism. Pakistan had been partitioned from India, and most of 
the world’s Muslim-majority countries (prior to the revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s) 
remained in an Anglo-American sphere. At the same time, however, the Motamar was concerned 
that huge numbers of Muslims remained under communist rule in the Soviet Union and China. 
There is a high likelihood that Wang Zengshan played a direct role in raising the Motamar’s 
awareness of this issue. In his report on the February 1951 inaugural meeting of the Motamar 
submitted to the GMD Executive Yuan and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wang included a map 
he had created at the Motamar showing the “World Distribution of Islam” (see IMAGE 1) that 
raised the issue of Muslim minorities quite clearly. In addition to the majority-Muslim Soviet 
satellites of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, this map shaded 
portions of Russian- and PRC-controlled territory (including Xinjiang and parts of Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, etc.) as contiguous with the rest of the “Islamic world.” It also marked with 
dots those “places where Muslims and non-Muslims live amongst one another,” particularly 
Northwest China, North China, Yunnan, and parts of India.757 Six months later, Wang’s map 
would be reproduced and published with Bai Chongxi’s abovementioned Work Plan; Bai’s call 
for attention to Palestine, Kashmir, Hyderabad, and other contested territories was based on 
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Wang’s report.758 The Motamar itself also continued to be preoccupied with the issue of Muslim 
minorities for years to come.759  
 
 
IMAGE 1. Wang Zengshan’s “Distribution of World Islam” map from the inaugural Motamar al-
Alam al-Islami, February 1951. The region of Northwest China (Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai) is 
unique on Wang’s map for being both shaded as contiguous with the rest of the Islamic world, 
and dotted as being a place where Muslims and non-Muslims live among one another. Source: 
Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives. 
 
 
Crucially, how important was the Motamar’s role in encouraging Pakistan to join the 
Baghdad Pact in February 1955, which (despite its recognition of the PRC in 1950) signaled 
Pakistan’s shift into a U.S. sphere of influence?760 And if that role was strong, how important in 
turn was Wang Zengshan in pushing the Motamar in an anticommunist direction? It is possible 
that all these things were connected. For one thing, the Motamar’s president, Hajj Amin al-
Husayni, clearly brought an anti-communist dimension to the organization. When Wang 
                                                 
758 Bai, Zhongguo huijiao xiehui jiyao, map following p. 35.  
 
759 See for example Country by Country Outline Survey of Muslim Minorities of the World (Karachi: The Congress 
[i.e. Motamar al-alam al-Islami], 1977). 
 
760 Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (Columbia UP, 
1997), Ch. 4. Robert McMahon makes it sound like Pakistan’s joining Baghdad Pact resulted directly from Prime 
Minister Liaqat Ali’s increasingly close relationship with the United States, but this leaves open the question of what 
pressures in that direction may have emanated instead from Pakistan itself, including the Motamar. 
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Zengshan met with al-Husayni in Beirut in 1938, their conversation had in fact turned toward the 
topic of communism, at which point al-Husayni remarked (according to Xue Wenbo’s records) 
that communism was inappropriate for Muslims and that it “tends toward the dictatorship of the 
proletariat” (wuchan jieji zhuanzheng).761 Furthermore, a key intermediate step in Pakistan’s 
joining the Baghdad Pact was a bilateral cooperation agreement it had signed with Turkey one 
year earlier. The fact that Wang Zengshan was also highly involved with Islamic circles in 
Turkey on an ongoing basis provokes this question further.  
 After the Motamar, however, it appears nothing happened on the Taiwanese side for two 
months. Bai Chongxi wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 7 May to remind them that 
Wang had attended the conference.762 He received a reply from Chiang Kai-shek himself on 23 
May.763 Chiang’s message quoted Vice President and Executive Yuan Director Chen Cheng’s 
earlier response, making two suggestions: appointing Wang to stay in Pakistan as Free China’s 
permanent representative to the Motamar, and, equally interesting, proposing that the Motamar 
organize a branch in Taiwan.764  
 Wang remained for a time in Karachi after the Motamar, still not moving to Taiwan. 
During this time, he did his best to gather intelligence on PRC and Soviet activities in Pakistan, 
and throughout South and Central Asia and the Middle East, particularly as emanating (or 
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perceived to be emanating) from Xinjiang.765 He remained in regular contact with Bai Chongxi 
and GMD Minister of Foreign Affairs Ye Gongchao (a.k.a. George Yeh), arguing that more 
robust contact with the Islamic world could be a sturdy pillar of Taiwan’s anti-communist policy, 
if only the GMD government would seize the opportunity. On one occasion, Wang went so far as 
to mail Ye annotated newspaper clippings from Rangoon’s Chung Hwa Shang Pao (The China 
Commercial Times) to reinforce his point. One clipping was from 8 March 1951, and discussed 
the narrowing of Taiwan’s options in the international arena. Wang underlined a passage he felt 
particularly deserved Ye’s attention:  
England, France, and other countries are unwilling to stand with Taiwan, which 
makes Taiwan’s relations with neutral countries such as India and the Arab 
nations all the more important…With regard to foreign relations, the 
strengthening of Sino-Soviet relations and of both countries’ growing connections 
with the countries of the Near East [is another reason to strengthen Taiwan’s 
relations with such countries].766 
 
The other clipping, from 14 April 1951, summarized statements by U.S. First Assistant Secretary 
of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (and former Texas oil man) George 
McGhee, which confidently asserted that communism could not succeed in Iran or the Middle 
East. Wang underlined the following sentences for Ye: “The reasons the Soviet Union will fail 
are as follows: (1) the majority of peoples in the Middle East and Southeast Asia detest 
communism (2) these people subscribe to religion and individualism (3) they also possess 
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ancient cultures which they are determined to preserve.”767 It is highly unlikely that McGhee, 
over a year before the Egyptian revolution and two years before the CIA-MI6 coup to remove 
Iran’s democratically elected Mohamed Mossadegh, would have appreciated that U.S. policy 
itself would ultimately drive “these people” into the Soviets’ arms.768 In any case, according to 
Wang, the Americans were clearly receptive to the type of rhetoric and policy initiatives he, Bai, 
and others were envisioning. Wang’s handwritten note accompanying the clipping read:  
The suggestion to strengthen our relations with the Muslim nations of the Near 
East, which I, Zengshan, previously had the honor of presenting, has not yet been 
taken into consideration. This is cause for disappointment. Enclosed herein are 
two newspaper clippings, which I unexpectedly find to be in agreement with my 
own humble opinion…I yet hold out hope of holding the line in firm opposition to 
international Communism.769 
 
Such statements served two purposes. One—similar to the anti-Japanese rhetoric of the 
previous decade—was to perform anti-communism early and often, so as to reassure the GMD of 
the Chinese Muslims’ unflagging commitment to the cause of nation, state, and party. The other 
was to persuade that government of the practical value of continuing to pursue Islamic 
internationalism in the struggle against communism, for the social and political position of elite 
Chinese Muslims in Taiwan was perceived as being, and probably was in fact, directly 
proportional to cultivating such a sense of “relevance.” The odd combination of deference and 
frank consternation with which Wang addresses Ye suggests that at this point, the GMD 
government was still willing to listen to the Muslim leaders, at least with respect to the all-
important work of anti-communism. Wang’s thinly veiled suggestion that the government was 
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not doing enough to seize anti-communist opportunities in the Islamic world, however, also 
speaks to multiple anxieties on the part of Wang and his associates. One was that the GMD state 
would increasingly overlook them in Taiwanese society; the other was that the state would cease 
supporting their aspirations to be better connected with the Islamic world. In other words, anti-
communism had become the key to preserving the twin pillars of elite Chinese Muslim identity 
that had developed over the last forty years: transnationalism and integrationism. 
A new opportunity struck for Wang later that month. On 26 April 1951, Wang (who was 
still receiving his mail at the “ABC Chinese Restaurant” on Elphinstone Street in Saddar, 
Karachi) wrote again to Minister Ye announcing that Professor Zeki Velidi Togan of Istanbul 
University, with whom Wang had studied in the 1920s, had invited him to attend the Twenty-
Second International Congress of Orientalists in Istanbul in September 1951. Togan was serving 
as president of the Congress’s organizing committee. Ye Gongchao and Bai Chongxi made 
arrangements to fund Wang’s travel to the Congress. The Congress itself, held from 15 to 22 
September, was attended by over three hundred individuals from Turkey, Germany, Britain, 
France, Italy, the United States, Egypt, and Pakistan; Wang Zengshan was probably counted 
among the fourteen attendees from Pakistan. The Congress featured a “Committee of Honour” 
including Louis Massignon, H.A.R. Gibb, Arnold Toynbee, William F. Albright, Carl 
Brockelmann, Enno Littmann, Giorgio Levi Della Vida, and Taha Hussein. Substantively, in 
addition to ancient studies, philology, art history, and so on, the Congress would contain portions 
on both Islamic and East Asian studies, which apparently prompted Togan’s conclusion that 
Wang would be interested. (Despite all this, it is not entirely clear whether Wang attended.)770 
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 By early 1953, Wang was still in Karachi, and still signing his letters as “Delegate to the 
Motamar al-Alam al-Islami from China,” but using an address at the Pakistani Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. On 2 February, he wrote to Professor Haleem 
Sahib, president of the Motamar al-Alam al-Islami, recommending that Sahib invite Bai Chongxi 
to the Third Open Session of the Motamar, to be held in Cairo later that year. Sahib replied on 20 
February, noting that Bai and Wang would both be invited, and that the invitations would be 
issued from Cairo on behalf of Muhammad al-Khidr Hussein, the Chinese Muslims’ old 
instructor, who had now risen to the position of Sheikh al-Azhar. While the details of this latest 
conference are more obscure, it appears Wang at least did attend with Bai’s approval.771 
 In the next two years, however, events would accelerate far beyond Bai and Wang’s 
control. In October 1954, Gamal Abdel Nasser, following an assassination attempt by a member 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, proceeded to imprison the Brotherhood’s leadership, fundamentally 
altering the status of Islam in Egypt. In April 1955, Nasser attended the first Afro-Asian 
Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, where he and Zhou Enlai got along famously well. In 
September, long frustrated in his overtures to the United States, Nasser concluded the “Czech 
arms deal,” which edged Egypt significantly closer to the Soviet bloc.772 As was the case for the 
GMD government generally, Bandung in particular exploded the Taiwanese Chinese Muslims’ 
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hopes for preventing stronger relations between the PRC and major Muslim countries.773 The 
anti-communist Islamic internationalism conducted by the Chinese Muslim elites on Taiwan 
never fully recovered from the Bandung moment.  
 In the decade from the end of the war to Bandung, as this drama unfolded between Bai, 
Wang, the GMD, and various Muslim countries, Wang’s old friend Ma Tianying was following a 
very different path, but one that ultimately led in a similar direction. Ma returned to Egypt from 
1943 to 1946 as secretary of the Chinese consulate.774 During this post, in June 1946, he became 
a member of the “National Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of Egypt,” at the 
grade of “apprentice” (apprenti/mubtadi’); in mid-1947, he was promoted to “companion” 
(compagnon/shaghal).775 Ma left Egypt in October 1946 and returned to Beiping, sending the 
GMD government a detailed report on King Farouq I.776 By early 1948, the GMD had decided it 
could put Ma to better use in Southeast Asia, at which point he was involved in lengthy 
discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the GMD consulate in Singapore regarding 
suspicions about Malayan communists.777 Then, in late 1948, Ma was appointed consul-general 
in Ipoh, Perak, where he remained until the victory of the CCP. On 30 December 1949, while 
Wang Zengshan was crossing into Pakistan, Ma received orders from Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Ye Gongchao to “return home” (huiguo ling)—that is, to move to Taiwan. Ma apparently did not 
respond for two and a half weeks, prompting Minister Ye to write again on 16 January 1950 
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repeating the orders.778 The next extant communication is from 20 February, when Ye asked Ma 
to “return the seal of the [defunct] Ipoh Consulate to our consul-general in Singapore.”779 Ma had 
disobeyed orders and was choosing to stay, along with his family, in Malaya.  
 Ma’s life veered sharply from there—though perhaps it did not feel that way to him. 
While remaining in touch and on good terms with the GMD government, he was not as involved 
as Wang Zengshan in the formulation of the Taiwanese Chinese Muslims’ anti-communist 
policies. Rather, he devoted himself to scholarship as well as to all manner of political, social, 
and religious activism in Malaya. He maintained regular correspondence with dozens of public 
figures, many of whom he had met during the South Seas Delegation, including Tungku Abdul 
Rahman (the first prime minister of the Federation of Malaya, 1957-63, and of Malaysia, 1963-
70) and the Alsagoffs of Singapore. One of his primary activities was proselytizing to non-
Muslim Chinese in the Malaysian Peninsula on behalf of the All-Malaya Muslim Missionary 
Society, successfully winning numerous converts. At the invitation of Tungku Abdul Rahman, in 
1960 Ma joined the Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM, i.e. “Muslim Welfare 
Organization of Malaysia”), through which he claimed to have helped convert approximately 
1,600 people to Islam.780 In the meantime, he had applied for Malayan citizenship and was 
granted it—by the name of “Haji Ibrahim Tien-Ying Ma”—on 27 November 1957, three months 
after the Federation’s independence on 31 August.781  
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779 Ma Tianying Papers, MTY.B3.27, B19500220 
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 The last gasp of Bai, Wang, and Ma’s version of postwar Islamic internationalism took 
shape in the project to “renovate and expand”—essentially build from scratch—the Taipei Grand 
Mosque (Taibei qingzhensi). The Taiwanese Chinese Islamic Federation hoped that the mosque 
would symbolize their community’s connectedness to the Islamic world, and they and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs both hoped that the opening ceremony would be an occasion to 
reinforce Taiwan’s friendship with anti-communist Muslim countries as mediated by the 
Federation. The Federation formed a “Renovation and Expansion Committee” consisting of Shi 
Zizhou, Sun Shengwu, Chang Zixuan, and two others. The well-known Taiwanese architect 
Yang Cho-cheng (a non-Muslim) was eventually selected to design the structure. Bai Chongxi 
also invited Minister of Foreign Affairs Ye to be a committee member.  
The committee submitted its “Taipei mosque proposal” to the GMD Executive Yuan in 
December 1957. In their proposal, they cited the need to “conform to international standards and 
attract the friendship of Middle Eastern countries.” They asked for NT4 million, and specified 
that the mosque would need to be built “in a new place.” The same month, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs wrote to Ma Hongkui and Ma Bufang, asking for donations. The cost estimate 
was later raised to NT6 million; the committee wrote to the Bank of Taiwan for a loan for 3 
million, but were only approved for a fixed-term loan of 2 million. They reapplied five months 
later, upon which they received the remaining 1 million.782 
The committee’s next step was to request information gathering on principles and 
examples of mosque architecture Middle Eastern countries in which Taiwan still had embassies 
                                                 
782 Chinese Islamic Federation to Executive Yuan, 17 December 1957; Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ma Hongkui, 
27 December 1957; Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ma Bufang, 27 December 1957; Ministry of Finance to Bank of 
Taiwan and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 1958; Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collection 11-WAA-00275.  
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or consulates, which were all U.S. allies (for the time being). They eventually received replies 
from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran.783 Even more tellingly, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs wrote to the U.S. Information Service to inquire about mosques the United 
States, and received a reply recommending they study the Islam Temple and Mohammed Temple 
of Islam in Washington, DC; the Islamic Mission of America on State Street in Brooklyn; and 
the Holy Temple of Islam on Greenwood Avenue in Chicago.784 They also asked the diplomatic 
installations to begin preparing lists of potential invitees to the mosque’s opening ceremony. As 
the planning developed, the Executive Yuan Director Xu Baiyuan recommended to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs that foreign Muslims wishing to donate to the mosque should be given a 
“favorable rate of exchange.”785  
Compared to the 1930s and 1940s, Chiang Kai-shek’s lack of involvement in a major 
initiative such as the construction of Taipei’s first large mosque signaled a diminished status for 
the Chinese Muslims in Taiwan. During the war, he had approved line budgets for Da Pusheng’s 
Pingliang school and traveled to Gansu personally with the “Northwest Propaganda Corps.” 
Even in the early 1950s, he was involved in Wang Zengshan’s attendance at the Motamar al-
Alam al-Islami in Karachi. By the end of 1958, however, executive-level coordination on the 
Taipei Mosque project had clearly been delegated to Vice President Chen Cheng, indicating that 
this was seen primarily as a domestic social and public relations issue rather than a matter of 
                                                 
783 Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collection 11-WAA-00275. 
Among the materials they collected was the 1952 book Türk Mimari Anitlari.  
 
784 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to U.S. Information Service, 21 January 1958, in Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern 
History Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collection 11-WAA-00275. These three mosques still exist, with 
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785 Executive Yuan to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 January 1958, in Academia Sinica (Taipei), Modern History 
Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collection 11-WAA-00275. 
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strategic importance to the ROC’s foreign affairs, as the Islamic Federation would have liked 
everyone to believe.786 
The Taipei Mosque project committed a significant gaffe abroad. On 23 December 1958, 
the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in a friendly but stern manner to the ROC embassy 
in Jidda informing them that Chinese individuals residing in Saudi had collected contributions of 
money in Medina to support the Taipei Mosque, a practice forbidden by Saudi law, “hoping that 
such collecting may be stopped and not repeated again.” The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
relayed the message to the mosque committee.787 Beyond respecting Saudi law, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs would probably have been especially eager not to offend Saudi Arabia in the 
latter’s capacity as an important anti-communist power and U.S. ally.  
Soon thereafter, the project ran into a telling obstacle at home as well. On 18 July 1959, 
the mosque committee wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressing concern that the 
mosque would be adjacent to buildings that violated architectural regulations, and asked “how 
they might be dismantled legally.”788 A ministry official responded immediately—anonymously 
and specifying “please do not transmit or include this in any official communications”—to say 
that “While we agree with you in principle, the completion date of the mosque is fixed to 
coincide with the visit of Muslim leaders, so discussion of costs and protocols in fact only causes 
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needless worry. It would be best if you were to resolve this matter with the private individuals 
involved; it is not necessary for the government to intervene.” The ministry repeated itself 
several times in the following months, with the GMD Central Committee and the Taipei 
Municipal Architectural Bureau eventually intervening to resolve the issue.789 For its part, 
however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was willing to look past building laws, safety, and to an 
extent cost in order to provide a timely and impressive demonstration to the anti-communist and 
U.S.-allied foreign Muslim leaders, even over the objections of their own Muslim citizens. As a 
late-1959 meeting between the mosque committee, the GMD Central Committee, and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, the purpose of the mosque was “to promote international 
Islamic friendship in support of the aims of the foreign relations of the Republic of China” and 
“to welcome foreign dignitaries…to observe the conditions of progress in our Free China.”790 
Who were the foreign Muslim dignitaries that justified such shortcuts? In fact, despite 
great effort, the Taiwanese Chinese Muslims and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs struggled 
tremendously to retain high-level invitees. In the end, they were unable to secure any visitors 
from the Middle East. Even at that, the Islamic Federation hoped for three attendees in particular: 
the Sultan of Brunei Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, Motamar al-Alam al-Islami Secretary Inamullah 
Khan, and Malayan Prime Minister Tungku Abdul Rahman.791 They knew whom to consult on 
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the second and third: Wang Zengshan and Ma Tianying. Wang, however, appears not to have 
gotten involved; he had moved to Istanbul in the mid-1950s, accepting a professorship at his 
alma mater, Istanbul University, where he founded Turkey’s first Chinese studies department. 
Wang passed away in 1961, so it is possible that deteriorating health was another factor keeping 
him from being as active as before in Taiwan’s foreign affairs.792 Ma Tianying, meanwhile, 
wrote back and forth several times with Shi Zizhou and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mostly 
to convey requests on behalf of Tungku Abdul Rahman (the ceremony should be timed to fit his 
schedule, and he should be the guest of honor). Eventually it became clear that Tungku would 
not be able to attend, as he needed to be in London. Deputy Prime Minister Tungku Abdul Razak 
was proposed instead. In one of their last exchanges on the issue, Shi Zizhou telegrammed Ma 
Tianying saying “Please cable confirmation whether Sultan of Brunei and Tun Abdul Razak will 
visit Taipei.” Two weeks later, Shi updated: “Second Malayan Ruler condolences…Sultan 
Brunei sending two representatives…Hoping you will come.” In the end, Abdul Razak and even 
Ma Tianying himself did not fly over from Malaya. Ma was perhaps too absorbed in his many 
local commitments. Both Ma and Abdul Razak recommended that their wives attend instead. Ma 
said his wife would “return to the home country” (huiguo) in order to attend—perhaps an odd 
choice of words by this point.793 
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Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Da had been perhaps the staunchest Chinese Muslim 
supporter of GMD nationalism and its vision for China’s Muslims. From 1943 until 1945, after 
the transformation of the Pingliang school to state-run status, Da moved to Zhangjiachuan, 
Gansu—where Zuo Zongtang had forcibly relocated large numbers of “rebellious” Muslims 
from Shaanxi in the 1870s—in order to continue his anti-Japanese work on behalf of the GMD. 
He also completed his Six Treatises on Islam at this time (see Chapter Two). When the war 
ended, Da returned to the coast, dividing his time between Nanjing and Shanghai. Official 
accounts claim that he “welcomed liberation” in Shanghai in 1949.794 Though already seventy-
five years old, his extensive subsequent travels suggest that old age was not the cause of Da’s 
decision to stay in China. In fact, Da enjoyed a remarkable second career that was ideologically 
opposite but functionally almost identical to what had come before. In 1952, he traveled to 
Helsinki and Vienna as a representative of the PRC, including at the Vienna People’s World 
Peace Conference. The same year, he also embarked on the PRC’s first Hajj delegation, but was 
mysteriously stopped in Pakistan.795 In 1953, he was appointed deputy director of the newly 
formed Chinese Islamic Association, which he helped found with Uyghur leader Burhan Shahidi. 
Beginning in 1954, he served as a Jiangsu Province representative to the First, Second, and Third 
National People’s Congresses. In 1955, he attended the Bandung Conference with Zhou Enlai. 
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795 This was very likely the doing of Wang Zengshan. Although no documentary evidence is extent in the Wang 
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Apparently not appreciating the significance of Gamal Abdel Nasser recent imprisonment of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Zhou was interested in using Da’s presence to reassure Egypt and the 
many other Muslim leaders in attendance that the newly founded PRC would be friendly to both 
China’s own Muslim population and to Muslim countries. For the remainder of the 1950s, Da led 
a new PRC Hajj delegation (successfully this time), led the Sino-Indonesian Friendship 
Delegation that met with President Sukarno, and also visited Egypt and Syria as a representative 
of the PRC. In 1957, he met Mao Zedong at a ceremony at Beijing’s Tiananmen city gate.796  
Da, who passed away in 1965 at age ninety-one and was buried in Beijing, was thus 
among the relatively few historical figures who interacted substantively with both Chiang Kai-
shek and Mao Zedong, and served in high-level political roles in both the Republic and the PRC. 
Given the tremendous political stakes involved in both cases, to do so while also being Muslim 
and an imam was in some sense a remarkable achievement. Considerable speculation is required 
to fill in the gaps in this story. At the very least, it is safe to conclude that a version of the same 
narrative of Muslims’ belonging in China served Da under communist rule as it had under 
nationalist rule, at least during the 1950s. 
Beyond Bandung, the PRC in the 1950s was indeed interested in portraying itself as a 
country with a thriving set of Muslim communities that accepted the state’s ethnicized discourse 
about them, and in using this self-image to cultivate relations with Muslim countries. The 
strategic calculus behind this was obvious, and essentially equal and opposite to that of the ROC. 
If the PRC could sway enough of the world’s newly independent “small” countries to recognize 
it and to vote for it in the United Nations, it could eventually wrest the UN Security Council’s 
“China” seat from the ROC (one could argue this was the true meaning of phrases such as “long 
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live the unity of the peoples of the world,” emblazoned on the walls of the Forbidden City to the 
right of Mao’s portrait). In the process, the PRC could also use its friendly relations with the 
“Afro-Asian peoples” to frustrate the designs of the Americans, the Taiwanese, and increasingly 
its own Soviet allies throughout the decolonizing world.  
Since so many of the “small” countries were Muslim, supporting Islamic internationalism 
through the Chinese Muslims clearly served the PRC’s purposes. Perceiving this, the Chinese 
Islamic Association published a number of trilingual (Chinese-Arabic-English) propaganda 
materials in the mid- to late-1950s demonstrating that Muslims were living peacefully and 
allowed to practice their religion. As in earlier times, and as was the case to an extent for the 
Chinese Muslims’ former associates on Taiwan, such practices should be interpreted not as sheer 
opportunism or the mere implementation of a vision imposed from above, but primarily in the 
“performative” terms of Chinese Muslim elites making the necessary discursive adjustments to 
ensure their community’s survival.  
For example, in March 1956—a year after the Bandung Conference, and two months 
before Egypt’s recognition of the PRC—the Chinese Islamic Association published a 
propaganda book, The Religious Life of Chinese Moslems (Ch. Zhongguo musilin de zongjiao 
shenghuo; Ar. al-Haya al-diniyya li-muslimi al-Sin). This book featured dozens of photographs 
of Chinese Muslims, now considered to include ten “ethnic minority nationalities” (shaoshu 
minzu): the “Hui,” Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Tatars, Uzbeks, Dongxiang, Salar, and 
Bao’an. The Chinese Islamic Association’s foreword to the book noted that “The spread of Islam 
in China dates back more than one thousand years” before describing the many ways in which 
the establishment of the PRC represented a “new stage” in the life of Chinese Muslims. The 
foreword by the Chinese Islamic Association specified that Chinese Muslims, like all Chinese 
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citizens, enjoyed freedom of belief under the new constitution, that the CCP government had 
assisted Muslims in “repairing and redecorating” many of China’s mosques, and that economic 
life was seeing “daily improvement.” The closing passage, however, was the most significant: 
“We hope that the free religious life reflected in these pictures will further inspire the patriotic 
enthusiasm of Chinese Moslems, increase non-Moslems’ understanding of Moslems in our 
country, and promote mutual understanding between us and our Moslem brothers and non-
Moslem friends throughout the world.”797 The following year, the Chinese Islamic Association 
published a similar book, Chinese Muslims in Progress (Ch. Qianjin zhong de Zhongguo 
Musilin; Ar. Muslimu al-Sin fi-l-taqaddum). This volume, however, dared to open its foreword 
(all three versions) with a Bismillah and with a reminder that “The Koran says, ‘All Moslems are 
brothers.’” This foreword noted that, in addition to Chinese, Arabic, and English, the Chinese 
Islamic Association had also begun printing materials in Indonesian.798 
In a similar manner to the publications of the Chinese Muslims in Taiwan, these 
propaganda materials were intended in part to showcase the clout of leading Chinese Muslims 
throughout the Islamic world. Chinese Muslims in Progress, for example, contained several 
photographs depicting Burhan Shahidi, in this case in his capacity as leader of the Chinese Hajj 
mission of 1956, meeting with Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egyptian Minister for Religious Affairs 
Sheikh Ahmad Hassan al-Baquri (who later visited China), Syrian President Shukry al-Kuwatly, 
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Prince ‘Abdullah Hussein of Yemen, King Mohammed Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, and various 
Islamic leaders in Jordan (who were also being courted by the ROC and the Chinese Muslims in 
Taiwan, and whose country was ostensibly in the U.S. sphere of influence).799 By the same 
token, the book also shows foreign Muslim leaders such as Sukarno visiting China and meeting 
with Chinese Muslims and Uyghurs. Of course, the photographs depict carefully staged, formal 
scenarios and do not indicate anything about the nature or extent of the interactions that 
occurred. They were meant to show that Muslims in the PRC could maintain their culture, that 
China (largely via its Muslim leaders) was influential and respected in the Islamic world, and 
that foreign Muslim leaders approved of China and its treatment of Muslims. 
At the same time, these publications did something else that the Chinese Muslims in 
Taiwan clearly did not feel as compelled to do, which was to go to lengths to portray Muslims as 
living happy, health, productive lives in the “New China.” To this end, they included multiple 
photos of Muslims meeting with and clapping for Mao Zedong, performing Hajj, celebrating 
Islamic holidays, working in traditional and modern industry, and praying in mosques (in the 
latter three cases, of course, there is little basis on which to verify beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the photos were even taken during the PRC era, or in some cases even taken in China). 
The Chinese Muslims were clearly under heavy new constraints. All “religion” was not 
shut down immediately in 1949, but the Chinese Muslims who were active were cautious, and 
the available evidence suggests that their activities were far less extensive than in the Republican 
era. For the time being, some Republican-era Muslim presses (or their institutional inheritors, 
managed by members of the same networks of people) were able to continue publishing works 
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on doctrine, Arabic language, and history into the 1950s. While these superficially resembled 
some works produced in the Republican era, their quantity was almost certainly less, and their 
form in certain ways also reflected the pressures of the times. In Beijing, for example, the 
Huimin dazhong (“Muslim Masses”) press, an inheritor to Yuehua housed in the Dongsi Mosque, 
published a translation of portions of the Quran side by side with the Arabic original in 1953, 
though only the Arabic title, and not the Chinese, identified this work as dealing with the Quran; 
the term gulan (“Quran”) did not appear in the Chinese title or the Chinese portions of the 
content.800 Similarly, in Shanghai, the Chinese Islamic Bookstore (Zhongguo huijiao shuju; see 
Chapter One) published works on Arabic morphology, pronunciation, and grammar as late as 
1957, which in some cases were direct continuations of publication projects begun in the late 
Republican era.801 
Many leading Republican-era imams, Chinese Azharites, and lay Muslim intellectuals 
remained active in whatever capacities were possible. Ma Songting was quiet compared to Da 
Pusheng, but served as a deputy director of both the Chinese Islamic Association and the Chinese 
Islamic Classic Texts Institute (Zhongguo yisilanjiao jingxue yuan), and also participated in the 
Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Chinese People’s Political Consultative Confernces. In 
between, however, he was accused in 1957 of being one of the “Six Major Ethnic Minority 
Rightists” (shaoshu minzu liu da youpai). In the 1980s, Ma—by then in his late eighties and 
nineties—continued to appear publicly with the Chinese Islamic Association in order to 
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demonstrate, much as the organization sought to do in the 1950s, that Islam and Muslims in 
China were happy, well-treated, and allowed to practice their religion.802 
For some Chinese Muslims, the choice to stay in China itself depended entirely on a 
combination of chance and the consideration of one’s family, friends, associates. The artist 
Zhang Hongtu recalls that in 1949, as the CCP stood poised to take over China, his father Zhang 
Bingduo (the former Chinese Azharite with a fundamentalist streak, and with connections to 
Pingliang) purchased tickets for the entire family to escape to Hong Kong, but a “Muslim 
professor of history” from Beijing convinced him to remain in China and move there. In Beijing, 
Zhang proceeded to work with the PRC’s Central Minority Affairs Commission (Zhongyang 
minzu shiwu weiyuanhui)—of which Da Pusheng also was a member—and produced Arabic-
language propaganda for the government publication Zhongguo musilin (Chinese Muslim).803 
The identity of the Muslim professor who convinced Zhang to stay in Beijing is unknown, but 
there is only a small set of possibilities.  
Regardless of how or why Chinese Muslims remained in China, the rise of the PRC 
necessitated rhetorical acrobatics from them on multiple fronts. Some ironies naturally resulted. 
In the Northwest, for example, Imam Ma Xiaoshi was moved to write Xibei huizu geming shi 
(The History of the Northwest Hui Revolutions, 1951). Ma’s history recast the Gansu Muslim 
uprisings of the nineteenth century, the specter of which haunted both the GMD state and the 
integrationist Chinese Muslim elites for the entire Republican era, as evidence of Chinese 
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Muslims’ “revolutionary” credentials (revisionist histories of the Taiping Rebellion tended to 
follow a similar pattern). 
Some faired relatively well, at least in terms of their careers. Ma Jian, the former Chinese 
Azharite and translator of the Quran (see Chapters Four and Five), founded the Arabic 
department at Peking University, where his students became the first generation of non-Muslim 
Chinese to learn reliable Arabic. Whether Ma appreciated it or not, this development carried the 
potential to finally undo the role the Chinese Muslim elites had played for decades as 
intermediaries between the Chinese state and Muslim countries. Personally, Ma appears not to 
have faced significant persecution. In fact, he served as a translator on multiple occasions for 
high-level government officials.804  
In 1954, Ma came into brief contact with one of his Indonesian acquaintances, Asa 
Bafagih, who was touring China that year. Bafagih was the founder and editor of the Jakarta 
daily Duta Masjarakat (Envoy of Society), the periodical of the Nahdatul Ulama, and was one of 
the Indonesian leaders who was willing to criticize the PRC. Hong Liu writes that Bafagih was 
“dismayed about a Muslim scholar”—Ma Jian—who had written a verse in praise of Mao, which 
Bafagih found un-Islamic (not to mention clearly inconsistent with indications of Ma’s earlier 
engagement with Salafi thought, as well as the broad approval he had received from the likes of 
Rashid Rida, Shakib Arslan, and Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib). According to Hong, Bafagih felt that 
Ma, though well-regarded in Indonesia before 1949, had suffered a “loss of intellectual 
independence.” Re-encountering Ma in 1954, Bafagih wrote that he seemed different, and was 
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willing to declare to Bafagih that Chinese Muslims “‘have enjoyed equal rights and could look 
forward to a brilliant future.’”805 
Somewhat similarly, Bai Shouyi (see Chapters Two and Three) continued his work as a 
historian of China and, when politically possible, as a historian of Islam in China. Bai, a Muslim 
of Kaifeng lineage, came to be regarded as one of China’s preeminent “Marxist” historians, and 
avoided persecution during the Cultural Revolution by serving, at Zhou Enlai’s request, as the 
supervisor of a new edition of the Twenty-Four Histories (Ershisi shi), the authoritative historical 
record of China’s imperial dynasties. In the 1950s, however, and again from the 1980s to his 
death in 2000, Bai again turned to the history of Islam in China, editing several reference works 
and primary source compilations that are used to this day.806 
Then there was Imam Pang Shiqian. According to Pang’s memoirs, the students in his 
Azhar delegation earned their shahadas from al-Azhar in 1942, and were preparing to return 
home “to serve their country and their religion.” The dangers of traveling during the war 
prevented that, however, particularly since Japan had invaded Hong Kong, Singapore, peninsular 
Malaya, and beyond in the winter of 1941-42. Pang eventually received a travel allowance from 
the GMD government in 1944, but since the Burma Road was closed, the only way to travel 
home would be by airplane, for which the 100-pound allowance would be insufficient. Pang 
asked Chen Kemao, an official at the GMD’s Cairo consulate, about the possibility of securing 
passage on a U.S. military plane to Chongqing. Pang recalls that the Americans agreed, but the 
GMD government refused after half a year of silence. They therefore approached the GMD 
                                                 
805 Hong Liu, China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949-1965 (Singapore: NUS Press, in association with Kyoto 
UP, 2011), pp. 122-23. Liu, pp. 119-23, discusses the widely diverging positions of Indonesia’s leaders toward the 
PRC and the question of China’s Muslims. 
 
806 Cherif-Chebbi, “Bai Shouyi”; Benite, “From Literati to Ulama.” 
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Ministry of Education for a second travel allowance. Finally, Ma Tianying intervened and after 
much “hard work and discreet inquiries” secured steamer passage from Port Said to Hong Kong 
on 17 April 1946. Pang’s memoir, Aiji jiunian, is also a diary of that journey.807 
The period of the Chinese Civil War and early PRC was in fact a very productive one for 
Pang. One could argue that he was beginning to apply his expansive, Azhar-inspired conception 
of ijtihad, in more specific ways than before, to the all-important question of how to reform 
Islam in China and how to secure Muslims’ status there (implicitly, whether the GMD prevailed 
or the CCP). In 1946-48, in addition to working on his memoir, he produced at least ten articles 
and a new book-length translation, all connected in varying ways to the problem of how Muslims 
should be represented in a large non-Muslim country and how they could balance national, local, 
and Islamic identities.  
Viewed in isolation, these new works of Pang’s might appear to be simply “news.” Taken 
together, at times allegorically, in the context of China’s ongoing civil war, however, they 
represent a systematic examination of the contemporary politics and thought of the Islamic 
world, in search of appropriate models to apply to the interrelated problems of reforming Islam 
in China, achieving equitable representation for Chinese Muslims, and promoting their continued 
interconnectedness with Muslims outside China. One article, “On the Arab League,” was 
published in the famous (non-Muslim) Shanghai-based newspaper Dongfang zazhi (Eastern 
Miscellany). This article used the example of the newly formed Arab League to explore the 
question of how regional federations might offer one practical form of middle ground between 
various scales of political loyalty. At the same time, Pang’s article offered a sympathetic 
discussion of the Arab world’s Kurds, Berbers, and Christian and Jewish minorities: despite the 
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differences of ethnicity and even religion, Pang appreciated the similarities between these 
groups’ predicament and that of the Chinese Muslims.808 Another article on the minority 
question, this one published in Yuehua, concerned the fate of Muslims in Yugoslavia.809  
Meanwhile, Pang had also become interested in the fate of Islam in Indonesia: though a 
Muslim-majority country, Indonesia was still important for Chinese Muslims because it was 
beginning to face the prospect of having to decide what Islam’s formal relationship should be to 
the modern state. Sparked by that country’s struggle for independence from the Dutch (and no 
doubt encouraged by his Jawi classmates at al-Azhar), Pang’s interest in Indonesia and its 
relevance for Chinese Muslims formed the topic of his third article, published in Huimin 
qingnian (Muslim Youth).810 Yet another article concerned Afghanistan, where Shah Mahmud 
Khan, prime minister from 1946 to 1953 and an uncle of the young King Mohammed Zahir 
Shah, was beginning to experiment with political reforms.811 India’s partition and the creation of 
Pakistan is oddly absent from Pang’s list, but other Chinese Muslims, including Hai Weiliang, 
had already been writing on those topics for several years in Yuehua and elsewhere.812  
Finally, Pang’s last new article in Yuehua, and the third-to-last article in the journal 
overall, was titled “Israel and Jewish Expansionism” (Yisilie yu youtai qinlue zhuyi). Published 
                                                 
808 Pang Shiqian, “Lun Alabo lianmeng [On the Arab League],” Dongfang zazhi 42/11 (1946): pp. 4-8. 
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on 15 June 1948, exactly one month after the establishment of the state of Israel and the 
beginning of the Arab-Israeli War, this article opened by distinguishing between the four Arabic 
terms ‘ibrani (“Hebrew,” which Pang says refers primarily to language), Isra’il (“Israel,” which 
Pang says refers to the “nation”; Ch. minzu), yahud (“Jews,” which Pang says refers primarily to 
religious identity), and sihyuni (“Zionist,” which Pang says refers to Theodor Herzl’s movement 
begun in 1895, but which he says “means expansionism”; Ch. qinlue zhuyi).813 Pang evidently 
meant to continue the essay (this first installment only covered the ancient Jewish history), but 
Yuehua ceased publication after the issue in which it appeared. Pang’s discussion of this topic, 
however, should not necessarily be seen as an expression of academic interest in Jewish history, 
ancient Near Eastern history, or even contemporary Middle Eastern politics, let alone as an 
indication of any deeply held biases (we already saw above, for example, that Pang identified the 
situation of Middle Eastern Jews as similar to that of Chinese Muslims). Rather, writing in 
Chinese, for Chinese Muslims, from China, and at the moment when the CCP appeared certain to 
take over the country (they would already control Beijing by 1 January 1949), Pang’s research on 
Zionism is probably best understood as a new meditation on the question of whether two peoples 
with certain imagined differences between them could peacefully coexist in a single territory 
with multiple histories and multiple significances for those peoples. This seems especially clear 
considering the article in the context of Pang’s other writings at this time. 
While Pang was researching and writing on these only seemingly unrelated topics, he was 
simultaneously continuing to think through the question of what must be done in China. One 
article falling in this latter category, published in the relatively obscure Muslim periodical 
                                                 




Zhenguang, concerned the “Past and future of the Chinese Azharites.” Pang recounted his 
colleagues multiple accomplishments in Cairo in order to recommend the continuation of such 
work in years to come, which in turn would produce sound answers to the above questions 
concerning the fate of Islam and Muslims in China.814 The second was his call for systematic 
reform of the education of hailifan (imam’s assistants) across China (see Chapter Five), which he 
hoped could form a basis for strengthening an Azhar-style modernist curriculum and 
democratizing the practice of ijtihad among China’s Muslims. A broad conceptualization and 
equally broad institutionalization of ijtihad among China’s ulama was Pang’s solution to the 
question of how to reform Islam in China. 
The question of reforming Islam in China was directly related to the question of how to 
promote stronger contact with Muslims outside China. Beginning during his time at al-Azhar, 
Pang had increasingly come to believe that regional federations could be a good way to 
institutionalize international cooperation between like-minded Muslims. Pang’s memoir suggests 
that this supranational dimension of the larger problem had occupied him during his journey 
home, as he was sailing by or through some of the lands about which he was writing, and as he 
had the opportunity to meet old friends. While stopped in Singapore in early August 1946, Pang 
found his classmate from al-Azhar, Tan Sri Hajj Hassan Yunus, the future Mufti of Johor. 
Hassan (as Pang identifies him) had returned to Malaya from Egypt in 1940, after which he 
experienced the brunt of the Japanese invasion and occupation. Sitting together on the evening of 
9 August (a jum‘a), Pang, Hassan, and other unnamed Malayan friends from al-Azhar met and 
talked about life in Cairo and about Japanese and British imperialism. The conversation soon 
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turned to their hopes to establish a “Far East Islamic Federation,” to include India, Indonesia 
(with Malaya), and China, and modeled somewhat on the Arab League. According to Pang, the 
plan was that each country would have its own branch association, and that there would be no 
permanent general assembly, but rather that a general assembly would convene once per year, 
each time in a different location, with participants drawn from the three countries. As Pang 
recalled, “We had discussed these ideas often with our Indian and Indonesian classmates while in 
Cairo. This time, however, we felt that the goal was somewhat closer at hand. There was also the 
issue of the Malay Union. They had been watching the progress of the Arab League, and very 
much hoped to succeed in forming their own organization along these lines in the near future.”815 
The idea of a Far East Islamic Federation, which never came to fruition, reflected the aloofness 
people like Pang and Hassan had sometimes experienced from Arab Muslims in Cairo, and the 
belief that South, Southeast, and East Asian Muslims deserved greater say in the affairs of the 
Islamic world, even if for no reason other than their huge numbers.  
At the same time, however, it also reflected their conviction, still intact and still shared, 
that new ways remained to apply what they had learned in Cairo to their home countries and 
their future cooperation. Indeed, at that very moment Pang was working on translating the Azhar 
Sheikh Yusuf al-Dijwi’s work Risalat al-salam wa rusul al-Islam (The Message of Peace and the 
Prophets of Islam), a new, staunchly modernst defense of Islam against the accusations of 
Orientalistm and Islamophobia, which al-Dijwi had dedicated—seemingly incongruously, but in 
fact not—to “the people of America.” Many in Egypt had eagerly followed the developments at 
the San Francisco United Nations Conference on International Organization of April-June 1945, 
feeling that Muslims were insufficiently represented in the process of creating the UN; al-Dijwi 
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perhaps hoped that restating the argument for Islam’s rationality, emphasis on knowledge, and 
historical “contributions” to humanity would help rectify the situation. Pang’s translation, 
Heping zhi shiming (The Mission of Peace), reorganized the contents of al-Dijwi’s original to 
make these points even clearer.816 In the Chinese context, however, the term heping, “peace,” 
carried a special additional weight at this historical moment, having arisen ubiquitously in the 
calls of an exhausted population for the CCP and GMD to give up their conflict. In other words, 
Pang was attempting to link an Azhar-inspired Islamic modernist understanding of the meaning 
of Islam to the most important social and political imperative of the time in China: a master 
stroke of his expansive ijtihad. Apart from this, he no doubt also wanted to portray Islam and 
Muslims in the most positive light possible if indeed they were now going to live under 
communism. 
For any of Pang’s aspirations to work, however, China would have to solve the problem 
of Muslims’ political representation. To that end, the elaborate thought processes described 
above led Pang to the perhaps surprising conclusion quoted at the beginning of this chapter: 
China today is starting on the path to democracy. But it would appear that it does 
not yet have a suitable manner of dealing with its several million Muslims. It 
continues to follow oppressive and guarded policies that the future will not 
vindicate. In the recent war of resistance, Muslims made many sacrifices for their 
country. But what of their rights? No matter, rights are to be claimed, not simply 
given. At the San Francisco conference, all parties had equal representation, yet 
Muslims were kept from participating. In the upcoming Republican Congress, I 
fear Muslims will not be allowed to choose representatives in proportion to their 
numbers. The Communists’ minority nationalities policy appears correct; clear-
headed people might give it some consideration.817 
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Pang’s optimism about communism was apparently enough for him to stay in Beijing after 1949. 
Yet Pang may have misunderstood communism. One of his earliest publications in Yuehua was a 
translation from al-Islah, a journal in Mecca, titled “The Situation of Muslim Peoples Living 
under Soviet Rule” (Su’e zhi xia de Yisilan minzu zhuangkuang). This article summarized the 
Russian Revolution of 1917 and noted that under Soviet nationalities policy, “separate peoples 
were free to establish their own independent states.” Pang noted that many Muslim groups of 
various ethnicities were among those allowed such autonomy in the Soviet system. By contrast, 
we have seen that Pang was critical of the GMD’s homogenizing and Sinicizing nation-building 
policies, as well as Chinese Muslim elites’ cooperation with that vision. For Pang, who lacked 
direct experience of the Soviet Union or of the CCP, the minority autonomy ostensibly offered 
by the communist system may have appeared to be a preferable alternative. In particular, if 
Chinese Muslims had a greater ability to govern their own affairs than the GMD had allowed, 
perhaps this would pave the way for instituting the broad ijtihad Pang believed was the key to 
reforming Islam in China. 
 Pang appears to have given this optimism a chance immediately upon the CCP takeover. 
Remaining in Beijing, he founded the journal Huimin dazhong (“Muslim Masses”) and the 
abovementioned publishing house by the same name.818 The first issue appeared in November 
1949, very soon after the establishment of the PRC.819 Some familiar figures, such as Ma Jian 
and Ma Jinpeng, published articles in this journal. The most significant articles, however, were 
those by Pang himself. The editor’s preface to the inaugural issue was titled “The Result of 
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Seven Hundred Years of Struggle” (Qibai nian douzheng de zongjie): an attempt to recast the 
history of Islam in China since the Mongol era in a communistic vocabulary. In the same issue, 
Pang also published an article titled “After Reading ‘On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship’” 
(Du ‘lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng’ hou). In this article, Pang reiterated Mao Zedong’s 
dismissal of the contradiction between democracy and dictatorship on the basis that if democracy 
were given to the “reactionaries,” they would misuse it and the “revolution” would not be 
fulfilled. Upon reading this, Pang claims, 
I was reminded of the Prophet Muhammad, who managed to complete his mission 
in the short span of twenty-three years, emerging victorious. The most important 
reason for this success was that he enacted his policies in a spirit of democratic 
dictatorship. The Noble Quran states: “The messengers of God—Muhammad and 
his Companions—dealt severely with the infidels, but showed great compassion 
among their own people.”820 
 
Here, “companions” of the Prophet was translated using the ubiquitous communist term for 
“comrades” (tongzhi men). As optimistic as Pang had been, this article appears to signal his 
already growing perception that Chinese communism was a danger to Islam and Muslims and 
needed to be accommodated in whatever way necessary.  
 By this time, Pang was employed teaching Arabic at Beijing Normal University. In 1952, 
he was also a founder of the Chinese Islamic Association. After the early 1950s, however, the 
sources both by and about Pang fall silent. The only publicly available information states that 
Pang “died of illness” in 1958.821 He was only fifty-six at the time, and had been extremely 
productive through the early 1950s (and consistently for decades before that). Meanwhile, the 
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Anti-Rightist Campaign, which targeted Pang’s associate Ma Songting, had begun in July 1957. 
Mao announced the Great Leap Forward in January 1958. 
 
Conclusion: Islam, Cold War, Decolonization, Nation-Statism 
 
As war became civil war and civil war became cold war, the Chinese Muslims were both divided 
from each other and increasingly marginalized in both China and Taiwan. On Taiwan, Bai 
Chongxi and his anti-communist platform became less integral to the Taiwanese GMD 
government’s policies as the 1950s wore on, in more or less direct correlation to the waning 
clout of the Chinese Muslim leadership overall. As that was happening, the former leaders of the 
Near East and South Seas Delegations, Wang Zengshan and Ma Tianying—staunch nationalists 
both—nevertheless elected to become permanent residents or naturalized citizens (respectively) 
of the Muslim countries in which they spent the greatest amounts of time: Turkey and Malaysia. 
On the Mainland, the picture was far starker. Chinese Muslims either cooperated fully with the 
state or met unclear, but probably often violent, ends. At the same time, the rest of the Islamic 
world was moving farther away from the Chinese Muslims, with decolonization pushing each 
new nation-state to follow its own path. Muslims outside China, even when they were not being 
imprisoned by new leaders such as Nasser, were distracted by the all-encompassing conflict of 
the Cold War, and by politics closer to home. 
Although rarely discussed openly in the available documents, a hugely important 
development for the Chinese Muslims on both sides of the GMD-CCP conflict was the discovery 
that Chinese Muslims were not nearly as numerous as they had been believed to be during the 
Republican era. The major and minor figures throughout this study repeated time and again that 
China’s Muslims numbered perhaps fifty million or more. This number, originating in 
unscientific Orientalist guesswork, became standardized and traveled surprising distances. In 
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1953, however, the PRC conducted China’s first successful census and discovered that Muslims 
in China numbered only ten million. There is, of course, the question of how they counted—as 
well as, grimly, the question of how many may have died in the tremendously violent preceding 
decades. Nevertheless, fifty million seemed out of reach. For the GMD government and the 
Chinese Muslims in Taiwan, the 1953 PRC census would have completely taken the air out of 
their argument that the Muslims in China could contribute significantly to resisting the CCP and 
eventually retaking the Mainland. For Chinese Muslims in the PRC, meanwhile, the discovery 
simply meant that they were much less powerful to resist the state. The Chinese Islamic 
Association’s 1956 propaganda publication The Religious Life of Chinese Muslims was one of 
the first publicly available materials to state the Chinese Muslims numbered only ten million. 
Fazlur Rahman, the Pakistani-American historian and philosopher of Islam who was 
director of the Central Institute of Islamic Research in Karachi in the 1960s, wrote at the end of 
the introduction to his work Islam:  
The most interesting factor in this picture [of the world Muslim population] is the 
number of Chinese Muslims. In his ‘Alaqat al-‘Arab [sic] wa’-l-Sin (Cairo 
1370/1950), Badr al-Din al-Sini [i.e. Hai Weiliang] asserts that Muslims 
constitute 10 per cent of the total Chinese population. In the Bandung Conference, 
the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai, stated that the Muslims in China are 
12 per cent of the total population and hence outnumber the Muslims in India. 
However, the Chinese official census figures put the Muslim population at 10 
million. It should be pointed out, however, that since religion is not counted as a 
factor in the distribution of population in Communist China and the distribution is 
classified on a tribal basis, only those tribes are listed as Muslims, particularly the 
‘Hui’ tribes, which are 100 per cent Muslim.822 
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 Events such as the failure of the Taipei Mosque project or the beginning of the Anti-
Rightist Campaign merely confirmed what Chinese Muslims on both sides of the Strait had 
feared for at least a decade, and in some ways for far longer than that: that they would be 
forgotten by the Islamic world, that they would not play a meaningful role in the creation of a 
more enlightened political and social order, and that they would be left at the mercy of an 
ideological and majoritarian nation-state. In Taiwan, at least, marginalization mostly only meant 
retirement and obscurity. In the PRC, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, it meant the 





In the beginning, Islam made no distinctions based on nationality. The 
commonality of religion was enough to make the believers one family. The Quran 
says: “Verily all the believers are brothers.” It also says: “The noblest among you 
are the most righteous in the sight of God.” The Prophet, peace be upon him, said: 
“Arabs are not superior to non-Arabs, and white is not superior to black.” 
Previously, all Muslims abided by this teaching and spoke not of national 
distinctions. Recently, however, because the tide of global thought flows toward 
nation-statism [guojia zhuyi], each person puts their own nation-state first. Islam 
has now seen the surge in this tide, and it too sets out on the path of the nation-
state. Everyone sees the nation-state as primary, and religion as secondary. 
-Pang Shiqian, “Nation-Statism’s Impact on Religious Feeling,” late 1940s823 
 
 
Islamic Modernism in China 
 
This study has analyzed how modern Chinese Muslims’ rediscovery of the Islamic world outside 
China both conditioned and was conditioned by their elites’ political priorities within China. It 
argues that Chinese Muslims’ selective engagement with Islamic modernism did not disrupt but 
facilitated the nationalization of Muslim (“Hui”) identity. From Qing collapse through the 
Second World War, Chinese Muslim elites increasingly adopted Islamic modernist and Arabo-
centric notions through otherwise highly complex processes of textual transnationalism. As a 
result, several forms of “public Islam” took shape in response to the political circumstances of 
the time, each of which embodied the ethos of transnationalist integrationism and the specific 
ideas of Islamic modernism in different ways. In the context of the GMD’s efforts to retain 
control of China’s vast frontiers, Chinese Muslim elites proceeded to wield Islamic modernist 
and Arabo-centric claims of authority and authenticity in support of GMD nation-building efforts 
across China’s largely Muslim northwestern frontiers. In the process, they brought to bear the 
material and moral resources of government organs, warlords, civic associations, print media, 
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and schools. The notion of “contribution” to China definitively emerged in the early to mid-
1930s in response to Han Islamophobia, but soon became greatly intensified and re-applied in 
the context of China’s war with Japan. At the same time, in dialogue with leading Chinese 
intellectuals and Muslims across the Indian Ocean and Middle East, certain Chinese Muslims—
particularly Pang Shiqian—strove to articulate a more inclusive vision of both Chinese 
nationalism and the global Islamic community (umma), expressed in his quintessentially 
modernist call for an expansive, extra-legal, and democratized ijtihad. On the whole, wherever 
else they may have differed, Chinese Muslim elites did not set their transnational and national 
solidarities in opposition, but rather argued that greater contact with Islam outside China would 
reinforce and enrich Muslims’ integration in China. Though they themselves became sidelined 
from high politics in the era of Cold War and decolonization, the Chinese Muslim elites’ 
narratives of history and identity, while contingent, have nevertheless become normalized as the 
virtually uncontested canonical truth of Chinese Islam to this day. 
That is not to say that there is any real unanimity about what Islam in China is, either 
from the perspective of the state or from that of the Chinese Muslims themselves. At the 
National Library of China in Beijing, for example, there is no separate section for the “Hui 
minority nationality” in the otherwise well-populated “Literatures in Ethnic Minority Nationality 
Languages” department. When I discussed with the librarians the fact that many members of the 
group now known as the Hui had published works in Arabic during the twentieth century and 
earlier, they apologized and explained that I would probably not find that sort of thing in their 
department (again, the underlying problem being that Arabic is not a “native” language for the 
Chinese Muslims). It was a long shot to begin with. Meanwhile, visiting mosques across Gansu 
and Ningxia and even in Ma Jian’s home province of Yunnan, I encountered imams and others 
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who were eager to point out that Ma Jian’s translation of the Quran contained errors of theology. 
“Where is God? God is not above,” they corrected, “God is everywhere. Why? Because God is 
light.”824 In other words, there is evidence that Sufi-informed theologies survived the propaganda 
of the GMD and its elite Muslim allies as well as the catastrophes of the Mao era. 
 What, then, is the significance of Republican-era Chinese Muslim elites’ transnationalist 
integrationism for Islam in China today? 
 
Canonizing Contingency: Islamic Modernism and the Ethnogenesis of the Huizu 
 
As I have shown, Muslims in China during the early twentieth century were empirically 
fragmented, with the urban coastal Chinese Muslim elites allied to the GMD asserting that 
Chinese Muslims were in fact a single community, and attempting to speak for them on that 
basis. The notion that certain figures and certain developments discussed in this study 
represented the trend and the consensus of modern Chinese Islam was already emerging in the 
period itself. Recall, for example, Pang’s statement on Wang Kuan: 
God be praised, for the twentieth century arrived, and with it the modernist ulama 
[al-‘ulama al-mujaddidun]. Among them was the late Hajj ‘Abd al-Rahman 
Wang Haoran [i.e. Wang Kuan], who visited Egypt and Turkey in 1905. He 
requested the Ottoman Caliph Abdülhamid II’s assistance in spreading Islam in 
China. Abdülhamid II therefore sent a religious and educational delegation to 
Beijing chaired by Sheikh Ali Rida, accompanied by Sheikh Hafiz.825 
 
Pang’s statement reflected a larger celebration of Wang Kuan as the founding figure of Islamic 
modernism in China. The conferral of this status began in the pages of Yuehua during the 
Republican era itself, but was later resumed by journals such as Huizu yanjiu (Research on the 
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Hui) and Zhongguo musilin (China Muslim) after the 1980s (when it became permissible to 
speak of matters of “religion” again).826 An equivalent process of canonization took place for the 
Four Great Imams—Da Pusheng, Wang Jingzhai, Ha Decheng, and Ma Songting. 
Along with Wang Kuan and the Four Great Imams, Xinghui pian was also remembered 
by Chinese Muslim ulama and intellectuals in both the Republican era and more recent times as 
the first publication in their modernist movement. This was the case for both transnationalist and 
integrationist reasons: it was allegedly the first Chinese Muslim publication to address the need 
for reform of Islam generally, and it also attempted to relate that reform to specific questions of 
Chinese national and Chinese Muslim communal interest. 
By contrast, Ma Lianyuan of Yunnan receives less emphasis than Wang Kuan or the 
Tokyo group because, despite being very good at Arabic, he was less explicit about political 
integrationism. 
It is not entirely clear where the phrase “Four Great Imams” came from.827 Based on the 
contents of this study, we might propose a revision: they were the four most pro-state imams. 
That being said, there were still important differences. Da Pusheng appears to have been the 
most well-connected and most proactively collaborationist. Ma Songting, meanwhile, was the 
least political of the four. During the PRC, including Ma as one of the Four Great Imams became 
                                                 
826 Ding Yimin, ed., Zhongguo huizu mingren cidian [Dictionary of Chinese Muslim Personages] (Yinchuan: 
Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1995), p. 269; Ma Shanting, “Wang Haoran ahong yishi (yi) [The Passing of Imam 
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ahong zhuanlue: sheng yu Daoguang nian [A Brief Biography of Imam Wang Haoran, Born in the Daoguang Era],” 
Zhongguo musilin 2 (1982): p. 8. 
 
827 See Aubin, “Islam on the Wings of Nationalism,” n16, n17, n18, and n20. See also Da Jie, “Da Pusheng ahong 
zhuanlue [Brief Biography of Imam Da Pusheng],” Zhongguo musilin 1 (1984): pp. 18-26. 
 
 433 
a way of co-opting him, whereas for Da it was a way of expressing approval for and making a 
positive example out of his proactively pro-state initiatives. Wang and Ha fall somewhere in the 
middle. Wang’s translation of aiguo aijiao has become completely naturalized and universal, 
today even applied to other religions in China such as Buddhism. Ha certainly had the state’s 
interests in mind as well, for example when he interfered with Tang Yichen’s Japanese-
sponsored Hajj delegation. Ha, too, however, was not on the same level as Da. 
In addition to the imams, the lay Chinese Muslim intellectuals played a hugely important 
role in canonizing certain narratives of Chinese Muslim identity and the history of Islam in 
China. Foremost among these is Bai Shouyi. More than that of any other figure, Bai’s work has 
had consequences for present scholarship on Islam in China. In the 1950s, and again from the 
1980s to his death in 2000, Bai also compiled many of the documentary collections and reference 
works that scholars to this day have used to understand “the” history of Islam and Muslims in 
China. This work, however, though often of clear academic value, must be seen in the context of 
the ethos of transnationalist integrationism. Bai’s priorities were to demonstrate that Chinese 
Muslims belonged in China and had long become Sinicized; to argue that the Hui represented a 
unique ethnicity, distinguished not only by religion but also by history and culture, and distinct 
from the Uyghurs and Muslims elsewhere; and thereby, no doubt, to help the Chinese Muslims 
avoid oppression and misunderstanding in the way he thought best: by asserting their 
Chineseness.828 
 Meanwhile, as we have seen in Chapters Three and Six, a similar image of the Chinese 
Muslims became enshrined in the rhetoric of the Chinese Islamic Association, which issued a 
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new publication in 1980 under the same title as their 1956 propaganda book, The Religious Life 
of Chinese Muslims.829 
Chinese Muslims beyond the Mainland also continued to build on aspects of 
transnationalist integrationism, but not in the mode of ethnicization (largely irrelevant outside the 
PRC). Rather, they continued the project of trying to write Chinese Muslims into a broader 
history of Sino-Islamic “civilizational” exchange. Ma Tianying, Hai Weiliang, and Ding 
Zhongming all published works in this genre from the late 1940s through at least the 1970s.830 
 
China, the Islamic World, and the Chinese Muslims since 1950 
 
From the 1950s, leaders of new secular nation-states in Asia and the Middle East began using a 
rhetoric of Eastern societies’ “ancient civilizations” and “shared values” that bore considerable 
resemblance to the themes articulated by transnational Islamic thinkers in the interwar period, 
including the Chinese Muslim elites. The new postcolonial leaders, however, removed Islam 
from the picture, and instead focused solely on culture. Consider, for example, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s statement from his Philosophy of the Revolution (Falsafat al-thawra, 1953): 
European society had passed through the stages of its evolution in an orderly 
manner. It crossed the bridge between the Renaissance at the end of the Middle 
Ages and the nineteenth century step by step. The stages of this evolution 
systematically succeeded one another. In our case everything was sudden. We 
lived behind an iron curtain which suddenly collapsed. We were cut off from the 
world; we renounced its life especially after trade with the East was rerouted to 
the Cape of Good Hope. European countries eyed us covetously and regarded us 
as a crossroad to their colonies in the East and the South. 
Torrents of ideas and opinions burst upon us which we were, at that stage 
of our evolution, incapable of assimilating. Our spirits were still in the Thirteenth 
Century though the symptoms of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
                                                 
829 Zhongguo yisilanjiao xiehui [Chinese Islamic Association], Zhongguo musilin de zongjiao shenghuo / Hayat 
muslimi al-sin al-diniyya / The Religious Life of Chinese Muslims (Beijing: Chinese Islamic Association, 1980). 
 
830 Ma Tianying, Huijiao gailun [An Introduction to Islam] (Ipoh: Nanyang shuju, 1949); Badr al-Din al-Sini, al-
‘Alaqat bayn al-‘Arab wa-l-Sin; Ding Zhongming, Huijiao liming shi [A History of Islamic Civilization] (Taipei: 
1973).  
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infiltrated in their various aspects. Our minds were trying to catch up the [sic] 
advancing caravan of humanity from which we fell back five centuries or more.831 
 
At the 1955 Bandung Conference, where Zhou Enlai included Da Pusheng in his delegation, and 
where Abdel Nasser and Zhou Enlai got along so well, Zhou stated to the 19 April plenary 
session: 
The peoples of Asia and Africa created brilliant ancient civilizations and made 
tremendous contributions to mankind. But, ever since modern times most of the 
countries of Asia and Africa in varying degrees have been subjected to colonial 
plunder and oppression, and have thus been forced to remain in a stagnant state of 
poverty and backwardness. Our voices have been suppressed, our aspirations 
shattered, and our destiny placed in the hands of others.832 
 
The co-optation of interwar Muslims’ civilizational discourse coincided more or less exactly 
with the marginalization of Muslims themselves in Egypt and in the PRC. A year after Abdel 
Nasser published Philosophy of the Revolution, he threw the Muslim Brotherhood leaders in 
prison, where extreme hardship and torture pushed the group toward fundamentalism. In the two 
years after that, Abdel Nasser met Zhou (and perhaps Da?) at Bandung, and Egypt recognized 
the PRC. Abdel Nasser met Zhou on several other occasions, though by the early 1960s, Egypt 
was leaning clearly toward the Soviets (who could promise much higher levels of weapons and 
other aid than China).833 Before the end of the decade, the PRC had abandoned its earlier sense 
of needing to use the Chinese Muslims to appeal to the Muslims of the world, and instead 
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targeted most Muslims as reactionaries along with other religious figures under the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign (1957-58). 
 For most of the 1960s and 1970s, as China acquired nuclear technology, as its differences 
with the Soviet Union erupted into conflict, and as nationalist and leftist revolutions continued 
across the decolonizing world, “revolution” rather than “civilization” became the dominant mode 
through which China engaged with the Middle East and other regions. At times Beijing 
portrayed itself as “exporting” revolution, while at other times Palestinians, South Yemenis, and 
others played a greater role in “importing” it.834 
 As for the Chinese Muslims, in 1958, just as repression was beginning to escalate, the 
PRC formed a separate “Hui Autonomous Region” out of Ningxia (Ningxia huizu zizhiqu), 
formerly the portion of Gansu governed by Ma Fuxiang and his family, which happens to contain 
some of the most barren territory in all of China. After that one concession, the Chinese Muslims 
suffered greatly under the Cultural Revolution, and for the time were forgotten by the outside 
world. After Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, the Chinese Islamic Association resumed its work, and 
Chinese Muslims resumed going on the Hajj, studying at al-Azhar, and writing their history. As 
with Chinese society generally, however, the greater openness hoped for in the 1980s largely 
ended with Tiananmen. From 1993, China became a net oil importer.835 For the past two 
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decades, the Chinese Muslims have become a further ethnicized and highly scripted sideshow to 
China’s commercial relations with Arab and Central Asian states. The rhetoric of the “New Silk 
Road” has occasioned a return to the discourse of civilization, but in contrast to the Republican 
era, the state alone controls the narrative, and not the Chinese Muslims.  
 The conventional wisdom of informed observers has been that the Hui receive better 
treatment than the Uyghurs. The extent to which the two groups are treated differently by the 
state is, in fact, largely traceable to the self-narratives of Chinese Muslims in the Republican era, 
who were eager to differentiate themselves from the allegedly less developed and more separatist 
Uyghurs. Uyghurs are indeed treated worse at the time of writing, when a militarized program of 
ethnic and ideological cleansing is taking place in Xinjiang. At the same time, it is important to 
note that Chinese Muslim self-narratives that have evolved over the twentieth century have been 
less successful at combating Islamophobia in Han society generally than they have been at 
influencing the discourses and practices of the state. In the mid-2010s, for example, popular 
misunderstandings and stereotypes about Halal are widespread—the very same problem Da 
Pusheng and Ha Decheng faced in their radio broadcasts in the 1930s. Online forums in China 
are filled with calls for Muslims to “go back to Arabia.”836 In 2017, the Nangang mosque in 
Hefei saw a pig’s head buried on its grounds, accompanied by online taunts and a death threat 
directed at the imam.837 Even more significantly, in early 2018 there was evidence that the state 
is beginning to apply stricter measures to the Hui, when local officials ordered Muslims in Linxia 
                                                 
 








not to attend Islamic school during Chinese New Year; Muslims worried about further 
restrictions that might follow.838 
 The most significant aspect of this most recent episode is its references to “Sinicization” 
and “Arabization.” This is especially true to the extent that China’s policies have been cross-
pollinated by a “war on terror” discourse originating in the United States. When asked about 
their policies, the Linxia government stated that “Religious affairs management…adheres to the 
direction of Sinofication [sic] of religion, and firmly resists and guards against the spread and 
infiltration of extremist religious ideology.” This echoed a new set of restrictions Xi Jinping had 
announced for religious groups in April 2016.839 It also reflected an April 2017 directive from 
the Chinese Islamic Association itself stating that new mosques should “reject the ‘Arabisation’ 
of architecture…in favor of traditional Chinese designs.” Also significant is the fact that the only 
two Chinese Muslims willing to be quoted in the article, though expressing some anxiety about 
the policies, nevertheless felt obliged to declare, respectively, that they were a “patriotic 
Muslim” and that “We aren’t extremists.”840 
 In March 2018, the month this study was completed, Chinese Islamic Association chair 
Yang Faming delivered an address to a full session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), of which he is by definition a member, titled “Rooted in the Fertile Soil of 
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Chinese Civilization: Upholding the Sinicization of Our Country’s Islam.”841 Yang praised Xi 
Jinping’s promotion of the “healthy development of religion in our country.” He also made 
several more specific comments that echoed and were descended from arguments articulated 
earlier by the Republican-era Chinese Muslim elites. For example: 
If we survey the history of humanity, we find that the survival and development 
of any religion hangs on its identification with the country where it exists, its 
accommodation to the society of that place, and its ability to merge with the local 
culture. The 1,300-year-long history of Islam’s development within China is the 
best testament to this fact. 
 After the transmission of Islam to China, it underwent a long-term process 
of assimilation, and gradually became a uniquely Chinese Islam and the accepted 
faith of the Hui, Uyghur, and ten other minority ethnicities of our country. During 
the Ming dynasty, Islamic culture was profoundly integrated into China’s 
traditional Confucian culture. The Muslims among the minority nationalities of 
the interior (neidi) universally spoke Chinese (hanyu), adopted Chinese surnames, 
and wore Chinese-style dress. By conforming to the conditions of Chinese 
society, Islam laid down permanent roots. During the Qing dynasty, Muslim 
intellectuals continued to promote the idea of “using Confucianism to explicate 
scripture.” In the recent era, the patriotic spirit of Muslims of all ethnicities has 
not ceased to strengthen and, under the religious injunction that, “love of one’s 
country is a part of one’s faith,” the broad masses of Muslims have exhibited 
extremely passionate love for the country and a determination to resist invasion, 
especially after the outbreak of the War Against Japan, and willingly joined their 
fellow countrymen of other ethnicities in the bloody battle… 
 
Such passages clearly echo statements about Islam’s alleged long-standing accommodation to 
“Chineseness” made in earlier decades—for instance those of the Fu’ad Library Preparatory 
Committee’s book request letter of 1936, discussed in Chapter Two; Bai Shouyi’s history of 
materia medica, discussed in Chapter Three; or the Chinese Islamic Near East and South Seas 
Delegations, discussed in Chapters Three and Four. Subsequent sections of the address, 
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furthermore, echoed 1950s state propaganda on the Muslims of China, as well as more recent 
propaganda by the governments of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping: 
After the founding of New China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Muslim brothers and sisters together with their fellow citizens of other 
ethnicities shared a common fate and actively threw themselves into the great 
enterprise of socialist construction, reform, and development. Following the same 
road and united in hearts and minds they built a new era of the Chinese Dream…  
 
Yang’s statements on the present, however, departed dramatically from the transnationalist 
integrationism of the Republican era and early PRC: 
In recent years, under the influence of the complicated and quickly changing 
international circumstances, there have emerged some problems within the sphere 
of Islam in our country that are impossible to ignore. For instance, the 
construction style of some mosques blindly imitates foreign designs and in some 
spheres of society, the notion of “halal” (qingzhen) has been expanded in ways 
that interfere with the secular customs. Some people “emphasize only the 
religious precepts and look lightly on the nation’s laws,” or “only consider 
themselves believers, not citizens.” In the face of these phenomenon, we must 
maintain a high level of vigilance.  
We are keenly aware that persisting with the Chinafication of Islam is the 
only lesson to be drawn from the successful experience of Islam in our country.842 
 
Unlike Da Pusheng and Ha Decheng in 1930s Shanghai, Yang did not even attempt to defend 
halal, but rather immediately ceded any ground that could breed controversy (Yang was probably 
referring to the case of certain food delivery services in China, which came under fire from non-
Muslim Chinese in mid-2017 for including “too many” halal-friendly options).843 As for Yang’s 
reference to certain Muslims seeing themselves as “believers, not citizens,” it reveals much about 
ongoing misunderstandings about Islam in Chinese state and society, but nothing about the 
empirical realities of Muslims’ experiences in contemporary China. Perhaps most subtly, and 
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843 See for example Kinling Lo, “New ‘halal’ option on food delivery app puts China’s social media users in a stew: 
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most significantly, Yang simultaneously echoes and misapplies a core logic of Islamic modernist 
thought, when he criticizes some mosques for “blindly imitating foreign designs” (zhaoban 
waiguo moshi). Scholars of Islam will note the connection to Islamic modernists’ polemic 
promoting reason (ijtihad) and rejecting “blind imitation” (taqlid) with respect to questions of 
Islamic doctrine and practice, which has played an important role in this study’s discussion of 
Pang Shiqian and his hopes for a more flexible and democratized Chinese Islam. In Yang’s 
speech, however, the pro-reason half of the equation is conveniently excised, whereas the blind 
imitation half is entirely recast, now critiquing not those Muslims deemed insufficiently modern, 
but those deemed insufficiently Chinese. 
 Popular responses to Yang’s speech were telling. On the Chinese news website 
Guanchazhe (“The Investigator”), where a full transcript of the speech was published, user 
comments proliferated. Few if any categorically defended Chinese Muslims’ right to live 
peacefully in China and practice as they choose. Rather, the dominant disagreement appeared to 
emerge between a version of Han chauvinism that can accommodate the presence of Muslims in 
China—and even then, only on certain terms—versus another that cannot. The most popular 
comment, which had gained 311 “likes” as of 2 April 2018, stated that “The oldest mosque in 
China was built with Chinese-style architecture; in the last few years, [however], the situation 
has gotten especially bad in western China.” This comment represents the position that Muslims 
are welcome so long as they make an effort to “become Chinese”: a line of reasoning not unlike 
that of the Republican-era Chinese Muslim elites themselves. Meanwhile, the second most 
popular comment, with 242 “likes” as of 2 April 2018, declared:  
They won’t change the meanings of the scriptures, they won’t disband their 
organizations, they won’t give up their Islamic law, they won’t abandon their 
ways of thinking, they won’t forsake their privileges. None of it is any use. It is 
like a path covered in thistles and thorns. To be rid of the ugliest thorns, you must 
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pare back the leaves and break the various branches. After that, the path will be 
clean and clear—but even then only for a short while. As long as there are roots, 
and fertile earth, and plentiful water, the plant will be back in a matter of months, 
and the road will be lost.844 
 
In contrast to the remark about mosque architecture, this more fully Islamophobic comment 
expresses skepticism that Muslims can ever “integrate” (even after thirteen centuries), and 
suggests that such an outcome would be undesirable. Its resemblance to popular Islamophobia in 
the United States, Europe, and elsewhere is striking, and perhaps not coincidental. This 
comment, moreover, drew responses such as “Very well said” and “You hit the nail on the head” 
(yi zhen jian xue). Of course, it is impossible to tell based on this evidence alone who these 
commenters may be. At the same time, it is telling that a caricature comparing Xi Jinping to 
Winnie the Pooh will be censored on the Chinese Internet, while blatantly bigoted statements, 
whatever the source, are allowed to flourish.845 
 As current events plainly show, the earlier dynamic, ethos, and discourse I have called 
transnationalist integrationism has become virtually untenable in the face of official and popular 
pressure as of the late 2010s. Only integrationism remains, as Yang Faming’s address to the 
CPPCC shows. It is now next to impossible to argue that contact with Muslims outside China 
could enrich Muslims’ belonging in China—which I have argued was the fundamental logic 
driving Chinese Muslims’ early twentieth-century textual exchanges, participation in frontier 
development, and travels and studies abroad. Put slightly differently, one clearly sees how 
uncritical notions of “Arabization” and “Sinicization” persist in China today, and are growing 
more ossified than before. Under Xi Jinping, the CCP is perhaps for the first time embracing a 
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set of homogenizing policies toward Muslims reminiscent of those of the GMD, and abandoning 
the earlier Stalinist pretense of letting nationalities “be themselves”—but backed by a far more 
powerful and uncompromising state. Rather than using terms such as “Arabization” and 
“Sinicization” descriptively, this study has attempted to join scholars and others who instead 
seek to historicize such concepts, and in so doing keep open the possibility of a more responsible 
conversation, and perhaps one day, a more open Chinese politics. The pressures Islam and 
Muslims face in China today, however, offer clear and frequent reminders of the reasons why the 
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GLOSSARY OF CHINESE NAMES 
 
n.b. This list is not exhaustive, but covers most of the major figures in this study, including 
several non-Chinese persons who appeared relatively frequently in Chinese-language writings by 
Chinese Muslims. Chinese characters are provided in traditional form, which is how they appear 
in most of the sources used in this study. 
 
 
Ahmad Amin      愛敏博士 or similar 
 
Ai Yizai     艾宜栽 
 
Alsagoff 愛爾賽高夫 or similar, typically used for all 
members of the family 
 
Bai Chongxi 白崇禧 
 
Bai Shouyi     白壽彝 
 
Chen Lifu 陈立夫 
 
Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi)   蔣介石 
 
Da Pusheng     達浦生 
 
Ding Zhongming 定仲明 
 
Farouq I of Egypt    埃王法魯克 
 
Fu’ad I of Egypt 埃王福德 
 
Ha Decheng 哈德成 
 
Hai Weiliang     海維諒 
 
He Yingqin     何應欽 
 
Huang Zhenpan    黃鎮磐 
 
Kong Xiangxi     孔祥熙 
 
Li Tingbi 李廷弼 
 
Ma Bufang     馬步芳 
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Ma Buqing     馬步青 
 
Ma Chunyi  馬淳夷  
Ma Debao      馬德寶 
 
Ma Dexin a.k.a. Ma Fuchu    馬德新 a.k.a. 馬復初 
 
Ma Fuxiang     馬福祥 
  
Ma Hongdao      馬宏道 
 
Ma Hongkui     馬鴻逵 
 
Ma Hongyi     馬宏毅 
 
Ma Jian     馬堅 
 
Ma Kaitang      馬開堂 
 
Ma Laichi     馬來遲 
 
Ma Liang 馬良 
 
Ma Lianyuan  馬聯元 
 
Ma Linyi     馬鄰翼 
 
Ma Songting (Shouling)    馬松亭（壽齡） 
 
Ma Qi      馬麒 
 
Ma Rulong      馬如龍 
 
Ma Ruye     馬汝夜 
 
Ma Tianying     馬天英 
 
Ma Zhicheng     馬志程 
 
Ma Zhongying    馬仲英 
 
Muhammad al-Khidr Hussein  胡祖禮 or similar 
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Muhammad Farid Wajdi   斡哲底 or similar 
 
Muhammad Ghallab    安拉補, 安亮補, or similar 
 
Mustafa al-Maraghi    麻賴額 or similar 
 
Na Xun     納訓 
 
Na Zhong     納忠 
 
Pang Shiqian 龐士謙 
 
Sha Guozhen     沙國珍 
 
Shi Juemin     石覺民 
 
Shi Zizhou     時子周 
 
Sun Shengwu     孫繩武 
 
Sun Yanyi     孫燕翼 
 
Sun Youming     孫幼銘 
  
Tang Kesan     唐柯三 
 
Wang Jingzhai (Wenqing)    王靜齋（文清） 
 
Wang Kuan a.k.a. Wang Haoran   王寬 a.k.a. 王浩然 
 
Wang Mengyang    王夢楊 
 
Wang Zengshan    王曾善 
 
Wu Zhongxin     吳忠信 
 
Xu Xiaochu     許曉初 
 
Xue Wenbo      薛文波 
 
Yang Shu     楊樞 
 
Yang Xingyuan    楊星垣 
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Zhang Bingduo    張秉鐸 
 
Zhang Hongtu     張宏圖 
 
Zhang Renjian     張人鑑 
 
Zhang Zhaoli     張兆理 
 
Zhao Yingxiang     趙映祥 
 
Zhao Zhenwu (Zhao Bin)    趙振武（趙斌） 
 
Zhou Zibin      周子賓 
 
Zuo Zongtang     左宗棠 
 
 
 
